diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/build.info openssl-1.1.1j/apps/build.info --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/build.info 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/build.info 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,16 +1,17 @@ {- our @apps_openssl_src = qw(openssl.c - asn1pars.c ca.c ciphers.c cms.c crl.c crl2p7.c dgst.c dhparam.c - dsa.c dsaparam.c ec.c ecparam.c enc.c engine.c errstr.c gendsa.c - genpkey.c genrsa.c nseq.c ocsp.c passwd.c pkcs12.c pkcs7.c pkcs8.c - pkey.c pkeyparam.c pkeyutl.c prime.c rand.c req.c rsa.c rsautl.c + asn1pars.c ca.c ciphers.c cms.c crl.c crl2p7.c dgst.c + enc.c errstr.c + genpkey.c nseq.c passwd.c pkcs7.c pkcs8.c + pkey.c pkeyparam.c pkeyutl.c prime.c rand.c req.c s_client.c s_server.c s_time.c sess_id.c smime.c speed.c spkac.c - srp.c ts.c verify.c version.c x509.c rehash.c storeutl.c); + verify.c version.c x509.c rehash.c storeutl.c); our @apps_lib_src = ( qw(apps.c opt.c s_cb.c s_socket.c app_rand.c bf_prefix.c), split(/\s+/, $target{apps_aux_src}) ); our @apps_init_src = split(/\s+/, $target{apps_init_src}); "" -} + IF[{- !$disabled{apps} -}] LIBS_NO_INST=libapps.a SOURCE[libapps.a]={- join(" ", @apps_lib_src) -} @@ -21,11 +22,51 @@ SOURCE[openssl]={- join(" ", @apps_openssl_src) -} INCLUDE[openssl]=.. ../include DEPEND[openssl]=libapps.a ../libssl - -IF[{- $config{target} =~ /^(?:Cygwin|mingw|VC-)/ -}] - GENERATE[openssl.rc]=../util/mkrc.pl openssl - SOURCE[openssl]=openssl.rc -ENDIF + IF[{- !$disabled{'des'} -}] + SOURCE[openssl]=pkcs12.c + DEPEND[pkcs12.o]=progs.h + ENDIF + IF[{- !$disabled{'ec'} -}] + SOURCE[openssl]=ec.c ecparam.c + DEPEND[ec.o]=progs.h + DEPEND[ecparam.o]=progs.h + ENDIF + IF[{- !$disabled{'ocsp'} -}] + SOURCE[openssl]=ocsp.c + DEPEND[ocsp.o]=progs.h + ENDIF + IF[{- !$disabled{'srp'} -}] + SOURCE[openssl]=srp.c + DEPEND[srp.o]=progs.h + ENDIF + IF[{- !$disabled{'ts'} -}] + SOURCE[openssl]=ts.c + DEPEND[ts.o]=progs.h + ENDIF + IF[{- !$disabled{'dh'} -}] + SOURCE[openssl]=dhparam.c + DEPEND[dhparam.o]=progs.h + ENDIF + IF[{- !$disabled{'dsa'} -}] + SOURCE[openssl]=dsa.c dsaparam.c gendsa.c + DEPEND[dsa.o]=progs.h + DEPEND[dsaparam.o]=progs.h + DEPEND[gendsa.o]=progs.h + ENDIF + IF[{- !$disabled{'engine'} -}] + SOURCE[openssl]=engine.c + DEPEND[engine.o]=progs.h + ENDIF + IF[{- !$disabled{'rsa'} -}] + SOURCE[openssl]=rsa.c rsautl.c genrsa.c + DEPEND[rsa.o]=progs.h + DEPEND[rsautl.o]=progs.h + DEPEND[genrsa.o]=progs.h + ENDIF + IF[{- $config{target} =~ /^(?:Cygwin|mingw|VC-)/ -}] + GENERATE[openssl.rc]=../util/mkrc.pl openssl + SOURCE[openssl]=openssl.rc + ENDIF {- join("\n ", map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|\.c$|.o|; "DEPEND[$x]=progs.h" } @apps_openssl_src) -} diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/ca.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/ca.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/ca.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/ca.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -1862,8 +1862,8 @@ row[DB_exp_date][tm->length] = '\0'; row[DB_rev_date] = NULL; row[DB_file] = OPENSSL_strdup("unknown"); - if ((row[DB_type] == NULL) || (row[DB_exp_date] == NULL) || - (row[DB_file] == NULL) || (row[DB_name] == NULL)) { + if ((row[DB_type] == NULL) || (row[DB_file] == NULL) + || (row[DB_name] == NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); goto end; } @@ -2223,62 +2223,51 @@ static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db) { - ASN1_UTCTIME *a_tm = NULL; + ASN1_TIME *a_tm = NULL; int i, cnt = 0; - int db_y2k, a_y2k; /* flags = 1 if y >= 2000 */ - char **rrow, *a_tm_s; + char **rrow; - a_tm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new(); + a_tm = ASN1_TIME_new(); if (a_tm == NULL) return -1; - /* get actual time and make a string */ + /* get actual time */ if (X509_gmtime_adj(a_tm, 0) == NULL) { - ASN1_UTCTIME_free(a_tm); + ASN1_TIME_free(a_tm); return -1; } - a_tm_s = app_malloc(a_tm->length + 1, "time string"); - - memcpy(a_tm_s, a_tm->data, a_tm->length); - a_tm_s[a_tm->length] = '\0'; - - if (strncmp(a_tm_s, "49", 2) <= 0) - a_y2k = 1; - else - a_y2k = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) { rrow = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i); if (rrow[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_VAL) { /* ignore entries that are not valid */ - if (strncmp(rrow[DB_exp_date], "49", 2) <= 0) - db_y2k = 1; - else - db_y2k = 0; - - if (db_y2k == a_y2k) { - /* all on the same y2k side */ - if (strcmp(rrow[DB_exp_date], a_tm_s) <= 0) { - rrow[DB_type][0] = DB_TYPE_EXP; - rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0'; - cnt++; + ASN1_TIME *exp_date = NULL; - BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired\n", rrow[DB_serial]); - } - } else if (db_y2k < a_y2k) { + exp_date = ASN1_TIME_new(); + if (exp_date == NULL) { + ASN1_TIME_free(a_tm); + return -1; + } + + if (!ASN1_TIME_set_string(exp_date, rrow[DB_exp_date])) { + ASN1_TIME_free(a_tm); + ASN1_TIME_free(exp_date); + return -1; + } + + if (ASN1_TIME_compare(exp_date, a_tm) <= 0) { rrow[DB_type][0] = DB_TYPE_EXP; rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0'; cnt++; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired\n", rrow[DB_serial]); } - + ASN1_TIME_free(exp_date); } } - ASN1_UTCTIME_free(a_tm); - OPENSSL_free(a_tm_s); + ASN1_TIME_free(a_tm); return cnt; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/cms.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/cms.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/cms.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/cms.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2008-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2008-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -545,9 +545,11 @@ if (key_param == NULL || key_param->idx != keyidx) { cms_key_param *nparam; nparam = app_malloc(sizeof(*nparam), "key param buffer"); - nparam->idx = keyidx; - if ((nparam->param = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) + if ((nparam->param = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(nparam); goto end; + } + nparam->idx = keyidx; nparam->next = NULL; if (key_first == NULL) key_first = nparam; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/dhparam.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/dhparam.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/dhparam.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/dhparam.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -8,28 +8,24 @@ */ #include -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH -NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT -#else - -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include "apps.h" -# include "progs.h" -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -# include -# endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "apps.h" +#include "progs.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include -# define DEFBITS 2048 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +# include +#endif + +#define DEFBITS 2048 static int dh_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb); @@ -56,13 +52,13 @@ {"C", OPT_C, '-', "Print C code"}, {"2", OPT_2, '-', "Generate parameters using 2 as the generator value"}, {"5", OPT_5, '-', "Generate parameters using 5 as the generator value"}, -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA {"dsaparam", OPT_DSAPARAM, '-', "Read or generate DSA parameters, convert to DH"}, -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine e, possibly a hardware device"}, -# endif +#endif {NULL} }; @@ -146,13 +142,13 @@ if (g && !num) num = DEFBITS; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (dsaparam && g) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "generator may not be chosen for DSA parameters\n"); goto end; } -# endif +#endif out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', outformat); if (out == NULL) @@ -173,7 +169,7 @@ BN_GENCB_set(cb, dh_cb, bio_err); -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (dsaparam) { DSA *dsa = DSA_new(); @@ -196,7 +192,7 @@ goto end; } } else -# endif +#endif { dh = DH_new(); BIO_printf(bio_err, @@ -217,7 +213,7 @@ if (in == NULL) goto end; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (dsaparam) { DSA *dsa; @@ -239,7 +235,7 @@ goto end; } } else -# endif +#endif { if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) { /* @@ -376,4 +372,3 @@ (void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb)); return 1; } -#endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/dsa.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/dsa.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/dsa.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/dsa.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -8,23 +8,19 @@ */ #include -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT -#else - -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include "apps.h" -# include "progs.h" -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "apps.h" +#include "progs.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, @@ -49,14 +45,14 @@ {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"}, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"}, -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 {"pvk-strong", OPT_PVK_STRONG, '-', "Enable 'Strong' PVK encoding level (default)"}, {"pvk-weak", OPT_PVK_WEAK, '-', "Enable 'Weak' PVK encoding level"}, {"pvk-none", OPT_PVK_NONE, '-', "Don't enforce PVK encoding"}, -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine e, possibly a hardware device"}, -# endif +#endif {NULL} }; @@ -71,9 +67,9 @@ OPTION_CHOICE o; int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, text = 0, noout = 0; int i, modulus = 0, pubin = 0, pubout = 0, ret = 1; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 int pvk_encr = 2; -# endif +#endif int private = 0; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, dsa_options); @@ -214,7 +210,7 @@ i = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(out, dsa, enc, NULL, 0, NULL, passout); } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA } else if (outformat == FORMAT_MSBLOB || outformat == FORMAT_PVK) { EVP_PKEY *pk; pk = EVP_PKEY_new(); @@ -229,13 +225,13 @@ goto end; } assert(private); -# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 +# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 BIO_printf(bio_err, "PVK format not supported\n"); EVP_PKEY_free(pk); goto end; -# else +# else i = i2b_PVK_bio(out, pk, pvk_encr, 0, passout); -# endif +# endif } else if (pubin || pubout) { i = i2b_PublicKey_bio(out, pk); } else { @@ -243,7 +239,7 @@ i = i2b_PrivateKey_bio(out, pk); } EVP_PKEY_free(pk); -# endif +#endif } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for outfile\n"); goto end; @@ -262,4 +258,3 @@ OPENSSL_free(passout); return ret; } -#endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/dsaparam.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/dsaparam.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/dsaparam.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/dsaparam.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -8,22 +8,18 @@ */ #include -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT -#else - -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include "apps.h" -# include "progs.h" -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "apps.h" +#include "progs.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include static int dsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb); @@ -44,9 +40,9 @@ {"noout", OPT_NOOUT, '-', "No output"}, {"genkey", OPT_GENKEY, '-', "Generate a DSA key"}, OPT_R_OPTIONS, -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine e, possibly a hardware device"}, -# endif +#endif {NULL} }; @@ -255,4 +251,3 @@ (void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb)); return 1; } -#endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/ec.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/ec.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/ec.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/ec.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -8,19 +8,15 @@ */ #include -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC -NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT -#else - -# include -# include -# include -# include "apps.h" -# include "progs.h" -# include -# include -# include -# include +#include +#include +#include +#include "apps.h" +#include "progs.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include static OPT_PAIR conv_forms[] = { {"compressed", POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED}, @@ -62,9 +58,9 @@ "Specifies the way the ec parameters are encoded"}, {"conv_form", OPT_CONV_FORM, 's', "Specifies the point conversion form "}, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"}, -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, -# endif +#endif {NULL} }; @@ -280,4 +276,3 @@ OPENSSL_free(passout); return ret; } -#endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/ecparam.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/ecparam.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/ecparam.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/ecparam.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -9,22 +9,18 @@ */ #include -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC -NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT -#else - -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include "apps.h" -# include "progs.h" -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "apps.h" +#include "progs.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, @@ -55,9 +51,9 @@ "Specifies the way the ec parameters are encoded"}, {"genkey", OPT_GENKEY, '-', "Generate ec key"}, OPT_R_OPTIONS, -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, -# endif +#endif {NULL} }; @@ -446,5 +442,3 @@ BIO_free_all(out); return ret; } - -#endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/engine.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/engine.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/engine.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/engine.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -8,19 +8,15 @@ */ #include -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE -NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT -#else - -# include "apps.h" -# include "progs.h" -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include +#include "apps.h" +#include "progs.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, @@ -486,4 +482,3 @@ BIO_free_all(out); return ret; } -#endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/gendsa.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/gendsa.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/gendsa.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/gendsa.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -8,22 +8,18 @@ */ #include -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT -#else - -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include "apps.h" -# include "progs.h" -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "apps.h" +#include "progs.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, @@ -39,9 +35,9 @@ {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"}, OPT_R_OPTIONS, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Encrypt the output with any supported cipher"}, -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, -# endif +#endif {NULL} }; @@ -143,4 +139,3 @@ OPENSSL_free(passout); return ret; } -#endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/genpkey.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/genpkey.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/genpkey.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/genpkey.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -177,9 +177,12 @@ goto end; } + ret = 0; + if (rv <= 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error writing key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + ret = 1; } if (text) { @@ -191,11 +194,10 @@ if (rv <= 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error printing key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); + ret = 1; } } - ret = 0; - end: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/genrsa.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/genrsa.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/genrsa.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/genrsa.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -8,27 +8,23 @@ */ #include -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT -#else - -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include "apps.h" -# include "progs.h" -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "apps.h" +#include "progs.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include -# define DEFBITS 2048 -# define DEFPRIMES 2 +#define DEFBITS 2048 +#define DEFPRIMES 2 static int genrsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb); @@ -48,9 +44,9 @@ OPT_R_OPTIONS, {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"}, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Encrypt the output with any supported cipher"}, -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, -# endif +#endif {"primes", OPT_PRIMES, 'p', "Specify number of primes"}, {NULL} }; @@ -198,4 +194,3 @@ (void)BIO_flush(BN_GENCB_get_arg(cb)); return 1; } -#endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/ocsp.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/ocsp.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/ocsp.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/ocsp.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -9,65 +9,62 @@ #include -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP -NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT -#else -# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS -# define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED/* So fd_set and friends get properly defined +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS +# define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED/* So fd_set and friends get properly defined * on OpenVMS */ -# endif +#endif -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include /* Needs to be included before the openssl headers */ -# include "apps.h" -# include "progs.h" -# include "internal/sockets.h" -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include +#include "apps.h" +#include "progs.h" +#include "internal/sockets.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include #ifndef HAVE_FORK -# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) -# define HAVE_FORK 0 -# else -# define HAVE_FORK 1 -# endif +#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) +# define HAVE_FORK 0 +#else +# define HAVE_FORK 1 +#endif #endif #if HAVE_FORK -# undef NO_FORK +#undef NO_FORK #else -# define NO_FORK +#define NO_FORK #endif -# if !defined(NO_FORK) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) \ +#if !defined(NO_FORK) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) \ && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) -# define OCSP_DAEMON -# include -# include -# include -# include -# define MAXERRLEN 1000 /* limit error text sent to syslog to 1000 bytes */ -# else -# undef LOG_INFO -# undef LOG_WARNING -# undef LOG_ERR -# define LOG_INFO 0 -# define LOG_WARNING 1 -# define LOG_ERR 2 -# endif +# define OCSP_DAEMON +# include +# include +# include +# include +# define MAXERRLEN 1000 /* limit error text sent to syslog to 1000 bytes */ +#else +# undef LOG_INFO +# undef LOG_WARNING +# undef LOG_ERR +# define LOG_INFO 0 +# define LOG_WARNING 1 +# define LOG_ERR 2 +#endif -# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) +#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) /* not supported */ int setpgid(pid_t pid, pid_t pgid) { @@ -80,9 +77,9 @@ errno = ENOSYS; return (pid_t) -1; } -# endif +#endif /* Maximum leeway in validity period: default 5 minutes */ -# define MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD (5 * 60) +#define MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD (5 * 60) static int add_ocsp_cert(OCSP_REQUEST **req, X509 *cert, const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer, @@ -109,20 +106,20 @@ static char *prog; static int multi = 0; -# ifdef OCSP_DAEMON +#ifdef OCSP_DAEMON static int acfd = (int) INVALID_SOCKET; static int index_changed(CA_DB *); static void spawn_loop(void); static int print_syslog(const char *str, size_t len, void *levPtr); static void socket_timeout(int signum); -# endif +#endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *cbio, const char *host, const char *path, const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers, OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout); -# endif +#endif typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, @@ -160,9 +157,9 @@ "Don't include any certificates in response"}, {"resp_key_id", OPT_RESP_KEY_ID, '-', "Identify response by signing certificate key ID"}, -# ifdef OCSP_DAEMON +#ifdef OCSP_DAEMON {"multi", OPT_MULTI, 'p', "run multiple responder processes"}, -# endif +#endif {"no_certs", OPT_NO_CERTS, '-', "Don't include any certificates in signed request"}, {"no_signature_verify", OPT_NO_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, '-', @@ -511,9 +508,9 @@ trailing_md = 1; break; case OPT_MULTI: -# ifdef OCSP_DAEMON +#ifdef OCSP_DAEMON multi = atoi(opt_arg()); -# endif +#endif break; } } @@ -593,7 +590,7 @@ } } -# ifdef OCSP_DAEMON +#ifdef OCSP_DAEMON if (multi && acbio != NULL) spawn_loop(); if (acbio != NULL && req_timeout > 0) @@ -606,7 +603,7 @@ redo_accept: if (acbio != NULL) { -# ifdef OCSP_DAEMON +#ifdef OCSP_DAEMON if (index_changed(rdb)) { CA_DB *newrdb = load_index(ridx_filename, NULL); @@ -619,7 +616,7 @@ ridx_filename); } } -# endif +#endif req = NULL; if (!do_responder(&req, &cbio, acbio, req_timeout)) @@ -688,16 +685,16 @@ if (cbio != NULL) send_ocsp_response(cbio, resp); } else if (host != NULL) { -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK resp = process_responder(req, host, path, port, use_ssl, headers, req_timeout); if (resp == NULL) goto end; -# else +#else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating connect BIO - sockets not supported.\n"); goto end; -# endif +#endif } else if (respin != NULL) { derbio = bio_open_default(respin, 'r', FORMAT_ASN1); if (derbio == NULL) @@ -840,7 +837,7 @@ va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); -# ifdef OCSP_DAEMON +#ifdef OCSP_DAEMON if (multi) { char buf[1024]; if (vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, ap) > 0) { @@ -849,7 +846,7 @@ if (level >= LOG_ERR) ERR_print_errors_cb(print_syslog, &level); } -# endif +#endif if (!multi) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: ", prog); BIO_vprintf(bio_err, fmt, ap); @@ -858,7 +855,7 @@ va_end(ap); } -# ifdef OCSP_DAEMON +#ifdef OCSP_DAEMON static int print_syslog(const char *str, size_t len, void *levPtr) { @@ -1011,7 +1008,7 @@ syslog(LOG_INFO, "terminating on signal: %d", termsig); killall(0, kidpids); } -# endif +#endif static int add_ocsp_cert(OCSP_REQUEST **req, X509 *cert, const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer, @@ -1291,11 +1288,11 @@ static BIO *init_responder(const char *port) { -# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting up accept BIO - sockets not supported.\n"); return NULL; -# else +#else BIO *acbio = NULL, *bufbio = NULL; bufbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); @@ -1322,10 +1319,10 @@ BIO_free_all(acbio); BIO_free(bufbio); return NULL; -# endif +#endif } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK /* * Decode %xx URL-decoding in-place. Ignores mal-formed sequences. */ @@ -1349,22 +1346,22 @@ *out = '\0'; return (int)(out - save); } -# endif +#endif -# ifdef OCSP_DAEMON +#ifdef OCSP_DAEMON static void socket_timeout(int signum) { if (acfd != (int)INVALID_SOCKET) (void)shutdown(acfd, SHUT_RD); } -# endif +#endif static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio, int timeout) { -# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK return 0; -# else +#else int len; OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL; char inbuf[2048], reqbuf[2048]; @@ -1382,12 +1379,12 @@ *pcbio = cbio; client = BIO_get_peer_name(cbio); -# ifdef OCSP_DAEMON +# ifdef OCSP_DAEMON if (timeout > 0) { (void) BIO_get_fd(cbio, &acfd); alarm(timeout); } -# endif +# endif /* Read the request line. */ len = BIO_gets(cbio, reqbuf, sizeof(reqbuf)); @@ -1450,11 +1447,11 @@ break; } -# ifdef OCSP_DAEMON +# ifdef OCSP_DAEMON /* Clear alarm before we close the client socket */ alarm(0); timeout = 0; -# endif +# endif /* Try to read OCSP request */ if (getbio != NULL) { @@ -1470,13 +1467,13 @@ *preq = req; out: -# ifdef OCSP_DAEMON +# ifdef OCSP_DAEMON if (timeout > 0) alarm(0); acfd = (int)INVALID_SOCKET; -# endif - return 1; # endif + return 1; +#endif } static int send_ocsp_response(BIO *cbio, OCSP_RESPONSE *resp) @@ -1492,7 +1489,7 @@ return 1; } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *cbio, const char *host, const char *path, const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers, @@ -1623,6 +1620,4 @@ SSL_CTX_free(ctx); return resp; } -# endif - #endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/pkcs12.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/pkcs12.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/pkcs12.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/pkcs12.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1999-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -8,25 +8,21 @@ */ #include -#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES) -NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT -#else - -# include -# include -# include -# include "apps.h" -# include "progs.h" -# include -# include -# include -# include - -# define NOKEYS 0x1 -# define NOCERTS 0x2 -# define INFO 0x4 -# define CLCERTS 0x8 -# define CACERTS 0x10 +#include +#include +#include +#include "apps.h" +#include "progs.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define NOKEYS 0x1 +#define NOCERTS 0x2 +#define INFO 0x4 +#define CLCERTS 0x8 +#define CACERTS 0x10 #define PASSWD_BUF_SIZE 2048 @@ -74,15 +70,15 @@ {"chain", OPT_CHAIN, '-', "Add certificate chain"}, {"twopass", OPT_TWOPASS, '-', "Separate MAC, encryption passwords"}, {"nomacver", OPT_NOMACVER, '-', "Don't verify MAC"}, -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 {"descert", OPT_DESCERT, '-', "Encrypt output with 3DES (default RC2-40)"}, {"certpbe", OPT_CERTPBE, 's', "Certificate PBE algorithm (default RC2-40)"}, -# else +#else {"descert", OPT_DESCERT, '-', "Encrypt output with 3DES (the default)"}, {"certpbe", OPT_CERTPBE, 's', "Certificate PBE algorithm (default 3DES)"}, -# endif +#endif {"export", OPT_EXPORT, '-', "Output PKCS12 file"}, {"noiter", OPT_NOITER, '-', "Don't use encryption iteration"}, {"maciter", OPT_MACITER, '-', "Use MAC iteration"}, @@ -113,9 +109,9 @@ {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-', "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"}, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"}, -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, -# endif +#endif {NULL} }; @@ -126,11 +122,11 @@ char pass[PASSWD_BUF_SIZE] = "", macpass[PASSWD_BUF_SIZE] = ""; int export_cert = 0, options = 0, chain = 0, twopass = 0, keytype = 0; int iter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER, maciter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 int cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC; -# else +#else int cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC; -# endif +#endif int key_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC; int ret = 1, macver = 1, add_lmk = 0, private = 0; int noprompt = 0; @@ -976,5 +972,3 @@ } return 1; } - -#endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/rsa8192.pem openssl-1.1.1j/apps/rsa8192.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/rsa8192.pem 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/rsa8192.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- - MIISKAIBAAKCBAEAiQ2f1X6Bte1DKD0OoCBKEikzPW+5w3oXk3WwnE97Wxzy6wJZ ebbZC3CZKKBnJeBMrysPf+lK+9+fP6Vm8bp1wvbcSIA59BDrX6irFSuM/bdnkbuF MFlDjt+uVrxwoyqfPi2IPot1HQg3l5mdyBqcTWvbOnU2L9HZxJfPUCjfzdTMPrMY @@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ yO7iBUNJzv6Qh22malLp4P8gzACkD7DGlSTnoB5cLwcjmDGg+i9WrUBbOiVTeQfZ kOj1o+Tz35ndpq/DDUVlqliB9krcxva+QHeJPH53EGI+YVg1nD+s/vUDZ3mQMGX9 DQou2L8uU6RnWNv/BihGcL8QvS4Ty6QyPOUPpD3zc70JQAEcQk9BxQNaELgJX0IN -22cYn22tYvElew9G41OpDqzBRcfbdJmKXQ2HcroShutYJQRGUpAXHk24fy6JVkIU +2cYUn22tYvElew9G41OpDqzBRcfbdJmKXQ2HcroShutYJQRGUpAXHk24fy6JVkIU ojF5U6cwextMja1ZIIZgh9eugIRUeIE7319nQNDzuXWjRCcoBLA25P7wnpHWDRpz D9ovXCIvdja74lL5psqobV6L5+fbLPkSgXoImKR0LQKCAgAIC9Jk8kxumCyIVGCP PeM5Uby9M3GMuKrfYsn0Y5e97+kSJF1dpojTodBgR2KQar6eVrvXt+8uZCcIjfx8 @@ -98,4 +97,3 @@ rMlMLtKfp2w8HlMZpsUlToNCx6CI+tJrohzcs3BAVAbjFAXRKWGijB1rxwyDdHPv I+/wJTNaRNPQ1M0SwtEL/zJd21y3KSPn4eL+GP3efhlDSjtlDvZqkdAUsU8= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- - diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/rsa.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/rsa.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/rsa.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/rsa.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -8,23 +8,19 @@ */ #include -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT -#else - -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include "apps.h" -# include "progs.h" -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "apps.h" +#include "progs.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, @@ -53,14 +49,14 @@ {"modulus", OPT_MODULUS, '-', "Print the RSA key modulus"}, {"check", OPT_CHECK, '-', "Verify key consistency"}, {"", OPT_CIPHER, '-', "Any supported cipher"}, -# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) {"pvk-strong", OPT_PVK_STRONG, '-', "Enable 'Strong' PVK encoding level (default)"}, {"pvk-weak", OPT_PVK_WEAK, '-', "Enable 'Weak' PVK encoding level"}, {"pvk-none", OPT_PVK_NONE, '-', "Don't enforce PVK encoding"}, -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, -# endif +#endif {NULL} }; @@ -75,9 +71,9 @@ int i, private = 0; int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, text = 0, check = 0; int noout = 0, modulus = 0, pubin = 0, pubout = 0, ret = 1; -# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) int pvk_encr = 2; -# endif +#endif OPTION_CHOICE o; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, rsa_options); @@ -130,9 +126,9 @@ case OPT_PVK_STRONG: /* pvk_encr:= 2 */ case OPT_PVK_WEAK: /* pvk_encr:= 1 */ case OPT_PVK_NONE: /* pvk_encr:= 0 */ -# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) pvk_encr = (o - OPT_PVK_NONE); -# endif +#endif break; case OPT_NOOUT: noout = 1; @@ -265,7 +261,7 @@ i = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(out, rsa, enc, NULL, 0, NULL, passout); } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA } else if (outformat == FORMAT_MSBLOB || outformat == FORMAT_PVK) { EVP_PKEY *pk; pk = EVP_PKEY_new(); @@ -280,13 +276,13 @@ goto end; } assert(private); -# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 +# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 BIO_printf(bio_err, "PVK format not supported\n"); EVP_PKEY_free(pk); goto end; -# else +# else i = i2b_PVK_bio(out, pk, pvk_encr, 0, passout); -# endif +# endif } else if (pubin || pubout) { i = i2b_PublicKey_bio(out, pk); } else { @@ -294,7 +290,7 @@ i = i2b_PrivateKey_bio(out, pk); } EVP_PKEY_free(pk); -# endif +#endif } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for outfile\n"); goto end; @@ -313,4 +309,3 @@ OPENSSL_free(passout); return ret; } -#endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/rsautl.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/rsautl.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/rsautl.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/rsautl.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -8,25 +8,21 @@ */ #include -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT -#else - -# include "apps.h" -# include "progs.h" -# include -# include -# include -# include - -# define RSA_SIGN 1 -# define RSA_VERIFY 2 -# define RSA_ENCRYPT 3 -# define RSA_DECRYPT 4 - -# define KEY_PRIVKEY 1 -# define KEY_PUBKEY 2 -# define KEY_CERT 3 +#include "apps.h" +#include "progs.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define RSA_SIGN 1 +#define RSA_VERIFY 2 +#define RSA_ENCRYPT 3 +#define RSA_DECRYPT 4 + +#define KEY_PRIVKEY 1 +#define KEY_PUBKEY 2 +#define KEY_CERT 3 typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, @@ -60,9 +56,9 @@ {"decrypt", OPT_DECRYPT, '-', "Decrypt with private key"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, OPT_R_OPTIONS, -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, -# endif +#endif {NULL} }; @@ -279,4 +275,3 @@ OPENSSL_free(passin); return ret; } -#endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/s_client.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/s_client.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/s_client.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/s_client.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -1283,22 +1283,42 @@ case OPT_SSL3: min_version = SSL3_VERSION; max_version = SSL3_VERSION; + socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS + isdtls = 0; +#endif break; case OPT_TLS1_3: min_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; + socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS + isdtls = 0; +#endif break; case OPT_TLS1_2: min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; + socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS + isdtls = 0; +#endif break; case OPT_TLS1_1: min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; + socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS + isdtls = 0; +#endif break; case OPT_TLS1: min_version = TLS1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_VERSION; + socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS + isdtls = 0; +#endif break; case OPT_DTLS: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/srp.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/srp.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/srp.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/srp.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2004-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2004-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2004, EdelKey Project. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -12,28 +12,24 @@ */ #include -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP -NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT -#else - -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include "apps.h" -# include "progs.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "apps.h" +#include "progs.h" -# define BASE_SECTION "srp" -# define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf" +#define BASE_SECTION "srp" +#define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf" -# define ENV_DATABASE "srpvfile" -# define ENV_DEFAULT_SRP "default_srp" +#define ENV_DATABASE "srpvfile" +#define ENV_DEFAULT_SRP "default_srp" static int get_index(CA_DB *db, char *id, char type) { @@ -212,9 +208,9 @@ {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"passout", OPT_PASSOUT, 's', "Output file pass phrase source"}, OPT_R_OPTIONS, -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, -# endif +#endif {NULL} }; @@ -610,4 +606,3 @@ release_engine(e); return ret; } -#endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/s_time.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/s_time.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/s_time.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/s_time.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ {"key", OPT_KEY, '<', "File with key, PEM; default is -cert file"}, {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "PEM format directory of CA's"}, {"cafile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "PEM format file of CA's"}, + {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "PEM format file of CA's"}, {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-', "Do not load the default certificates file"}, {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-', diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/ts.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/ts.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/ts.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/ts.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -8,29 +8,26 @@ */ #include -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TS -NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT -#else -# include -# include -# include -# include "apps.h" -# include "progs.h" -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include -# include +#include +#include +#include +#include "apps.h" +#include "progs.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include /* Request nonce length, in bits (must be a multiple of 8). */ -# define NONCE_LENGTH 64 +#define NONCE_LENGTH 64 /* Name of config entry that defines the OID file. */ -# define ENV_OID_FILE "oid_file" +#define ENV_OID_FILE "oid_file" /* Is |EXACTLY_ONE| of three pointers set? */ -# define EXACTLY_ONE(a, b, c) \ +#define EXACTLY_ONE(a, b, c) \ (( a && !b && !c) || \ ( b && !a && !c) || \ ( c && !a && !b)) @@ -114,9 +111,9 @@ {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "File with trusted CA certs"}, {"untrusted", OPT_UNTRUSTED, '<', "File with untrusted certs"}, {"", OPT_MD, '-', "Any supported digest"}, -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, -# endif +#endif {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "\nOptions specific to 'ts -verify': \n"}, OPT_V_OPTIONS, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "\n"}, @@ -137,11 +134,11 @@ " [-signer tsa_cert.pem] [-inkey private_key.pem]", " [-chain certs_file.pem] [-tspolicy oid]", " [-in file] [-token_in] [-out file] [-token_out]", -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE " [-text] [-engine id]", -# else +#else " [-text]", -# endif +#endif " or", "ts -verify -CApath dir -CAfile file.pem -untrusted file.pem", " [-data file] [-digest hexstring]", @@ -682,10 +679,10 @@ goto end; if (!TS_CONF_set_serial(conf, section, serial_cb, resp_ctx)) goto end; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (!TS_CONF_set_crypto_device(conf, section, engine)) goto end; -# endif +#endif if (!TS_CONF_set_signer_cert(conf, section, signer, resp_ctx)) goto end; if (!TS_CONF_set_certs(conf, section, chain, resp_ctx)) @@ -984,4 +981,3 @@ { return ok; } -#endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_TS */ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/apps/x509.c openssl-1.1.1j/apps/x509.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/apps/x509.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/apps/x509.