diff -Nru libarchive-3.1.2/debian/changelog libarchive-3.1.2/debian/changelog --- libarchive-3.1.2/debian/changelog 2018-08-08 18:28:49.000000000 +0000 +++ libarchive-3.1.2/debian/changelog 2019-01-14 12:31:22.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,3 +1,20 @@ +libarchive (3.1.2-11ubuntu0.16.04.5) xenial-security; urgency=medium + + * SECURITY UPDATE: Out-of-bounds read + - debian/patches/CVE-2017-14502.patch: fix in + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c. + - CVE-2017-14502 + * SECURITY UPDATE: Denial of service + - debian/patches/CVE-2018-1000877.patch: fix in + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c. + - CVE-2018-1000877 + * SECURITY UPDATE: Denial of service + - debian/patches/CVE-2018-1000878.patch: fix in + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c. + - CVE-2018-1000878 + + -- Leonidas S. Barbosa Mon, 14 Jan 2019 09:30:58 -0300 + libarchive (3.1.2-11ubuntu0.16.04.4) xenial-security; urgency=medium * SECURITY UPDATE: Denial of service diff -Nru libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/CVE-2017-14502.patch libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/CVE-2017-14502.patch --- libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/CVE-2017-14502.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/CVE-2017-14502.patch 2019-01-14 12:27:41.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From 5562545b5562f6d12a4ef991fae158bf4ccf92b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Joerg Sonnenberger +Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2017 17:47:32 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid a read off-by-one error for UTF16 names in RAR + archives. + +Reported-By: OSS-Fuzz issue 573 +--- + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 6 +++++- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +Index: libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +=================================================================== +--- libarchive-3.1.2.orig/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c ++++ libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +@@ -1421,7 +1421,11 @@ read_header(struct archive_read *a, stru + return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); + } + filename[filename_size++] = '\0'; +- filename[filename_size++] = '\0'; ++ /* ++ * Do not increment filename_size here as the computations below ++ * add the space for the terminating NUL explicitly. ++ */ ++ filename[filename_size] = '\0'; + + /* Decoded unicode form is UTF-16BE, so we have to update a string + * conversion object for it. */ diff -Nru libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/CVE-2018-1000877.patch libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/CVE-2018-1000877.patch --- libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/CVE-2018-1000877.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/CVE-2018-1000877.patch 2019-01-14 12:28:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +From 021efa522ad729ff0f5806c4ce53e4a6cc1daa31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 17:56:29 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid a double-free when a window size of 0 is specified + +new_size can be 0 with a malicious or corrupted RAR archive. + +realloc(area, 0) is equivalent to free(area), so the region would +be free()d here and the free()d again in the cleanup function. + +Found with a setup running AFL, afl-rb, and qsym. +--- + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +Index: libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +=================================================================== +--- libarchive-3.1.2.orig/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c ++++ libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +@@ -2237,6 +2237,11 @@ parse_codes(struct archive_read *a) + new_size = DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE; + else + new_size = rar_fls((unsigned int)rar->unp_size) << 1; ++ if (new_size == 0) { ++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, ++ "Zero window size is invalid."); ++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ } + new_window = realloc(rar->lzss.window, new_size); + if (new_window == NULL) { + archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, diff -Nru libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/CVE-2018-1000878.patch libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/CVE-2018-1000878.patch --- libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/CVE-2018-1000878.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/CVE-2018-1000878.patch 2019-01-14 12:28:16.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +From bfcfe6f04ed20db2504db8a254d1f40a1d84eb28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 00:55:22 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] rar: file split across multi-part archives must match + +Fuzzing uncovered some UAF and memory overrun bugs where a file in a +single file archive reported that it was split across multiple +volumes. This was caused by ppmd7 operations calling +rar_br_fillup. This would invoke rar_read_ahead, which would in some +situations invoke archive_read_format_rar_read_header. That would +check the new file name against the old file name, and if they didn't +match up it would free the ppmd7 buffer and allocate a new +one. However, because the ppmd7 decoder wasn't actually done with the +buffer, it would continue to used the freed buffer. Both reads and +writes to the freed region can be observed. + +This is quite tricky to solve: once the buffer has been freed it is +too late, as the ppmd7 decoder functions almost universally assume +success - there's no way for ppmd_read to signal error, nor are there +good ways for functions like Range_Normalise to propagate them. So we +can't detect after the fact that we're in an invalid state - e.g. by +checking rar->cursor, we have to prevent ourselves from ever ending up +there. So, when we are in the dangerous part or rar_read_ahead that +assumes a valid split, we set a flag force read_header to either go +down the path for split files or bail. This means that the ppmd7 +decoder keeps a valid buffer and just runs out of data. + +Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb and qsym. +--- + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +Index: libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +=================================================================== +--- libarchive-3.1.2.orig/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c ++++ libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ struct rar + struct data_block_offsets *dbo; + unsigned int cursor; + unsigned int nodes; ++ char filename_must_match; + + /* LZSS members */ + struct huffman_code maincode; +@@ -1498,6 +1499,12 @@ read_header(struct archive_read *a, stru + } + return ret; + } ++ else if (rar->filename_must_match) ++ { ++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, ++ "Mismatch of file parts split across multi-volume archive"); ++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ } + + rar->filename_save = (char*)realloc(rar->filename_save, + filename_size + 1); +@@ -2862,12 +2869,14 @@ rar_read_ahead(struct archive_read *a, s + else if (*avail == 0 && rar->main_flags & MHD_VOLUME && + rar->file_flags & FHD_SPLIT_AFTER) + { ++ rar->filename_must_match = 1; + ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry); + if (ret == (ARCHIVE_EOF)) + { + rar->has_endarc_header = 1; + ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry); + } ++ rar->filename_must_match = 0; + if (ret != (ARCHIVE_OK)) + return NULL; + return rar_read_ahead(a, min, avail); diff -Nru libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/series libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/series --- libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/series 2018-08-08 18:28:03.000000000 +0000 +++ libarchive-3.1.2/debian/patches/series 2019-01-14 12:28:12.000000000 +0000 @@ -45,3 +45,6 @@ CVE-2017-14166.patch CVE-2017-14501.patch CVE-2017-14503.patch +CVE-2017-14502.patch +CVE-2018-1000877.patch +CVE-2018-1000878.patch