diff -Nru json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/changelog json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/changelog --- json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/changelog 2020-05-11 18:40:58.000000000 +0000 +++ json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/changelog 2020-05-15 11:33:18.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +json-c (0.13.1+dfsg-4ubuntu0.2) eoan-security; urgency=medium + + * Revert the security fixes and rebuild the old version (LP: #1878723) + + -- Chris Coulson Fri, 15 May 2020 12:33:18 +0100 + json-c (0.13.1+dfsg-4ubuntu0.1) eoan-security; urgency=medium * SECURITY UPDATE: Integer overflows diff -Nru json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/control json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/control --- json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/control 2020-05-11 18:40:58.000000000 +0000 +++ json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/control 2019-08-08 11:19:56.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ Source: json-c Priority: optional -Maintainer: Ubuntu Developers -XSBC-Original-Maintainer: Debian QA Group +Maintainer: Debian QA Group Build-Depends: debhelper-compat (= 12), doxygen, dh-exec diff -Nru json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2020-12762-1.patch json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2020-12762-1.patch --- json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2020-12762-1.patch 2020-05-11 18:29:48.000000000 +0000 +++ json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2020-12762-1.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -From 099016b7e8d70a6d5dd814e788bba08d33d48426 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Tobias Stoeckmann -Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:41:16 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Protect array_list_del_idx against size_t overflow. - -If the assignment of stop overflows due to idx and count being -larger than SIZE_T_MAX in sum, out of boundary access could happen. - -It takes invalid usage of this function for this to happen, but -I decided to add this check so array_list_del_idx is as safe against -bad usage as the other arraylist functions. ---- - arraylist.c | 3 +++ - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) - -Index: json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/arraylist.c -=================================================================== ---- json-c-0.13.1+dfsg.orig/arraylist.c -+++ json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/arraylist.c -@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ array_list_del_idx( struct array_list *a - { - size_t i, stop; - -+ /* Avoid overflow in calculation with large indices. */ -+ if (idx > SIZE_T_MAX - count) -+ return -1; - stop = idx + count; - if ( idx >= arr->length || stop > arr->length ) return -1; - for ( i = idx; i < stop; ++i ) { diff -Nru json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2020-12762-2.patch json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2020-12762-2.patch --- json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2020-12762-2.patch 2020-05-11 18:29:53.000000000 +0000 +++ json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2020-12762-2.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ -Backported of: - -From 77d935b7ae7871a1940cd827e850e6063044ec45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Tobias Stoeckmann -Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:46:45 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Prevent division by zero in linkhash. - -If a linkhash with a size of zero is created, then modulo operations -are prone to division by zero operations. - -Purely protective measure against bad usage. -diff --git a/linkhash.c b/linkhash.c -index 5497061..c48c8d6 100644 ---- a/linkhash.c -+++ b/linkhash.c -@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ - - #include "config.h" - -+#include - #include - #include - #include -@@ -498,6 +499,8 @@ struct lh_table* lh_table_new(int size, - int i; - struct lh_table *t; - -+ /* Allocate space for elements to avoid divisions by zero. */ -+ assert(size > 0); - t = (struct lh_table*)calloc(1, sizeof(struct lh_table)); - if (!t) - return NULL; diff -Nru json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2020-12762-3.patch json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2020-12762-3.patch --- json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2020-12762-3.patch 2020-05-11 18:40:49.000000000 +0000 +++ json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2020-12762-3.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,86 +0,0 @@ -Backported of: - -From d07b91014986900a3a75f306d302e13e005e9d67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Tobias Stoeckmann -Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:47:25 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflows. - -The data structures linkhash and printbuf are limited to 2 GB in size -due to a signed integer being used to track their current size. - -If too much data is added, then size variable can overflow, which is -an undefined behaviour in C programming language. - -Assuming that a signed int overflow just leads to a negative value, -like it happens on many sytems (Linux i686/amd64 with gcc), then -printbuf is vulnerable to an out of boundary write on 64 bit systems. -diff --git a/linkhash.c b/linkhash.c -index c48c8d6..e924d7f 100644 ---- a/linkhash.c -+++ b/linkhash.c -@@ -579,9 +579,12 @@ int lh_table_insert_w_hash(struct lh_table *t, const void *k, const void *v, con - { - unsigned long n; - -- if (t->count >= t->size * LH_LOAD_FACTOR) -- if (lh_table_resize(t, t->size * 2) != 0) -+ if (t->count >= t->size * LH_LOAD_FACTOR) { -+ /* Avoid signed integer overflow with large tables. */ -+ int new_size = INT_MAX / 2 < t->size ? t->size * 2 : INT_MAX; -+ if (t->size == INT_MAX || lh_table_resize(t, new_size) != 0) - return -1; -+ } - - n = h % t->size; - -diff --git a/printbuf.c b/printbuf.c -index 6c77b5d..a8bb42e 100644 ---- a/printbuf.c -+++ b/printbuf.c -@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ - - #include "config.h" - -+#include - #include - #include - #include -@@ -65,9 +66,16 @@ static int printbuf_extend(struct printbuf *p, int min_size) - if (p->size >= min_size) - return 0; - -- new_size = p->size * 2; -- if (new_size < min_size + 8) -+ /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */ -+ if (min_size > INT_MAX - 8) -+ return -1; -+ if (p->size > INT_MAX / 2) - new_size = min_size + 8; -+ else { -+ new_size = p->size * 2; -+ if (new_size < min_size + 8) -+ new_size = min_size + 8; -+ } - #ifdef PRINTBUF_DEBUG - MC_DEBUG("printbuf_memappend: realloc " - "bpos=%d min_size=%d old_size=%d new_size=%d\n", -@@ -82,6 +90,9 @@ static int printbuf_extend(struct printbuf *p, int min_size) - - int printbuf_memappend(struct printbuf *p, const char *buf, int size) - { -+ /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */ -+ if (size > INT_MAX - p->bpos - 1) -+ return -1; - if (p->size <= p->bpos + size + 1) { - if (printbuf_extend(p, p->bpos + size + 1) < 0) - return -1; -@@ -98,6 +109,9 @@ int printbuf_memset(struct printbuf *pb, int offset, int charvalue, int len) - - if (offset == -1) - offset = pb->bpos; -+ /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */ -+ if (len > INT_MAX - offset) -+ return -1; - size_needed = offset + len; - if (pb->size < size_needed) - { diff -Nru json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/series json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/series --- json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/series 2020-05-11 18:40:49.000000000 +0000 +++ json-c-0.13.1+dfsg/debian/patches/series 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -CVE-2020-12762-1.patch -CVE-2020-12762-2.patch -CVE-2020-12762-3.patch