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -140,9 +140,9 @@ {"", OPT_MD, '-', "Any supported digest"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 {"subject_hash_old", OPT_SUBJECT_HASH_OLD, '-', - "Print old-style (MD5) issuer hash value"}, - {"issuer_hash_old", OPT_ISSUER_HASH_OLD, '-', "Print old-style (MD5) subject hash value"}, + {"issuer_hash_old", OPT_ISSUER_HASH_OLD, '-', + "Print old-style (MD5) issuer hash value"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/appveyor.yml openssl-1.1.1j/appveyor.yml --- openssl-1.1.1f/appveyor.yml 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/appveyor.yml 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ - cd .. - ps: >- if (-not $env:APPVEYOR_PULL_REQUEST_NUMBER` - -or (&git log -2 | Select-String "\[extended tests\]") ) { + -or (&git log -1 $env:APPVEYOR_PULL_REQUEST_HEAD_COMMIT | + Select-String "\[extended tests\]") ) { $env:EXTENDED_TESTS="yes" } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/AUTHORS openssl-1.1.1j/AUTHORS --- openssl-1.1.1f/AUTHORS 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/AUTHORS 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ Bernd Edlinger Bodo Möller David Benjamin +David von Oheimb +Dmitry Belyavskiy (Дмитрий Белявский) Emilia Käsper Eric Young Geoff Thorpe @@ -22,14 +24,19 @@ Mark J. Cox Matt Caswell Matthias St. Pierre +Nicola Tuveri Nils Larsch +Patrick Steuer Paul Dale Paul C. Sutton +Paul Yang Ralf S. Engelschall Rich Salz Richard Levitte +Shane Lontis Stephen Henson Steve Marquess Tim Hudson +Tomáš Mráz Ulf Möller Viktor Dukhovni diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/CHANGES openssl-1.1.1j/CHANGES --- openssl-1.1.1f/CHANGES 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/CHANGES 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -7,6 +7,127 @@ https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate release branch. + Changes between 1.1.1i and 1.1.1j [16 Feb 2021] + + *) Fixed the X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() function. It attempts to + create a unique hash value based on the issuer and serial number data + contained within an X509 certificate. However it was failing to correctly + handle any errors that may occur while parsing the issuer field (which might + occur if the issuer field is maliciously constructed). This may subsequently + result in a NULL pointer deref and a crash leading to a potential denial of + service attack. + (CVE-2021-23841) + [Matt Caswell] + + *) Fixed the RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() function and the RSA_SSLV23_PADDING + padding mode to correctly check for rollback attacks. This is considered a + bug in OpenSSL 1.1.1 because it does not support SSLv2. In 1.0.2 this is + CVE-2021-23839. + [Matt Caswell] + + *) Fixed the EVP_CipherUpdate, EVP_EncryptUpdate and EVP_DecryptUpdate + functions. Previously they could overflow the output length argument in some + cases where the input length is close to the maximum permissable length for + an integer on the platform. In such cases the return value from the function + call would be 1 (indicating success), but the output length value would be + negative. This could cause applications to behave incorrectly or crash. + (CVE-2021-23840) + [Matt Caswell] + + *) Fixed SRP_Calc_client_key so that it runs in constant time. The previous + implementation called BN_mod_exp without setting BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. This + could be exploited in a side channel attack to recover the password. Since + the attack is local host only this is outside of the current OpenSSL + threat model and therefore no CVE is assigned. + + Thanks to Mohammed Sabt and Daniel De Almeida Braga for reporting this + issue. + [Matt Caswell] + + Changes between 1.1.1h and 1.1.1i [8 Dec 2020] + + *) Fixed NULL pointer deref in the GENERAL_NAME_cmp function + This function could crash if both GENERAL_NAMEs contain an EDIPARTYNAME. + If an attacker can control both items being compared then this could lead + to a possible denial of service attack. OpenSSL itself uses the + GENERAL_NAME_cmp function for two purposes: + 1) Comparing CRL distribution point names between an available CRL and a + CRL distribution point embedded in an X509 certificate + 2) When verifying that a timestamp response token signer matches the + timestamp authority name (exposed via the API functions + TS_RESP_verify_response and TS_RESP_verify_token) + (CVE-2020-1971) + [Matt Caswell] + + *) Add support for Apple Silicon M1 Macs with the darwin64-arm64-cc target. + [Stuart Carnie] + + *) The security callback, which can be customised by application code, supports + the security operation SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH. This is defined to take an EVP_PKEY + in the "other" parameter. In most places this is what is passed. All these + places occur server side. However there was one client side call of this + security operation and it passed a DH object instead. This is incorrect + according to the definition of SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, and is inconsistent with all + of the other locations. Therefore this client side call has been changed to + pass an EVP_PKEY instead. + [Matt Caswell] + + *) In 1.1.1h, an expired trusted (root) certificate was not anymore rejected + when validating a certificate path. This check is restored in 1.1.1i. + [David von Oheimb] + + Changes between 1.1.1g and 1.1.1h [22 Sep 2020] + + *) Certificates with explicit curve parameters are now disallowed in + verification chains if the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag is used. + [Tomas Mraz] + + *) The 'MinProtocol' and 'MaxProtocol' configuration commands now silently + ignore TLS protocol version bounds when configuring DTLS-based contexts, and + conversely, silently ignore DTLS protocol version bounds when configuring + TLS-based contexts. The commands can be repeated to set bounds of both + types. The same applies with the corresponding "min_protocol" and + "max_protocol" command-line switches, in case some application uses both TLS + and DTLS. + + SSL_CTX instances that are created for a fixed protocol version (e.g. + TLSv1_server_method()) also silently ignore version bounds. Previously + attempts to apply bounds to these protocol versions would result in an + error. Now only the "version-flexible" SSL_CTX instances are subject to + limits in configuration files in command-line options. + [Viktor Dukhovni] + + *) Handshake now fails if Extended Master Secret extension is dropped + on renegotiation. + [Tomas Mraz] + + *) Accidentally, an expired trusted (root) certificate is not anymore rejected + when validating a certificate path. + [David von Oheimb] + + *) The Oracle Developer Studio compiler will start reporting deprecated APIs + + Changes between 1.1.1f and 1.1.1g [21 Apr 2020] + + *) Fixed segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain() + Server or client applications that call the SSL_check_chain() function + during or after a TLS 1.3 handshake may crash due to a NULL pointer + dereference as a result of incorrect handling of the + "signature_algorithms_cert" TLS extension. The crash occurs if an invalid + or unrecognised signature algorithm is received from the peer. This could + be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial of Service attack. + (CVE-2020-1967) + [Benjamin Kaduk] + + *) Added AES consttime code for no-asm configurations + an optional constant time support for AES was added + when building openssl for no-asm. + Enable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_AES_CONST_TIME + Disable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_NO_AES_CONST_TIME + At this time this feature is by default disabled. + It will be enabled by default in 3.0. + [Bernd Edlinger] + Changes between 1.1.1e and 1.1.1f [31 Mar 2020] *) Revert the change of EOF detection while reading in libssl to avoid diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/config openssl-1.1.1j/config --- openssl-1.1.1f/config 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/config 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -253,11 +253,8 @@ Power*) echo "ppc-apple-darwin${VERSION}" ;; - x86_64) - echo "x86_64-apple-darwin${VERSION}" - ;; *) - echo "i686-apple-darwin${VERSION}" + echo "${MACHINE}-apple-darwin${VERSION}" ;; esac exit 0 @@ -497,6 +494,9 @@ else OUT="darwin64-x86_64-cc" fi ;; + $MACHINE-apple-darwin*) + OUT="darwin64-$MACHINE-cc" + ;; armv6+7-*-iphoneos) __CNF_CFLAGS="$__CNF_CFLAGS -arch armv6 -arch armv7" __CNF_CXXFLAGS="$__CNF_CXXFLAGS -arch armv6 -arch armv7" diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf openssl-1.1.1j/Configurations/10-main.conf --- openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/Configurations/10-main.conf 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -663,6 +663,7 @@ "linux-ppc" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic32", asm("ppc32_asm") ], perlasm_scheme => "linux32", + lib_cppflags => add("-DB_ENDIAN"), }, "linux-ppc64" => { inherit_from => [ "linux-generic64", asm("ppc64_asm") ], @@ -741,7 +742,7 @@ inherit_from => [ "linux-generic32", asm("mips64_asm") ], cflags => add("-mabi=n32"), cxxflags => add("-mabi=n32"), - bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR", + bn_ops => "RC4_CHAR", perlasm_scheme => "n32", multilib => "32", }, @@ -1125,7 +1126,7 @@ CFLAGS => picker(debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O"), cflags => add(threads("-pthread")), - ex_libs => threads("-pthread"), + ex_libs => add(threads("-pthread")), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR", perlasm_scheme => "aix32", shared_ldflag => add_before("-shared -static-libgcc"), @@ -1138,7 +1139,7 @@ CFLAGS => picker(debug => "-O0 -g", release => "-O"), cflags => combine("-maix64", threads("-pthread")), - ex_libs => threads("-pthread"), + ex_libs => add(threads("-pthread")), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR", perlasm_scheme => "aix64", shared_ldflag => add_before("-shared -static-libgcc"), @@ -1154,7 +1155,7 @@ cflags => combine("-q32 -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst", threads("-qthreaded")), cppflags => threads("-D_THREAD_SAFE"), - ex_libs => threads("-lpthreads"), + ex_libs => add(threads("-lpthreads")), bn_ops => "BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR", perlasm_scheme => "aix32", shared_cflag => "-qpic", @@ -1169,7 +1170,7 @@ cflags => combine("-q64 -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst", threads("-qthreaded")), cppflags => threads("-D_THREAD_SAFE"), - ex_libs => threads("-lpthreads"), + ex_libs => add(threads("-lpthreads")), bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR", perlasm_scheme => "aix64", dso_scheme => "dlfcn", @@ -1365,9 +1366,9 @@ } push @ex_libs, '$(PORTSDK_LIBPATH)/portlib.lib' if (defined(env('PORTSDK_LIBPATH'))); - push @ex_libs, ' /nodefaultlib coredll.lib corelibc.lib' - if (env('TARGETCPU') eq "X86"); - return @ex_libs; + push @ex_libs, '/nodefaultlib coredll.lib corelibc.lib' + if (env('TARGETCPU') =~ /^X86|^ARMV4[IT]/); + return join(" ", @ex_libs); }), }, @@ -1557,6 +1558,14 @@ bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", perlasm_scheme => "macosx", }, + "darwin64-arm64-cc" => { + inherit_from => [ "darwin-common", asm("aarch64_asm") ], + CFLAGS => add("-Wall"), + cflags => add("-arch arm64"), + lib_cppflags => add("-DL_ENDIAN"), + bn_ops => "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG", + perlasm_scheme => "ios64", + }, ##### GNU Hurd "hurd-x86" => { diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/descrip.mms.tmpl openssl-1.1.1j/Configurations/descrip.mms.tmpl --- openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/descrip.mms.tmpl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/Configurations/descrip.mms.tmpl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -377,8 +377,13 @@ $(NODEBUG) ! $(NODEBUG) ! Installation logical names $(NODEBUG) ! - $(NODEBUG) installtop = F$PARSE(staging_instdir,"$(INSTALLTOP)","[]A.;",,"SYNTAX_ONLY,NO_CONCEAL") - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + ".]" - $(NODEBUG) datatop = F$PARSE(staging_datadir,"$(OPENSSLDIR)","[]A.;",,"SYNTAX_ONLY,NO_CONCEAL") - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + ".]" + $(NODEBUG) ! This also creates a few DCL variables that are used for + $(NODEBUG) ! the "install_msg" target. + $(NODEBUG) ! + $(NODEBUG) installroot = F$PARSE(staging_instdir,"$(INSTALLTOP)","[]A.;",,"SYNTAX_ONLY,NO_CONCEAL") - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + $(NODEBUG) installtop = installroot + ".]" + $(NODEBUG) dataroot = F$PARSE(staging_datadir,"$(OPENSSLDIR)","[]A.;",,"SYNTAX_ONLY,NO_CONCEAL") - ".][000000" - "[000000." - "][" - "]A.;" + $(NODEBUG) datatop = dataroot + ".]" $(NODEBUG) DEFINE ossl_installroot 'installtop' $(NODEBUG) DEFINE ossl_dataroot 'datatop' $(NODEBUG) ! @@ -455,30 +460,19 @@ @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Tests are not supported with your chosen Configure options" @ ! {- output_on() if !$disabled{tests}; "" -} -install : install_sw install_ssldirs install_docs +install : install_sw install_ssldirs install_docs install_msg + @ ! + +install_msg : @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "######################################################################" @ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" @ IF "$(DESTDIR)" .EQS. "" THEN - - PIPE ( WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Installation complete" ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Run @$(SYSTARTUP)openssl_startup{- $osslver -} to set up logical names" ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "then run @$(SYSTARTUP)openssl_utils{- $osslver -} to define commands" ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" ) + @{- sourcefile("VMS", "msg_install.com") -} "$(SYSTARTUP)" "{- $osslver -}" @ IF "$(DESTDIR)" .NES. "" THEN - - PIPE ( WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Staging installation complete" ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Finish or package in such a way that the contents of the directory tree" ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT staging_instdir ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "ends up in $(INSTALLTOP)," ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "and that the contents of the contents of the directory tree" ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT staging_datadir ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "ends up in $(OPENSSLDIR)" ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "When in its final destination," ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Run @$(SYSTARTUP)openssl_startup{- $osslver -} to set up logical names" ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "then run @$(SYSTARTUP)openssl_utils{- $osslver -} to define commands" ; - - WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" ) + @{- sourcefile("VMS", "msg_staging.com") -} - + "''installroot']" "''dataroot']" "$(INSTALLTOP)" "$(OPENSSLDIR)" - + "$(SYSTARTUP)" "{- $osslver -}" check_install : spawn/nolog @ossl_installroot:[SYSTEST]openssl_ivp{- $osslver -}.com diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/windows-makefile.tmpl openssl-1.1.1j/Configurations/windows-makefile.tmpl --- openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/windows-makefile.tmpl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/Configurations/windows-makefile.tmpl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -211,8 +211,8 @@ join(' ', $target{cppflags} || (), (map { '-D'.quotify1($_) } @{$target{defines}}, @{$config{defines}}), - (map { '-I'.quotify1($_) } @{$target{includes}}, - @{$config{includes}}), + (map { '-I'.'"'.$_.'"' } @{$target{includes}}, + @{$config{includes}}), @{$config{cppflags}}) -} CNF_CFLAGS={- join(' ', $target{cflags} || (), @{$config{cflags}}) -} diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/Configure openssl-1.1.1j/Configure --- openssl-1.1.1f/Configure 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/Configure 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ #! /usr/bin/env perl # -*- mode: perl; -*- -# Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +# Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -217,12 +217,22 @@ # Unified build supports separate build dir my $srcdir = catdir(absolutedir(dirname($0))); # catdir ensures local syntax my $blddir = catdir(absolutedir(".")); # catdir ensures local syntax + +# File::Spec::Unix doesn't detect case insensitivity, so we make sure to +# check if the source and build directory are really the same, and make +# them so. This avoids all kinds of confusion later on. +# We must check @File::Spec::ISA rather than using File::Spec->isa() to +# know if File::Spec ended up loading File::Spec::Unix. +$srcdir = $blddir + if (grep(/::Unix$/, @File::Spec::ISA) + && samedir($srcdir, $blddir)); + my $dofile = abs2rel(catfile($srcdir, "util/dofile.pl")); my $local_config_envname = 'OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR'; -$config{sourcedir} = abs2rel($srcdir); -$config{builddir} = abs2rel($blddir); +$config{sourcedir} = abs2rel($srcdir, $blddir); +$config{builddir} = abs2rel($blddir, $blddir); # Collect reconfiguration information if needed my @argvcopy=@ARGV; @@ -1049,6 +1059,9 @@ print "Using os-specific seed configuration\n"; push @seed_sources, 'os'; } +if (scalar(grep { $_ eq 'egd' } @seed_sources) > 0) { + delete $disabled{'egd'}; +} if (scalar(grep { $_ eq 'none' } @seed_sources) > 0) { die "Cannot seed with none and anything else" if scalar(@seed_sources) > 1; warn <<_____ if scalar(@seed_sources) == 1; @@ -1188,6 +1201,10 @@ # At this point, we can forget everything about %user and %useradd, # because it's now all been merged into the corresponding $config entry +if (grep { $_ eq '-static' } @{$config{LDFLAGS}}) { + disable('static', 'pic', 'threads'); +} + # Allow overriding the build file name $config{build_file} = env('BUILDFILE') || $target{build_file} || "Makefile"; @@ -1508,10 +1525,6 @@ } } -if (grep { $_ eq '-static' } @{$config{LDFLAGS}}) { - disable('static', 'pic', 'threads'); -} - $config{CFLAGS} = [ map { $_ eq '--ossl-strict-warnings' ? @strict_warnings_collection : ( $_ ) } @@ -2598,19 +2611,22 @@ } print "\nEnabled features:\n\n"; foreach my $what (@disablables) { - print " $what\n" unless $disabled{$what}; + print " $what\n" + unless grep { $_ =~ /^${what}$/ } keys %disabled; } print "\nDisabled features:\n\n"; foreach my $what (@disablables) { - if ($disabled{$what}) { - print " $what", ' ' x ($longest - length($what) + 1), - "[$disabled{$what}]", ' ' x ($longest2 - length($disabled{$what}) + 1); - print $disabled_info{$what}->{macro} - if $disabled_info{$what}->{macro}; + my @what2 = grep { $_ =~ /^${what}$/ } keys %disabled; + my $what3 = $what2[0]; + if ($what3) { + print " $what3", ' ' x ($longest - length($what3) + 1), + "[$disabled{$what3}]", ' ' x ($longest2 - length($disabled{$what3}) + 1); + print $disabled_info{$what3}->{macro} + if $disabled_info{$what3}->{macro}; print ' (skip ', - join(', ', @{$disabled_info{$what}->{skipped}}), + join(', ', @{$disabled_info{$what3}->{skipped}}), ')' - if $disabled_info{$what}->{skipped}; + if $disabled_info{$what3}->{skipped}; print "\n"; } } @@ -3424,6 +3440,27 @@ return realpath($dir); } +# Check if all paths are one and the same, using stat. They must both exist +# We need this for the cases when File::Spec doesn't detect case insensitivity +# (File::Spec::Unix assumes case sensitivity) +sub samedir { + die "samedir expects two arguments\n" unless scalar @_ == 2; + + my @stat0 = stat($_[0]); # First argument + my @stat1 = stat($_[1]); # Second argument + + die "Couldn't stat $_[0]" unless @stat0; + die "Couldn't stat $_[1]" unless @stat1; + + # Compare device number + return 0 unless ($stat0[0] == $stat1[0]); + # Compare "inode". The perl manual recommends comparing as + # string rather than as number. + return 0 unless ($stat0[1] eq $stat1[1]); + + return 1; # All the same +} + sub quotify { my %processors = ( perl => sub { my $x = shift; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/CONTRIBUTING openssl-1.1.1j/CONTRIBUTING --- openssl-1.1.1f/CONTRIBUTING 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/CONTRIBUTING 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ https://www.openssl.org/policies/codingstyle.html) and compile without warnings. Where gcc or clang is available you should use the --strict-warnings Configure option. OpenSSL compiles on many varied - platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features. Clean builds - via Travis and AppVeyor are required, and they are started automatically + platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features. Clean builds via + GitHub Actions and AppVeyor are required, and they are started automatically whenever a PR is created or updated. 5. When at all possible, patches should include tests. These can diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/aes/aes_core.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/aes/aes_core.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/aes/aes_core.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/aes/aes_core.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -43,7 +43,637 @@ #include #include "aes_local.h" -#ifndef AES_ASM +#if defined(OPENSSL_AES_CONST_TIME) && !defined(AES_ASM) +typedef union { + unsigned char b[8]; + u32 w[2]; + u64 d; +} uni; + +/* + * Compute w := (w * x) mod (x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^1 + 1) + * Therefore the name "xtime". + */ +static void XtimeWord(u32 *w) +{ + u32 a, b; + + a = *w; + b = a & 0x80808080u; + a ^= b; + b -= b >> 7; + b &= 0x1B1B1B1Bu; + b ^= a << 1; + *w = b; +} + +static void XtimeLong(u64 *w) +{ + u64 a, b; + + a = *w; + b = a & 0x8080808080808080uLL; + a ^= b; + b -= b >> 7; + b &= 0x1B1B1B1B1B1B1B1BuLL; + b ^= a << 1; + *w = b; +} + +/* + * This computes w := S * w ^ -1 + c, where c = {01100011}. + * Instead of using GF(2^8) mod (x^8+x^4+x^3+x+1} we do the inversion + * in GF(GF(GF(2^2)^2)^2) mod (X^2+X+8) + * and GF(GF(2^2)^2) mod (X^2+X+2) + * and GF(2^2) mod (X^2+X+1) + * The first part of the algorithm below transfers the coordinates + * {0x01,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x10,0x20,0x40,0x80} => + * {1,Y,Y^2,Y^3,Y^4,Y^5,Y^6,Y^7} with Y=0x41: + * {0x01,0x41,0x66,0x6c,0x56,0x9a,0x58,0xc4} + * The last part undoes the coordinate transfer and the final affine + * transformation S: + * b[i] = b[i] + b[(i+4)%8] + b[(i+5)%8] + b[(i+6)%8] + b[(i+7)%8] + c[i] + * in one step. + * The multiplication in GF(2^2^2^2) is done in ordinary coords: + * A = (a0*1 + a1*x^4) + * B = (b0*1 + b1*x^4) + * AB = ((a0*b0 + 8*a1*b1)*1 + (a1*b0 + (a0+a1)*b1)*x^4) + * When A = (a0,a1) is given we want to solve AB = 1: + * (a) 1 = a0*b0 + 8*a1*b1 + * (b) 0 = a1*b0 + (a0+a1)*b1 + * => multiply (a) by a1 and (b) by a0 + * (c) a1 = a1*a0*b0 + (8*a1*a1)*b1 + * (d) 0 = a1*a0*b0 + (a0*a0+a1*a0)*b1 + * => add (c) + (d) + * (e) a1 = (a0*a0 + a1*a0 + 8*a1*a1)*b1 + * => therefore + * b1 = (a0*a0 + a1*a0 + 8*a1*a1)^-1 * a1 + * => and adding (a1*b0) to (b) we get + * (f) a1*b0 = (a0+a1)*b1 + * => therefore + * b0 = (a0*a0 + a1*a0 + 8*a1*a1)^-1 * (a0+a1) + * Note this formula also works for the case + * (a0+a1)*a0 + 8*a1*a1 = 0 + * if the inverse element for 0^-1 is mapped to 0. + * Repeat the same for GF(2^2^2) and GF(2^2). + * We get the following algorithm: + * inv8(a0,a1): + * x0 = a0^a1 + * [y0,y1] = mul4([x0,a1],[a0,a1]); (*) + * y1 = mul4(8,y1); + * t = inv4(y0^y1); + * [b0,b1] = mul4([x0,a1],[t,t]); (*) + * return [b0,b1]; + * The non-linear multiplies (*) can be done in parallel at no extra cost. + */ +static void SubWord(u32 *w) +{ + u32 x, y, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6; + + x = *w; + y = ((x & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((x & 0x01010101u) << 7); + x &= 0xDDDDDDDDu; + x ^= y & 0x57575757u; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x1C1C1C1Cu; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x4A4A4A4Au; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x42424242u; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x64646464u; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7); + x ^= y & 0xE0E0E0E0u; + a1 = x; + a1 ^= (x & 0xF0F0F0F0u) >> 4; + a2 = ((x & 0xCCCCCCCCu) >> 2) | ((x & 0x33333333u) << 2); + a3 = x & a1; + a3 ^= (a3 & 0xAAAAAAAAu) >> 1; + a3 ^= (((x << 1) & a1) ^ ((a1 << 1) & x)) & 0xAAAAAAAAu; + a4 = a2 & a1; + a4 ^= (a4 & 0xAAAAAAAAu) >> 1; + a4 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a1) ^ ((a1 << 1) & a2)) & 0xAAAAAAAAu; + a5 = (a3 & 0xCCCCCCCCu) >> 2; + a3 ^= ((a4 << 2) ^ a4) & 0xCCCCCCCCu; + a4 = a5 & 0x22222222u; + a4 |= a4 >> 1; + a4 ^= (a5 << 1) & 0x22222222u; + a3 ^= a4; + a5 = a3 & 0xA0A0A0A0u; + a5 |= a5 >> 1; + a5 ^= (a3 << 1) & 0xA0A0A0A0u; + a4 = a5 & 0xC0C0C0C0u; + a6 = a4 >> 2; + a4 ^= (a5 << 2) & 0xC0C0C0C0u; + a5 = a6 & 0x20202020u; + a5 |= a5 >> 1; + a5 ^= (a6 << 1) & 0x20202020u; + a4 |= a5; + a3 ^= a4 >> 4; + a3 &= 0x0F0F0F0Fu; + a2 = a3; + a2 ^= (a3 & 0x0C0C0C0Cu) >> 2; + a4 = a3 & a2; + a4 ^= (a4 & 0x0A0A0A0A0Au) >> 1; + a4 ^= (((a3 << 1) & a2) ^ ((a2 << 1) & a3)) & 0x0A0A0A0Au; + a5 = a4 & 0x08080808u; + a5 |= a5 >> 1; + a5 ^= (a4 << 1) & 0x08080808u; + a4 ^= a5 >> 2; + a4 &= 0x03030303u; + a4 ^= (a4 & 0x02020202u) >> 1; + a4 |= a4 << 2; + a3 = a2 & a4; + a3 ^= (a3 & 0x0A0A0A0Au) >> 1; + a3 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a4) ^ ((a4 << 1) & a2)) & 0x0A0A0A0Au; + a3 |= a3 << 4; + a2 = ((a1 & 0xCCCCCCCCu) >> 2) | ((a1 & 0x33333333u) << 2); + x = a1 & a3; + x ^= (x & 0xAAAAAAAAu) >> 1; + x ^= (((a1 << 1) & a3) ^ ((a3 << 1) & a1)) & 0xAAAAAAAAu; + a4 = a2 & a3; + a4 ^= (a4 & 0xAAAAAAAAu) >> 1; + a4 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a3) ^ ((a3 << 1) & a2)) & 0xAAAAAAAAu; + a5 = (x & 0xCCCCCCCCu) >> 2; + x ^= ((a4 << 2) ^ a4) & 0xCCCCCCCCu; + a4 = a5 & 0x22222222u; + a4 |= a4 >> 1; + a4 ^= (a5 << 1) & 0x22222222u; + x ^= a4; + y = ((x & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((x & 0x01010101u) << 7); + x &= 0x39393939u; + x ^= y & 0x3F3F3F3Fu; + y = ((y & 0xFCFCFCFCu) >> 2) | ((y & 0x03030303u) << 6); + x ^= y & 0x97979797u; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x9B9B9B9Bu; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x3C3C3C3Cu; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7); + x ^= y & 0xDDDDDDDDu; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEu) >> 1) | ((y & 0x01010101u) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x72727272u; + x ^= 0x63636363u; + *w = x; +} + +static void SubLong(u64 *w) +{ + u64 x, y, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6; + + x = *w; + y = ((x & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((x & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x &= 0xDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDuLL; + x ^= y & 0x5757575757575757uLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x1C1C1C1C1C1C1C1CuLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x4A4A4A4A4A4A4A4AuLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x4242424242424242uLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x6464646464646464uLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0xE0E0E0E0E0E0E0E0uLL; + a1 = x; + a1 ^= (x & 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0uLL) >> 4; + a2 = ((x & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2) | ((x & 0x3333333333333333uLL) << 2); + a3 = x & a1; + a3 ^= (a3 & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1; + a3 ^= (((x << 1) & a1) ^ ((a1 << 1) & x)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL; + a4 = a2 & a1; + a4 ^= (a4 & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1; + a4 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a1) ^ ((a1 << 1) & a2)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL; + a5 = (a3 & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2; + a3 ^= ((a4 << 2) ^ a4) & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL; + a4 = a5 & 0x2222222222222222uLL; + a4 |= a4 >> 1; + a4 ^= (a5 << 1) & 0x2222222222222222uLL; + a3 ^= a4; + a5 = a3 & 0xA0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0uLL; + a5 |= a5 >> 1; + a5 ^= (a3 << 1) & 0xA0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0uLL; + a4 = a5 & 0xC0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0uLL; + a6 = a4 >> 2; + a4 ^= (a5 << 2) & 0xC0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0uLL; + a5 = a6 & 0x2020202020202020uLL; + a5 |= a5 >> 1; + a5 ^= (a6 << 1) & 0x2020202020202020uLL; + a4 |= a5; + a3 ^= a4 >> 4; + a3 &= 0x0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0FuLL; + a2 = a3; + a2 ^= (a3 & 0x0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0CuLL) >> 2; + a4 = a3 & a2; + a4 ^= (a4 & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL) >> 1; + a4 ^= (((a3 << 1) & a2) ^ ((a2 << 1) & a3)) & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL; + a5 = a4 & 0x0808080808080808uLL; + a5 |= a5 >> 1; + a5 ^= (a4 << 1) & 0x0808080808080808uLL; + a4 ^= a5 >> 2; + a4 &= 0x0303030303030303uLL; + a4 ^= (a4 & 0x0202020202020202uLL) >> 1; + a4 |= a4 << 2; + a3 = a2 & a4; + a3 ^= (a3 & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL) >> 1; + a3 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a4) ^ ((a4 << 1) & a2)) & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL; + a3 |= a3 << 4; + a2 = ((a1 & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2) | ((a1 & 0x3333333333333333uLL) << 2); + x = a1 & a3; + x ^= (x & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1; + x ^= (((a1 << 1) & a3) ^ ((a3 << 1) & a1)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL; + a4 = a2 & a3; + a4 ^= (a4 & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1; + a4 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a3) ^ ((a3 << 1) & a2)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL; + a5 = (x & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2; + x ^= ((a4 << 2) ^ a4) & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL; + a4 = a5 & 0x2222222222222222uLL; + a4 |= a4 >> 1; + a4 ^= (a5 << 1) & 0x2222222222222222uLL; + x ^= a4; + y = ((x & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((x & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x &= 0x3939393939393939uLL; + x ^= y & 0x3F3F3F3F3F3F3F3FuLL; + y = ((y & 0xFCFCFCFCFCFCFCFCuLL) >> 2) | ((y & 0x0303030303030303uLL) << 6); + x ^= y & 0x9797979797979797uLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x9B9B9B9B9B9B9B9BuLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3CuLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0xDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDuLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x7272727272727272uLL; + x ^= 0x6363636363636363uLL; + *w = x; +} + +/* + * This computes w := (S^-1 * (w + c))^-1 + */ +static void InvSubLong(u64 *w) +{ + u64 x, y, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6; + + x = *w; + x ^= 0x6363636363636363uLL; + y = ((x & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((x & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x &= 0xFDFDFDFDFDFDFDFDuLL; + x ^= y & 0x5E5E5E5E5E5E5E5EuLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0xF3F3F3F3F3F3F3F3uLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0xF5F5F5F5F5F5F5F5uLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x7878787878787878uLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x7777777777777777uLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x1515151515151515uLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0xA5A5A5A5A5A5A5A5uLL; + a1 = x; + a1 ^= (x & 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0uLL) >> 4; + a2 = ((x & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2) | ((x & 0x3333333333333333uLL) << 2); + a3 = x & a1; + a3 ^= (a3 & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1; + a3 ^= (((x << 1) & a1) ^ ((a1 << 1) & x)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL; + a4 = a2 & a1; + a4 ^= (a4 & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1; + a4 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a1) ^ ((a1 << 1) & a2)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL; + a5 = (a3 & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2; + a3 ^= ((a4 << 2) ^ a4) & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL; + a4 = a5 & 0x2222222222222222uLL; + a4 |= a4 >> 1; + a4 ^= (a5 << 1) & 0x2222222222222222uLL; + a3 ^= a4; + a5 = a3 & 0xA0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0uLL; + a5 |= a5 >> 1; + a5 ^= (a3 << 1) & 0xA0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0uLL; + a4 = a5 & 0xC0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0uLL; + a6 = a4 >> 2; + a4 ^= (a5 << 2) & 0xC0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0uLL; + a5 = a6 & 0x2020202020202020uLL; + a5 |= a5 >> 1; + a5 ^= (a6 << 1) & 0x2020202020202020uLL; + a4 |= a5; + a3 ^= a4 >> 4; + a3 &= 0x0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0FuLL; + a2 = a3; + a2 ^= (a3 & 0x0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0CuLL) >> 2; + a4 = a3 & a2; + a4 ^= (a4 & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL) >> 1; + a4 ^= (((a3 << 1) & a2) ^ ((a2 << 1) & a3)) & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL; + a5 = a4 & 0x0808080808080808uLL; + a5 |= a5 >> 1; + a5 ^= (a4 << 1) & 0x0808080808080808uLL; + a4 ^= a5 >> 2; + a4 &= 0x0303030303030303uLL; + a4 ^= (a4 & 0x0202020202020202uLL) >> 1; + a4 |= a4 << 2; + a3 = a2 & a4; + a3 ^= (a3 & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL) >> 1; + a3 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a4) ^ ((a4 << 1) & a2)) & 0x0A0A0A0A0A0A0A0AuLL; + a3 |= a3 << 4; + a2 = ((a1 & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2) | ((a1 & 0x3333333333333333uLL) << 2); + x = a1 & a3; + x ^= (x & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1; + x ^= (((a1 << 1) & a3) ^ ((a3 << 1) & a1)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL; + a4 = a2 & a3; + a4 ^= (a4 & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL) >> 1; + a4 ^= (((a2 << 1) & a3) ^ ((a3 << 1) & a2)) & 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuLL; + a5 = (x & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL) >> 2; + x ^= ((a4 << 2) ^ a4) & 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCuLL; + a4 = a5 & 0x2222222222222222uLL; + a4 |= a4 >> 1; + a4 ^= (a5 << 1) & 0x2222222222222222uLL; + x ^= a4; + y = ((x & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((x & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x &= 0xB5B5B5B5B5B5B5B5uLL; + x ^= y & 0x4040404040404040uLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x8080808080808080uLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x1616161616161616uLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0xEBEBEBEBEBEBEBEBuLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x9797979797979797uLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0xFBFBFBFBFBFBFBFBuLL; + y = ((y & 0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFEuLL) >> 1) | ((y & 0x0101010101010101uLL) << 7); + x ^= y & 0x7D7D7D7D7D7D7D7DuLL; + *w = x; +} + +static void ShiftRows(u64 *state) +{ + unsigned char s[4]; + unsigned char *s0; + int r; + + s0 = (unsigned char *)state; + for (r = 0; r < 4; r++) { + s[0] = s0[0*4 + r]; + s[1] = s0[1*4 + r]; + s[2] = s0[2*4 + r]; + s[3] = s0[3*4 + r]; + s0[0*4 + r] = s[(r+0) % 4]; + s0[1*4 + r] = s[(r+1) % 4]; + s0[2*4 + r] = s[(r+2) % 4]; + s0[3*4 + r] = s[(r+3) % 4]; + } +} + +static void InvShiftRows(u64 *state) +{ + unsigned char s[4]; + unsigned char *s0; + int r; + + s0 = (unsigned char *)state; + for (r = 0; r < 4; r++) { + s[0] = s0[0*4 + r]; + s[1] = s0[1*4 + r]; + s[2] = s0[2*4 + r]; + s[3] = s0[3*4 + r]; + s0[0*4 + r] = s[(4-r) % 4]; + s0[1*4 + r] = s[(5-r) % 4]; + s0[2*4 + r] = s[(6-r) % 4]; + s0[3*4 + r] = s[(7-r) % 4]; + } +} + +static void MixColumns(u64 *state) +{ + uni s1; + uni s; + int c; + + for (c = 0; c < 2; c++) { + s1.d = state[c]; + s.d = s1.d; + s.d ^= ((s.d & 0xFFFF0000FFFF0000uLL) >> 16) + | ((s.d & 0x0000FFFF0000FFFFuLL) << 16); + s.d ^= ((s.d & 0xFF00FF00FF00FF00uLL) >> 8) + | ((s.d & 0x00FF00FF00FF00FFuLL) << 8); + s.d ^= s1.d; + XtimeLong(&s1.d); + s.d ^= s1.d; + s.b[0] ^= s1.b[1]; + s.b[1] ^= s1.b[2]; + s.b[2] ^= s1.b[3]; + s.b[3] ^= s1.b[0]; + s.b[4] ^= s1.b[5]; + s.b[5] ^= s1.b[6]; + s.b[6] ^= s1.b[7]; + s.b[7] ^= s1.b[4]; + state[c] = s.d; + } +} + +static void InvMixColumns(u64 *state) +{ + uni s1; + uni s; + int c; + + for (c = 0; c < 2; c++) { + s1.d = state[c]; + s.d = s1.d; + s.d ^= ((s.d & 0xFFFF0000FFFF0000uLL) >> 16) + | ((s.d & 0x0000FFFF0000FFFFuLL) << 16); + s.d ^= ((s.d & 0xFF00FF00FF00FF00uLL) >> 8) + | ((s.d & 0x00FF00FF00FF00FFuLL) << 8); + s.d ^= s1.d; + XtimeLong(&s1.d); + s.d ^= s1.d; + s.b[0] ^= s1.b[1]; + s.b[1] ^= s1.b[2]; + s.b[2] ^= s1.b[3]; + s.b[3] ^= s1.b[0]; + s.b[4] ^= s1.b[5]; + s.b[5] ^= s1.b[6]; + s.b[6] ^= s1.b[7]; + s.b[7] ^= s1.b[4]; + XtimeLong(&s1.d); + s1.d ^= ((s1.d & 0xFFFF0000FFFF0000uLL) >> 16) + | ((s1.d & 0x0000FFFF0000FFFFuLL) << 16); + s.d ^= s1.d; + XtimeLong(&s1.d); + s1.d ^= ((s1.d & 0xFF00FF00FF00FF00uLL) >> 8) + | ((s1.d & 0x00FF00FF00FF00FFuLL) << 8); + s.d ^= s1.d; + state[c] = s.d; + } +} + +static void AddRoundKey(u64 *state, const u64 *w) +{ + state[0] ^= w[0]; + state[1] ^= w[1]; +} + +static void Cipher(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + const u64 *w, int nr) +{ + u64 state[2]; + int i; + + memcpy(state, in, 16); + + AddRoundKey(state, w); + + for (i = 1; i < nr; i++) { + SubLong(&state[0]); + SubLong(&state[1]); + ShiftRows(state); + MixColumns(state); + AddRoundKey(state, w + i*2); + } + + SubLong(&state[0]); + SubLong(&state[1]); + ShiftRows(state); + AddRoundKey(state, w + nr*2); + + memcpy(out, state, 16); +} + +static void InvCipher(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + const u64 *w, int nr) + +{ + u64 state[2]; + int i; + + memcpy(state, in, 16); + + AddRoundKey(state, w + nr*2); + + for (i = nr - 1; i > 0; i--) { + InvShiftRows(state); + InvSubLong(&state[0]); + InvSubLong(&state[1]); + AddRoundKey(state, w + i*2); + InvMixColumns(state); + } + + InvShiftRows(state); + InvSubLong(&state[0]); + InvSubLong(&state[1]); + AddRoundKey(state, w); + + memcpy(out, state, 16); +} + +static void RotWord(u32 *x) +{ + unsigned char *w0; + unsigned char tmp; + + w0 = (unsigned char *)x; + tmp = w0[0]; + w0[0] = w0[1]; + w0[1] = w0[2]; + w0[2] = w0[3]; + w0[3] = tmp; +} + +static void KeyExpansion(const unsigned char *key, u64 *w, + int nr, int nk) +{ + u32 rcon; + uni prev; + u32 temp; + int i, n; + + memcpy(w, key, nk*4); + memcpy(&rcon, "\1\0\0\0", 4); + n = nk/2; + prev.d = w[n-1]; + for (i = n; i < (nr+1)*2; i++) { + temp = prev.w[1]; + if (i % n == 0) { + RotWord(&temp); + SubWord(&temp); + temp ^= rcon; + XtimeWord(&rcon); + } else if (nk > 6 && i % n == 2) { + SubWord(&temp); + } + prev.d = w[i-n]; + prev.w[0] ^= temp; + prev.w[1] ^= prev.w[0]; + w[i] = prev.d; + } +} + +/** + * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule. + */ +int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, + AES_KEY *key) +{ + u64 *rk; + + if (!userKey || !key) + return -1; + if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256) + return -2; + + rk = (u64*)key->rd_key; + + if (bits == 128) + key->rounds = 10; + else if (bits == 192) + key->rounds = 12; + else + key->rounds = 14; + + KeyExpansion(userKey, rk, key->rounds, bits/32); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule. + */ +int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits, + AES_KEY *key) +{ + return AES_set_encrypt_key(userKey, bits, key); +} + +/* + * Encrypt a single block + * in and out can overlap + */ +void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + const AES_KEY *key) +{ + const u64 *rk; + + assert(in && out && key); + rk = (u64*)key->rd_key; + + Cipher(in, out, rk, key->rounds); +} + +/* + * Decrypt a single block + * in and out can overlap + */ +void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + const AES_KEY *key) +{ + const u64 *rk; + + assert(in && out && key); + rk = (u64*)key->rd_key; + + InvCipher(in, out, rk, key->rounds); +} +#elif !defined(AES_ASM) /*- Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03]; Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01]; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/aes/aes_ige.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/aes/aes_ige.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/aes/aes_ige.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/aes/aes_ige.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -12,11 +12,6 @@ #include #include "aes_local.h" -#define N_WORDS (AES_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)) -typedef struct { - unsigned long data[N_WORDS]; -} aes_block_t; - /* XXX: probably some better way to do this */ #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) # define UNALIGNED_MEMOPS_ARE_FAST 1 @@ -24,6 +19,15 @@ # define UNALIGNED_MEMOPS_ARE_FAST 0 #endif +#define N_WORDS (AES_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)) +typedef struct { + unsigned long data[N_WORDS]; +#if defined(__GNUC__) && UNALIGNED_MEMOPS_ARE_FAST +} aes_block_t __attribute((__aligned__(1))); +#else +} aes_block_t; +#endif + #if UNALIGNED_MEMOPS_ARE_FAST # define load_block(d, s) (d) = *(const aes_block_t *)(s) # define store_block(d, s) *(aes_block_t *)(d) = (s) diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/aes/aes_local.h openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/aes/aes_local.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/aes/aes_local.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/aes/aes_local.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ # define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16); (ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >> 8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); } # endif +typedef unsigned long long u64; # ifdef AES_LONG typedef unsigned long u32; # else diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } -if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { +if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ $avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ && $1>=10); -$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0); +$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0); $shaext=1; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1 diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=12); } -if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { +if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -183,7 +183,12 @@ .Loop192: vtbl.8 $key,{$in1},$mask vext.8 $tmp,$zero,$in0,#12 +#ifdef __ARMEB__ + vst1.32 {$in1},[$out],#16 + sub $out,$out,#8 +#else vst1.32 {$in1},[$out],#8 +#endif aese $key,$zero subs $bits,$bits,#1 @@ -715,8 +720,11 @@ ldr $rounds,[$key,#240] ldr $ctr, [$ivp, #12] +#ifdef __ARMEB__ + vld1.8 {$dat0},[$ivp] +#else vld1.32 {$dat0},[$ivp] - +#endif vld1.32 {q8-q9},[$key] // load key schedule... sub $rounds,$rounds,#4 mov $step,#16 @@ -732,17 +740,17 @@ #ifndef __ARMEB__ rev $ctr, $ctr #endif - vorr $dat1,$dat0,$dat0 add $tctr1, $ctr, #1 - vorr $dat2,$dat0,$dat0 - add $ctr, $ctr, #2 vorr $ivec,$dat0,$dat0 rev $tctr1, $tctr1 - vmov.32 ${dat1}[3],$tctr1 + vmov.32 ${ivec}[3],$tctr1 + add $ctr, $ctr, #2 + vorr $dat1,$ivec,$ivec b.ls .Lctr32_tail rev $tctr2, $ctr + vmov.32 ${ivec}[3],$tctr2 sub $len,$len,#3 // bias - vmov.32 ${dat2}[3],$tctr2 + vorr $dat2,$ivec,$ivec b .Loop3x_ctr32 .align 4 @@ -769,11 +777,11 @@ aese $dat1,q8 aesmc $tmp1,$dat1 vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16 - vorr $dat0,$ivec,$ivec + add $tctr0,$ctr,#1 aese $dat2,q8 aesmc $dat2,$dat2 vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#16 - vorr $dat1,$ivec,$ivec + rev $tctr0,$tctr0 aese $tmp0,q9 aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0 aese $tmp1,q9 @@ -782,8 +790,6 @@ mov $key_,$key aese $dat2,q9 aesmc $tmp2,$dat2 - vorr $dat2,$ivec,$ivec - add $tctr0,$ctr,#1 aese $tmp0,q12 aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0 aese $tmp1,q12 @@ -799,20 +805,22 @@ aese $tmp1,q13 aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1 veor $in2,$in2,$rndlast - rev $tctr0,$tctr0 + vmov.32 ${ivec}[3], $tctr0 aese $tmp2,q13 aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2 - vmov.32 ${dat0}[3], $tctr0 + vorr $dat0,$ivec,$ivec rev $tctr1,$tctr1 aese $tmp0,q14 aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0 + vmov.32 ${ivec}[3], $tctr1 + rev $tctr2,$ctr aese $tmp1,q14 aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1 - vmov.32 ${dat1}[3], $tctr1 - rev $tctr2,$ctr + vorr $dat1,$ivec,$ivec + vmov.32 ${ivec}[3], $tctr2 aese $tmp2,q14 aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2 - vmov.32 ${dat2}[3], $tctr2 + vorr $dat2,$ivec,$ivec subs $len,$len,#3 aese $tmp0,q15 aese $tmp1,q15 diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/armcap.