App Armor denies access, despite appropriate security policy groups in manifest

Can you attach the click package to this bug or otherwise make it available for testing?

Alberto, can you look at these accesses:
Sep 4 07:07:11 ubuntu-phablet kernel: [30791.811075] type=1400 audit(1378278431.009:2810): apparmor="DENIED" operation="open" parent=716 profile="com.wellsb.blackjack-app_blackjack-app_0.0.1" name="/home/phablet/.config/libaccounts-glib/accounts.db" pid=24322 comm="qmlscene" requested_mask="rwc" denied_mask="rwc" fsuid=32011 ouid=32011
Sep 4 07:07:11 ubuntu-phablet kernel: [30791.811136] type=1400 audit(1378278431.009:2811): apparmor="DENIED" operation="open" parent=716 profile="com.wellsb.blackjack-app_blackjack-app_0.0.1" name="/home/phablet/.config/libaccounts-glib/accounts.db" pid=24322 comm="qmlscene" requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=32011 ouid=32011

Applications should not require direct access to the accounts.db.

Alberto, the accounts policy group (/usr/share/apparmor/easyprof/policygroups/ubuntu/1.0/accounts) currently has:
# Description: Can use Online Accounts
dbus (receive, send)
     bus=session
     path=/com/google/code/AccountsSSO/SingleSignOn
     interface=com.google.code.AccountsSSO.SingleSignOn.AuthService,
dbus (receive, send)
     bus=session
     interface=com.google.code.AccountsSSO.SingleSignOn.AuthSession,
dbus (receive, send)
     bus=session
     interface=com.google.code.AccountsSSO.SingleSignOn.Identity,

# p2p support uses a named unix socket
owner /{,var/}run/user/*/signond/socket w,

Status changed to 'Confirmed' because the bug affects multiple users.

Hi Jamie, so, there are two pieces that the accounts policy group should allow:
1) Access the signond dbus interfaces and socket (correctly done by the policy you pasted in comment #3)
2) Allow access to the accounts DB, as in https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/Specifications/ApplicationConfinement#Ubuntu_Online_Accounts

The accounts DB is a sqlite file containing the list of the accounts, what services are enabled/disabled, and maybe some settings. It does not contain passwords or authentication tokens. It might contain usernames, but we agreed that we have to live with that, because usernames are going to be shown in the UIs in order to differentiate the accounts.

Thanks Alberto, I'll update the policy in the next apparmor-easyprof-ubuntu upload.

This is actually libaccounts-glib. It will need a change to open the sqlite database as readonly. Marking its task as Triaged.

This bug was fixed in the package apparmor-easyprof-ubuntu - 1.0.28

---------------
apparmor-easyprof-ubuntu (1.0.28) saucy; urgency=low

  * accounts policy group: allow read access to accounts.db (LP: #1220552)
  * audio policy group: allow a few more pulseaudio accesses (LP: #1220552)
  * ubuntu-sdk template: allow read access to gschemas.compiled (LP: #1218655)
 -- Jamie Strandboge <email address hidden> Wed, 04 Sep 2013 08:34:33 -0500

Re-opening the apparmor-easyprof-ubuntu task since we need to allow the write access until libaccounts-glib is fixed.

This bug was fixed in the package libaccounts-glib - 1.12+13.10.20130918.1-0ubuntu1

---------------
libaccounts-glib (1.12+13.10.20130918.1-0ubuntu1) saucy; urgency=low

  [ Alberto Mardegan ]
  * New upstream release
    - Allow opening the DB in read-only mode (LP: #1220552)
      Fixes: http://code.google.com/p/accounts-sso/issues/detail?id=199
    - Application: do not require ".desktop" suffix
      Fixes: http://code.google.com/p/accounts-sso/issues/detail?id=193
    - Account: emit "enabled" signal also on non-selected services
    - AgAccount: implement the GInitable interface
    - Tests: revert "don't run tests in parallel", disable gtkdoc tests
  * debian/rules
    - support patching with quilt
    - run tests verbosely
  * debian/patches/0001-Tests-allow-some-time-for-D-Bus-signals-to-arrive.patch
    - Bugfix patch, submitted upstream as issue #200:
      http://code.google.com/p/accounts-sso/issues/detail?id=200

  [ Ubuntu daily release ]
  * Automatic snapshot from revision 175
 -- Ubuntu daily release <email address hidden> Wed, 18 Sep 2013 18:08:22 +0000

BTW, Jamie, another thing that you might need to know is that apps using online accounts should have read access to all files under /usr/share/accounts/{applications,services,service-types,providers}. I think you can safely grant them read access to everything under /usr/share/accounts/.

This bug was fixed in the package apparmor-easyprof-ubuntu - 1.0.32

---------------
apparmor-easyprof-ubuntu (1.0.32) saucy; urgency=low

  * accounts:
    - needs lock ('k') access to .config/libaccounts-glib/accounts.db and read
      access to .config/libaccounts-glib/accounts.db*.
    - read access to /usr/share/accounts/**
    - deny write to .config/libaccounts-glib/accounts.db* (LP: #1220552)
  * refine audio policy group:
    - remove /tmp/ accesses now that TMPDIR is set by the sandbox
    - allow access to only the native socket (ie, disallow dbus-socket (only
      needed by pacmd), access to pid and the cli debugging socket)
      (LP: #1211380)
    - remove 'w' access to /{,var/}run/user/*/pulse/ - this should already
      exist when click apps run
    - remove /dev/binder, no longer needed now that we use audio HAL and
      pulseaudio
    - silence the denial for creating ~/.gstreamer-0.10/ if it doesn't exist
  * camera:
    - add rw for /dev/ashmem. This will go away when camera moves to HAL
    - rw /run/shm/hybris_shm_data
    - add read on /android/system/media/audio/ui/camera_click.ogg
  * connectivity:
    - add policy as used by QML's QtSystemInfo and also Qt's QHostAddress,
      QNetworkInterface
    - add commented out rules for ofono (LP: 1226844)
  * finalize content_exchange policy for the content-hub. We now have two
    different policy groups: content_exchange for requesting/importing data
    and content_exchange_source for providing/exporting data
  * microphone:
    - remove /dev/binder, no longer needed now that we use audio HAL and
      pulseaudio
    - add gstreamer and pulseaudio accesses and silence ALSA denials (we
      force pulseaudio). Eventually we should consolidate these and the ones
      in audio into a separate abstraction.
  * networking
    - explicitly deny access to NetworkManager. This technically should be
      needed at all, but depending on how apps connect, the lowlevel
      libraries get NM involved. Do the same for ofono
    - add access to the download manager (LP: #1227860)
  * video: add gstreamer accesses. Eventually we should consolidate these
    and the ones in audio into a gstreamer abstraction
  * add the following new reserved policy groups (reserved because they need
    integration with trust-store to be used by untrusted apps):
    - calendar - to access /org/gnome/evolution/dataserver/SourceManager,
      /org/gnome/evolution/dataserver/CalendarFactory and
      /org/gnome/evolution/dataserver/Calendar/**
    - contacts - to access com.canonical.pim and org.freedesktop.Telepathy.
      Note, org.freedesktop.Telepathy will go away when LP: 1227818 is fixed
    - history - to access com.canonical.HistoryService
  * remove unused policy groups. This would normally constitute a new minor
    version, but no one is using these yet. When there is an API to use for
    this sort of thing, we can reintroduce them
    - read_connectivity_details
    - bluetooth (no supported Qt5 API for these per the SDK team)
    - nfc (no supported Qt5 API for these per the SDK team)
  * ubuntu* templates:
    - remove workaround HUD rule for DBus access to hud/applications/* now
      ...