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/armcap.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/armcap.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/armcap.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2011-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2011-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -69,6 +69,23 @@ # define OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL # endif # endif +# if defined(__FreeBSD__) +# include +# if __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000 +# include +# define OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL + +static unsigned long getauxval(unsigned long key) +{ + unsigned long val = 0ul; + + if (elf_aux_info((int)key, &val, sizeof(val)) != 0) + return 0ul; + + return val; +} +# endif +# endif /* * ARM puts the feature bits for Crypto Extensions in AT_HWCAP2, whereas diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ "asn1_item_embed_d2i"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW, 0), "asn1_item_embed_new"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D, 0), "ASN1_item_ex_i2d"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_FLAGS_I2D, 0), "asn1_item_flags_i2d"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO, 0), "ASN1_item_i2d_bio"}, @@ -160,6 +161,7 @@ "asn1 sig parse error"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR), "aux error"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER), "bad object header"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE), "bad template"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH), "bmpstring is wrong length"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_BN_LIB), "bn lib"}, diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -268,18 +268,29 @@ return ret; } -int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *_data, int len) +int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *_data, int len_in) { unsigned char *c; const char *data = _data; + size_t len; - if (len < 0) { + if (len_in < 0) { if (data == NULL) return 0; - else - len = strlen(data); + len = strlen(data); + } else { + len = (size_t)len_in; + } + /* + * Verify that the length fits within an integer for assignment to + * str->length below. The additional 1 is subtracted to allow for the + * '\0' terminator even though this isn't strictly necessary. + */ + if (len > INT_MAX - 1) { + ASN1err(0, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE); + return 0; } - if ((str->length <= len) || (str->data == NULL)) { + if ((size_t)str->length <= len || str->data == NULL) { c = str->data; str->data = OPENSSL_realloc(c, len + 1); if (str->data == NULL) { diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/asn1/charmap.h openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/asn1/charmap.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/asn1/charmap.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/asn1/charmap.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/asn1/charmap.pl * - * Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ goto err; EVP_PKEY_free(ret); ret = tmp; + if (EVP_PKEY_type(type) != EVP_PKEY_base_id(ret)) + goto err; } else { ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -182,6 +182,15 @@ tag, aclass, opt, ctx); case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING: + /* + * It never makes sense for multi-strings to have implicit tagging, so + * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template. + */ + if (tag != -1) { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE); + goto err; + } + p = *in; /* Just read in tag and class */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL, @@ -199,6 +208,7 @@ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL); goto err; } + /* Check tag matches bit map */ if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) { /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */ @@ -215,6 +225,15 @@ return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: + /* + * It never makes sense for CHOICE types to have implicit tagging, so + * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template. + */ + if (tag != -1) { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE); + goto err; + } + if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) goto auxerr; if (*pval) { diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -103,9 +103,25 @@ return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, tag, aclass); case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING: + /* + * It never makes sense for multi-strings to have implicit tagging, so + * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template. + */ + if (tag != -1) { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE); + return -1; + } return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, -1, aclass); case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: + /* + * It never makes sense for CHOICE types to have implicit tagging, so + * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template. + */ + if (tag != -1) { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE); + return -1; + } if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) return 0; i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1998-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -92,3 +92,35 @@ return 0; return ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->parameter, b->parameter); } + +int X509_ALGOR_copy(X509_ALGOR *dest, const X509_ALGOR *src) +{ + if (src == NULL || dest == NULL) + return 0; + + if (dest->algorithm) + ASN1_OBJECT_free(dest->algorithm); + dest->algorithm = NULL; + + if (dest->parameter) + ASN1_TYPE_free(dest->parameter); + dest->parameter = NULL; + + if (src->algorithm) + if ((dest->algorithm = OBJ_dup(src->algorithm)) == NULL) + return 0; + + if (src->parameter) { + dest->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new(); + if (dest->parameter == NULL) + return 0; + + /* Assuming this is also correct for a BOOL. + * set does copy as a side effect. + */ + if (ASN1_TYPE_set1(dest->parameter, + src->parameter->type, src->parameter->value.ptr) == 0) + return 0; + } + return 1; +} diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bio/b_addr.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bio/b_addr.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bio/b_addr.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bio/b_addr.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ +#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE +# define _GNU_SOURCE +#endif + #include #include diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bio/b_print.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bio/b_print.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bio/b_print.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bio/b_print.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -635,7 +635,11 @@ fvalue = tmpvalue; } ufvalue = abs_val(fvalue); - if (ufvalue > ULONG_MAX) { + /* + * By subtracting 65535 (2^16-1) we cancel the low order 15 bits + * of ULONG_MAX to avoid using imprecise floating point values. + */ + if (ufvalue >= (double)(ULONG_MAX - 65535) + 65536.0) { /* Number too big */ return 0; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -222,10 +222,10 @@ break; case ACPT_S_CREATE_SOCKET: - ret = BIO_socket(BIO_ADDRINFO_family(c->addr_iter), - BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(c->addr_iter), - BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(c->addr_iter), 0); - if (ret == (int)INVALID_SOCKET) { + s = BIO_socket(BIO_ADDRINFO_family(c->addr_iter), + BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(c->addr_iter), + BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(c->addr_iter), 0); + if (s == (int)INVALID_SOCKET) { SYSerr(SYS_F_SOCKET, get_last_socket_error()); ERR_add_error_data(4, "hostname=", c->param_addr, @@ -233,9 +233,10 @@ BIOerr(BIO_F_ACPT_STATE, BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET); goto exit_loop; } - c->accept_sock = ret; - b->num = ret; + c->accept_sock = s; + b->num = s; c->state = ACPT_S_LISTEN; + s = -1; break; case ACPT_S_LISTEN: @@ -433,8 +434,10 @@ b->init = 1; } else if (num == 1) { OPENSSL_free(data->param_serv); - data->param_serv = BUF_strdup(ptr); - b->init = 1; + if ((data->param_serv = OPENSSL_strdup(ptr)) == NULL) + ret = 0; + else + b->init = 1; } else if (num == 2) { data->bind_mode |= BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK; } else if (num == 3) { diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -186,8 +186,17 @@ case BIO_CONN_S_BLOCKED_CONNECT: i = BIO_sock_error(b->num); - if (i) { + if (i != 0) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); + if ((c->addr_iter = BIO_ADDRINFO_next(c->addr_iter)) != NULL) { + /* + * if there are more addresses to try, do that first + */ + BIO_closesocket(b->num); + c->state = BIO_CONN_S_CREATE_SOCKET; + ERR_clear_error(); + break; + } SYSerr(SYS_F_CONNECT, i); ERR_add_error_data(4, "hostname=", c->param_hostname, @@ -407,12 +416,13 @@ case BIO_C_SET_CONNECT: if (ptr != NULL) { b->init = 1; - if (num == 0) { + if (num == 0) { /* BIO_set_conn_hostname */ char *hold_service = data->param_service; /* We affect the hostname regardless. However, the input * string might contain a host:service spec, so we must * parse it, which might or might not affect the service */ + OPENSSL_free(data->param_hostname); data->param_hostname = NULL; ret = BIO_parse_hostserv(ptr, @@ -421,19 +431,29 @@ BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST); if (hold_service != data->param_service) OPENSSL_free(hold_service); - } else if (num == 1) { + } else if (num == 1) { /* BIO_set_conn_port */ OPENSSL_free(data->param_service); - data->param_service = BUF_strdup(ptr); - } else if (num == 2) { + if ((data->param_service = OPENSSL_strdup(ptr)) == NULL) + ret = 0; + } else if (num == 2) { /* BIO_set_conn_address */ const BIO_ADDR *addr = (const BIO_ADDR *)ptr; + char *host = BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(addr, 1); + char *service = BIO_ADDR_service_string(addr, 1); + + ret = host != NULL && service != NULL; if (ret) { - data->param_hostname = BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(addr, 1); - data->param_service = BIO_ADDR_service_string(addr, 1); + OPENSSL_free(data->param_hostname); + data->param_hostname = host; + OPENSSL_free(data->param_service); + data->param_service = service; BIO_ADDRINFO_free(data->addr_first); data->addr_first = NULL; data->addr_iter = NULL; + } else { + OPENSSL_free(host); + OPENSSL_free(service); } - } else if (num == 3) { + } else if (num == 3) { /* BIO_set_conn_ip_family */ data->connect_family = *(int *)ptr; } else { ret = 0; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ $addx = ($1>=11); } -if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) { +if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) { my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 $avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01); $addx = ($ver>=3.03); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ $addx = ($1>=12); } -if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) { +if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) { my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 $addx = ($ver>=3.03); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ $addx = ($1>=12); } -if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) { +if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) { my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 $addx = ($ver>=3.03); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ $addx = ($1>=12); } -if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) { +if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) { my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 $addx = ($ver>=3.03); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -10,22 +10,189 @@ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_local.h" -/* solves ax == 1 (mod n) */ -static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, - const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, - BN_CTX *ctx); - -BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, - const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx) +/* + * bn_mod_inverse_no_branch is a special version of BN_mod_inverse. It does + * not contain branches that may leak sensitive information. + * + * This is a static function, we ensure all callers in this file pass valid + * arguments: all passed pointers here are non-NULL. + */ +static ossl_inline +BIGNUM *bn_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, + const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, + BN_CTX *ctx, int *pnoinv) { - BIGNUM *rv; - int noinv; - rv = int_bn_mod_inverse(in, a, n, ctx, &noinv); - if (noinv) - BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE, BN_R_NO_INVERSE); - return rv; + BIGNUM *A, *B, *X, *Y, *M, *D, *T, *R = NULL; + BIGNUM *ret = NULL; + int sign; + + bn_check_top(a); + bn_check_top(n); + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + A = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + B = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + D = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + M = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + Y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + T = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (T == NULL) + goto err; + + if (in == NULL) + R = BN_new(); + else + R = in; + if (R == NULL) + goto err; + + BN_one(X); + BN_zero(Y); + if (BN_copy(B, a) == NULL) + goto err; + if (BN_copy(A, n) == NULL) + goto err; + A->neg = 0; + + if (B->neg || (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0)) { + /* + * Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked, + * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually. + */ + { + BIGNUM local_B; + bn_init(&local_B); + BN_with_flags(&local_B, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_nnmod(B, &local_B, A, ctx)) + goto err; + /* Ensure local_B goes out of scope before any further use of B */ + } + } + sign = -1; + /*- + * From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that + * + * 0 <= B < A, + * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), + * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|). + */ + + while (!BN_is_zero(B)) { + BIGNUM *tmp; + + /*- + * 0 < B < A, + * (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), + * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|) + */ + + /* + * Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked, + * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually. + */ + { + BIGNUM local_A; + bn_init(&local_A); + BN_with_flags(&local_A, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */ + if (!BN_div(D, M, &local_A, B, ctx)) + goto err; + /* Ensure local_A goes out of scope before any further use of A */ + } + + /*- + * Now + * A = D*B + M; + * thus we have + * (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|). + */ + + tmp = A; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not + * matter */ + + /* (A, B) := (B, A mod B) ... */ + A = B; + B = M; + /* ... so we have 0 <= B < A again */ + + /*- + * Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A, + * (**) translates into + * sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|), + * i.e. + * sign*Y*a - D*A == B (mod |n|). + * Similarly, (*) translates into + * -sign*X*a == A (mod |n|). + * + * Thus, + * sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), + * i.e. + * sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|). + * + * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at + * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), + * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|). + * Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time. + */ + + if (!BN_mul(tmp, D, X, ctx)) + goto err; + if (!BN_add(tmp, tmp, Y)) + goto err; + + M = Y; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not + * matter */ + Y = X; + X = tmp; + sign = -sign; + } + + /*- + * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when + * A == gcd(a,n); + * we have + * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|), + * where Y is non-negative. + */ + + if (sign < 0) { + if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y)) + goto err; + } + /* Now Y*a == A (mod |n|). */ + + if (BN_is_one(A)) { + /* Y*a == 1 (mod |n|) */ + if (!Y->neg && BN_ucmp(Y, n) < 0) { + if (!BN_copy(R, Y)) + goto err; + } else { + if (!BN_nnmod(R, Y, n, ctx)) + goto err; + } + } else { + *pnoinv = 1; + /* caller sets the BN_R_NO_INVERSE error */ + goto err; + } + + ret = R; + *pnoinv = 0; + + err: + if ((ret == NULL) && (in == NULL)) + BN_free(R); + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + bn_check_top(ret); + return ret; } +/* + * This is an internal function, we assume all callers pass valid arguments: + * all pointers passed here are assumed non-NULL. + */ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx, int *pnoinv) @@ -36,17 +203,15 @@ /* This is invalid input so we don't worry about constant time here */ if (BN_abs_is_word(n, 1) || BN_is_zero(n)) { - if (pnoinv != NULL) - *pnoinv = 1; + *pnoinv = 1; return NULL; } - if (pnoinv != NULL) - *pnoinv = 0; + *pnoinv = 0; if ((BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) || (BN_get_flags(n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)) { - return BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(in, a, n, ctx); + return bn_mod_inverse_no_branch(in, a, n, ctx, pnoinv); } bn_check_top(a); @@ -332,8 +497,7 @@ goto err; } } else { - if (pnoinv) - *pnoinv = 1; + *pnoinv = 1; goto err; } ret = R; @@ -345,175 +509,27 @@ return ret; } -/* - * BN_mod_inverse_no_branch is a special version of BN_mod_inverse. It does - * not contain branches that may leak sensitive information. - */ -static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, - const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, - BN_CTX *ctx) +/* solves ax == 1 (mod n) */ +BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, + const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx) { - BIGNUM *A, *B, *X, *Y, *M, *D, *T, *R = NULL; - BIGNUM *ret = NULL; - int sign; - - bn_check_top(a); - bn_check_top(n); - - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - A = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - B = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - D = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - M = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - Y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - T = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - if (T == NULL) - goto err; - - if (in == NULL) - R = BN_new(); - else - R = in; - if (R == NULL) - goto err; - - BN_one(X); - BN_zero(Y); - if (BN_copy(B, a) == NULL) - goto err; - if (BN_copy(A, n) == NULL) - goto err; - A->neg = 0; - - if (B->neg || (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0)) { - /* - * Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked, - * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually. - */ - { - BIGNUM local_B; - bn_init(&local_B); - BN_with_flags(&local_B, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - if (!BN_nnmod(B, &local_B, A, ctx)) - goto err; - /* Ensure local_B goes out of scope before any further use of B */ - } - } - sign = -1; - /*- - * From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that - * - * 0 <= B < A, - * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), - * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|). - */ - - while (!BN_is_zero(B)) { - BIGNUM *tmp; - - /*- - * 0 < B < A, - * (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), - * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|) - */ - - /* - * Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked, - * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually. - */ - { - BIGNUM local_A; - bn_init(&local_A); - BN_with_flags(&local_A, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *rv; + int noinv = 0; - /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */ - if (!BN_div(D, M, &local_A, B, ctx)) - goto err; - /* Ensure local_A goes out of scope before any further use of A */ + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; } - - /*- - * Now - * A = D*B + M; - * thus we have - * (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|). - */ - - tmp = A; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not - * matter */ - - /* (A, B) := (B, A mod B) ... */ - A = B; - B = M; - /* ... so we have 0 <= B < A again */ - - /*- - * Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A, - * (**) translates into - * sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|), - * i.e. - * sign*Y*a - D*A == B (mod |n|). - * Similarly, (*) translates into - * -sign*X*a == A (mod |n|). - * - * Thus, - * sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), - * i.e. - * sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|). - * - * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at - * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), - * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|). - * Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time. - */ - - if (!BN_mul(tmp, D, X, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!BN_add(tmp, tmp, Y)) - goto err; - - M = Y; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not - * matter */ - Y = X; - X = tmp; - sign = -sign; - } - - /*- - * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when - * A == gcd(a,n); - * we have - * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|), - * where Y is non-negative. - */ - - if (sign < 0) { - if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y)) - goto err; } - /* Now Y*a == A (mod |n|). */ - if (BN_is_one(A)) { - /* Y*a == 1 (mod |n|) */ - if (!Y->neg && BN_ucmp(Y, n) < 0) { - if (!BN_copy(R, Y)) - goto err; - } else { - if (!BN_nnmod(R, Y, n, ctx)) - goto err; - } - } else { - BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE_NO_BRANCH, BN_R_NO_INVERSE); - goto err; - } - ret = R; - err: - if ((ret == NULL) && (in == NULL)) - BN_free(R); - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - bn_check_top(ret); - return ret; + rv = int_bn_mod_inverse(in, a, n, ctx, &noinv); + if (noinv) + BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE, BN_R_NO_INVERSE); + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return rv; } /*- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -87,6 +87,15 @@ return &const_one; } +/* + * Old Visual Studio ARM compiler miscompiles BN_num_bits_word() + * https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/2018-August/008465.html + */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_ARM_) && defined(_WIN32_WCE) \ + && _MSC_VER>=1400 && _MSC_VER<1501 +# define MS_BROKEN_BN_num_bits_word +# pragma optimize("", off) +#endif int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG l) { BN_ULONG x, mask; @@ -131,6 +140,9 @@ return bits; } +#ifdef MS_BROKEN_BN_num_bits_word +# pragma optimize("", on) +#endif /* * This function still leaks `a->dmax`: it's caller's responsibility to @@ -322,15 +334,19 @@ BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) { + int bn_words; + bn_check_top(b); + bn_words = BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) ? b->dmax : b->top; + if (a == b) return a; - if (bn_wexpand(a, b->top) == NULL) + if (bn_wexpand(a, bn_words) == NULL) return NULL; if (b->top > 0) - memcpy(a->d, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top); + memcpy(a->d, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * bn_words); a->neg = b->neg; a->top = b->top; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/bn_mpi.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_mpi.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/bn_mpi.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_mpi.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ int neg = 0; BIGNUM *a = NULL; - if (n < 4) { + if (n < 4 || (d[0] & 0x80) != 0) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MPI2BN, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH); return NULL; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl * - * Copyright 1998-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1998-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv8.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv8.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv8.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv8.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ .text .extern OPENSSL_armcap_P +.hidden OPENSSL_armcap_P .align 5 .Lsigma: diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86_64.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86_64.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86_64.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86_64.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } -if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { +if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ $1>=10); # first version supporting AVX $ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && - `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/ && + `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0); # first version supporting AVX $a="eax"; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/cmac/cmac.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/cmac/cmac.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/cmac/cmac.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/cmac/cmac.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2010-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2010-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -116,11 +116,18 @@ return 1; } /* Initialise context */ - if (cipher && !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->cctx, cipher, impl, NULL, NULL)) - return 0; + if (cipher != NULL) { + /* Ensure we can't use this ctx until we also have a key */ + ctx->nlast_block = -1; + if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->cctx, cipher, impl, NULL, NULL)) + return 0; + } /* Non-NULL key means initialisation complete */ - if (key) { + if (key != NULL) { int bl; + + /* If anything fails then ensure we can't use this ctx */ + ctx->nlast_block = -1; if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx->cctx)) return 0; if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx->cctx, keylen)) @@ -128,7 +135,7 @@ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->cctx, NULL, NULL, key, zero_iv)) return 0; bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx->cctx); - if (!EVP_Cipher(ctx->cctx, ctx->tbl, zero_iv, bl)) + if (EVP_Cipher(ctx->cctx, ctx->tbl, zero_iv, bl) <= 0) return 0; make_kn(ctx->k1, ctx->tbl, bl); make_kn(ctx->k2, ctx->k1, bl); @@ -166,12 +173,12 @@ return 1; data += nleft; /* Else not final block so encrypt it */ - if (!EVP_Cipher(ctx->cctx, ctx->tbl, ctx->last_block, bl)) + if (EVP_Cipher(ctx->cctx, ctx->tbl, ctx->last_block, bl) <= 0) return 0; } /* Encrypt all but one of the complete blocks left */ while (dlen > bl) { - if (!EVP_Cipher(ctx->cctx, ctx->tbl, data, bl)) + if (EVP_Cipher(ctx->cctx, ctx->tbl, data, bl) <= 0) return 0; dlen -= bl; data += bl; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2008-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -92,12 +92,13 @@ default: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DATAINIT, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE); - return NULL; + goto err; } if (cmsbio) return BIO_push(cmsbio, cont); +err: if (!icont) BIO_free(cont); return NULL; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2008-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2008-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -897,8 +897,10 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *key = NULL; if (keysize > 0) { key = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); - if (key == NULL || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(key, keysize)) + if (key == NULL || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(key, keysize)) { + ASN1_INTEGER_free(key); return 0; + } } alg = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (alg == NULL) { diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2008-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2008-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ char *ptr; long len; len = BIO_get_mem_data(dcont, &ptr); - tmpin = BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len); + tmpin = (len == 0) ? dcont : BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len); if (tmpin == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err2; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/conf/conf_def.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/conf/conf_def.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/conf/conf_def.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/conf/conf_def.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ BUF_MEM *buff = NULL; char *s, *p, *end; int again; + int first_call = 1; long eline = 0; char btmp[DECIMAL_SIZE(eline) + 1]; CONF_VALUE *v = NULL, *tv; @@ -233,6 +234,19 @@ BIO_gets(in, p, CONFBUFSIZE - 1); p[CONFBUFSIZE - 1] = '\0'; ii = i = strlen(p); + if (first_call) { + /* Other BOMs imply unsupported multibyte encoding, + * so don't strip them and let the error raise */ + const unsigned char utf8_bom[3] = {0xEF, 0xBB, 0xBF}; + + if (i >= 3 && memcmp(p, utf8_bom, 3) == 0) { + memmove(p, p + 3, i - 3); + p[i - 3] = 0; + i -= 3; + ii -= 3; + } + first_call = 0; + } if (i == 0 && !again) { /* the currently processed BIO is at EOF */ BIO *parent; @@ -376,11 +390,13 @@ if (biosk == NULL) { if ((biosk = sk_BIO_new_null()) == NULL) { CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + BIO_free(next); goto err; } } if (!sk_BIO_push(biosk, in)) { CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + BIO_free(next); goto err; } /* continue with reading from the included BIO */ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/conf/conf_def.h openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/conf/conf_def.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/conf/conf_def.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/conf/conf_def.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/conf/keysets.pl * - * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/dh/dh_key.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_key.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/dh/dh_key.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dh/dh_key.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -25,18 +25,45 @@ return dh->meth->generate_key(dh); } +/*- + * NB: This function is inherently not constant time due to the + * RFC 5246 (8.1.2) padding style that strips leading zero bytes. + */ int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh) { - return dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh); + int ret = 0, i; + volatile size_t npad = 0, mask = 1; + + /* compute the key; ret is constant unless compute_key is external */ + if ((ret = dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh)) <= 0) + return ret; + + /* count leading zero bytes, yet still touch all bytes */ + for (i = 0; i < ret; i++) { + mask &= !key[i]; + npad += mask; + } + + /* unpad key */ + ret -= npad; + /* key-dependent memory access, potentially leaking npad / ret */ + memmove(key, key + npad, ret); + /* key-dependent memory access, potentially leaking npad / ret */ + memset(key + ret, 0, npad); + + return ret; } int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh) { int rv, pad; + + /* rv is constant unless compute_key is external */ rv = dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh); if (rv <= 0) return rv; pad = BN_num_bytes(dh->p) - rv; + /* pad is constant (zero) unless compute_key is external */ if (pad > 0) { memmove(key + pad, key, rv); memset(key, 0, pad); @@ -212,7 +239,7 @@ goto err; } - ret = BN_bn2bin(tmp, key); + ret = BN_bn2binpad(tmp, key, BN_num_bytes(dh->p)); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -565,8 +565,8 @@ /* Enumerate the modules to find one which includes me. */ do { - if ((uintptr_t) addr >= (uintptr_t) me32.modBaseAddr && - (uintptr_t) addr < (uintptr_t) (me32.modBaseAddr + me32.modBaseSize)) { + if ((size_t) addr >= (size_t) me32.modBaseAddr && + (size_t) addr < (size_t) (me32.modBaseAddr + me32.modBaseSize)) { (*close_snap) (hModuleSnap); FreeLibrary(dll); # ifdef _WIN32_WCE diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv4.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv4.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv4.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv4.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1517,9 +1517,9 @@ ldr $t2,[sp,#32*18+12] @ ~is_equal(S1,S2) mvn $t0,$t0 @ -1/0 -> 0/-1 mvn $t1,$t1 @ -1/0 -> 0/-1 - orr $a0,$t0 - orr $a0,$t1 - orrs $a0,$t2 @ set flags + orr $a0,$a0,$t0 + orr $a0,$a0,$t1 + orrs $a0,$a0,$t2 @ set flags @ if(~is_equal(U1,U2) | in1infty | in2infty | ~is_equal(S1,S2)) bne .Ladd_proceed diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-avx2.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-avx2.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-avx2.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-avx2.pl 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,2080 +0,0 @@ -#! /usr/bin/env perl -# Copyright 2014-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. -# Copyright (c) 2014, Intel Corporation. All Rights Reserved. -# -# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use -# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy -# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at -# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html -# -# Originally written by Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1) -# (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel -# (2) University of Haifa, Israel -# -# Reference: -# S.Gueron and V.Krasnov, "Fast Prime Field Elliptic Curve Cryptography with -# 256 Bit Primes" - -$flavour = shift; -$output = shift; -if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; } - -$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/); - -$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; -( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or -( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or -die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl"; - -open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output"; -*STDOUT=*OUT; - -if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1` - =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { - $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22); - $addx = ($1>=2.23); -} - -if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) && - `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) { - $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); - $addx = ($1>=2.10); -} - -if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) && - `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) { - $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); - $addx = ($1>=12); -} - -if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) { - my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 - $avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01); - $addx = ($ver>=3.03); -} - -if ($avx>=2) {{ -$digit_size = "\$29"; -$n_digits = "\$9"; - -$code.=<<___; -.text - -.align 64 -.LAVX2_AND_MASK: -.LAVX2_POLY: -.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff -.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff -.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff -.quad 0x000001ff, 0x000001ff, 0x000001ff, 0x000001ff -.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 -.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 -.quad 0x00040000, 0x00040000, 0x00040000, 0x00040000 -.quad 0x1fe00000, 0x1fe00000, 0x1fe00000, 0x1fe00000 -.quad 0x00ffffff, 0x00ffffff, 0x00ffffff, 0x00ffffff - -.LAVX2_POLY_x2: -.quad 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC -.quad 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC -.quad 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC -.quad 0x400007FC, 0x400007FC, 0x400007FC, 0x400007FC -.quad 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE -.quad 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE, 0x3FFFFFFE -.quad 0x400FFFFE, 0x400FFFFE, 0x400FFFFE, 0x400FFFFE -.quad 0x7F7FFFFE, 0x7F7FFFFE, 0x7F7FFFFE, 0x7F7FFFFE -.quad 0x03FFFFFC, 0x03FFFFFC, 0x03FFFFFC, 0x03FFFFFC - -.LAVX2_POLY_x8: -.quad 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8 -.quad 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8 -.quad 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFF8 -.quad 0x80000FF8, 0x80000FF8, 0x80000FF8, 0x80000FF8 -.quad 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC -.quad 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC, 0x7FFFFFFC -.quad 0x801FFFFC, 0x801FFFFC, 0x801FFFFC, 0x801FFFFC -.quad 0xFEFFFFFC, 0xFEFFFFFC, 0xFEFFFFFC, 0xFEFFFFFC -.quad 0x07FFFFF8, 0x07FFFFF8, 0x07FFFFF8, 0x07FFFFF8 - -.LONE: -.quad 0x00000020, 0x00000020, 0x00000020, 0x00000020 -.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 -.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 -.quad 0x1fffc000, 0x1fffc000, 0x1fffc000, 0x1fffc000 -.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff -.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff -.quad 0x1f7fffff, 0x1f7fffff, 0x1f7fffff, 0x1f7fffff -.quad 0x03ffffff, 0x03ffffff, 0x03ffffff, 0x03ffffff -.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 - -# RR = 2^266 mod p in AVX2 format, to transform from the native OpenSSL -# Montgomery form (*2^256) to our format (*2^261) - -.LTO_MONT_AVX2: -.quad 0x00000400, 0x00000400, 0x00000400, 0x00000400 -.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 -.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 -.quad 0x1ff80000, 0x1ff80000, 0x1ff80000, 0x1ff80000 -.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff -.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff -.quad 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff, 0x0fffffff -.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff -.quad 0x00000003, 0x00000003, 0x00000003, 0x00000003 - -.LFROM_MONT_AVX2: -.quad 0x00000001, 0x00000001, 0x00000001, 0x00000001 -.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 -.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 -.quad 0x1ffffe00, 0x1ffffe00, 0x1ffffe00, 0x1ffffe00 -.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff -.quad 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x1fffffff -.quad 0x1ffbffff, 0x1ffbffff, 0x1ffbffff, 0x1ffbffff -.quad 0x001fffff, 0x001fffff, 0x001fffff, 0x001fffff -.quad 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 - -.LIntOne: -.long 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 -___ - -{ -# This function receives a pointer to an array of four affine points -# (X, Y, <1>) and rearranges the data for AVX2 execution, while -# converting it to 2^29 radix redundant form - -my ($X0,$X1,$X2,$X3, $Y0,$Y1,$Y2,$Y3, - $T0,$T1,$T2,$T3, $T4,$T5,$T6,$T7)=map("%ymm$_",(0..15)); - -$code.=<<___; -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert -.type ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert,\@function,2 -.align 64 -ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert: - vzeroupper -___ -$code.=<<___ if ($win64); - lea -8-16*10(%rsp), %rsp - vmovaps %xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax) -___ -$code.=<<___; - # Load the data - vmovdqa 32*0(%rsi), $X0 - lea 112(%rsi), %rax # size optimization - vmovdqa 32*1(%rsi), $Y0 - lea .LAVX2_AND_MASK(%rip), %rdx - vmovdqa 32*2(%rsi), $X1 - vmovdqa 32*3(%rsi), $Y1 - vmovdqa 32*4-112(%rax), $X2 - vmovdqa 32*5-112(%rax), $Y2 - vmovdqa 32*6-112(%rax), $X3 - vmovdqa 32*7-112(%rax), $Y3 - - # Transpose X and Y independently - vpunpcklqdq $X1, $X0, $T0 # T0 = [B2 A2 B0 A0] - vpunpcklqdq $X3, $X2, $T1 # T1 = [D2 C2 D0 C0] - vpunpckhqdq $X1, $X0, $T2 # T2 = [B3 A3 B1 A1] - vpunpckhqdq $X3, $X2, $T3 # T3 = [D3 C3 D1 C1] - - vpunpcklqdq $Y1, $Y0, $T4 - vpunpcklqdq $Y3, $Y2, $T5 - vpunpckhqdq $Y1, $Y0, $T6 - vpunpckhqdq $Y3, $Y2, $T7 - - vperm2i128 \$0x20, $T1, $T0, $X0 # X0 = [D0 C0 B0 A0] - vperm2i128 \$0x20, $T3, $T2, $X1 # X1 = [D1 C1 B1 A1] - vperm2i128 \$0x31, $T1, $T0, $X2 # X2 = [D2 C2 B2 A2] - vperm2i128 \$0x31, $T3, $T2, $X3 # X3 = [D3 C3 B3 A3] - - vperm2i128 \$0x20, $T5, $T4, $Y0 - vperm2i128 \$0x20, $T7, $T6, $Y1 - vperm2i128 \$0x31, $T5, $T4, $Y2 - vperm2i128 \$0x31, $T7, $T6, $Y3 - vmovdqa (%rdx), $T7 - - vpand (%rdx), $X0, $T0 # out[0] = in[0] & mask; - vpsrlq \$29, $X0, $X0 - vpand $T7, $X0, $T1 # out[1] = (in[0] >> shift) & mask; - vpsrlq \$29, $X0, $X0 - vpsllq \$6, $X1, $T2 - vpxor $X0, $T2, $T2 - vpand $T7, $T2, $T2 # out[2] = ((in[0] >> (shift*2)) ^ (in[1] << (64-shift*2))) & mask; - vpsrlq \$23, $X1, $X1 - vpand $T7, $X1, $T3 # out[3] = (in[1] >> ((shift*3)%64)) & mask; - vpsrlq \$29, $X1, $X1 - vpsllq \$12, $X2, $T4 - vpxor $X1, $T4, $T4 - vpand $T7, $T4, $T4 # out[4] = ((in[1] >> ((shift*4)%64)) ^ (in[2] << (64*2-shift*4))) & mask; - vpsrlq \$17, $X2, $X2 - vpand $T7, $X2, $T5 # out[5] = (in[2] >> ((shift*5)%64)) & mask; - vpsrlq \$29, $X2, $X2 - vpsllq \$18, $X3, $T6 - vpxor $X2, $T6, $T6 - vpand $T7, $T6, $T6 # out[6] = ((in[2] >> ((shift*6)%64)) ^ (in[3] << (64*3-shift*6))) & mask; - vpsrlq \$11, $X3, $X3 - vmovdqa $T0, 32*0(%rdi) - lea 112(%rdi), %rax # size optimization - vpand $T7, $X3, $T0 # out[7] = (in[3] >> ((shift*7)%64)) & mask; - vpsrlq \$29, $X3, $X3 # out[8] = (in[3] >> ((shift*8)%64)) & mask; - - vmovdqa $T1, 32*1(%rdi) - vmovdqa $T2, 32*2(%rdi) - vmovdqa $T3, 32*3(%rdi) - vmovdqa $T4, 32*4-112(%rax) - vmovdqa $T5, 32*5-112(%rax) - vmovdqa $T6, 32*6-112(%rax) - vmovdqa $T0, 32*7-112(%rax) - vmovdqa $X3, 32*8-112(%rax) - lea 448(%rdi), %rax # size optimization - - vpand $T7, $Y0, $T0 # out[0] = in[0] & mask; - vpsrlq \$29, $Y0, $Y0 - vpand $T7, $Y0, $T1 # out[1] = (in[0] >> shift) & mask; - vpsrlq \$29, $Y0, $Y0 - vpsllq \$6, $Y1, $T2 - vpxor $Y0, $T2, $T2 - vpand $T7, $T2, $T2 # out[2] = ((in[0] >> (shift*2)) ^ (in[1] << (64-shift*2))) & mask; - vpsrlq \$23, $Y1, $Y1 - vpand $T7, $Y1, $T3 # out[3] = (in[1] >> ((shift*3)%64)) & mask; - vpsrlq \$29, $Y1, $Y1 - vpsllq \$12, $Y2, $T4 - vpxor $Y1, $T4, $T4 - vpand $T7, $T4, $T4 # out[4] = ((in[1] >> ((shift*4)%64)) ^ (in[2] << (64*2-shift*4))) & mask; - vpsrlq \$17, $Y2, $Y2 - vpand $T7, $Y2, $T5 # out[5] = (in[2] >> ((shift*5)%64)) & mask; - vpsrlq \$29, $Y2, $Y2 - vpsllq \$18, $Y3, $T6 - vpxor $Y2, $T6, $T6 - vpand $T7, $T6, $T6 # out[6] = ((in[2] >> ((shift*6)%64)) ^ (in[3] << (64*3-shift*6))) & mask; - vpsrlq \$11, $Y3, $Y3 - vmovdqa $T0, 32*9-448(%rax) - vpand $T7, $Y3, $T0 # out[7] = (in[3] >> ((shift*7)%64)) & mask; - vpsrlq \$29, $Y3, $Y3 # out[8] = (in[3] >> ((shift*8)%64)) & mask; - - vmovdqa $T1, 32*10-448(%rax) - vmovdqa $T2, 32*11-448(%rax) - vmovdqa $T3, 32*12-448(%rax) - vmovdqa $T4, 32*13-448(%rax) - vmovdqa $T5, 32*14-448(%rax) - vmovdqa $T6, 32*15-448(%rax) - vmovdqa $T0, 32*16-448(%rax) - vmovdqa $Y3, 32*17-448(%rax) - - vzeroupper -___ -$code.=<<___ if ($win64); - movaps 16*0(%rsp), %xmm6 - movaps 16*1(%rsp), %xmm7 - movaps 16*2(%rsp), %xmm8 - movaps 16*3(%rsp), %xmm9 - movaps 16*4(%rsp), %xmm10 - movaps 16*5(%rsp), %xmm11 - movaps 16*6(%rsp), %xmm12 - movaps 16*7(%rsp), %xmm13 - movaps 16*8(%rsp), %xmm14 - movaps 16*9(%rsp), %xmm15 - lea 8+16*10(%rsp), %rsp -___ -$code.=<<___; - ret -.size ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert -___ -} -{ -################################################################################ -# This function receives a pointer to an array of four AVX2 formatted points -# (X, Y, Z) convert the data to normal representation, and rearranges the data - -my ($D0,$D1,$D2,$D3, $D4,$D5,$D6,$D7, $D8)=map("%ymm$_",(0..8)); -my ($T0,$T1,$T2,$T3, $T4,$T5,$T6)=map("%ymm$_",(9..15)); - -$code.=<<___; - -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back -.type ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back,\@function,2 -.align 32 -ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back: - vzeroupper -___ -$code.=<<___ if ($win64); - lea -8-16*10(%rsp), %rsp - vmovaps %xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax) -___ -$code.=<<___; - mov \$3, %ecx - -.Lconv_loop: - vmovdqa 32*0(%rsi), $D0 - lea 160(%rsi), %rax # size optimization - vmovdqa 32*1(%rsi), $D1 - vmovdqa 32*2(%rsi), $D2 - vmovdqa 32*3(%rsi), $D3 - vmovdqa 32*4-160(%rax), $D4 - vmovdqa 32*5-160(%rax), $D5 - vmovdqa 32*6-160(%rax), $D6 - vmovdqa 32*7-160(%rax), $D7 - vmovdqa 32*8-160(%rax), $D8 - - vpsllq \$29, $D1, $D1 - vpsllq \$58, $D2, $T0 - vpaddq $D1, $D0, $D0 - vpaddq $T0, $D0, $D0 # out[0] = (in[0]) ^ (in[1] << shift*1) ^ (in[2] << shift*2); - - vpsrlq \$6, $D2, $D2 - vpsllq \$23, $D3, $D3 - vpsllq \$52, $D4, $T1 - vpaddq $D2, $D3, $D3 - vpaddq $D3, $T1, $D1 # out[1] = (in[2] >> (64*1-shift*2)) ^ (in[3] << shift*3%64) ^ (in[4] << shift*4%64); - - vpsrlq \$12, $D4, $D4 - vpsllq \$17, $D5, $D5 - vpsllq \$46, $D6, $T2 - vpaddq $D4, $D5, $D5 - vpaddq $D5, $T2, $D2 # out[2] = (in[4] >> (64*2-shift*4)) ^ (in[5] << shift*5%64) ^ (in[6] << shift*6%64); - - vpsrlq \$18, $D6, $D6 - vpsllq \$11, $D7, $D7 - vpsllq \$40, $D8, $T3 - vpaddq $D6, $D7, $D7 - vpaddq $D7, $T3, $D3 # out[3] = (in[6] >> (64*3-shift*6)) ^ (in[7] << shift*7%64) ^ (in[8] << shift*8%64); - - vpunpcklqdq $D1, $D0, $T0 # T0 = [B2 A2 B0 A0] - vpunpcklqdq $D3, $D2, $T1 # T1 = [D2 C2 D0 C0] - vpunpckhqdq $D1, $D0, $T2 # T2 = [B3 A3 B1 A1] - vpunpckhqdq $D3, $D2, $T3 # T3 = [D3 C3 D1 C1] - - vperm2i128 \$0x20, $T1, $T0, $D0 # X0 = [D0 C0 B0 A0] - vperm2i128 \$0x20, $T3, $T2, $D1 # X1 = [D1 C1 B1 A1] - vperm2i128 \$0x31, $T1, $T0, $D2 # X2 = [D2 C2 B2 A2] - vperm2i128 \$0x31, $T3, $T2, $D3 # X3 = [D3 C3 B3 A3] - - vmovdqa $D0, 32*0(%rdi) - vmovdqa $D1, 32*3(%rdi) - vmovdqa $D2, 32*6(%rdi) - vmovdqa $D3, 32*9(%rdi) - - lea 32*9(%rsi), %rsi - lea 32*1(%rdi), %rdi - - dec %ecx - jnz .Lconv_loop - - vzeroupper -___ -$code.=<<___ if ($win64); - movaps 16*0(%rsp), %xmm6 - movaps 16*1(%rsp), %xmm7 - movaps 16*2(%rsp), %xmm8 - movaps 16*3(%rsp), %xmm9 - movaps 16*4(%rsp), %xmm10 - movaps 16*5(%rsp), %xmm11 - movaps 16*6(%rsp), %xmm12 - movaps 16*7(%rsp), %xmm13 - movaps 16*8(%rsp), %xmm14 - movaps 16*9(%rsp), %xmm15 - lea 8+16*10(%rsp), %rsp -___ -$code.=<<___; - ret -.size ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back -___ -} -{ -my ($r_ptr,$a_ptr,$b_ptr,$itr)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%ecx"); -my ($ACC0,$ACC1,$ACC2,$ACC3,$ACC4,$ACC5,$ACC6,$ACC7,$ACC8)=map("%ymm$_",(0..8)); -my ($B,$Y,$T0,$AND_MASK,$OVERFLOW)=map("%ymm$_",(9..13)); - -sub NORMALIZE { -my $ret=<<___; - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC0, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC1 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC1, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC2, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC3 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC3, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC4, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC5, $ACC5 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC5, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC6, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC7, $ACC7 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC7, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC8 - #vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 -___ - $ret; -} - -sub STORE { -my $ret=<<___; - vmovdqa $ACC0, 32*0(%rdi) - lea 160(%rdi), %rax # size optimization - vmovdqa $ACC1, 32*1(%rdi) - vmovdqa $ACC2, 32*2(%rdi) - vmovdqa $ACC3, 32*3(%rdi) - vmovdqa $ACC4, 32*4-160(%rax) - vmovdqa $ACC5, 32*5-160(%rax) - vmovdqa $ACC6, 32*6-160(%rax) - vmovdqa $ACC7, 32*7-160(%rax) - vmovdqa $ACC8, 32*8-160(%rax) -___ - $ret; -} - -$code.=<<___; -.type avx2_normalize,\@abi-omnipotent -.align 32 -avx2_normalize: - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC0, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC1 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC1, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC2, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC3 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC3, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC4, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC5, $ACC5 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC5, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC6, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC7, $ACC7 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC7, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC8 - #vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 - - ret -.size avx2_normalize,.-avx2_normalize - -.type avx2_normalize_n_store,\@abi-omnipotent -.align 32 -avx2_normalize_n_store: - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC0, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC1 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC1, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC1, $ACC1 - vmovdqa $ACC0, 32*0(%rdi) - lea 160(%rdi), %rax # size optimization - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC2, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vmovdqa $ACC1, 32*1(%rdi) - vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC3 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC3, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vmovdqa $ACC2, 32*2(%rdi) - vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC4, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vmovdqa $ACC3, 32*3(%rdi) - vpaddq $T0, $ACC5, $ACC5 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC5, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vmovdqa $ACC4, 32*4-160(%rax) - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC6, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC6, $ACC6 - vmovdqa $ACC5, 32*5-160(%rax) - vpaddq $T0, $ACC7, $ACC7 - - vpsrlq $digit_size, $ACC7, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vmovdqa $ACC6, 32*6-160(%rax) - vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC8 - #vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC8, $ACC8 - vmovdqa $ACC7, 32*7-160(%rax) - vmovdqa $ACC8, 32*8-160(%rax) - - ret -.size avx2_normalize_n_store,.-avx2_normalize_n_store - -################################################################################ -# void avx2_mul_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4, void *Bx4); -.type avx2_mul_x4,\@abi-omnipotent -.align 32 -avx2_mul_x4: - lea .LAVX2_POLY(%rip), %rax - - vpxor $ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpxor $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpxor $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpxor $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpxor $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpxor $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpxor $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpxor $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 - - vmovdqa 32*7(%rax), %ymm14 - vmovdqa 32*8(%rax), %ymm15 - - mov $n_digits, $itr - lea -512($a_ptr), $a_ptr # strategic bias to control u-op density - jmp .Lavx2_mul_x4_loop - -.align 32 -.Lavx2_mul_x4_loop: - vmovdqa 32*0($b_ptr), $B - lea 32*1($b_ptr), $b_ptr - - vpmuludq 32*0+512($a_ptr), $B, $T0 - vpmuludq 32*1+512($a_ptr), $B, $OVERFLOW # borrow $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpmuludq 32*2+512($a_ptr), $B, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y - vpmuludq 32*3+512($a_ptr), $B, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpmuludq 32*4+512($a_ptr), $B, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpmuludq 32*5+512($a_ptr), $B, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpmuludq 32*6+512($a_ptr), $B, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpmuludq 32*7+512($a_ptr), $B, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 - - # Skip some multiplications, optimizing for the constant poly - vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpmuludq 32*8+512($a_ptr), $B, $ACC8 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 - vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 - vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 - .byte 0x67 - vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 - vpsllq \$18, $Y, $OVERFLOW - .byte 0x67 - vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 - vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC6, $ACC5 - vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC7, $ACC6 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC8, $ACC7 - - dec $itr - jnz .Lavx2_mul_x4_loop - - vpxor $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 - - ret -.size avx2_mul_x4,.-avx2_mul_x4 - -# Function optimized for the constant 1 -################################################################################ -# void avx2_mul_by1_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4); -.type avx2_mul_by1_x4,\@abi-omnipotent -.align 32 -avx2_mul_by1_x4: - lea .LAVX2_POLY(%rip), %rax - - vpxor $ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpxor $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpxor $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpxor $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpxor $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpxor $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpxor $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpxor $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpxor $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 - - vmovdqa 32*3+.LONE(%rip), %ymm14 - vmovdqa 32*7+.LONE(%rip), %ymm15 - - mov $n_digits, $itr - jmp .Lavx2_mul_by1_x4_loop - -.align 32 -.Lavx2_mul_by1_x4_loop: - vmovdqa 32*0($a_ptr), $B - .byte 0x48,0x8d,0xb6,0x20,0,0,0 # lea 32*1($a_ptr), $a_ptr - - vpsllq \$5, $B, $OVERFLOW - vpmuludq %ymm14, $B, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC3 - .byte 0x67 - vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $B, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y - vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpsllq \$23, $B, $T0 - - .byte 0x67,0x67 - vpmuludq %ymm15, $B, $OVERFLOW - vpsubq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 - - vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 - .byte 0x67,0x67 - vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 - vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 - vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 - vpsllq \$18, $Y, $OVERFLOW - vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 - vpmuludq 32*7(%rax), $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC6, $ACC5 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC7, $ACC6 - vpmuludq 32*8(%rax), $Y, $ACC7 - - dec $itr - jnz .Lavx2_mul_by1_x4_loop - - ret -.size avx2_mul_by1_x4,.-avx2_mul_by1_x4 - -################################################################################ -# void avx2_sqr_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4, void *Bx4); -.type avx2_sqr_x4,\@abi-omnipotent -.align 32 -avx2_sqr_x4: - lea .LAVX2_POLY(%rip), %rax - - vmovdqa 32*7(%rax), %ymm14 - vmovdqa 32*8(%rax), %ymm15 - - vmovdqa 32*0($a_ptr), $B - vmovdqa 32*1($a_ptr), $ACC1 - vmovdqa 32*2($a_ptr), $ACC2 - vmovdqa 32*3($a_ptr), $ACC3 - vmovdqa 32*4($a_ptr), $ACC4 - vmovdqa 32*5($a_ptr), $ACC5 - vmovdqa 32*6($a_ptr), $ACC6 - vmovdqa 32*7($a_ptr), $ACC7 - vpaddq $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 # 2*$ACC0..7 - vmovdqa 32*8($a_ptr), $ACC8 - vpaddq $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vmovdqa $ACC1, 32*0(%rcx) - vpaddq $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vmovdqa $ACC2, 32*1(%rcx) - vpaddq $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vmovdqa $ACC3, 32*2(%rcx) - vpaddq $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vmovdqa $ACC4, 32*3(%rcx) - vpaddq $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 - vmovdqa $ACC5, 32*4(%rcx) - vpaddq $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vmovdqa $ACC6, 32*5(%rcx) - vpaddq $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 - vmovdqa $ACC7, 32*6(%rcx) - vmovdqa $ACC8, 32*7(%rcx) - - #itr 1 - vpmuludq $B, $B, $ACC0 - vpmuludq $B, $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y - vpmuludq $B, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpmuludq $B, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpmuludq $B, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpmuludq $B, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpmuludq $B, $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 - vpmuludq $B, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpmuludq $B, $ACC8, $ACC8 - vmovdqa 32*1($a_ptr), $B - - vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 - vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 - vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 - vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 - vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 - vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 - vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 - vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 - - #itr 2 - vpmuludq $B, $B, $OVERFLOW - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y - vpmuludq 32*1(%rcx), $B, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpmuludq 32*2(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpmuludq 32*3(%rcx), $B, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpmuludq 32*4(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpmuludq 32*5(%rcx), $B, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpmuludq 32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 - - vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpmuludq 32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8 - vmovdqa 32*2($a_ptr), $B - vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 - vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 - vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 - vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 - vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 - vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 - vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 - vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 - - #itr 3 - vpmuludq $B, $B, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y - vpmuludq 32*2(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpmuludq 32*3(%rcx), $B, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpmuludq 32*4(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpmuludq 32*5(%rcx), $B, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpmuludq 32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 - - vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpmuludq 32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8 - vmovdqa 32*3($a_ptr), $B - vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 - vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 - vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 - vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 - vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 - vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 - vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 - vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 - - #itr 4 - vpmuludq $B, $B, $OVERFLOW - vpmuludq 32*3(%rcx), $B, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpmuludq 32*4(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpmuludq 32*5(%rcx), $B, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpmuludq 32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 - - vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpmuludq 32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8 - vmovdqa 32*4($a_ptr), $B - vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 - vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 - vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 - vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 - vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 - vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 - vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 - vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 - - #itr 5 - vpmuludq $B, $B, $T0 - vpmuludq 32*4(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpmuludq 32*5(%rcx), $B, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpmuludq 32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 - - vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpmuludq 32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8 - vmovdqa 32*5($a_ptr), $B - vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW - vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 - vpmuludq 32*3+.LAVX2_POLY(%rip), $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 - vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 - vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 - vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 - vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 - vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 - - #itr 6 - vpmuludq $B, $B, $OVERFLOW - vpmuludq 32*5(%rcx), $B, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpmuludq 32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 - - vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpmuludq 32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8 - vmovdqa 32*6($a_ptr), $B - vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 - vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 - vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 - vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 - vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 - vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 - vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 - vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 - - #itr 7 - vpmuludq $B, $B, $T0 - vpmuludq 32*6(%rcx), $B, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 - - vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpmuludq 32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8 - vmovdqa 32*7($a_ptr), $B - vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW - vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 - vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 - vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 - vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 - vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 - vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 - vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 - - #itr 8 - vpmuludq $B, $B, $OVERFLOW - - vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpmuludq 32*7(%rcx), $B, $ACC8 - vmovdqa 32*8($a_ptr), $B - vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW - vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 - vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 - vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 - vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 - vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 - vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 - vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 - vpand $AND_MASK, $ACC0, $Y - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 - - #itr 9 - vpmuludq $B, $B, $ACC8 - - vpmuludq $AND_MASK, $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC0, $OVERFLOW - vpsrlq $digit_size, $OVERFLOW, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC1, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC2, $ACC1 - vpmuludq 32*3(%rax), $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC3, $ACC2 - vmovdqa $ACC4, $ACC3 - vpsllq \$18, $Y, $T0 - vmovdqa $ACC5, $ACC4 - vpmuludq %ymm14, $Y, $OVERFLOW - vpaddq $T0, $ACC6, $ACC5 - vpmuludq %ymm15, $Y, $T0 - vpaddq $OVERFLOW, $ACC7, $ACC6 - vpaddq $T0, $ACC8, $ACC7 - - vpxor $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 - - ret -.size avx2_sqr_x4,.-avx2_sqr_x4 - -################################################################################ -# void avx2_sub_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4, void *Bx4); -.type avx2_sub_x4,\@abi-omnipotent -.align 32 -avx2_sub_x4: - vmovdqa 32*0($a_ptr), $ACC0 - lea 160($a_ptr), $a_ptr - lea .LAVX2_POLY_x8+128(%rip), %rax - lea 128($b_ptr), $b_ptr - vmovdqa 32*1-160($a_ptr), $ACC1 - vmovdqa 32*2-160($a_ptr), $ACC2 - vmovdqa 32*3-160($a_ptr), $ACC3 - vmovdqa 32*4-160($a_ptr), $ACC4 - vmovdqa 32*5-160($a_ptr), $ACC5 - vmovdqa 32*6-160($a_ptr), $ACC6 - vmovdqa 32*7-160($a_ptr), $ACC7 - vmovdqa 32*8-160($a_ptr), $ACC8 - - vpaddq 32*0-128(%rax), $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq 32*1-128(%rax), $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpaddq 32*2-128(%rax), $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpaddq 32*3-128(%rax), $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpaddq 32*4-128(%rax), $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpaddq 32*5-128(%rax), $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpaddq 32*6-128(%rax), $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpaddq 32*7-128(%rax), $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpaddq 32*8-128(%rax), $ACC8, $ACC8 - - vpsubq 32*0-128($b_ptr), $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpsubq 32*1-128($b_ptr), $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpsubq 32*2-128($b_ptr), $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpsubq 32*3-128($b_ptr), $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpsubq 32*4-128($b_ptr), $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpsubq 32*5-128($b_ptr), $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpsubq 32*6-128($b_ptr), $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpsubq 32*7-128($b_ptr), $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpsubq 32*8-128($b_ptr), $ACC8, $ACC8 - - ret -.size avx2_sub_x4,.-avx2_sub_x4 - -.type avx2_select_n_store,\@abi-omnipotent -.align 32 -avx2_select_n_store: - vmovdqa `8+32*9*8`(%rsp), $Y - vpor `8+32*9*8+32`(%rsp), $Y, $Y - - vpandn $ACC0, $Y, $ACC0 - vpandn $ACC1, $Y, $ACC1 - vpandn $ACC2, $Y, $ACC2 - vpandn $ACC3, $Y, $ACC3 - vpandn $ACC4, $Y, $ACC4 - vpandn $ACC5, $Y, $ACC5 - vpandn $ACC6, $Y, $ACC6 - vmovdqa `8+32*9*8+32`(%rsp), $B - vpandn $ACC7, $Y, $ACC7 - vpandn `8+32*9*8`(%rsp), $B, $B - vpandn $ACC8, $Y, $ACC8 - - vpand 32*0(%rsi), $B, $T0 - lea 160(%rsi), %rax - vpand 32*1(%rsi), $B, $Y - vpxor $T0, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpand 32*2(%rsi), $B, $T0 - vpxor $Y, $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpand 32*3(%rsi), $B, $Y - vpxor $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpand 32*4-160(%rax), $B, $T0 - vpxor $Y, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpand 32*5-160(%rax), $B, $Y - vpxor $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpand 32*6-160(%rax), $B, $T0 - vpxor $Y, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpand 32*7-160(%rax), $B, $Y - vpxor $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpand 32*8-160(%rax), $B, $T0 - vmovdqa `8+32*9*8+32`(%rsp), $B - vpxor $Y, $ACC7, $ACC7 - - vpand 32*0(%rdx), $B, $Y - lea 160(%rdx), %rax - vpxor $T0, $ACC8, $ACC8 - vpand 32*1(%rdx), $B, $T0 - vpxor $Y, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpand 32*2(%rdx), $B, $Y - vpxor $T0, $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpand 32*3(%rdx), $B, $T0 - vpxor $Y, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpand 32*4-160(%rax), $B, $Y - vpxor $T0, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpand 32*5-160(%rax), $B, $T0 - vpxor $Y, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpand 32*6-160(%rax), $B, $Y - vpxor $T0, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpand 32*7-160(%rax), $B, $T0 - vpxor $Y, $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpand 32*8-160(%rax), $B, $Y - vpxor $T0, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpxor $Y, $ACC8, $ACC8 - `&STORE` - - ret -.size avx2_select_n_store,.-avx2_select_n_store -___ -$code.=<<___ if (0); # inlined -################################################################################ -# void avx2_mul_by2_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4); -.type avx2_mul_by2_x4,\@abi-omnipotent -.align 32 -avx2_mul_by2_x4: - vmovdqa 32*0($a_ptr), $ACC0 - lea 160($a_ptr), %rax - vmovdqa 32*1($a_ptr), $ACC1 - vmovdqa 32*2($a_ptr), $ACC2 - vmovdqa 32*3($a_ptr), $ACC3 - vmovdqa 32*4-160(%rax), $ACC4 - vmovdqa 32*5-160(%rax), $ACC5 - vmovdqa 32*6-160(%rax), $ACC6 - vmovdqa 32*7-160(%rax), $ACC7 - vmovdqa 32*8-160(%rax), $ACC8 - - vpaddq $ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpaddq $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpaddq $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpaddq $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpaddq $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpaddq $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpaddq $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpaddq $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 - - ret -.size avx2_mul_by2_x4,.-avx2_mul_by2_x4 -___ -my ($r_ptr_in,$a_ptr_in,$b_ptr_in)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx"); -my ($r_ptr,$a_ptr,$b_ptr)=("%r8","%r9","%r10"); - -$code.=<<___; -################################################################################ -# void ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4, void *Bx4); -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4 -.type ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4,\@function,3 -.align 32 -ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4: - mov %rsp, %rax - push %rbp - vzeroupper -___ -$code.=<<___ if ($win64); - lea -16*10(%rsp), %rsp - vmovaps %xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax) -___ -$code.=<<___; - lea -8(%rax), %rbp - -# Result + 32*0 = Result.X -# Result + 32*9 = Result.Y -# Result + 32*18 = Result.Z - -# A + 32*0 = A.X -# A + 32*9 = A.Y -# A + 32*18 = A.Z - -# B + 32*0 = B.X -# B + 32*9 = B.Y - - sub \$`32*9*8+32*2+32*8`, %rsp - and \$-64, %rsp - - mov $r_ptr_in, $r_ptr - mov $a_ptr_in, $a_ptr - mov $b_ptr_in, $b_ptr - - vmovdqa 32*0($a_ptr_in), %ymm0 - vmovdqa .LAVX2_AND_MASK(%rip), $AND_MASK - vpxor %ymm1, %ymm1, %ymm1 - lea 256($a_ptr_in), %rax # size optimization - vpor 32*1($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*2($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*3($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*4-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - lea 256(%rax), %rcx # size optimization - vpor 32*5-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*6-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*7-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*8-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*9-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*10-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*11-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*12-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*13-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*14-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*15-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*16-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*17-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpcmpeqq %ymm1, %ymm0, %ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0, `32*9*8`(%rsp) - - vpxor %ymm1, %ymm1, %ymm1 - vmovdqa 32*0($b_ptr), %ymm0 - lea 256($b_ptr), %rax # size optimization - vpor 32*1($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*2($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*3($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*4-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - lea 256(%rax), %rcx # size optimization - vpor 32*5-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*6-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*7-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*8-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*9-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*10-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*11-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*12-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*13-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*14-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*15-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*16-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*17-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpcmpeqq %ymm1, %ymm0, %ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0, `32*9*8+32`(%rsp) - - # Z1^2 = Z1*Z1 - lea `32*9*2`($a_ptr), %rsi - lea `32*9*2`(%rsp), %rdi - lea `32*9*8+32*2`(%rsp), %rcx # temporary vector - call avx2_sqr_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # U2 = X2*Z1^2 - lea `32*9*0`($b_ptr), %rsi - lea `32*9*2`(%rsp), %rdx - lea `32*9*0`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_mul_x4 - #call avx2_normalize - `&STORE` - - # S2 = Z1*Z1^2 = Z1^3 - lea `32*9*2`($a_ptr), %rsi - lea `32*9*2`(%rsp), %rdx - lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_mul_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # S2 = S2*Y2 = Y2*Z1^3 - lea `32*9*1`($b_ptr), %rsi - lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdx - lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_mul_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # H = U2 - U1 = U2 - X1 - lea `32*9*0`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*0`($a_ptr), %rdx - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_sub_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # R = S2 - S1 = S2 - Y1 - lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*1`($a_ptr), %rdx - lea `32*9*4`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_sub_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*2`($a_ptr), %rdx - lea `32*9*2`($r_ptr), %rdi - call avx2_mul_x4 - call avx2_normalize - - lea .LONE(%rip), %rsi - lea `32*9*2`($a_ptr), %rdx - call avx2_select_n_store - - # R^2 = R^2 - lea `32*9*4`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*6`(%rsp), %rdi - lea `32*9*8+32*2`(%rsp), %rcx # temporary vector - call avx2_sqr_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # H^2 = H^2 - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_sqr_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # H^3 = H^2*H - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdx - lea `32*9*7`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_mul_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # U2 = U1*H^2 - lea `32*9*0`($a_ptr), %rsi - lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdx - lea `32*9*0`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_mul_x4 - #call avx2_normalize - `&STORE` - - # Hsqr = U2*2 - #lea 32*9*0(%rsp), %rsi - #lea 32*9*5(%rsp), %rdi - #call avx2_mul_by2_x4 - - vpaddq $ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0 # inlined avx2_mul_by2_x4 - lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdi - vpaddq $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpaddq $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpaddq $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpaddq $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpaddq $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpaddq $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpaddq $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpaddq $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # X3 = R^2 - H^3 - #lea 32*9*6(%rsp), %rsi - #lea 32*9*7(%rsp), %rdx - #lea 32*9*5(%rsp), %rcx - #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi - #call avx2_sub_x4 - #NORMALIZE - #STORE - - # X3 = X3 - U2*2 - #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rsi - #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi - #call avx2_sub_x4 - #NORMALIZE - #STORE - - lea `32*9*6+128`(%rsp), %rsi - lea .LAVX2_POLY_x2+128(%rip), %rax - lea `32*9*7+128`(%rsp), %rdx - lea `32*9*5+128`(%rsp), %rcx - lea `32*9*0`($r_ptr), %rdi - - vmovdqa 32*0-128(%rsi), $ACC0 - vmovdqa 32*1-128(%rsi), $ACC1 - vmovdqa 32*2-128(%rsi), $ACC2 - vmovdqa 32*3-128(%rsi), $ACC3 - vmovdqa 32*4-128(%rsi), $ACC4 - vmovdqa 32*5-128(%rsi), $ACC5 - vmovdqa 32*6-128(%rsi), $ACC6 - vmovdqa 32*7-128(%rsi), $ACC7 - vmovdqa 32*8-128(%rsi), $ACC8 - - vpaddq 32*0-128(%rax), $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq 32*1-128(%rax), $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpaddq 32*2-128(%rax), $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpaddq 32*3-128(%rax), $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpaddq 32*4-128(%rax), $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpaddq 32*5-128(%rax), $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpaddq 32*6-128(%rax), $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpaddq 32*7-128(%rax), $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpaddq 32*8-128(%rax), $ACC8, $ACC8 - - vpsubq 32*0-128(%rdx), $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpsubq 32*1-128(%rdx), $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpsubq 32*2-128(%rdx), $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpsubq 32*3-128(%rdx), $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpsubq 32*4-128(%rdx), $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpsubq 32*5-128(%rdx), $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpsubq 32*6-128(%rdx), $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpsubq 32*7-128(%rdx), $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpsubq 32*8-128(%rdx), $ACC8, $ACC8 - - vpsubq 32*0-128(%rcx), $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpsubq 32*1-128(%rcx), $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpsubq 32*2-128(%rcx), $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpsubq 32*3-128(%rcx), $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpsubq 32*4-128(%rcx), $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpsubq 32*5-128(%rcx), $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpsubq 32*6-128(%rcx), $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpsubq 32*7-128(%rcx), $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpsubq 32*8-128(%rcx), $ACC8, $ACC8 - call avx2_normalize - - lea 32*0($b_ptr), %rsi - lea 32*0($a_ptr), %rdx - call avx2_select_n_store - - # H = U2 - X3 - lea `32*9*0`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*0`($r_ptr), %rdx - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_sub_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*4`(%rsp), %rdx - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_mul_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # - lea `32*9*7`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*1`($a_ptr), %rdx - lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_mul_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdx - lea `32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rdi - call avx2_sub_x4 - call avx2_normalize - - lea 32*9($b_ptr), %rsi - lea 32*9($a_ptr), %rdx - call avx2_select_n_store - - #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rsi - #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi - #call avx2_mul_by1_x4 - #NORMALIZE - #STORE - - lea `32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rsi - lea `32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rdi - call avx2_mul_by1_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - vzeroupper -___ -$code.=<<___ if ($win64); - movaps %xmm6, -16*10(%rbp) - movaps %xmm7, -16*9(%rbp) - movaps %xmm8, -16*8(%rbp) - movaps %xmm9, -16*7(%rbp) - movaps %xmm10, -16*6(%rbp) - movaps %xmm11, -16*5(%rbp) - movaps %xmm12, -16*4(%rbp) - movaps %xmm13, -16*3(%rbp) - movaps %xmm14, -16*2(%rbp) - movaps %xmm15, -16*1(%rbp) -___ -$code.=<<___; - mov %rbp, %rsp - pop %rbp - ret -.size ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4 - -################################################################################ -# void ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4, void *Bx4); -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4 -.type ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4,\@function,3 -.align 32 -ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4: - mov %rsp, %rax - push %rbp - vzeroupper -___ -$code.=<<___ if ($win64); - lea -16*10(%rsp), %rsp - vmovaps %xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax) -___ -$code.=<<___; - lea -8(%rax), %rbp - -# Result + 32*0 = Result.X -# Result + 32*9 = Result.Y -# Result + 32*18 = Result.Z - -# A + 32*0 = A.X -# A + 32*9 = A.Y - -# B + 32*0 = B.X -# B + 32*9 = B.Y - - sub \$`32*9*8+32*2+32*8`, %rsp - and \$-64, %rsp - - mov $r_ptr_in, $r_ptr - mov $a_ptr_in, $a_ptr - mov $b_ptr_in, $b_ptr - - vmovdqa 32*0($a_ptr_in), %ymm0 - vmovdqa .LAVX2_AND_MASK(%rip), $AND_MASK - vpxor %ymm1, %ymm1, %ymm1 - lea 256($a_ptr_in), %rax # size optimization - vpor 32*1($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*2($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*3($a_ptr_in), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*4-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - lea 256(%rax), %rcx # size optimization - vpor 32*5-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*6-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*7-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*8-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*9-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*10-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*11-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*12-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*13-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*14-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*15-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*16-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*17-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpcmpeqq %ymm1, %ymm0, %ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0, `32*9*8`(%rsp) - - vpxor %ymm1, %ymm1, %ymm1 - vmovdqa 32*0($b_ptr), %ymm0 - lea 256($b_ptr), %rax # size optimization - vpor 32*1($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*2($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*3($b_ptr), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*4-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - lea 256(%rax), %rcx # size optimization - vpor 32*5-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*6-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*7-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*8-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*9-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*10-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*11-256(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*12-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*13-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*14-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*15-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*16-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpor 32*17-512(%rcx), %ymm0, %ymm0 - vpcmpeqq %ymm1, %ymm0, %ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm0, `32*9*8+32`(%rsp) - - # H = U2 - U1 = X2 - X1 - lea `32*9*0`($b_ptr), %rsi - lea `32*9*0`($a_ptr), %rdx - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_sub_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # R = S2 - S1 = Y2 - Y1 - lea `32*9*1`($b_ptr), %rsi - lea `32*9*1`($a_ptr), %rdx - lea `32*9*4`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_sub_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # Z3 = H*Z1*Z2 = H - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*2`($r_ptr), %rdi - call avx2_mul_by1_x4 - call avx2_normalize - - vmovdqa `32*9*8`(%rsp), $B - vpor `32*9*8+32`(%rsp), $B, $B - - vpandn $ACC0, $B, $ACC0 - lea .LONE+128(%rip), %rax - vpandn $ACC1, $B, $ACC1 - vpandn $ACC2, $B, $ACC2 - vpandn $ACC3, $B, $ACC3 - vpandn $ACC4, $B, $ACC4 - vpandn $ACC5, $B, $ACC5 - vpandn $ACC6, $B, $ACC6 - vpandn $ACC7, $B, $ACC7 - - vpand 32*0-128(%rax), $B, $T0 - vpandn $ACC8, $B, $ACC8 - vpand 32*1-128(%rax), $B, $Y - vpxor $T0, $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpand 32*2-128(%rax), $B, $T0 - vpxor $Y, $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpand 32*3-128(%rax), $B, $Y - vpxor $T0, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpand 32*4-128(%rax), $B, $T0 - vpxor $Y, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpand 32*5-128(%rax), $B, $Y - vpxor $T0, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpand 32*6-128(%rax), $B, $T0 - vpxor $Y, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpand 32*7-128(%rax), $B, $Y - vpxor $T0, $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpand 32*8-128(%rax), $B, $T0 - vpxor $Y, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpxor $T0, $ACC8, $ACC8 - `&STORE` - - # R^2 = R^2 - lea `32*9*4`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*6`(%rsp), %rdi - lea `32*9*8+32*2`(%rsp), %rcx # temporary vector - call avx2_sqr_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # H^2 = H^2 - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_sqr_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # H^3 = H^2*H - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdx - lea `32*9*7`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_mul_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # U2 = U1*H^2 - lea `32*9*0`($a_ptr), %rsi - lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdx - lea `32*9*0`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_mul_x4 - #call avx2_normalize - `&STORE` - - # Hsqr = U2*2 - #lea 32*9*0(%rsp), %rsi - #lea 32*9*5(%rsp), %rdi - #call avx2_mul_by2_x4 - - vpaddq $ACC0, $ACC0, $ACC0 # inlined avx2_mul_by2_x4 - lea `32*9*5`(%rsp), %rdi - vpaddq $ACC1, $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpaddq $ACC2, $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpaddq $ACC3, $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpaddq $ACC4, $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpaddq $ACC5, $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpaddq $ACC6, $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpaddq $ACC7, $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpaddq $ACC8, $ACC8, $ACC8 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # X3 = R^2 - H^3 - #lea 32*9*6(%rsp), %rsi - #lea 32*9*7(%rsp), %rdx - #lea 32*9*5(%rsp), %rcx - #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi - #call avx2_sub_x4 - #NORMALIZE - #STORE - - # X3 = X3 - U2*2 - #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rsi - #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi - #call avx2_sub_x4 - #NORMALIZE - #STORE - - lea `32*9*6+128`(%rsp), %rsi - lea .LAVX2_POLY_x2+128(%rip), %rax - lea `32*9*7+128`(%rsp), %rdx - lea `32*9*5+128`(%rsp), %rcx - lea `32*9*0`($r_ptr), %rdi - - vmovdqa 32*0-128(%rsi), $ACC0 - vmovdqa 32*1-128(%rsi), $ACC1 - vmovdqa 32*2-128(%rsi), $ACC2 - vmovdqa 32*3-128(%rsi), $ACC3 - vmovdqa 32*4-128(%rsi), $ACC4 - vmovdqa 32*5-128(%rsi), $ACC5 - vmovdqa 32*6-128(%rsi), $ACC6 - vmovdqa 32*7-128(%rsi), $ACC7 - vmovdqa 32*8-128(%rsi), $ACC8 - - vpaddq 32*0-128(%rax), $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpaddq 32*1-128(%rax), $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpaddq 32*2-128(%rax), $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpaddq 32*3-128(%rax), $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpaddq 32*4-128(%rax), $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpaddq 32*5-128(%rax), $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpaddq 32*6-128(%rax), $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpaddq 32*7-128(%rax), $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpaddq 32*8-128(%rax), $ACC8, $ACC8 - - vpsubq 32*0-128(%rdx), $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpsubq 32*1-128(%rdx), $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpsubq 32*2-128(%rdx), $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpsubq 32*3-128(%rdx), $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpsubq 32*4-128(%rdx), $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpsubq 32*5-128(%rdx), $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpsubq 32*6-128(%rdx), $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpsubq 32*7-128(%rdx), $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpsubq 32*8-128(%rdx), $ACC8, $ACC8 - - vpsubq 32*0-128(%rcx), $ACC0, $ACC0 - vpsubq 32*1-128(%rcx), $ACC1, $ACC1 - vpsubq 32*2-128(%rcx), $ACC2, $ACC2 - vpsubq 32*3-128(%rcx), $ACC3, $ACC3 - vpsubq 32*4-128(%rcx), $ACC4, $ACC4 - vpsubq 32*5-128(%rcx), $ACC5, $ACC5 - vpsubq 32*6-128(%rcx), $ACC6, $ACC6 - vpsubq 32*7-128(%rcx), $ACC7, $ACC7 - vpsubq 32*8-128(%rcx), $ACC8, $ACC8 - call avx2_normalize - - lea 32*0($b_ptr), %rsi - lea 32*0($a_ptr), %rdx - call avx2_select_n_store - - # H = U2 - X3 - lea `32*9*0`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*0`($r_ptr), %rdx - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_sub_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # H = H*R - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*4`(%rsp), %rdx - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_mul_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # S2 = S1 * H^3 - lea `32*9*7`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*1`($a_ptr), %rdx - lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdi - call avx2_mul_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - # - lea `32*9*3`(%rsp), %rsi - lea `32*9*1`(%rsp), %rdx - lea `32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rdi - call avx2_sub_x4 - call avx2_normalize - - lea 32*9($b_ptr), %rsi - lea 32*9($a_ptr), %rdx - call avx2_select_n_store - - #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rsi - #lea 32*9*0($r_ptr), %rdi - #call avx2_mul_by1_x4 - #NORMALIZE - #STORE - - lea `32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rsi - lea `32*9*1`($r_ptr), %rdi - call avx2_mul_by1_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - vzeroupper -___ -$code.=<<___ if ($win64); - movaps %xmm6, -16*10(%rbp) - movaps %xmm7, -16*9(%rbp) - movaps %xmm8, -16*8(%rbp) - movaps %xmm9, -16*7(%rbp) - movaps %xmm10, -16*6(%rbp) - movaps %xmm11, -16*5(%rbp) - movaps %xmm12, -16*4(%rbp) - movaps %xmm13, -16*3(%rbp) - movaps %xmm14, -16*2(%rbp) - movaps %xmm15, -16*1(%rbp) -___ -$code.=<<___; - mov %rbp, %rsp - pop %rbp - ret -.size ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4 - -################################################################################ -# void ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4); -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont -.type ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont,\@function,2 -.align 32 -ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont: - vzeroupper -___ -$code.=<<___ if ($win64); - lea -8-16*10(%rsp), %rsp - vmovaps %xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax) -___ -$code.=<<___; - vmovdqa .LAVX2_AND_MASK(%rip), $AND_MASK - lea .LTO_MONT_AVX2(%rip), %rdx - call avx2_mul_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - vzeroupper -___ -$code.=<<___ if ($win64); - movaps 16*0(%rsp), %xmm6 - movaps 16*1(%rsp), %xmm7 - movaps 16*2(%rsp), %xmm8 - movaps 16*3(%rsp), %xmm9 - movaps 16*4(%rsp), %xmm10 - movaps 16*5(%rsp), %xmm11 - movaps 16*6(%rsp), %xmm12 - movaps 16*7(%rsp), %xmm13 - movaps 16*8(%rsp), %xmm14 - movaps 16*9(%rsp), %xmm15 - lea 8+16*10(%rsp), %rsp -___ -$code.=<<___; - ret -.size ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont - -################################################################################ -# void ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(void* RESULTx4, void *Ax4); -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont -.type ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont,\@function,2 -.align 32 -ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont: - vzeroupper -___ -$code.=<<___ if ($win64); - lea -8-16*10(%rsp), %rsp - vmovaps %xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax) -___ -$code.=<<___; - vmovdqa .LAVX2_AND_MASK(%rip), $AND_MASK - lea .LFROM_MONT_AVX2(%rip), %rdx - call avx2_mul_x4 - call avx2_normalize_n_store - - vzeroupper -___ -$code.=<<___ if ($win64); - movaps 16*0(%rsp), %xmm6 - movaps 16*1(%rsp), %xmm7 - movaps 16*2(%rsp), %xmm8 - movaps 16*3(%rsp), %xmm9 - movaps 16*4(%rsp), %xmm10 - movaps 16*5(%rsp), %xmm11 - movaps 16*6(%rsp), %xmm12 - movaps 16*7(%rsp), %xmm13 - movaps 16*8(%rsp), %xmm14 - movaps 16*9(%rsp), %xmm15 - lea 8+16*10(%rsp), %rsp -___ -$code.=<<___; - ret -.size ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont - -################################################################################ -# void ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1(void* RESULTx4); -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1 -.type ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1,\@function,1 -.align 32 -ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1: - lea .LONE+128(%rip), %rax - lea 128(%rdi), %rdi - vzeroupper - vmovdqa 32*0-128(%rax), %ymm0 - vmovdqa 32*1-128(%rax), %ymm1 - vmovdqa 32*2-128(%rax), %ymm2 - vmovdqa 32*3-128(%rax), %ymm3 - vmovdqa 32*4-128(%rax), %ymm4 - vmovdqa 32*5-128(%rax), %ymm5 - vmovdqa %ymm0, 32*0-128(%rdi) - vmovdqa 32*6-128(%rax), %ymm0 - vmovdqa %ymm1, 32*1-128(%rdi) - vmovdqa 32*7-128(%rax), %ymm1 - vmovdqa %ymm2, 32*2-128(%rdi) - vmovdqa 32*8-128(%rax), %ymm2 - vmovdqa %ymm3, 32*3-128(%rdi) - vmovdqa %ymm4, 32*4-128(%rdi) - vmovdqa %ymm5, 32*5-128(%rdi) - vmovdqa %ymm0, 32*6-128(%rdi) - vmovdqa %ymm1, 32*7-128(%rdi) - vmovdqa %ymm2, 32*8-128(%rdi) - - vzeroupper - ret -.size ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1 -___ -} -{ -################################################################################ -# void ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7(void* RESULT, void *in, -# int index0, int index1, int index2, int index3); -################################################################################ - -my ($val,$in_t,$index0,$index1,$index2,$index3)=("%rdi","%rsi","%edx","%ecx","%r8d","%r9d"); -my ($INDEX0,$INDEX1,$INDEX2,$INDEX3)=map("%ymm$_",(0..3)); -my ($R0a,$R0b,$R1a,$R1b,$R2a,$R2b,$R3a,$R3b)=map("%ymm$_",(4..11)); -my ($M0,$T0,$T1,$TMP0)=map("%ymm$_",(12..15)); - -$code.=<<___; -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7 -.type ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7,\@function,6 -.align 32 -ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7: - vzeroupper -___ -$code.=<<___ if ($win64); - lea -8-16*10(%rsp), %rsp - vmovaps %xmm6, -8-16*10(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm7, -8-16*9(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm8, -8-16*8(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm9, -8-16*7(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm10, -8-16*6(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm11, -8-16*5(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm12, -8-16*4(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm13, -8-16*3(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm14, -8-16*2(%rax) - vmovaps %xmm15, -8-16*1(%rax) -___ -$code.=<<___; - lea .LIntOne(%rip), %rax - - vmovd $index0, %xmm0 - vmovd $index1, %xmm1 - vmovd $index2, %xmm2 - vmovd $index3, %xmm3 - - vpxor $R0a, $R0a, $R0a - vpxor $R0b, $R0b, $R0b - vpxor $R1a, $R1a, $R1a - vpxor $R1b, $R1b, $R1b - vpxor $R2a, $R2a, $R2a - vpxor $R2b, $R2b, $R2b - vpxor $R3a, $R3a, $R3a - vpxor $R3b, $R3b, $R3b - vmovdqa (%rax), $M0 - - vpermd $INDEX0, $R0a, $INDEX0 - vpermd $INDEX1, $R0a, $INDEX1 - vpermd $INDEX2, $R0a, $INDEX2 - vpermd $INDEX3, $R0a, $INDEX3 - - mov \$64, %ecx - lea 112($val), $val # size optimization - jmp .Lmulti_select_loop_avx2 - -# INDEX=0, corresponds to the point at infty (0,0) -.align 32 -.Lmulti_select_loop_avx2: - vpcmpeqd $INDEX0, $M0, $TMP0 - - vmovdqa `32*0+32*64*2*0`($in_t), $T0 - vmovdqa `32*1+32*64*2*0`($in_t), $T1 - vpand $TMP0, $T0, $T0 - vpand $TMP0, $T1, $T1 - vpxor $T0, $R0a, $R0a - vpxor $T1, $R0b, $R0b - - vpcmpeqd $INDEX1, $M0, $TMP0 - - vmovdqa `32*0+32*64*2*1`($in_t), $T0 - vmovdqa `32*1+32*64*2*1`($in_t), $T1 - vpand $TMP0, $T0, $T0 - vpand $TMP0, $T1, $T1 - vpxor $T0, $R1a, $R1a - vpxor $T1, $R1b, $R1b - - vpcmpeqd $INDEX2, $M0, $TMP0 - - vmovdqa `32*0+32*64*2*2`($in_t), $T0 - vmovdqa `32*1+32*64*2*2`($in_t), $T1 - vpand $TMP0, $T0, $T0 - vpand $TMP0, $T1, $T1 - vpxor $T0, $R2a, $R2a - vpxor $T1, $R2b, $R2b - - vpcmpeqd $INDEX3, $M0, $TMP0 - - vmovdqa `32*0+32*64*2*3`($in_t), $T0 - vmovdqa `32*1+32*64*2*3`($in_t), $T1 - vpand $TMP0, $T0, $T0 - vpand $TMP0, $T1, $T1 - vpxor $T0, $R3a, $R3a - vpxor $T1, $R3b, $R3b - - vpaddd (%rax), $M0, $M0 # increment - lea 32*2($in_t), $in_t - - dec %ecx - jnz .Lmulti_select_loop_avx2 - - vmovdqu $R0a, 32*0-112($val) - vmovdqu $R0b, 32*1-112($val) - vmovdqu $R1a, 32*2-112($val) - vmovdqu $R1b, 32*3-112($val) - vmovdqu $R2a, 32*4-112($val) - vmovdqu $R2b, 32*5-112($val) - vmovdqu $R3a, 32*6-112($val) - vmovdqu $R3b, 32*7-112($val) - - vzeroupper -___ -$code.=<<___ if ($win64); - movaps 16*0(%rsp), %xmm6 - movaps 16*1(%rsp), %xmm7 - movaps 16*2(%rsp), %xmm8 - movaps 16*3(%rsp), %xmm9 - movaps 16*4(%rsp), %xmm10 - movaps 16*5(%rsp), %xmm11 - movaps 16*6(%rsp), %xmm12 - movaps 16*7(%rsp), %xmm13 - movaps 16*8(%rsp), %xmm14 - movaps 16*9(%rsp), %xmm15 - lea 8+16*10(%rsp), %rsp -___ -$code.=<<___; - ret -.size ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7 - -.extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P -.globl ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible -.type ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible,\@abi-omnipotent -.align 32 -ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible: - mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%eax - shr \$5,%eax - and \$1,%eax - ret -.size ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible,.-ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible -___ -} -}} else {{ # assembler is too old -$code.=<<___; -.text - -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4 -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4 -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1 -.globl ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7 -.type ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7,\@abi-omnipotent -ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert: -ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back: -ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4: -ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4: -ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont: -ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont: -ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1: -ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7: - .byte 0x0f,0x0b # ud2 - ret -.size ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7,.-ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7 - -.globl ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible -.type ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible,\@abi-omnipotent -ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible: - xor %eax,%eax - ret -.size ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible,.-ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible -___ -}} - -foreach (split("\n",$code)) { - s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo; - - print $_,"\n"; -} - -close STDOUT or die "error closing STDOUT: $!"; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ $addx = ($1>=12); } -if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) { +if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) { my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 $avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01); $addx = ($ver>=3.03); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/asm/x25519-x86_64.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/asm/x25519-x86_64.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/asm/x25519-x86_64.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/asm/x25519-x86_64.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ $addx = ($1>=12); } -if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) { +if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) { my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10 $addx = ($ver>=3.03); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ static int ecdh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); #endif -static int eckey_param2type(int *pptype, void **ppval, EC_KEY *ec_key) +static int eckey_param2type(int *pptype, void **ppval, const EC_KEY *ec_key) { const EC_GROUP *group; int nid; @@ -35,7 +35,14 @@ && (nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) /* we have a 'named curve' => just set the OID */ { - *ppval = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); + ASN1_OBJECT *asn1obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); + + if (asn1obj == NULL || OBJ_length(asn1obj) == 0) { + ASN1_OBJECT_free(asn1obj); + ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE, EC_R_MISSING_OID); + return 0; + } + *ppval = asn1obj; *pptype = V_ASN1_OBJECT; } else { /* explicit parameters */ @@ -43,7 +50,17 @@ pstr = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (pstr == NULL) return 0; - pstr->length = i2d_ECParameters(ec_key, &pstr->data); + + /* + * The cast in the following line is intentional as the + * `i2d_ECParameters` signature can't be constified (see discussion at + * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9347 where related and + * required constification backports were rejected). + * + * This cast should be safe anyway, because we can expect + * `i2d_ECParameters()` to treat the first argument as if it was const. + */ + pstr->length = i2d_ECParameters((EC_KEY *)ec_key, &pstr->data); if (pstr->length <= 0) { ASN1_STRING_free(pstr); ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); @@ -57,7 +74,7 @@ static int eckey_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { - EC_KEY *ec_key = pkey->pkey.ec; + const EC_KEY *ec_key = pkey->pkey.ec; void *pval = NULL; int ptype; unsigned char *penc = NULL, *p; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *cofactor; } /* ECPARAMETERS */ ; +typedef enum { + ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_NAMED = 0, + ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT, + ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_IMPLICIT +} ecpk_parameters_type_t; + struct ecpk_parameters_st { int type; union { @@ -535,9 +541,10 @@ return NULL; } } else { - if (ret->type == 0) + if (ret->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_NAMED) ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret->value.named_curve); - else if (ret->type == 1 && ret->value.parameters) + else if (ret->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT + && ret->value.parameters != NULL) ECPARAMETERS_free(ret->value.parameters); } @@ -547,15 +554,22 @@ */ tmp = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group); if (tmp) { - ret->type = 0; - if ((ret->value.named_curve = OBJ_nid2obj(tmp)) == NULL) + ASN1_OBJECT *asn1obj = OBJ_nid2obj(tmp); + + if (asn1obj == NULL || OBJ_length(asn1obj) == 0) { + ASN1_OBJECT_free(asn1obj); + ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_MISSING_OID); ok = 0; + } else { + ret->type = ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_NAMED; + ret->value.named_curve = asn1obj; + } } else /* we don't know the nid => ERROR */ ok = 0; } else { /* use the ECPARAMETERS structure */ - ret->type = 1; + ret->type = ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT; if ((ret->value.parameters = EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(group, NULL)) == NULL) ok = 0; @@ -894,7 +908,8 @@ return NULL; } - if (params->type == 0) { /* the curve is given by an OID */ + if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_NAMED) { + /* the curve is given by an OID */ tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->value.named_curve); if ((ret = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(tmp)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, @@ -902,15 +917,16 @@ return NULL; } EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); - } else if (params->type == 1) { /* the parameters are given by a - * ECPARAMETERS structure */ + } else if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT) { + /* the parameters are given by an ECPARAMETERS structure */ ret = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(params->value.parameters); if (!ret) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return NULL; } EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE); - } else if (params->type == 2) { /* implicitlyCA */ + } else if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_IMPLICIT) { + /* implicit parameters inherited from CA - unsupported */ return NULL; } else { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); @@ -940,6 +956,9 @@ return NULL; } + if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT) + group->decoded_from_explicit_params = 1; + if (a) { EC_GROUP_free(*a); *a = group; @@ -991,6 +1010,9 @@ if (priv_key->parameters) { EC_GROUP_free(ret->group); ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(priv_key->parameters); + if (ret->group != NULL + && priv_key->parameters->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT) + ret->group->decoded_from_explicit_params = 1; } if (ret->group == NULL) { @@ -1297,5 +1319,7 @@ i = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&bs, NULL); i += i; /* r and s */ ret = ASN1_object_size(1, i, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret < 0) + return 0; return ret; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ec_err.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_err.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ec_err.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_err.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -341,6 +341,7 @@ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_LADDER_POST_FAILURE), "ladder post failure"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_LADDER_PRE_FAILURE), "ladder pre failure"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_LADDER_STEP_FAILURE), "ladder step failure"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_MISSING_OID), "missing OID"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS), "missing parameters"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY), "missing private key"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES), diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ec_key.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_key.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ec_key.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_key.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "internal/refcount.h" #include #include +#include "crypto/bn.h" EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void) { @@ -416,17 +417,86 @@ int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key) { + int fixed_top; + const BIGNUM *order = NULL; + BIGNUM *tmp_key = NULL; + if (key->group == NULL || key->group->meth == NULL) return 0; + + /* + * Not only should key->group be set, but it should also be in a valid + * fully initialized state. + * + * Specifically, to operate in constant time, we need that the group order + * is set, as we use its length as the fixed public size of any scalar used + * as an EC private key. + */ + order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group); + if (order == NULL || BN_is_zero(order)) + return 0; /* This should never happen */ + if (key->group->meth->set_private != NULL && key->group->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0) return 0; if (key->meth->set_private != NULL && key->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0) return 0; + + /* + * We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key, + * so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM` + * holding the secret scalar. + * + * This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not + * propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and + * this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when + * the caller specifically set it. + * + * The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past + * years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in + * some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer. + * + * In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by + * manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that + * inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated + * correctly and should not generate unintended consequences. + * + * Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have + * to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed public size big + * enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger + * a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory + * accesses. + * + * Fixed Length + * ------------ + * + * The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for + * a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for + * generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid + * secret scalars. + * + * For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words" + * required for the internal representation of the order, and we + * preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing + * might temporarily overflow the order length. + */ + tmp_key = BN_dup(priv_key); + if (tmp_key == NULL) + return 0; + + BN_set_flags(tmp_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + fixed_top = bn_get_top(order) + 2; + if (bn_wexpand(tmp_key, fixed_top) == NULL) { + BN_clear_free(tmp_key); + return 0; + } + BN_clear_free(key->priv_key); - key->priv_key = BN_dup(priv_key); - return (key->priv_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1; + key->priv_key = tmp_key; + + return 1; } const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key) @@ -494,6 +564,13 @@ key->flags &= ~flags; } +int EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(const EC_KEY *key) +{ + if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL) + return -1; + return key->group->decoded_from_explicit_params; +} + size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx) { diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ dest->asn1_flag = src->asn1_flag; dest->asn1_form = src->asn1_form; + dest->decoded_from_explicit_params = src->decoded_from_explicit_params; if (src->seed) { OPENSSL_free(dest->seed); @@ -1007,14 +1008,14 @@ size_t i = 0; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; - if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 0)) { - return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r); - } - if (!ec_point_is_compat(r, group)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } + + if (scalar == NULL && num == 0) + return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r); + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if (!ec_point_is_compat(points[i], group)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ec_local.h openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_local.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ec_local.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_local.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -209,6 +209,8 @@ BIGNUM *order, *cofactor; int curve_name; /* optional NID for named curve */ int asn1_flag; /* flag to control the asn1 encoding */ + int decoded_from_explicit_params; /* set if decoded from explicit + * curve parameters encoding */ point_conversion_form_t asn1_form; unsigned char *seed; /* optional seed for parameters (appears in * ASN1) */ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -260,17 +260,10 @@ goto err; } - /*- - * Apply coordinate blinding for EC_POINT. - * - * The underlying EC_METHOD can optionally implement this function: - * ec_point_blind_coordinates() returns 0 in case of errors or 1 on - * success or if coordinate blinding is not implemented for this - * group. - */ - if (!ec_point_blind_coordinates(group, p, ctx)) { - ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, EC_R_POINT_COORDINATES_BLIND_FAILURE); - goto err; + /* ensure input point is in affine coords for ladder step efficiency */ + if (!p->Z_is_one && !EC_POINT_make_affine(group, p, ctx)) { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; } /* Initialize the Montgomery ladder */ @@ -747,6 +740,20 @@ if (r_is_at_infinity) { if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1])) goto err; + + /*- + * Apply coordinate blinding for EC_POINT. + * + * The underlying EC_METHOD can optionally implement this function: + * ec_point_blind_coordinates() returns 0 in case of errors or 1 on + * success or if coordinate blinding is not implemented for this + * group. + */ + if (!ec_point_blind_coordinates(group, r, ctx)) { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_POINT_COORDINATES_BLIND_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + r_is_at_infinity = 0; } else { if (!EC_POINT_add diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ */ typedef uint64_t limb; +typedef uint64_t limb_aX __attribute((__aligned__(1))); typedef uint128_t widelimb; typedef limb felem[4]; @@ -307,10 +308,10 @@ */ static void bin28_to_felem(felem out, const u8 in[28]) { - out[0] = *((const uint64_t *)(in)) & 0x00ffffffffffffff; - out[1] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in + 7))) & 0x00ffffffffffffff; - out[2] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in + 14))) & 0x00ffffffffffffff; - out[3] = (*((const uint64_t *)(in+20))) >> 8; + out[0] = *((const limb *)(in)) & 0x00ffffffffffffff; + out[1] = (*((const limb_aX *)(in + 7))) & 0x00ffffffffffffff; + out[2] = (*((const limb_aX *)(in + 14))) & 0x00ffffffffffffff; + out[3] = (*((const limb_aX *)(in + 20))) >> 8; } static void felem_to_bin28(u8 out[28], const felem in) diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ # define NLIMBS 9 typedef uint64_t limb; +typedef limb limb_aX __attribute((__aligned__(1))); typedef limb felem[NLIMBS]; typedef uint128_t largefelem[NLIMBS]; @@ -141,14 +142,14 @@ static void bin66_to_felem(felem out, const u8 in[66]) { out[0] = (*((limb *) & in[0])) & bottom58bits; - out[1] = (*((limb *) & in[7]) >> 2) & bottom58bits; - out[2] = (*((limb *) & in[14]) >> 4) & bottom58bits; - out[3] = (*((limb *) & in[21]) >> 6) & bottom58bits; - out[4] = (*((limb *) & in[29])) & bottom58bits; - out[5] = (*((limb *) & in[36]) >> 2) & bottom58bits; - out[6] = (*((limb *) & in[43]) >> 4) & bottom58bits; - out[7] = (*((limb *) & in[50]) >> 6) & bottom58bits; - out[8] = (*((limb *) & in[58])) & bottom57bits; + out[1] = (*((limb_aX *) & in[7]) >> 2) & bottom58bits; + out[2] = (*((limb_aX *) & in[14]) >> 4) & bottom58bits; + out[3] = (*((limb_aX *) & in[21]) >> 6) & bottom58bits; + out[4] = (*((limb_aX *) & in[29])) & bottom58bits; + out[5] = (*((limb_aX *) & in[36]) >> 2) & bottom58bits; + out[6] = (*((limb_aX *) & in[43]) >> 4) & bottom58bits; + out[7] = (*((limb_aX *) & in[50]) >> 6) & bottom58bits; + out[8] = (*((limb_aX *) & in[58])) & bottom57bits; } /* @@ -159,14 +160,14 @@ { memset(out, 0, 66); (*((limb *) & out[0])) = in[0]; - (*((limb *) & out[7])) |= in[1] << 2; - (*((limb *) & out[14])) |= in[2] << 4; - (*((limb *) & out[21])) |= in[3] << 6; - (*((limb *) & out[29])) = in[4]; - (*((limb *) & out[36])) |= in[5] << 2; - (*((limb *) & out[43])) |= in[6] << 4; - (*((limb *) & out[50])) |= in[7] << 6; - (*((limb *) & out[58])) = in[8]; + (*((limb_aX *) & out[7])) |= in[1] << 2; + (*((limb_aX *) & out[14])) |= in[2] << 4; + (*((limb_aX *) & out[21])) |= in[3] << 6; + (*((limb_aX *) & out[29])) = in[4]; + (*((limb_aX *) & out[36])) |= in[5] << 2; + (*((limb_aX *) & out[43])) |= in[6] << 4; + (*((limb_aX *) & out[50])) |= in[7] << 6; + (*((limb_aX *) & out[58])) = in[8]; } /* BN_to_felem converts an OpenSSL BIGNUM into an felem */ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -929,207 +929,6 @@ return ret; } -/* - * Note that by default ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 is undefined. While it's great - * code processing 4 points in parallel, corresponding serial operation - * is several times slower, because it uses 29x29=58-bit multiplication - * as opposite to 64x64=128-bit in integer-only scalar case. As result - * it doesn't provide *significant* performance improvement. Note that - * just defining ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 is not sufficient to make it work, - * you'd need to compile even asm/ecp_nistz256-avx.pl module. - */ -#if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2) -# if !(defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ - defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)) || \ - !(defined(__GNUC__) || defined(_MSC_VER)) /* this is for ALIGN32 */ -# undef ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 -# else -/* Constant time access, loading four values, from four consecutive tables */ -void ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7(void *result, const void *in, - int index0, int index1, int index2, - int index3); -void ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(void *RESULTx4, const void *in); -void ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back(void *result, const void *Ax4); -void ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4, - const void *Bx4); -void ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4, - const void *Bx4); -void ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4); -void ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(void *RESULTx4, const void *Ax4); -void ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1(void *RESULTx4); -int ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible(void); - -static void booth_recode_w7(unsigned char *sign, - unsigned char *digit, unsigned char in) -{ - unsigned char s, d; - - s = ~((in >> 7) - 1); - d = (1 << 8) - in - 1; - d = (d & s) | (in & ~s); - d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1); - - *sign = s & 1; - *digit = d; -} - -/* - * ecp_nistz256_avx2_mul_g performs multiplication by G, using only the - * precomputed table. It does 4 affine point additions in parallel, - * significantly speeding up point multiplication for a fixed value. - */ -static void ecp_nistz256_avx2_mul_g(P256_POINT *r, - unsigned char p_str[33], - const P256_POINT_AFFINE(*preComputedTable)[64]) -{ - const unsigned int window_size = 7; - const unsigned int mask = (1 << (window_size + 1)) - 1; - unsigned int wvalue; - /* Using 4 windows at a time */ - unsigned char sign0, digit0; - unsigned char sign1, digit1; - unsigned char sign2, digit2; - unsigned char sign3, digit3; - unsigned int idx = 0; - BN_ULONG tmp[P256_LIMBS]; - int i; - - ALIGN32 BN_ULONG aX4[4 * 9 * 3] = { 0 }; - ALIGN32 BN_ULONG bX4[4 * 9 * 2] = { 0 }; - ALIGN32 P256_POINT_AFFINE point_arr[4]; - ALIGN32 P256_POINT res_point_arr[4]; - - /* Initial four windows */ - wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[0]); - wvalue = (wvalue << 1) & mask; - idx += window_size; - booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue); - wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); - wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; - idx += window_size; - booth_recode_w7(&sign1, &digit1, wvalue); - wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); - wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; - idx += window_size; - booth_recode_w7(&sign2, &digit2, wvalue); - wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); - wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; - idx += window_size; - booth_recode_w7(&sign3, &digit3, wvalue); - - ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7(point_arr, preComputedTable[0], - digit0, digit1, digit2, digit3); - - ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[0].Y); - copy_conditional(point_arr[0].Y, tmp, sign0); - ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[1].Y); - copy_conditional(point_arr[1].Y, tmp, sign1); - ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[2].Y); - copy_conditional(point_arr[2].Y, tmp, sign2); - ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[3].Y); - copy_conditional(point_arr[3].Y, tmp, sign3); - - ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(aX4, point_arr); - ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(aX4, aX4); - ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(&aX4[4 * 9], &aX4[4 * 9]); - ecp_nistz256_avx2_set1(&aX4[4 * 9 * 2]); - - wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); - wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; - idx += window_size; - booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue); - wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); - wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; - idx += window_size; - booth_recode_w7(&sign1, &digit1, wvalue); - wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); - wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; - idx += window_size; - booth_recode_w7(&sign2, &digit2, wvalue); - wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); - wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; - idx += window_size; - booth_recode_w7(&sign3, &digit3, wvalue); - - ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7(point_arr, preComputedTable[4 * 1], - digit0, digit1, digit2, digit3); - - ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[0].Y); - copy_conditional(point_arr[0].Y, tmp, sign0); - ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[1].Y); - copy_conditional(point_arr[1].Y, tmp, sign1); - ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[2].Y); - copy_conditional(point_arr[2].Y, tmp, sign2); - ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[3].Y); - copy_conditional(point_arr[3].Y, tmp, sign3); - - ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(bX4, point_arr); - ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(bX4, bX4); - ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(&bX4[4 * 9], &bX4[4 * 9]); - /* Optimized when both inputs are affine */ - ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affines_x4(aX4, aX4, bX4); - - for (i = 2; i < 9; i++) { - wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); - wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; - idx += window_size; - booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue); - wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); - wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; - idx += window_size; - booth_recode_w7(&sign1, &digit1, wvalue); - wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); - wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; - idx += window_size; - booth_recode_w7(&sign2, &digit2, wvalue); - wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); - wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; - idx += window_size; - booth_recode_w7(&sign3, &digit3, wvalue); - - ecp_nistz256_avx2_multi_gather_w7(point_arr, - preComputedTable[4 * i], - digit0, digit1, digit2, digit3); - - ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[0].Y); - copy_conditional(point_arr[0].Y, tmp, sign0); - ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[1].Y); - copy_conditional(point_arr[1].Y, tmp, sign1); - ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[2].Y); - copy_conditional(point_arr[2].Y, tmp, sign2); - ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, point_arr[3].Y); - copy_conditional(point_arr[3].Y, tmp, sign3); - - ecp_nistz256_avx2_transpose_convert(bX4, point_arr); - ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(bX4, bX4); - ecp_nistz256_avx2_to_mont(&bX4[4 * 9], &bX4[4 * 9]); - - ecp_nistz256_avx2_point_add_affine_x4(aX4, aX4, bX4); - } - - ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(&aX4[4 * 9 * 0], &aX4[4 * 9 * 0]); - ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(&aX4[4 * 9 * 1], &aX4[4 * 9 * 1]); - ecp_nistz256_avx2_from_mont(&aX4[4 * 9 * 2], &aX4[4 * 9 * 2]); - - ecp_nistz256_avx2_convert_transpose_back(res_point_arr, aX4); - /* Last window is performed serially */ - wvalue = *((u16 *) & p_str[(idx - 1) / 8]); - wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; - booth_recode_w7(&sign0, &digit0, wvalue); - ecp_nistz256_gather_w7((P256_POINT_AFFINE *)r, - preComputedTable[36], digit0); - ecp_nistz256_neg(tmp, r->Y); - copy_conditional(r->Y, tmp, sign0); - memcpy(r->Z, ONE, sizeof(ONE)); - /* Sum the four windows */ - ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[0]); - ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[1]); - ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[2]); - ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &res_point_arr[3]); -} -# endif -#endif - __owur static int ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine(EC_POINT *out, const EC_GROUP *group, const P256_POINT_AFFINE *in, BN_CTX *ctx) @@ -1219,6 +1018,8 @@ } if (preComputedTable) { + BN_ULONG infty; + if ((BN_num_bits(scalar) > 256) || BN_is_negative(scalar)) { if ((tmp_scalar = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) @@ -1250,67 +1051,58 @@ for (; i < 33; i++) p_str[i] = 0; -#if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2) - if (ecp_nistz_avx2_eligible()) { - ecp_nistz256_avx2_mul_g(&p.p, p_str, preComputedTable); - } else -#endif - { - BN_ULONG infty; + /* First window */ + wvalue = (p_str[0] << 1) & mask; + idx += window_size; - /* First window */ - wvalue = (p_str[0] << 1) & mask; - idx += window_size; - - wvalue = _booth_recode_w7(wvalue); + wvalue = _booth_recode_w7(wvalue); - ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(&p.a, preComputedTable[0], - wvalue >> 1); + ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(&p.a, preComputedTable[0], + wvalue >> 1); - ecp_nistz256_neg(p.p.Z, p.p.Y); - copy_conditional(p.p.Y, p.p.Z, wvalue & 1); + ecp_nistz256_neg(p.p.Z, p.p.Y); + copy_conditional(p.p.Y, p.p.Z, wvalue & 1); - /* - * Since affine infinity is encoded as (0,0) and - * Jacobian ias (,,0), we need to harmonize them - * by assigning "one" or zero to Z. - */ - infty = (p.p.X[0] | p.p.X[1] | p.p.X[2] | p.p.X[3] | - p.p.Y[0] | p.p.Y[1] | p.p.Y[2] | p.p.Y[3]); - if (P256_LIMBS == 8) - infty |= (p.p.X[4] | p.p.X[5] | p.p.X[6] | p.p.X[7] | - p.p.Y[4] | p.p.Y[5] | p.p.Y[6] | p.p.Y[7]); - - infty = 0 - is_zero(infty); - infty = ~infty; - - p.p.Z[0] = ONE[0] & infty; - p.p.Z[1] = ONE[1] & infty; - p.p.Z[2] = ONE[2] & infty; - p.p.Z[3] = ONE[3] & infty; - if (P256_LIMBS == 8) { - p.p.Z[4] = ONE[4] & infty; - p.p.Z[5] = ONE[5] & infty; - p.p.Z[6] = ONE[6] & infty; - p.p.Z[7] = ONE[7] & infty; - } + /* + * Since affine infinity is encoded as (0,0) and + * Jacobian is (,,0), we need to harmonize them + * by assigning "one" or zero to Z. + */ + infty = (p.p.X[0] | p.p.X[1] | p.p.X[2] | p.p.X[3] | + p.p.Y[0] | p.p.Y[1] | p.p.Y[2] | p.p.Y[3]); + if (P256_LIMBS == 8) + infty |= (p.p.X[4] | p.p.X[5] | p.p.X[6] | p.p.X[7] | + p.p.Y[4] | p.p.Y[5] | p.p.Y[6] | p.p.Y[7]); + + infty = 0 - is_zero(infty); + infty = ~infty; + + p.p.Z[0] = ONE[0] & infty; + p.p.Z[1] = ONE[1] & infty; + p.p.Z[2] = ONE[2] & infty; + p.p.Z[3] = ONE[3] & infty; + if (P256_LIMBS == 8) { + p.p.Z[4] = ONE[4] & infty; + p.p.Z[5] = ONE[5] & infty; + p.p.Z[6] = ONE[6] & infty; + p.p.Z[7] = ONE[7] & infty; + } - for (i = 1; i < 37; i++) { - unsigned int off = (idx - 1) / 8; - wvalue = p_str[off] | p_str[off + 1] << 8; - wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; - idx += window_size; + for (i = 1; i < 37; i++) { + unsigned int off = (idx - 1) / 8; + wvalue = p_str[off] | p_str[off + 1] << 8; + wvalue = (wvalue >> ((idx - 1) % 8)) & mask; + idx += window_size; - wvalue = _booth_recode_w7(wvalue); + wvalue = _booth_recode_w7(wvalue); - ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(&t.a, - preComputedTable[i], wvalue >> 1); + ecp_nistz256_gather_w7(&t.a, + preComputedTable[i], wvalue >> 1); - ecp_nistz256_neg(t.p.Z, t.a.Y); - copy_conditional(t.a.Y, t.p.Z, wvalue & 1); + ecp_nistz256_neg(t.p.Z, t.a.Y); + copy_conditional(t.a.Y, t.p.Z, wvalue & 1); - ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(&p.p, &p.p, &t.a); - } + ecp_nistz256_point_add_affine(&p.p, &p.p, &t.a); } } else { p_is_infinity = 1; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -1372,6 +1372,7 @@ * Computes the multiplicative inverse of a in GF(p), storing the result in r. * If a is zero (or equivalent), you'll get a EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT error. * Since we don't have a Mont structure here, SCA hardening is with blinding. + * NB: "a" must be in _decoded_ form. (i.e. field_decode must precede.) */ int ec_GFp_simple_field_inv(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) @@ -1431,112 +1432,133 @@ temp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (temp == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_BLIND_COORDINATES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; + goto end; } - /* make sure lambda is not zero */ + /*- + * Make sure lambda is not zero. + * If the RNG fails, we cannot blind but nevertheless want + * code to continue smoothly and not clobber the error stack. + */ do { - if (!BN_priv_rand_range(lambda, group->field)) { - ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_BLIND_COORDINATES, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; + ERR_set_mark(); + ret = BN_priv_rand_range(lambda, group->field); + ERR_pop_to_mark(); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = 1; + goto end; } } while (BN_is_zero(lambda)); /* if field_encode defined convert between representations */ - if (group->meth->field_encode != NULL - && !group->meth->field_encode(group, lambda, lambda, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, p->Z, p->Z, lambda, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, temp, lambda, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, p->X, p->X, temp, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, temp, temp, lambda, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, p->Y, p->Y, temp, ctx)) - goto err; - p->Z_is_one = 0; + if ((group->meth->field_encode != NULL + && !group->meth->field_encode(group, lambda, lambda, ctx)) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, p->Z, p->Z, lambda, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, temp, lambda, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, p->X, p->X, temp, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, temp, temp, lambda, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, p->Y, p->Y, temp, ctx)) + goto end; + p->Z_is_one = 0; ret = 1; - err: + end: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } /*- - * Set s := p, r := 2p. + * Input: + * - p: affine coordinates + * + * Output: + * - s := p, r := 2p: blinded projective (homogeneous) coordinates * * For doubling we use Formula 3 from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve - * multiplication resistant against side channel attacks" appendix, as described - * at + * multiplication resistant against side channel attacks" appendix, described at * https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#doubling-dbl-2002-it-2 + * simplified for Z1=1. * - * The input point p will be in randomized Jacobian projective coords: - * x = X/Z**2, y=Y/Z**3 - * - * The output points p, s, and r are converted to standard (homogeneous) - * projective coords: - * x = X/Z, y=Y/Z + * Blinding uses the equivalence relation (\lambda X, \lambda Y, \lambda Z) + * for any non-zero \lambda that holds for projective (homogeneous) coords. */ int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_pre(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, EC_POINT *s, EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { - BIGNUM *t1, *t2, *t3, *t4, *t5, *t6 = NULL; + BIGNUM *t1, *t2, *t3, *t4, *t5 = NULL; - t1 = r->Z; - t2 = r->Y; + t1 = s->Z; + t2 = r->Z; t3 = s->X; t4 = r->X; t5 = s->Y; - t6 = s->Z; - /* convert p: (X,Y,Z) -> (XZ,Y,Z**3) */ - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, p->X, p->X, p->Z, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t1, p->Z, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, p->Z, p->Z, t1, ctx) - /* r := 2p */ - || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t2, p->X, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t3, p->Z, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t3, group->a, ctx) - || !BN_mod_sub_quick(t5, t2, t4, group->field) - || !BN_mod_add_quick(t2, t2, t4, group->field) - || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t5, t5, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, t3, group->b, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, p->X, p->Z, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t1, t6, ctx) - || !BN_mod_lshift_quick(t4, t4, 3, group->field) + if (!p->Z_is_one /* r := 2p */ + || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t3, p->X, ctx) + || !BN_mod_sub_quick(t4, t3, group->a, group->field) + || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t4, t4, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, p->X, group->b, ctx) + || !BN_mod_lshift_quick(t5, t5, 3, group->field) /* r->X coord output */ - || !BN_mod_sub_quick(r->X, t5, t4, group->field) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, t1, t2, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, t3, t6, ctx) - || !BN_mod_add_quick(t1, t1, t2, group->field) + || !BN_mod_sub_quick(r->X, t4, t5, group->field) + || !BN_mod_add_quick(t1, t3, group->a, group->field) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, p->X, t1, ctx) + || !BN_mod_add_quick(t2, group->b, t2, group->field) /* r->Z coord output */ - || !BN_mod_lshift_quick(r->Z, t1, 2, group->field) - || !EC_POINT_copy(s, p)) + || !BN_mod_lshift_quick(r->Z, t2, 2, group->field)) + return 0; + + /* make sure lambda (r->Y here for storage) is not zero */ + do { + if (!BN_priv_rand_range(r->Y, group->field)) + return 0; + } while (BN_is_zero(r->Y)); + + /* make sure lambda (s->Z here for storage) is not zero */ + do { + if (!BN_priv_rand_range(s->Z, group->field)) + return 0; + } while (BN_is_zero(s->Z)); + + /* if field_encode defined convert between representations */ + if (group->meth->field_encode != NULL + && (!group->meth->field_encode(group, r->Y, r->Y, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_encode(group, s->Z, s->Z, ctx))) + return 0; + + /* blind r and s independently */ + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, r->Z, r->Z, r->Y, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->X, r->X, r->Y, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, s->X, p->X, s->Z, ctx)) /* s := p */ return 0; r->Z_is_one = 0; s->Z_is_one = 0; - p->Z_is_one = 0; return 1; } /*- - * Differential addition-and-doubling using Eq. (9) and (10) from Izu-Takagi + * Input: + * - s, r: projective (homogeneous) coordinates + * - p: affine coordinates + * + * Output: + * - s := r + s, r := 2r: projective (homogeneous) coordinates + * + * Differential addition-and-doubling using Eq. (9) and (10) from Izu-Takagi * "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel * attacks", as described at - * https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-4 + * https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-mladd-2002-it-4 */ int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_step(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, EC_POINT *s, EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; - BIGNUM *t0, *t1, *t2, *t3, *t4, *t5, *t6, *t7 = NULL; + BIGNUM *t0, *t1, *t2, *t3, *t4, *t5, *t6 = NULL; BN_CTX_start(ctx); t0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); @@ -1546,50 +1568,47 @@ t4 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t5 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t6 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - t7 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - if (t7 == NULL - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, r->X, s->X, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, r->Z, s->Z, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, r->X, s->Z, ctx) + if (t6 == NULL + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, r->X, s->X, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, r->Z, s->Z, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, r->X, s->Z, ctx) || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, r->Z, s->X, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, group->a, t1, ctx) - || !BN_mod_add_quick(t0, t0, t4, group->field) - || !BN_mod_add_quick(t4, t3, t2, group->field) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t4, t0, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t1, t1, ctx) - || !BN_mod_lshift_quick(t7, group->b, 2, group->field) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, t7, t1, ctx) - || !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t0, t0, group->field) - || !BN_mod_add_quick(t0, t1, t0, group->field) - || !BN_mod_sub_quick(t1, t2, t3, group->field) - || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t1, t1, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, t1, p->X, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, p->Z, t0, ctx) - /* s->X coord output */ - || !BN_mod_sub_quick(s->X, t0, t3, group->field) - /* s->Z coord output */ - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, s->Z, p->Z, t1, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t3, r->X, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t2, r->Z, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t2, group->a, ctx) - || !BN_mod_add_quick(t5, r->X, r->Z, group->field) - || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t5, t5, ctx) - || !BN_mod_sub_quick(t5, t5, t3, group->field) - || !BN_mod_sub_quick(t5, t5, t2, group->field) - || !BN_mod_sub_quick(t6, t3, t4, group->field) - || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t6, t6, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t2, t5, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t7, t0, ctx) - /* r->X coord output */ - || !BN_mod_sub_quick(r->X, t6, t0, group->field) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, group->a, t0, ctx) + || !BN_mod_add_quick(t5, t6, t5, group->field) || !BN_mod_add_quick(t6, t3, t4, group->field) - || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t3, t2, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t7, t3, t7, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, t5, t6, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, t6, t5, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t0, t0, ctx) + || !BN_mod_lshift_quick(t2, group->b, 2, group->field) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t2, t0, ctx) || !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t5, t5, group->field) + || !BN_mod_sub_quick(t3, t4, t3, group->field) + /* s->Z coord output */ + || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, s->Z, t3, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, s->Z, p->X, ctx) + || !BN_mod_add_quick(t0, t0, t5, group->field) + /* s->X coord output */ + || !BN_mod_sub_quick(s->X, t0, t4, group->field) + || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t4, r->X, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t5, r->Z, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, t5, group->a, ctx) + || !BN_mod_add_quick(t1, r->X, r->Z, group->field) + || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t1, t1, ctx) + || !BN_mod_sub_quick(t1, t1, t4, group->field) + || !BN_mod_sub_quick(t1, t1, t5, group->field) + || !BN_mod_sub_quick(t3, t4, t6, group->field) + || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t3, t3, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t5, t1, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t2, t0, ctx) + /* r->X coord output */ + || !BN_mod_sub_quick(r->X, t3, t0, group->field) + || !BN_mod_add_quick(t3, t4, t6, group->field) + || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t4, t5, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t4, t2, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, t1, t3, ctx) + || !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t1, t1, group->field) /* r->Z coord output */ - || !BN_mod_add_quick(r->Z, t7, t5, group->field)) + || !BN_mod_add_quick(r->Z, t4, t1, group->field)) goto err; ret = 1; @@ -1600,17 +1619,23 @@ } /*- + * Input: + * - s, r: projective (homogeneous) coordinates + * - p: affine coordinates + * + * Output: + * - r := (x,y): affine coordinates + * * Recovers the y-coordinate of r using Eq. (8) from Brier-Joye, "Weierstrass - * Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks", modified to work in projective - * coordinates and return r in Jacobian projective coordinates. + * Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks", modified to work in mixed + * projective coords, i.e. p is affine and (r,s) in projective (homogeneous) + * coords, and return r in affine coordinates. * - * X4 = two*Y1*X2*Z3*Z2*Z1; - * Y4 = two*b*Z3*SQR(Z2*Z1) + Z3*(a*Z2*Z1+X1*X2)*(X1*Z2+X2*Z1) - X3*SQR(X1*Z2-X2*Z1); - * Z4 = two*Y1*Z3*SQR(Z2)*Z1; + * X4 = two*Y1*X2*Z3*Z2; + * Y4 = two*b*Z3*SQR(Z2) + Z3*(a*Z2+X1*X2)*(X1*Z2+X2) - X3*SQR(X1*Z2-X2); + * Z4 = two*Y1*Z3*SQR(Z2); * * Z4 != 0 because: - * - Z1==0 implies p is at infinity, which would have caused an early exit in - * the caller; * - Z2==0 implies r is at infinity (handled by the BN_is_zero(r->Z) branch); * - Z3==0 implies s is at infinity (handled by the BN_is_zero(s->Z) branch); * - Y1==0 implies p has order 2, so either r or s are infinity and handled by @@ -1627,11 +1652,7 @@ return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r); if (BN_is_zero(s->Z)) { - /* (X,Y,Z) -> (XZ,YZ**2,Z) */ - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, r->X, p->X, p->Z, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, r->Z, p->Z, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->Y, p->Y, r->Z, ctx) - || !BN_copy(r->Z, p->Z) + if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, p) || !EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx)) return 0; return 1; @@ -1647,38 +1668,46 @@ t6 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t6 == NULL - || !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t0, p->Y, group->field) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, r->X, p->Z, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, r->Z, s->Z, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, t1, t2, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, t2, t0, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, r->Z, p->Z, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t4, t2, ctx) - || !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t5, group->b, group->field) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t4, t5, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, t2, group->a, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, r->X, p->X, ctx) - || !BN_mod_add_quick(t5, t6, t5, group->field) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, r->Z, p->X, ctx) - || !BN_mod_add_quick(t2, t6, t1, group->field) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, t5, t2, ctx) - || !BN_mod_sub_quick(t6, t6, t1, group->field) - || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t6, t6, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, t6, s->X, ctx) - || !BN_mod_add_quick(t4, t5, t4, group->field) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t4, s->Z, ctx) - || !BN_mod_sub_quick(t4, t4, t6, group->field) - || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t5, r->Z, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->Z, p->Z, s->Z, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->Z, t5, r->Z, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->Z, r->Z, t0, ctx) - /* t3 := X, t4 := Y */ - /* (X,Y,Z) -> (XZ,YZ**2,Z) */ - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->X, t3, r->Z, ctx) + || !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t4, p->Y, group->field) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, r->X, t4, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, s->Z, t6, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, r->Z, t6, ctx) + || !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t1, group->b, group->field) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, s->Z, t1, ctx) || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t3, r->Z, ctx) - || !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->Y, t4, t3, ctx)) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, t3, t1, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, r->Z, group->a, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, p->X, r->X, ctx) + || !BN_mod_add_quick(t1, t1, t6, group->field) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, s->Z, t1, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, p->X, r->Z, ctx) + || !BN_mod_add_quick(t6, r->X, t0, group->field) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, t6, t1, ctx) + || !BN_mod_add_quick(t6, t6, t2, group->field) + || !BN_mod_sub_quick(t0, t0, r->X, group->field) + || !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t0, t0, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t0, s->X, ctx) + || !BN_mod_sub_quick(t0, t6, t0, group->field) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, s->Z, t4, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, t3, t1, ctx) + || (group->meth->field_decode != NULL + && !group->meth->field_decode(group, t1, t1, ctx)) + || !group->meth->field_inv(group, t1, t1, ctx) + || (group->meth->field_encode != NULL + && !group->meth->field_encode(group, t1, t1, ctx)) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->X, t5, t1, ctx) + || !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->Y, t0, t1, ctx)) goto err; + if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != NULL) { + if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, r->Z, ctx)) + goto err; + } else { + if (!BN_one(r->Z)) + goto err; + } + + r->Z_is_one = 1; ret = 1; err: diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ cleanup_stack = NULL; } CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(global_engine_lock); + global_engine_lock = NULL; } /* Now the "ex_data" support */ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/err/openssl.txt openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/err/openssl.txt --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/err/openssl.txt 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/err/openssl.txt 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# Copyright 1999-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +# Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP:191:ASN1_item_dup ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I:120:asn1_item_embed_d2i ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW:121:asn1_item_embed_new +ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D:144:ASN1_item_ex_i2d ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_FLAGS_I2D:118:asn1_item_flags_i2d ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO:192:ASN1_item_i2d_bio ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP:193:ASN1_item_i2d_fp @@ -934,6 +935,8 @@ PEM_F_PEM_SIGNFINAL:112:PEM_SignFinal PEM_F_PEM_WRITE:113:PEM_write PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO:114:PEM_write_bio +PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO_PRIVATEKEY_TRADITIONAL:147:\ + PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_PRIVATEKEY:139:PEM_write_PrivateKey PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ:115:PEM_X509_INFO_read PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO:116:PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio @@ -1742,6 +1745,7 @@ X509_F_X509_OBJECT_NEW:150:X509_OBJECT_new X509_F_X509_PRINT_EX_FP:118:X509_print_ex_fp X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE:148:x509_pubkey_decode +X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET:161:X509_PUBKEY_get X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET0:119:X509_PUBKEY_get0 X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET:120:X509_PUBKEY_set X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY:144:X509_REQ_check_private_key @@ -1768,6 +1772,7 @@ ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR:204:asn1 sig parse error ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR:100:aux error ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER:102:bad object header +ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE:230:bad template ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH:214:bmpstring is wrong length ASN1_R_BN_LIB:105:bn lib ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH:106:boolean is wrong length @@ -2164,6 +2169,7 @@ EC_R_LADDER_POST_FAILURE:136:ladder post failure EC_R_LADDER_PRE_FAILURE:153:ladder pre failure EC_R_LADDER_STEP_FAILURE:162:ladder step failure +EC_R_MISSING_OID:167:missing OID EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS:124:missing parameters EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY:125:missing private key EC_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES:157:need new setup values @@ -2277,6 +2283,7 @@ EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE:150:\ operation not supported for this keytype EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED:151:operaton not initialized +EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW:184:output would overflow EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING:162:partially overlapping buffers EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR:181:pbkdf2 error EVP_R_PKEY_APPLICATION_ASN1_METHOD_ALREADY_REGISTERED:179:\ @@ -2398,6 +2405,7 @@ PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER:113:unsupported cipher PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION:114:unsupported encryption PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS:126:unsupported key components +PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE:110:unsupported public key type PKCS12_R_CANT_PACK_STRUCTURE:100:cant pack structure PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA:121:content type not data PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR:101:decode error diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ /* * copy start of the next block into proper place */ - if (ctx->buf_len_save - ctx->buf_off_save > 0) { + if (ctx->buf_len_save > ctx->buf_off_save) { ctx->buf_len = ctx->buf_len_save - ctx->buf_off_save; memmove(ctx->buf, &(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off_save]), ctx->buf_len); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/evp/encode.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/encode.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/evp/encode.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/encode.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ table = data_ascii2bin; /* trim white space from the start of the line. */ - while ((conv_ascii2bin(*f, table) == B64_WS) && (n > 0)) { + while ((n > 0) && (conv_ascii2bin(*f, table) == B64_WS)) { f++; n--; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ */ #include +#include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include @@ -355,6 +356,19 @@ return 1; } else { j = bl - i; + + /* + * Once we've processed the first j bytes from in, the amount of + * data left that is a multiple of the block length is: + * (inl - j) & ~(bl - 1) + * We must ensure that this amount of data, plus the one block that + * we process from ctx->buf does not exceed INT_MAX + */ + if (((inl - j) & ~(bl - 1)) > INT_MAX - bl) { + EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE, + EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW); + return 0; + } memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, j); inl -= j; in += j; @@ -502,6 +516,19 @@ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); return 0; } + /* + * final_used is only ever set if buf_len is 0. Therefore the maximum + * length output we will ever see from evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate is + * the maximum multiple of the block length that is <= inl, or just: + * inl & ~(b - 1) + * Since final_used has been set then the final output length is: + * (inl & ~(b - 1)) + b + * This must never exceed INT_MAX + */ + if ((inl & ~(b - 1)) > INT_MAX - b) { + EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW); + return 0; + } memcpy(out, ctx->final, b); out += b; fix_len = 1; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/evp/evp_err.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_err.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/evp/evp_err.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/evp/evp_err.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT - * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -239,6 +239,8 @@ "operation not supported for this keytype"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED), "operaton not initialized"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW), + "output would overflow"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING), "partially overlapping buffers"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR), "pbkdf2 error"}, diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/mem_sec.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/mem_sec.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/mem_sec.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/mem_sec.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 2004-2014, Akamai Technologies. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ # include # endif # endif +# if defined(__FreeBSD__) +# define MADV_DONTDUMP MADV_NOCORE +# endif +# if !defined(MAP_CONCEAL) +# define MAP_CONCEAL 0 +# endif # include # include # include @@ -442,7 +448,7 @@ if (1) { #ifdef MAP_ANON sh.map_result = mmap(NULL, sh.map_size, - PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANON|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); + PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANON|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_CONCEAL, -1, 0); } else { #endif int fd; @@ -502,7 +508,7 @@ OPENSSL_free(sh.freelist); OPENSSL_free(sh.bittable); OPENSSL_free(sh.bitmalloc); - if (sh.map_result != NULL && sh.map_size) + if (sh.map_result != MAP_FAILED && sh.map_size) munmap(sh.map_result, sh.map_size); memset(&sh, 0, sizeof(sh)); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } -if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { +if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } -if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { +if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/cbc128.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/cbc128.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/cbc128.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/cbc128.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2008-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ # define STRICT_ALIGNMENT 0 #endif +#if defined(__GNUC__) && !STRICT_ALIGNMENT +typedef size_t size_t_aX __attribute((__aligned__(1))); +#else +typedef size_t size_t_aX; +#endif + void CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len, const void *key, unsigned char ivec[16], block128_f block) @@ -40,8 +46,8 @@ } else { while (len >= 16) { for (n = 0; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t)) - *(size_t *)(out + n) = - *(size_t *)(in + n) ^ *(size_t *)(iv + n); + *(size_t_aX *)(out + n) = + *(size_t_aX *)(in + n) ^ *(size_t_aX *)(iv + n); (*block) (out, out, key); iv = out; len -= 16; @@ -96,7 +102,8 @@ } } else if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true */ while (len >= 16) { - size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out, *iv_t = (size_t *)iv; + size_t_aX *out_t = (size_t_aX *)out; + size_t_aX *iv_t = (size_t_aX *)iv; (*block) (in, out, key); for (n = 0; n < 16 / sizeof(size_t); n++) @@ -125,8 +132,10 @@ } } else if (16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0) { /* always true */ while (len >= 16) { - size_t c, *out_t = (size_t *)out, *ivec_t = (size_t *)ivec; - const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in; + size_t c; + size_t_aX *out_t = (size_t_aX *)out; + size_t_aX *ivec_t = (size_t_aX *)ivec; + const size_t_aX *in_t = (const size_t_aX *)in; (*block) (in, tmp.c, key); for (n = 0; n < 16 / sizeof(size_t); n++) { diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/ccm128.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/ccm128.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/ccm128.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/ccm128.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2011-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -11,6 +11,14 @@ #include "modes_local.h" #include +#ifndef STRICT_ALIGNMENT +# ifdef __GNUC__ +typedef u64 u64_a1 __attribute((__aligned__(1))); +# else +typedef u64 u64_a1; +# endif +#endif + /* * First you setup M and L parameters and pass the key schedule. This is * called once per session setup... @@ -170,8 +178,8 @@ ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= temp.u[0]; ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= temp.u[1]; #else - ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= ((u64 *)inp)[0]; - ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= ((u64 *)inp)[1]; + ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= ((u64_a1 *)inp)[0]; + ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= ((u64_a1 *)inp)[1]; #endif (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, key); (*block) (ctx->nonce.c, scratch.c, key); @@ -181,8 +189,8 @@ temp.u[1] ^= scratch.u[1]; memcpy(out, temp.c, 16); #else - ((u64 *)out)[0] = scratch.u[0] ^ ((u64 *)inp)[0]; - ((u64 *)out)[1] = scratch.u[1] ^ ((u64 *)inp)[1]; + ((u64_a1 *)out)[0] = scratch.u[0] ^ ((u64_a1 *)inp)[0]; + ((u64_a1 *)out)[1] = scratch.u[1] ^ ((u64_a1 *)inp)[1]; #endif inp += 16; out += 16; @@ -254,8 +262,10 @@ ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= (scratch.u[1] ^= temp.u[1]); memcpy(out, scratch.c, 16); #else - ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= (((u64 *)out)[0] = scratch.u[0] ^ ((u64 *)inp)[0]); - ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= (((u64 *)out)[1] = scratch.u[1] ^ ((u64 *)inp)[1]); + ctx->cmac.u[0] ^= (((u64_a1 *)out)[0] + = scratch.u[0] ^ ((u64_a1 *)inp)[0]); + ctx->cmac.u[1] ^= (((u64_a1 *)out)[1] + = scratch.u[1] ^ ((u64_a1 *)inp)[1]); #endif (*block) (ctx->cmac.c, ctx->cmac.c, key); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/cfb128.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/cfb128.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/cfb128.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/cfb128.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2008-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ #include "modes_local.h" #include +#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) +typedef size_t size_t_aX __attribute((__aligned__(1))); +#else +typedef size_t size_t_aX; +#endif + /* * The input and output encrypted as though 128bit cfb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 128bit block we have @@ -43,8 +49,9 @@ while (len >= 16) { (*block) (ivec, ivec, key); for (; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t)) { - *(size_t *)(out + n) = - *(size_t *)(ivec + n) ^= *(size_t *)(in + n); + *(size_t_aX *)(out + n) = + *(size_t_aX *)(ivec + n) + ^= *(size_t_aX *)(in + n); } len -= 16; out += 16; @@ -92,9 +99,10 @@ while (len >= 16) { (*block) (ivec, ivec, key); for (; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t)) { - size_t t = *(size_t *)(in + n); - *(size_t *)(out + n) = *(size_t *)(ivec + n) ^ t; - *(size_t *)(ivec + n) = t; + size_t t = *(size_t_aX *)(in + n); + *(size_t_aX *)(out + n) + = *(size_t_aX *)(ivec + n) ^ t; + *(size_t_aX *)(ivec + n) = t; } len -= 16; out += 16; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/ctr128.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/ctr128.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/ctr128.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/ctr128.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2008-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ #include "modes_local.h" #include +#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) +typedef size_t size_t_aX __attribute((__aligned__(1))); +#else +typedef size_t size_t_aX; +#endif + /* * NOTE: the IV/counter CTR mode is big-endian. The code itself is * endian-neutral. @@ -97,8 +103,9 @@ (*block) (ivec, ecount_buf, key); ctr128_inc_aligned(ivec); for (n = 0; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t)) - *(size_t *)(out + n) = - *(size_t *)(in + n) ^ *(size_t *)(ecount_buf + n); + *(size_t_aX *)(out + n) = + *(size_t_aX *)(in + n) + ^ *(size_t_aX *)(ecount_buf + n); len -= 16; out += 16; in += 16; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/gcm128.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/gcm128.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/gcm128.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/gcm128.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2010-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2010-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ #include "modes_local.h" #include +#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) +typedef size_t size_t_aX __attribute((__aligned__(1))); +#else +typedef size_t size_t_aX; +#endif + #if defined(BSWAP4) && defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) /* redefine, because alignment is ensured */ # undef GETU32 @@ -1080,8 +1086,8 @@ size_t j = GHASH_CHUNK; while (j) { - size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out; - const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in; + size_t_aX *out_t = (size_t_aX *)out; + const size_t_aX *in_t = (const size_t_aX *)in; (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; @@ -1107,8 +1113,8 @@ size_t j = i; while (len >= 16) { - size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out; - const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in; + size_t_aX *out_t = (size_t_aX *)out; + const size_t_aX *in_t = (const size_t_aX *)in; (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; @@ -1318,8 +1324,8 @@ GHASH(ctx, in, GHASH_CHUNK); while (j) { - size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out; - const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in; + size_t_aX *out_t = (size_t_aX *)out; + const size_t_aX *in_t = (const size_t_aX *)in; (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; @@ -1343,8 +1349,8 @@ if ((i = (len & (size_t)-16))) { GHASH(ctx, in, i); while (len >= 16) { - size_t *out_t = (size_t *)out; - const size_t *in_t = (const size_t *)in; + size_t_aX *out_t = (size_t_aX *)out; + const size_t_aX *in_t = (const size_t_aX *)in; (*block) (ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/modes_local.h openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/modes_local.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/modes_local.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/modes_local.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2010-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2010-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -37,6 +37,14 @@ # endif #endif +#ifndef STRICT_ALIGNMENT +# ifdef __GNUC__ +typedef u32 u32_a1 __attribute((__aligned__(1))); +# else +typedef u32 u32_a1; +# endif +#endif + #if !defined(PEDANTIC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 # if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) @@ -55,12 +63,15 @@ asm ("bswapl %0" \ : "+r"(ret_)); ret_; }) # elif defined(__aarch64__) -# define BSWAP8(x) ({ u64 ret_; \ +# if defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && defined(__ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && \ + __BYTE_ORDER__==__ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ +# define BSWAP8(x) ({ u64 ret_; \ asm ("rev %0,%1" \ : "=r"(ret_) : "r"(x)); ret_; }) -# define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret_; \ +# define BSWAP4(x) ({ u32 ret_; \ asm ("rev %w0,%w1" \ : "=r"(ret_) : "r"(x)); ret_; }) +# endif # elif (defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm)) && !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) # define BSWAP8(x) ({ u32 lo_=(u64)(x)>>32,hi_=(x); \ asm ("rev %0,%0; rev %1,%1" \ @@ -86,8 +97,8 @@ # endif #endif #if defined(BSWAP4) && !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) -# define GETU32(p) BSWAP4(*(const u32 *)(p)) -# define PUTU32(p,v) *(u32 *)(p) = BSWAP4(v) +# define GETU32(p) BSWAP4(*(const u32_a1 *)(p)) +# define PUTU32(p,v) *(u32_a1 *)(p) = BSWAP4(v) #else # define GETU32(p) ((u32)(p)[0]<<24|(u32)(p)[1]<<16|(u32)(p)[2]<<8|(u32)(p)[3]) # define PUTU32(p,v) ((p)[0]=(u8)((v)>>24),(p)[1]=(u8)((v)>>16),(p)[2]=(u8)((v)>>8),(p)[3]=(u8)(v)) diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/ofb128.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/ofb128.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/ofb128.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/ofb128.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2008-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2008-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ #include "modes_local.h" #include +#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) +typedef size_t size_t_aX __attribute((__aligned__(1))); +#else +typedef size_t size_t_aX; +#endif + /* * The input and output encrypted as though 128bit ofb mode is being used. * The extra state information to record how much of the 128bit block we have @@ -41,8 +47,9 @@ while (len >= 16) { (*block) (ivec, ivec, key); for (; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t)) - *(size_t *)(out + n) = - *(size_t *)(in + n) ^ *(size_t *)(ivec + n); + *(size_t_aX *)(out + n) = + *(size_t_aX *)(in + n) + ^ *(size_t_aX *)(ivec + n); len -= 16; out += 16; in += 16; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/xts128.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/xts128.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/modes/xts128.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/modes/xts128.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -11,6 +11,14 @@ #include "modes_local.h" #include +#ifndef STRICT_ALIGNMENT +# ifdef __GNUC__ +typedef u64 u64_a1 __attribute((__aligned__(1))); +# else +typedef u64 u64_a1; +# endif +#endif + int CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(const XTS128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char iv[16], const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, @@ -45,8 +53,8 @@ scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0]; scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1]; #else - scratch.u[0] = ((u64 *)inp)[0] ^ tweak.u[0]; - scratch.u[1] = ((u64 *)inp)[1] ^ tweak.u[1]; + scratch.u[0] = ((u64_a1 *)inp)[0] ^ tweak.u[0]; + scratch.u[1] = ((u64_a1 *)inp)[1] ^ tweak.u[1]; #endif (*ctx->block1) (scratch.c, scratch.c, ctx->key1); #if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) @@ -54,8 +62,8 @@ scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1]; memcpy(out, scratch.c, 16); #else - ((u64 *)out)[0] = scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0]; - ((u64 *)out)[1] = scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1]; + ((u64_a1 *)out)[0] = scratch.u[0] ^= tweak.u[0]; + ((u64_a1 *)out)[1] = scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1]; #endif inp += 16; out += 16; @@ -128,8 +136,8 @@ scratch.u[0] ^= tweak1.u[0]; scratch.u[1] ^= tweak1.u[1]; #else - scratch.u[0] = ((u64 *)inp)[0] ^ tweak1.u[0]; - scratch.u[1] = ((u64 *)inp)[1] ^ tweak1.u[1]; + scratch.u[0] = ((u64_a1 *)inp)[0] ^ tweak1.u[0]; + scratch.u[1] = ((u64_a1 *)inp)[1] ^ tweak1.u[1]; #endif (*ctx->block1) (scratch.c, scratch.c, ctx->key1); scratch.u[0] ^= tweak1.u[0]; @@ -148,8 +156,8 @@ scratch.u[1] ^= tweak.u[1]; memcpy(out, scratch.c, 16); #else - ((u64 *)out)[0] = scratch.u[0] ^ tweak.u[0]; - ((u64 *)out)[1] = scratch.u[1] ^ tweak.u[1]; + ((u64_a1 *)out)[0] = scratch.u[0] ^ tweak.u[0]; + ((u64_a1 *)out)[1] = scratch.u[1] ^ tweak.u[1]; #endif } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl * - * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by objxref.pl * - * Copyright 1998-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1998-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/o_str.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/o_str.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/o_str.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/o_str.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2003-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2003-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ int openssl_strerror_r(int errnum, char *buf, size_t buflen) { -#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1400 +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1400 && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) return !strerror_s(buf, buflen, errnum); #elif defined(_GNU_SOURCE) char *err; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/o_time.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/o_time.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/o_time.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/o_time.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ if (gmtime_r(timer, result) == NULL) return NULL; ts = result; -#elif defined (OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER >= 1400 +#elif defined (OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER >= 1400 && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) if (gmtime_s(result, timer)) return NULL; ts = result; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/pem/pem_err.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/pem/pem_err.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/pem/pem_err.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/pem/pem_err.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PEM, PEM_F_PEM_SIGNFINAL, 0), "PEM_SignFinal"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PEM, PEM_F_PEM_WRITE, 0), "PEM_write"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PEM, PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO, 0), "PEM_write_bio"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PEM, PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO_PRIVATEKEY_TRADITIONAL, 0), + "PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PEM, PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_PRIVATEKEY, 0), "PEM_write_PrivateKey"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PEM, PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ, 0), "PEM_X509_INFO_read"}, @@ -109,6 +111,8 @@ "unsupported encryption"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PEM, 0, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS), "unsupported key components"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PEM, 0, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE), + "unsupported public key type"}, {0, NULL} }; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ } } - if ((dsize = i2d(x, NULL)) < 0) { + if ((dsize = i2d(x, NULL)) <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); dsize = 0; goto err; @@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ { BIO *tmp = *header; char *linebuf, *p; - int len, line, ret = 0, end = 0; + int len, line, ret = 0, end = 0, prev_partial_line_read = 0, partial_line_read = 0; /* 0 if not seen (yet), 1 if reading header, 2 if finished header */ enum header_status got_header = MAYBE_HEADER; unsigned int flags_mask; @@ -809,10 +809,18 @@ flags_mask = ~0u; len = BIO_gets(bp, linebuf, LINESIZE); if (len <= 0) { - PEMerr(PEM_F_GET_HEADER_AND_DATA, PEM_R_SHORT_HEADER); + PEMerr(PEM_F_GET_HEADER_AND_DATA, PEM_R_BAD_END_LINE); goto err; } + /* + * Check if line has been read completely or if only part of the line + * has been read. Keep the previous value to ignore newlines that + * appear due to reading a line up until the char before the newline. + */ + prev_partial_line_read = partial_line_read; + partial_line_read = len == LINESIZE-1 && linebuf[LINESIZE-2] != '\n'; + if (got_header == MAYBE_HEADER) { if (memchr(linebuf, ':', len) != NULL) got_header = IN_HEADER; @@ -823,13 +831,19 @@ /* Check for end of header. */ if (linebuf[0] == '\n') { - if (got_header == POST_HEADER) { - /* Another blank line is an error. */ - PEMerr(PEM_F_GET_HEADER_AND_DATA, PEM_R_BAD_END_LINE); - goto err; + /* + * If previous line has been read only partially this newline is a + * regular newline at the end of a line and not an empty line. + */ + if (!prev_partial_line_read) { + if (got_header == POST_HEADER) { + /* Another blank line is an error. */ + PEMerr(PEM_F_GET_HEADER_AND_DATA, PEM_R_BAD_END_LINE); + goto err; + } + got_header = POST_HEADER; + tmp = *data; } - got_header = POST_HEADER; - tmp = *data; continue; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -108,6 +108,12 @@ pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { char pem_str[80]; + + if (x->ameth == NULL || x->ameth->old_priv_encode == NULL) { + PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO_PRIVATEKEY_TRADITIONAL, + PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE); + return 0; + } BIO_snprintf(pem_str, 80, "%s PRIVATE KEY", x->ameth->pem_str); return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_PrivateKey, pem_str, bp, x, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2005-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2005-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ { const unsigned char *p = *in; unsigned int ret; - ret = *p++; - ret |= (*p++ << 8); - ret |= (*p++ << 16); - ret |= (*p++ << 24); + ret = (unsigned int)*p++; + ret |= (unsigned int)*p++ << 8; + ret |= (unsigned int)*p++ << 16; + ret |= (unsigned int)*p++ << 24; *in = p; return ret; } @@ -875,9 +875,9 @@ wrlen = BIO_write(out, tmp, outlen); OPENSSL_free(tmp); if (wrlen == outlen) { - PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_BIO_WRITE_FAILURE); return outlen; } + PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_BIO_WRITE_FAILURE); return -1; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1999-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ char *ptr; long len; len = BIO_get_mem_data(indata, &ptr); - tmpin = BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len); + tmpin = (len == 0) ? indata : BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len); if (tmpin == NULL) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv4.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv4.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv4.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv4.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #! /usr/bin/env perl -# Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +# Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -133,10 +133,10 @@ # ifdef __thumb2__ itete eq # endif - addeq r12,r11,#(poly1305_emit-.Lpoly1305_init) - addne r12,r11,#(poly1305_emit_neon-.Lpoly1305_init) - addeq r11,r11,#(poly1305_blocks-.Lpoly1305_init) - addne r11,r11,#(poly1305_blocks_neon-.Lpoly1305_init) + addeq r12,r11,#(.Lpoly1305_emit-.Lpoly1305_init) + addne r12,r11,#(.Lpoly1305_emit_neon-.Lpoly1305_init) + addeq r11,r11,#(.Lpoly1305_blocks-.Lpoly1305_init) + addne r11,r11,#(.Lpoly1305_blocks_neon-.Lpoly1305_init) # endif # ifdef __thumb2__ orr r12,r12,#1 @ thumb-ify address @@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ .type poly1305_emit,%function .align 5 poly1305_emit: +.Lpoly1305_emit: stmdb sp!,{r4-r11} .Lpoly1305_emit_enter: @@ -671,6 +672,7 @@ .type poly1305_blocks_neon,%function .align 5 poly1305_blocks_neon: +.Lpoly1305_blocks_neon: ldr ip,[$ctx,#36] @ is_base2_26 ands $len,$len,#-16 beq .Lno_data_neon @@ -1157,6 +1159,7 @@ .type poly1305_emit_neon,%function .align 5 poly1305_emit_neon: +.Lpoly1305_emit_neon: ldr ip,[$ctx,#36] @ is_base2_26 stmdb sp!,{r4-r11} diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv8.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv8.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv8.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-armv8.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -57,10 +57,14 @@ // forward "declarations" are required for Apple .extern OPENSSL_armcap_P +.hidden OPENSSL_armcap_P +.globl poly1305_init +.hidden poly1305_init .globl poly1305_blocks +.hidden poly1305_blocks .globl poly1305_emit +.hidden poly1305_emit -.globl poly1305_init .type poly1305_init,%function .align 5 poly1305_init: @@ -860,8 +864,8 @@ st1 {$ACC4}[0],[$ctx] .Lno_data_neon: - .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp ldr x29,[sp],#80 + .inst 0xd50323bf // autiasp ret .size poly1305_blocks_neon,.-poly1305_blocks_neon diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86_64.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86_64.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86_64.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86_64.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=12); } -if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { +if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ $avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10); } - if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { + if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ppccap.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ppccap.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ppccap.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ppccap.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2009-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2009-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -214,6 +214,24 @@ # endif #endif +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) +# include +# if __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000 +# include +# define OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL + +static unsigned long getauxval(unsigned long key) +{ + unsigned long val = 0ul; + + if (elf_aux_info((int)key, &val, sizeof(val)) != 0) + return 0ul; + + return val; +} +# endif +#endif + /* I wish was universally available */ #define HWCAP 16 /* AT_HWCAP */ #define HWCAP_PPC64 (1U << 30) diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rand/build.info openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rand/build.info --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rand/build.info 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rand/build.info 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \ rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c drbg_lib.c drbg_ctr.c + +INCLUDE[drbg_ctr.o]=../modes diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -12,28 +12,25 @@ #include #include #include -#include "internal/thread_once.h" +#include "modes_local.h" #include "internal/thread_once.h" #include "rand_local.h" + /* * Implementation of NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG. */ static void inc_128(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr) { - int i; - unsigned char c; - unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[15]; - - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++, p--) { - c = *p; - c++; - *p = c; - if (c != 0) { - /* If we didn't wrap around, we're done. */ - break; - } - } + unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[0]; + u32 n = 16, c = 1; + + do { + --n; + c += p[n]; + p[n] = (u8)c; + c >>= 8; + } while (n); } static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) @@ -66,15 +63,15 @@ * Process a complete block using BCC algorithm of SP 800-90A 10.3.3 */ __owur static int ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in) + const unsigned char *in, int len) { int i, outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) out[i] ^= in[i]; - if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_df, out, &outlen, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_df, out, &outlen, out, len) + || outlen != len) return 0; return 1; } @@ -85,12 +82,16 @@ */ __owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in) { - if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in) - || !ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, in)) - return 0; - if (ctr->keylen != 16 && !ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, in)) - return 0; - return 1; + unsigned char in_tmp[48]; + unsigned char num_of_blk = 2; + + memcpy(in_tmp, in, 16); + memcpy(in_tmp + 16, in, 16); + if (ctr->keylen != 16) { + memcpy(in_tmp + 32, in, 16); + num_of_blk = 3; + } + return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in_tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE * num_of_blk); } /* @@ -99,19 +100,14 @@ */ __owur static int ctr_BCC_init(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr) { + unsigned char bltmp[48] = {0}; + unsigned char num_of_blk; + memset(ctr->KX, 0, 48); - memset(ctr->bltmp, 0, 16); - if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, ctr->bltmp)) - return 0; - ctr->bltmp[3] = 1; - if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, ctr->bltmp)) - return 0; - if (ctr->keylen != 16) { - ctr->bltmp[3] = 2; - if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, ctr->bltmp)) - return 0; - } - return 1; + num_of_blk = ctr->keylen == 16 ? 2 : 3; + bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 1) + 3] = 1; + bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2) + 3] = 2; + return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, bltmp, num_of_blk * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); } /* @@ -200,20 +196,20 @@ || !ctr_BCC_final(ctr)) return 0; /* Set up key K */ - if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx, ctr->cipher, NULL, ctr->KX, NULL, 1)) + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->KX, NULL, -1)) return 0; /* X follows key K */ - if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->KX, &outlen, ctr->KX + ctr->keylen, + if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX, &outlen, ctr->KX + ctr->keylen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0; - if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->KX + 16, &outlen, ctr->KX, + if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 16, &outlen, ctr->KX, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0; if (ctr->keylen != 16) - if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->KX + 32, &outlen, ctr->KX + 16, - AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 32, &outlen, + ctr->KX + 16, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0; return 1; @@ -232,31 +228,25 @@ { RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; int outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + unsigned char V_tmp[48], out[48]; + unsigned char len; /* correct key is already set up. */ + memcpy(V_tmp, ctr->V, 16); inc_128(ctr); - if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->K, &outlen, ctr->V, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - return 0; - - /* If keylen longer than 128 bits need extra encrypt */ - if (ctr->keylen != 16) { + memcpy(V_tmp + 16, ctr->V, 16); + if (ctr->keylen == 16) { + len = 32; + } else { inc_128(ctr); - if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->K+16, &outlen, ctr->V, - AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - return 0; + memcpy(V_tmp + 32, ctr->V, 16); + len = 48; } - inc_128(ctr); - if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->V, &outlen, ctr->V, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, out, &outlen, V_tmp, len) + || outlen != len) return 0; - - /* If 192 bit key part of V is on end of K */ - if (ctr->keylen == 24) { - memcpy(ctr->V + 8, ctr->V, 8); - memcpy(ctr->V, ctr->K + 24, 8); - } + memcpy(ctr->K, out, ctr->keylen); + memcpy(ctr->V, out + ctr->keylen, 16); if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) { /* If no input reuse existing derived value */ @@ -271,7 +261,8 @@ ctr_XOR(ctr, in2, in2len); } - if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx, ctr->cipher, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, 1)) + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1) + || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1)) return 0; return 1; } @@ -288,8 +279,10 @@ memset(ctr->K, 0, sizeof(ctr->K)); memset(ctr->V, 0, sizeof(ctr->V)); - if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx, ctr->cipher, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, 1)) + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1)) return 0; + + inc_128(ctr); if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, pers, perslen, nonce, noncelen)) return 0; return 1; @@ -299,20 +292,40 @@ const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen, const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) { + RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; + if (entropy == NULL) return 0; + + inc_128(ctr); if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0)) return 0; return 1; } +static void ctr96_inc(unsigned char *counter) +{ + u32 n = 12, c = 1; + + do { + --n; + c += counter[n]; + counter[n] = (u8)c; + c >>= 8; + } while (n); +} + __owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) { RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; + unsigned int ctr32, blocks; + int outl, buflen; if (adin != NULL && adinlen != 0) { + inc_128(ctr); + if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) return 0; /* This means we reuse derived value */ @@ -324,28 +337,53 @@ adinlen = 0; } - for ( ; ; ) { - int outl = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + inc_128(ctr); + if (outlen == 0) { inc_128(ctr); - if (outlen < 16) { - /* Use K as temp space as it will be updated */ - if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->K, &outl, ctr->V, - AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - || outl != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - return 0; - memcpy(out, ctr->K, outlen); - break; - } - if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, out, &outl, ctr->V, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - || outl != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + + if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) return 0; - out += 16; - outlen -= 16; - if (outlen == 0) - break; + return 1; } + memset(out, 0, outlen); + + do { + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, + NULL, NULL, NULL, ctr->V, -1)) + return 0; + + /*- + * outlen has type size_t while EVP_CipherUpdate takes an + * int argument and thus cannot be guaranteed to process more + * than 2^31-1 bytes at a time. We process such huge generate + * requests in 2^30 byte chunks, which is the greatest multiple + * of AES block size lower than or equal to 2^31-1. + */ + buflen = outlen > (1U << 30) ? (1U << 30) : outlen; + blocks = (buflen + 15) / 16; + + ctr32 = GETU32(ctr->V + 12) + blocks; + if (ctr32 < blocks) { + /* 32-bit counter overflow into V. */ + if (ctr32 != 0) { + blocks -= ctr32; + buflen = blocks * 16; + ctr32 = 0; + } + ctr96_inc(ctr->V); + } + PUTU32(ctr->V + 12, ctr32); + + if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ctr, out, &outl, out, buflen) + || outl != buflen) + return 0; + + out += buflen; + outlen -= buflen; + } while (outlen); + if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) return 0; return 1; @@ -353,7 +391,8 @@ static int drbg_ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ecb); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ctr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_df); OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.ctr, sizeof(drbg->data.ctr)); return 1; @@ -377,25 +416,36 @@ return 0; case NID_aes_128_ctr: keylen = 16; - ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb(); + ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_128_ecb(); + ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_128_ctr(); break; case NID_aes_192_ctr: keylen = 24; - ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb(); + ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_192_ecb(); + ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_192_ctr(); break; case NID_aes_256_ctr: keylen = 32; - ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb(); + ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_256_ecb(); + ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_256_ctr(); break; } drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth; ctr->keylen = keylen; - if (ctr->ctx == NULL) - ctr->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - if (ctr->ctx == NULL) + if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL) + ctr->ctx_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL) + ctr->ctx_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL || ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL + || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, + ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) + || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, + ctr->cipher_ctr, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1)) return 0; + + drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth; drbg->strength = keylen * 8; drbg->seedlen = keylen + 16; @@ -413,7 +463,8 @@ if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL) return 0; /* Set key schedule for df_key */ - if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df, ctr->cipher, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1)) + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df, + ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1)) return 0; drbg->min_entropylen = ctr->keylen; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -327,13 +327,6 @@ max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen; } - drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter); - if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) { - drbg->reseed_next_counter++; - if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter) - drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1; - } - if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy, min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0); @@ -359,9 +352,15 @@ } drbg->state = DRBG_READY; - drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1; + drbg->generate_counter = 1; drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL); - tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter); + if (drbg->enable_reseed_propagation) { + if (drbg->parent == NULL) + tsan_counter(&drbg->reseed_counter); + else + tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_counter, + tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_counter)); + } end: if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL) @@ -428,14 +427,6 @@ } drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; - - drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter); - if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) { - drbg->reseed_next_counter++; - if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter) - drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1; - } - if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength, drbg->min_entropylen, @@ -451,9 +442,15 @@ goto end; drbg->state = DRBG_READY; - drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1; + drbg->generate_counter = 1; drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL); - tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter); + if (drbg->enable_reseed_propagation) { + if (drbg->parent == NULL) + tsan_counter(&drbg->reseed_counter); + else + tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_counter, + tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_counter)); + } end: if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL) @@ -554,7 +551,9 @@ drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0); } else if (reseeded == 0) { /* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */ - RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0); + if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0)) { + RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR); + } } } @@ -612,7 +611,7 @@ } if (drbg->reseed_interval > 0) { - if (drbg->reseed_gen_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval) + if (drbg->generate_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval) reseed_required = 1; } if (drbg->reseed_time_interval > 0) { @@ -621,11 +620,8 @@ || now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval) reseed_required = 1; } - if (drbg->parent != NULL) { - unsigned int reseed_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter); - if (reseed_counter > 0 - && tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter) - != reseed_counter) + if (drbg->enable_reseed_propagation && drbg->parent != NULL) { + if (drbg->reseed_counter != tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_counter)) reseed_required = 1; } @@ -644,7 +640,7 @@ return 0; } - drbg->reseed_gen_counter++; + drbg->generate_counter++; return 1; } @@ -706,8 +702,7 @@ RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce, RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce) { - if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED - || drbg->parent != NULL) + if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) return 0; drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy; drbg->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_entropy; @@ -883,8 +878,9 @@ if (parent == NULL && rand_drbg_enable_locking(drbg) == 0) goto err; - /* enable seed propagation */ - tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, 1); + /* enable reseed propagation */ + drbg->enable_reseed_propagation = 1; + drbg->reseed_counter = 1; /* * Ignore instantiation error to support just-in-time instantiation. diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rand/randfile.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rand/randfile.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rand/randfile.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rand/randfile.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO # include # include -# ifdef _WIN32 +# if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) # include # include # define stat _stat diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -174,8 +174,6 @@ prediction_resistance, (unsigned char *)&drbg, sizeof(drbg)) != 0) bytes = bytes_needed; - drbg->reseed_next_counter - = tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter); rand_drbg_unlock(drbg->parent); rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rand/rand_local.h openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rand/rand_local.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rand/rand_local.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rand/rand_local.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -138,9 +138,11 @@ * The state of a DRBG AES-CTR. */ typedef struct rand_drbg_ctr_st { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_ecb; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_ctr; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_df; - const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ecb; + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ctr; size_t keylen; unsigned char K[32]; unsigned char V[16]; @@ -233,7 +235,7 @@ size_t max_perslen, max_adinlen; /* Counts the number of generate requests since the last reseed. */ - unsigned int reseed_gen_counter; + unsigned int generate_counter; /* * Maximum number of generate requests until a reseed is required. * This value is ignored if it is zero. @@ -246,9 +248,15 @@ * This value is ignored if it is zero. */ time_t reseed_time_interval; + + /* + * Enables reseed propagation (see following comment) + */ + unsigned int enable_reseed_propagation; + /* * Counts the number of reseeds since instantiation. - * This value is ignored if it is zero. + * This value is ignored if enable_reseed_propagation is zero. * * This counter is used only for seed propagation from the DRBG * to its two children, the and DRBG. This feature is @@ -256,8 +264,7 @@ * is added by RAND_add() or RAND_seed() will have an immediate effect on * the output of RAND_bytes() resp. RAND_priv_bytes(). */ - TSAN_QUALIFIER unsigned int reseed_prop_counter; - unsigned int reseed_next_counter; + TSAN_QUALIFIER unsigned int reseed_counter; size_t seedlen; DRBG_STATUS state; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -26,12 +26,12 @@ # include # endif #endif -#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) # include # include # include #endif -#if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__) +#if defined(__OpenBSD__) # include #endif @@ -247,10 +247,12 @@ * when the sysctl returns long and we want to request something not a * multiple of longs, which should never be the case. */ +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0)) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } +#endif /* * On NetBSD before 4.0 KERN_ARND was an alias for KERN_URND, and only @@ -268,7 +270,7 @@ mib[1] = KERN_ARND; do { - len = buflen; + len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen; if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1) return done > 0 ? done : -1; done += len; @@ -363,12 +365,19 @@ * - OpenBSD since 5.6 * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25 * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061) + * + * Note: Sometimes getentropy() can be provided but not implemented + * internally. So we need to check errno for ENOSYS */ # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux) extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak)); - if (getentropy != NULL) - return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1; + if (getentropy != NULL) { + if (getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0) + return (ssize_t)buflen; + if (errno != ENOSYS) + return -1; + } # else union { void *p; @@ -409,7 +418,8 @@ } random_devices[OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths)]; static int keep_random_devices_open = 1; -# if defined(__linux) && defined(DEVRANDOM_WAIT) +# if defined(__linux) && defined(DEVRANDOM_WAIT) \ + && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) static void *shm_addr; static void cleanup_shm(void) @@ -487,7 +497,7 @@ } return seeded; } -# else /* defined __linux */ +# else /* defined __linux && DEVRANDOM_WAIT && OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM */ static int wait_random_seeded(void) { return 1; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -118,6 +118,15 @@ static int rsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { + /* + * Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly for smart + * cards. + */ + if (((RSA_flags(a->pkey.rsa) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK)) + || (RSA_flags(b->pkey.rsa) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK)) { + return 1; + } + if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->n, a->pkey.rsa->n) != 0 || BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->e, a->pkey.rsa->e) != 0) return 0; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ /* * Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding - * if nul delimiter is not preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also + * if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also * preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility. */ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, @@ -122,7 +122,13 @@ RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING); mask = ~good; - good &= constant_time_ge(threes_in_row, 8); + /* + * Reject if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. Note + * that RFC5246 incorrectly states this the other way around, i.e. reject + * if it is not preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. However this is + * corrected in subsequent errata for that RFC. + */ + good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8); err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK); mask = ~good; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ `ml 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ && $1>=10); # first version supporting AVX -$ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/ && +$ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0); # first version supporting AVX $shaext=$xmm; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1 diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv8.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv8.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv8.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv8.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ .text .extern OPENSSL_armcap_P +.hidden OPENSSL_armcap_P .globl sha1_block_data_order .type sha1_block_data_order,%function .align 6 @@ -329,7 +330,6 @@ #endif .asciz "SHA1 block transform for ARMv8, CRYPTOGAMS by " .align 2 -.comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4 ___ }}} diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } -if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { +if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } -if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { +if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } -if ($xmm && !$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { +if ($xmm && !$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } -if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { +if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ .text .extern OPENSSL_armcap_P +.hidden OPENSSL_armcap_P .globl $func .type $func,%function .align 6 @@ -840,12 +841,6 @@ ___ } -$code.=<<___; -#ifndef __KERNEL__ -.comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4 -#endif -___ - { my %opcode = ( "sha256h" => 0x5e004000, "sha256h2" => 0x5e005000, "sha256su0" => 0x5e282800, "sha256su1" => 0x5e006000 ); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ $avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11); } -if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { +if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) { $avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0); } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2004-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2004-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2004, EdelKey Project. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *u) { BIGNUM *tmp = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *tmp3 = NULL, *k = NULL, *K = NULL; + BIGNUM *xtmp = NULL; BN_CTX *bn_ctx; if (u == NULL || B == NULL || N == NULL || g == NULL || x == NULL @@ -185,10 +186,13 @@ if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp2 = BN_new()) == NULL || - (tmp3 = BN_new()) == NULL) + (tmp3 = BN_new()) == NULL || + (xtmp = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; - if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, g, x, N, bn_ctx)) + BN_with_flags(xtmp, x, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, g, xtmp, N, bn_ctx)) goto err; if ((k = srp_Calc_k(N, g)) == NULL) goto err; @@ -196,7 +200,7 @@ goto err; if (!BN_mod_sub(tmp, B, tmp2, N, bn_ctx)) goto err; - if (!BN_mul(tmp3, u, x, bn_ctx)) + if (!BN_mul(tmp3, u, xtmp, bn_ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_add(tmp2, a, tmp3)) goto err; @@ -208,6 +212,7 @@ err: BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + BN_free(xtmp); BN_clear_free(tmp); BN_clear_free(tmp2); BN_clear_free(tmp3); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/store/loader_file.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/store/loader_file.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/store/loader_file.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/store/loader_file.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -429,6 +429,42 @@ } } else { int i; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + ENGINE *curengine = ENGINE_get_first(); + + while (curengine != NULL) { + ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR asn1meths = + ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meths(curengine); + + if (asn1meths != NULL) { + const int *nids = NULL; + int nids_n = asn1meths(curengine, NULL, &nids, 0); + + for (i = 0; i < nids_n; i++) { + EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth2 = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *tmp_pkey = NULL; + const unsigned char *tmp_blob = blob; + + if (!asn1meths(curengine, &ameth2, NULL, nids[i])) + continue; + if (ameth2 == NULL + || ameth2->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) + continue; + + tmp_pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(ameth2->pkey_id, NULL, + &tmp_blob, len); + if (tmp_pkey != NULL) { + if (pkey != NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_pkey); + else + pkey = tmp_pkey; + (*matchcount)++; + } + } + } + curengine = ENGINE_get_next(curengine); + } +#endif for (i = 0; i < EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(); i++) { EVP_PKEY *tmp_pkey = NULL; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/store/store_lib.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/store/store_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/store/store_lib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/store/store_lib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -218,7 +218,11 @@ int OSSL_STORE_close(OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx) { - int loader_ret = ctx->loader->close(ctx->loader_ctx); + int loader_ret; + + if (ctx == NULL) + return 1; + loader_ret = ctx->loader->close(ctx->loader_ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); return loader_ret; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/threads_win.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/threads_win.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/threads_win.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/threads_win.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock) { - *ret = InterlockedExchangeAdd(val, amount) + amount; + *ret = (int)InterlockedExchangeAdd((long volatile *)val, (long)amount) + amount; return 1; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -57,12 +57,14 @@ goto err; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(serial, 1)) goto err; + return serial; err: TSerr(TS_F_DEF_SERIAL_CB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info(ctx, TS_STATUS_REJECTION, "Error during serial number generation."); + ASN1_INTEGER_free(serial); return NULL; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -439,6 +439,16 @@ is_a_tty = 0; else # endif +# ifdef EPERM + /* + * Linux can return EPERM (Operation not permitted), + * e.g. if a daemon executes openssl via fork()+execve() + * This should be ok + */ + if (errno == EPERM) + is_a_tty = 0; + else +# endif # ifdef ENODEV /* * MacOS X returns ENODEV (Operation not supported by device), diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/whrlpool/wp_block.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/whrlpool/wp_block.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/whrlpool/wp_block.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/whrlpool/wp_block.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2005-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2005-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -63,6 +63,20 @@ # undef STRICT_ALIGNMENT #endif +#ifndef STRICT_ALIGNMENT +# ifdef __GNUC__ +typedef u64 u64_a1 __attribute((__aligned__(1))); +# else +typedef u64 u64_a1; +# endif +#endif + +#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT) +typedef u64 u64_aX __attribute((__aligned__(1))); +#else +typedef u64 u64_aX; +#endif + #undef SMALL_REGISTER_BANK #if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) # define SMALL_REGISTER_BANK @@ -191,13 +205,13 @@ # define LL(c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7) c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7, \ c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7 # define C0(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+0))[2*K.c[(i)*8+0]]) -# define C1(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+7))[2*K.c[(i)*8+1]]) -# define C2(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+6))[2*K.c[(i)*8+2]]) -# define C3(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+5))[2*K.c[(i)*8+3]]) -# define C4(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+4))[2*K.c[(i)*8+4]]) -# define C5(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+3))[2*K.c[(i)*8+5]]) -# define C6(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+2))[2*K.c[(i)*8+6]]) -# define C7(K,i) (((u64*)(Cx.c+1))[2*K.c[(i)*8+7]]) +# define C1(K,i) (((u64_a1*)(Cx.c+7))[2*K.c[(i)*8+1]]) +# define C2(K,i) (((u64_a1*)(Cx.c+6))[2*K.c[(i)*8+2]]) +# define C3(K,i) (((u64_a1*)(Cx.c+5))[2*K.c[(i)*8+3]]) +# define C4(K,i) (((u64_a1*)(Cx.c+4))[2*K.c[(i)*8+4]]) +# define C5(K,i) (((u64_a1*)(Cx.c+3))[2*K.c[(i)*8+5]]) +# define C6(K,i) (((u64_a1*)(Cx.c+2))[2*K.c[(i)*8+6]]) +# define C7(K,i) (((u64_a1*)(Cx.c+1))[2*K.c[(i)*8+7]]) #endif static const @@ -531,7 +545,7 @@ } else # endif { - const u64 *pa = (const u64 *)p; + const u64_aX *pa = (const u64_aX *)p; S.q[0] = (K.q[0] = H->q[0]) ^ pa[0]; S.q[1] = (K.q[1] = H->q[1]) ^ pa[1]; S.q[2] = (K.q[2] = H->q[2]) ^ pa[2]; @@ -769,7 +783,7 @@ } else # endif { - const u64 *pa = (const u64 *)p; + const u64_aX *pa = (const u64_aX *)p; H->q[0] ^= S.q[0] ^ pa[0]; H->q[1] ^= S.q[1] ^ pa[1]; H->q[2] ^= S.q[2] ^ pa[2]; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x509_att.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x509_att.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x509_att.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x509_att.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ return ret; } -void *X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, +void *X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos, int type) { int i; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ if (ctx == NULL) goto err; f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0); + if (f == NULL) + goto err; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) @@ -133,17 +135,21 @@ */ int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { - int rv; + int rv = 0; - /* ensure hash is valid */ - if (X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0) != 1) - return -2; - if (X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0) != 1) - return -2; + if (a == b) /* for efficiency */ + return 0; - rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); - if (rv) + /* try to make sure hash is valid */ + (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); + (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); + + if ((a->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0 + && (b->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0) + rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + if (rv != 0) return rv; + /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) { if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len) diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x509_err.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x509_err.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x509_err.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x509_err.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PRINT_EX_FP, 0), "X509_print_ex_fp"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE, 0), "x509_pubkey_decode"}, + {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, 0), "X509_PUBKEY_get"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET0, 0), "X509_PUBKEY_get0"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET, 0), "X509_PUBKEY_set"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, 0), diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x509_local.h openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x509_local.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x509_local.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x509_local.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2014-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2014-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -145,3 +145,5 @@ void x509_set_signature_info(X509_SIG_INFO *siginf, const X509_ALGOR *alg, const ASN1_STRING *sig); +int x509_likely_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject); +int x509_signing_allowed(const X509 *issuer, const X509 *subject); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x509_req.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x509_req.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x509_req.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x509_req.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -286,6 +286,18 @@ *palg = &req->sig_alg; } +void X509_REQ_set0_signature(X509_REQ *req, ASN1_BIT_STRING *psig) +{ + if (req->signature) + ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(req->signature); + req->signature = psig; +} + +int X509_REQ_set1_signature_algo(X509_REQ *req, X509_ALGOR *palg) +{ + return X509_ALGOR_copy(&req->sig_alg, palg); +} + int X509_REQ_get_signature_nid(const X509_REQ *req) { return OBJ_obj2nid(req->sig_alg.algorithm); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ return "OCSP verification failed"; case X509_V_ERR_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN: return "OCSP unknown cert"; + case X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS: + return "Certificate public key has explicit ECC parameters"; default: /* Printing an error number into a static buffer is not thread-safe */ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); +static int check_curve(X509 *cert); static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); @@ -104,7 +105,12 @@ return ok; } -/* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */ +/* + * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not or on error. + * This does not verify self-signedness but relies on x509v3_cache_extensions() + * matching issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any + * present authority key identifier matching the subject key identifier, etc. + */ static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) { if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) @@ -131,10 +137,9 @@ xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) break; + xtmp = NULL; } - if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) - X509_up_ref(xtmp); - else + if (xtmp != NULL && !X509_up_ref(xtmp)) xtmp = NULL; sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); return xtmp; @@ -267,17 +272,24 @@ return -1; } + if (!X509_up_ref(ctx->cert)) { + X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; + return -1; + } + /* * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that * the first entry is in place */ - if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || - (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { + if ((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL + || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) { + X509_free(ctx->cert); X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return -1; } - X509_up_ref(ctx->cert); + ctx->num_untrusted = 1; /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */ @@ -300,8 +312,21 @@ return ret; } +static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert) +{ + int i, n = sk_X509_num(sk); + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0) + return 1; + return 0; +} + /* - * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) + * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) sk an issuer cert of given cert x. + * The issuer must not yet be in ctx->chain, where the exceptional case + * that x is self-issued and ctx->chain has just one element is allowed. + * Prefer the first one that is not expired, else take the last expired one. */ static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) { @@ -310,7 +335,9 @@ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); - if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) { + if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer) + && (((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) + || !sk_X509_contains(ctx->chain, issuer))) { rv = issuer; if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1)) break; @@ -319,42 +346,25 @@ return rv; } -/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ - +/* Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer' */ static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) { - int ret; - if (x == issuer) - return cert_self_signed(x); - ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); - if (ret == X509_V_OK) { - int i; - X509 *ch; - /* Special case: single self signed certificate */ - if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) - return 1; - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { - ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); - if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) { - ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP; - break; - } - } - } - - return (ret == X509_V_OK); + return x509_likely_issued(issuer, x) == X509_V_OK; } /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ - static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); - if (*issuer) { - X509_up_ref(*issuer); - return 1; - } else - return 0; + + if (*issuer == NULL || !X509_up_ref(*issuer)) + goto err; + + return 1; + + err: + *issuer = NULL; + return 0; } static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm) @@ -366,15 +376,21 @@ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i); if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) { + if (!X509_up_ref(x)) { + sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); + X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; + return NULL; + } if (sk == NULL) sk = sk_X509_new_null(); - if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_push(sk, x) == 0) { + if (sk == NULL || !sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { + X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return NULL; } - X509_up_ref(x); } } return sk; @@ -508,6 +524,20 @@ ret = 1; break; } + if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && num > 1) { + /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */ + ret = check_curve(x); + if (ret < 0) + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; + else if (ret == 0) + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS; + } + if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 + && x->ex_pathlen != -1 + && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)) { + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; + ret = 0; + } if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK)) return 0; /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */ @@ -1693,6 +1723,7 @@ return 1; } +/* verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain */ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; @@ -1707,19 +1738,25 @@ if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) { xs = xi; xi = NULL; - goto check_cert; + goto check_cert_time; } if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) - xs = xi; + xs = xi; /* the typical case: last cert in the chain is self-issued */ else { if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { xs = xi; - goto check_cert; + goto check_cert_time; + } + if (n <= 0) { + if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0, + X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE)) + return 0; + + xs = xi; + goto check_cert_time; } - if (n <= 0) - return verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0, - X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE); + n--; ctx->error_depth = n; xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); @@ -1730,27 +1767,55 @@ * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril). */ while (n >= 0) { - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - /* - * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly - * asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes time. If - * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate - * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject). + * For each iteration of this loop: + * n is the subject depth + * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked + * xi is the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use + * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued. + * + * Skip signature check for self-signed certificates unless explicitly + * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time. */ - if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) { + if (xs != xi || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE) + && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)) { + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + /* + * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage + * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer + * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject). + */ + int issuer_depth = n + (xs == xi ? 0 : 1); + /* + * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4 + * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert + * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it. + * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3 + * we must not verify a certifiate signature if the key usage of the + * CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing. + * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is + * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e., + * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply + * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus + * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs. + */ + int ret = xs == xi && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 + ? X509_V_OK : x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs); + + if (ret != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret)) + return 0; if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { - if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, xi != xs ? n+1 : n, - X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY)) + ret = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; + if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret)) return 0; } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { - if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n, - X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) + ret = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; + if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n, ret)) return 0; } } - check_cert: + check_cert_time: /* in addition to RFC 5280, do also for trusted (root) cert */ /* Calls verify callback as needed */ if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n)) return 0; @@ -3152,7 +3217,16 @@ /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */ (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); + if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp)) { + X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; + search = 0; + continue; + } + if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { + X509_free(xtmp); X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; @@ -3160,7 +3234,7 @@ continue; } - X509_up_ref(x = xtmp); + x = xtmp; ++ctx->num_untrusted; ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp); @@ -3252,6 +3326,32 @@ } /* + * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params + * for an elliptic curve. + * + * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors. + */ +static int check_curve(X509 *cert) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); + + /* Unsupported or malformed key */ + if (pkey == NULL) + return -1; + + if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { + int ret; + + ret = EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); + return ret < 0 ? ret : !ret; + } +#endif + + return 1; +} + +/* * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether * self-signed or otherwise). diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x_all.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x_all.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x_all.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x_all.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ unsigned int *len) { if (type == EVP_sha1() && (data->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) != 0 - && (data->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0) { + && (data->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0) { /* Asking for SHA1 and we already computed it. */ if (len != NULL) *len = sizeof(data->sha1_hash); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x_attrib.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x_attrib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x_attrib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x_attrib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -37,10 +37,13 @@ { X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret = NULL; ASN1_TYPE *val = NULL; + ASN1_OBJECT *oid; + if ((oid = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)) == NULL) + return NULL; if ((ret = X509_ATTRIBUTE_new()) == NULL) return NULL; - ret->object = OBJ_nid2obj(nid); + ret->object = oid; if ((val = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(ret->set, val)) diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -169,8 +169,11 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key) { EVP_PKEY *ret = X509_PUBKEY_get0(key); - if (ret != NULL) - EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret); + + if (ret != NULL && !EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret)) { + X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + ret = NULL; + } return ret; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509v3/pcy_data.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509v3/pcy_data.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509v3/pcy_data.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509v3/pcy_data.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2004-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2004-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_DATA_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ASN1_OBJECT_free(id); return NULL; } ret->expected_policy_set = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null(); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1999-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ num = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(ialt); if (!sk_GENERAL_NAME_reserve(gens, num)) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_COPY_ISSUER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(ialt); goto err; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1999-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -22,8 +22,9 @@ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OTHERNAME) ASN1_SEQUENCE(EDIPARTYNAME) = { - ASN1_IMP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, nameAssigner, DIRECTORYSTRING, 0), - ASN1_IMP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, partyName, DIRECTORYSTRING, 1) + /* DirectoryString is a CHOICE type so use explicit tagging */ + ASN1_EXP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, nameAssigner, DIRECTORYSTRING, 0), + ASN1_EXP(EDIPARTYNAME, partyName, DIRECTORYSTRING, 1) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(EDIPARTYNAME) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(EDIPARTYNAME) @@ -57,6 +58,37 @@ (char *)a); } +static int edipartyname_cmp(const EDIPARTYNAME *a, const EDIPARTYNAME *b) +{ + int res; + + if (a == NULL || b == NULL) { + /* + * Shouldn't be possible in a valid GENERAL_NAME, but we handle it + * anyway. OTHERNAME_cmp treats NULL != NULL so we do the same here + */ + return -1; + } + if (a->nameAssigner == NULL && b->nameAssigner != NULL) + return -1; + if (a->nameAssigner != NULL && b->nameAssigner == NULL) + return 1; + /* If we get here then both have nameAssigner set, or both unset */ + if (a->nameAssigner != NULL) { + res = ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->nameAssigner, b->nameAssigner); + if (res != 0) + return res; + } + /* + * partyName is required, so these should never be NULL. We treat it in + * the same way as the a == NULL || b == NULL case above + */ + if (a->partyName == NULL || b->partyName == NULL) + return -1; + + return ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->partyName, b->partyName); +} + /* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */ int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GENERAL_NAME *b) { @@ -66,8 +98,11 @@ return -1; switch (a->type) { case GEN_X400: + result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->d.x400Address, b->d.x400Address); + break; + case GEN_EDIPARTY: - result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->d.other, b->d.other); + result = edipartyname_cmp(a->d.ediPartyName, b->d.ediPartyName); break; case GEN_OTHERNAME: @@ -114,8 +149,11 @@ { switch (type) { case GEN_X400: + a->d.x400Address = value; + break; + case GEN_EDIPARTY: - a->d.other = value; + a->d.ediPartyName = value; break; case GEN_OTHERNAME: @@ -149,8 +187,10 @@ *ptype = a->type; switch (a->type) { case GEN_X400: + return a->d.x400Address; + case GEN_EDIPARTY: - return a->d.other; + return a->d.ediPartyName; case GEN_OTHERNAME: return a->d.otherName; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1999-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include #include #include "crypto/x509.h" +#include "../x509/x509_local.h" /* for x509_signing_allowed() */ #include "internal/tsan_assist.h" static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x); @@ -344,6 +345,24 @@ return 1; } +/* Check that issuer public key algorithm matches subject signature algorithm */ +static int check_sig_alg_match(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const X509 *subject) +{ + int pkey_sig_nid, subj_sig_nid; + + if (pkey == NULL) + return X509_V_ERR_NO_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; + if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey), + NULL, &pkey_sig_nid) == 0) + pkey_sig_nid = EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey); + if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(subject->cert_info.signature.algorithm), + NULL, &subj_sig_nid) == 0) + return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; + if (pkey_sig_nid != EVP_PKEY_type(subj_sig_nid)) + return X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH; + return X509_V_OK; +} + #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS) #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) @@ -375,7 +394,8 @@ } if (!X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL)) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; + x->ex_flags |= (EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT | EXFLAG_INVALID); + /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */ if (!X509_get_version(x)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; @@ -384,12 +404,16 @@ if (bs->ca) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; if (bs->pathlen) { - if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) - || !bs->ca) { + if (bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; x->ex_pathlen = 0; - } else + } else { x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); + if (!bs->ca && x->ex_pathlen != 0) { + x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; + x->ex_pathlen = 0; + } + } } else x->ex_pathlen = -1; BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs); @@ -492,11 +516,11 @@ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; /* Does subject name match issuer ? */ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) { - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; - /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */ - if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK && - !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) - x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; + x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; /* cert is self-issued */ + if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK /* SKID matches AKID */ + /* .. and the signature alg matches the PUBKEY alg: */ + && check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(x), x) == X509_V_OK) + x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; /* indicate self-signed */ } x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, &i, NULL); if (x->altname == NULL && i != -1) @@ -545,9 +569,11 @@ * return codes: * 0 not a CA * 1 is a CA - * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA + * 2 Only possible in older versions of openSSL when basicConstraints are absent + * new versions will not return this value. May be a CA * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1. * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted. + * 5 Netscape specific CA Flags present */ static int check_ca(const X509 *x) @@ -787,6 +813,23 @@ } /*- + * Check if certificate I is allowed to issue certificate I + * according to the B field of I if present + * depending on any proxyCertInfo extension of I. + * Returns 0 for OK, or positive for reason for rejection + * where reason codes match those for X509_verify_cert(). + */ +int x509_signing_allowed(const X509 *issuer, const X509 *subject) +{ + if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { + if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) + return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; + } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) + return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; + return X509_V_OK; +} + +/*- * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by @@ -794,13 +837,24 @@ * These are: * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer - * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing + * 3. Check that issuer public key algorithm matches subject signature algorithm + * 4. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match * codes for X509_verify_cert() */ int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) { + int ret; + + if ((ret = x509_likely_issued(issuer, subject)) != X509_V_OK) + return ret; + return x509_signing_allowed(issuer, subject); +} + +/* do the checks 1., 2., and 3. as described above for X509_check_issued() */ +int x509_likely_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) +{ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer), X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; @@ -818,12 +872,8 @@ return ret; } - if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { - if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) - return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; - } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) - return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; - return X509_V_OK; + /* check if the subject signature alg matches the issuer's PUBKEY alg */ + return check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(issuer), subject); } int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/changelog openssl-1.1.1j/debian/changelog --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/changelog 2020-12-08 17:33:52.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/changelog 2021-02-23 22:01:12.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,3 +1,113 @@ +openssl (1.1.1j-1ubuntu1) hirsute; urgency=medium + + * Merge from Debian unstable. Remaining changes: + - Replace duplicate files in the doc directory with symlinks. + - debian/libssl1.1.postinst: + + Display a system restart required notification on libssl1.1 + upgrade on servers, unless needrestart is available. + + Use a different priority for libssl1.1/restart-services depending + on whether a desktop, or server dist-upgrade is being performed. + + Skip services restart & reboot notification if needrestart is in-use. + + Bump version check to to 1.1.1. + + Import libraries/restart-without-asking template as used by above. + - Revert "Enable system default config to enforce TLS1.2 as a + minimum" & "Increase default security level from 1 to 2". + - Reword the NEWS entry, as applicable on Ubuntu. + - Cherrypick s390x SIMD acceleration patches for poly1305 and chacha20 + and ECC from master. + - Use perl:native in the autopkgtest for installability on i386. + - Set OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL=2 as compiled-in minimum security + level. Change meaning of SECURITY_LEVEL=2 to prohibit TLS versions + below 1.2 and update documentation. Previous default of 1, can be set + by calling SSL_CTX_set_security_level(), SSL_set_security_level() or + using ':@SECLEVEL=1' CipherString value in openssl.cfg. + - Import https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12272.patch to enable + CET. + * Add support for building with noudeb build profile. + + -- Dimitri John Ledkov Tue, 23 Feb 2021 22:01:12 +0000 + +openssl (1.1.1j-1) unstable; urgency=medium + + * New upstream version. + - CVE-2021-23841 (NULL pointer deref in X509_issuer_and_serial_hash()). + - CVE-2021-23840 (Possible overflow of the output length argument in + EVP_CipherUpdate(), EVP_EncryptUpdate() and EVP_DecryptUpdate()). + + -- Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Tue, 16 Feb 2021 20:50:01 +0100 + +openssl (1.1.1i-3ubuntu2) hirsute; urgency=medium + + * No-change rebuild to drop the udeb package. + + -- Matthias Klose Mon, 22 Feb 2021 10:35:47 +0100 + +openssl (1.1.1i-3ubuntu1) hirsute; urgency=medium + + * Merge from Debian unstable. Remaining changes: + - Replace duplicate files in the doc directory with symlinks. + - debian/libssl1.1.postinst: + + Display a system restart required notification on libssl1.1 + upgrade on servers, unless needrestart is available. + + Use a different priority for libssl1.1/restart-services depending + on whether a desktop, or server dist-upgrade is being performed. + + Skip services restart & reboot notification if needrestart is in-use. + + Bump version check to to 1.1.1. + + Import libraries/restart-without-asking template as used by above. + - Revert "Enable system default config to enforce TLS1.2 as a + minimum" & "Increase default security level from 1 to 2". + - Reword the NEWS entry, as applicable on Ubuntu. + - Cherrypick s390x SIMD acceleration patches for poly1305 and chacha20 + and ECC from master. + - Use perl:native in the autopkgtest for installability on i386. + - Set OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL=2 as compiled-in minimum security + level. Change meaning of SECURITY_LEVEL=2 to prohibit TLS versions + below 1.2 and update documentation. Previous default of 1, can be set + by calling SSL_CTX_set_security_level(), SSL_set_security_level() or + using ':@SECLEVEL=1' CipherString value in openssl.cfg. + - Import https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12272.patch to enable + CET. + + * Drop many patches included upstream. + + -- Dimitri John Ledkov Mon, 08 Feb 2021 11:08:21 +0000 + +openssl (1.1.1i-3) unstable; urgency=medium + + * Cherry-pick a patch from upstream to address #13931. + * Enable LFS. Thanks to Dan Nicholson for debugging (Closes: #923479). + + -- Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Sat, 30 Jan 2021 14:06:46 +0100 + +openssl (1.1.1i-2) unstable; urgency=medium + + * Apply two patches from upstream to address x509 related regressions. + + -- Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Sun, 17 Jan 2021 20:08:26 +0100 + +openssl (1.1.1i-1) unstable; urgency=medium + + * New upstream version. + - CVE-2020-1971 (EDIPARTYNAME NULL pointer de-reference). + - Restore rejection of expired trusted (root) certificate + (Closes: #976465). + + -- Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Tue, 08 Dec 2020 20:32:32 +0100 + +openssl (1.1.1h-1) unstable; urgency=medium + + * New upstream version + * Disable CAPI engine, it is designed for Windows. + + -- Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Sun, 11 Oct 2020 00:00:47 +0200 + +openssl (1.1.1g-1) unstable; urgency=medium + + * New upstream version + - CVE-2020-1967 (Segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain). + + -- Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Tue, 21 Apr 2020 21:45:21 +0200 + openssl (1.1.1f-1ubuntu5) hirsute; urgency=medium * SECURITY UPDATE: EDIPARTYNAME NULL pointer de-ref diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/control openssl-1.1.1j/debian/control --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/control 2020-04-01 15:57:10.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/control 2021-02-23 22:01:12.000000000 +0000 @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ Package: libcrypto1.1-udeb Package-Type: udeb +Build-Profiles: Section: debian-installer Architecture: any Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, ${misc:Depends} @@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ Package: libssl1.1-udeb Package-Type: udeb +Build-Profiles: Section: debian-installer Architecture: any Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, ${misc:Depends} diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/libssl1.1.symbols openssl-1.1.1j/debian/libssl1.1.symbols --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/libssl1.1.symbols 2020-04-01 15:57:10.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/libssl1.1.symbols 2021-02-16 19:31:27.000000000 +0000 @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ *@OPENSSL_1_1_1c 1.1.1c *@OPENSSL_1_1_1d 1.1.1d *@OPENSSL_1_1_1e 1.1.1e + *@OPENSSL_1_1_1h 1.1.1h libssl.so.1.1 libssl1.1 #MINVER# *@OPENSSL_1_1_0 1.1.0 *@OPENSSL_1_1_0d 1.1.0d diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/0d011f540400b425aba1c3e59624ad9dbabe83cb.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/0d011f540400b425aba1c3e59624ad9dbabe83cb.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/0d011f540400b425aba1c3e59624ad9dbabe83cb.patch 2020-09-15 17:04:36.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/0d011f540400b425aba1c3e59624ad9dbabe83cb.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -From 0d011f540400b425aba1c3e59624ad9dbabe83cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Pauli -Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2020 12:33:47 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix AES-CTR_DRBG on 1.1.1. - -The backport of the timing information leak fix uses u32 which is defined -in crypto/modes/modes_local.h in 1.1.1 and include/crypto/modes.h for 3.0. - -Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11489) ---- - crypto/rand/build.info | 2 ++ - crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c | 3 ++- - 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/rand/build.info b/crypto/rand/build.info -index df9bac67f04c..a4e7900bdbff 100644 ---- a/crypto/rand/build.info -+++ b/crypto/rand/build.info -@@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ LIBS=../../libcrypto - SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\ - randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \ - rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c drbg_lib.c drbg_ctr.c -+ -+INCLUDE[drbg_ctr.o]=../modes -diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c -index f41484e9d548..af201971dd1b 100644 ---- a/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c -+++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c -@@ -12,9 +12,10 @@ - #include - #include - #include --#include "internal/thread_once.h" -+#include "modes_local.h" - #include "internal/thread_once.h" - #include "rand_local.h" -+ - /* - * Implementation of NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG. - */ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/11767.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/11767.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/11767.patch 2020-09-15 16:38:51.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/11767.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ -From 2d84c9c983729c2a2ae0a24789a3787f2559e143 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Maxim Zakharov <5158255+Maxime2@users.noreply.github.com> -Date: Fri, 8 May 2020 14:58:10 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH] TTY_get() in crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c open_console() can also - return errno 1 (EPERM, Linux) - -Signed-off-by: Maxim Zakharov <5158255+Maxime2@users.noreply.github.com> ---- - crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c | 10 ++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c -index 168de4630dcc..6830bd25c2d7 100644 ---- a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c -+++ b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c -@@ -439,6 +439,16 @@ static int open_console(UI *ui) - is_a_tty = 0; - else - # endif -+# ifdef EPERM -+ /* -+ * Linux can return EPERM (Operation not permitted), -+ * e.g. if a daemon executes openssl via fork()+execve() -+ * This should be ok -+ */ -+ if (errno == EPERM) -+ is_a_tty = 0; -+ else -+# endif - # ifdef ENODEV - /* - * MacOS X returns ENODEV (Operation not supported by device), diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/53eb05bdf00d7237e3b12976c2ac38d68206eb13.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/53eb05bdf00d7237e3b12976c2ac38d68206eb13.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/53eb05bdf00d7237e3b12976c2ac38d68206eb13.patch 2020-09-15 16:48:33.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/53eb05bdf00d7237e3b12976c2ac38d68206eb13.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,414 +0,0 @@ -From 53eb05bdf00d7237e3b12976c2ac38d68206eb13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Patrick Steuer -Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2019 23:27:09 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] AES CTR-DRGB: performance improvement - -Optimize the the AES-based implementation of the CTR_DRBG -construction, see 10.2.1 in [1]. -Due to the optimizations, the code may deviate (more) from the -pseudocode in [1], but it is functional equivalence being decisive -for compliance: - -"All DRBG mechanisms and algorithms are described in this document -in pseudocode, which is intended to explain functionality. -The pseudocode is not intended to constrain real-world -implementations." [9 in [1]]. - -The following optimizations are done: - -- Replace multiple plain AES encryptions by a single AES-ECB - encryption of a corresponding pre-initialized buffer, where - possible. - This allows platform-specific AES-ECB support to - be used and reduces the overhead of multiple EVP calls. - -- Replace the generate operation loop (which is a counter - increment followed by a plain AES encryption) by a - loop which does a plain AES encryption followed by - a counter increment. The latter loop is just a description - of AES-CTR, so we replace it by a single AES-CTR - encryption. - This allows for platform-specific AES-CTR support to be used - and reduces the overhead of multiple EVP calls. - This change, that is, going from a pre- to a post- counter - increment, requires the counter in the internal state - to be kept at "+1" (compared to the pseudocode in [1]) - such that it is in the correct state, when a generate - operation is called. - That in turn also requires all other operations to be - changed from pre- to post-increment to keep functional - equivalence. - -[1] NIST SP 800-90A Revision 1 - -Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer - -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz - -(cherry picked from commit 28bdbe1aaa474ae8cd83e520d02e463e46ce89d9) - -Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11968) ---- - crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c | 198 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- - crypto/rand/rand_local.h | 6 +- - 2 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c -index 0f0ad1b37be4..89c9ccc876a8 100644 ---- a/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c -+++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c -@@ -63,15 +63,15 @@ static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) - * Process a complete block using BCC algorithm of SP 800-90A 10.3.3 - */ - __owur static int ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out, -- const unsigned char *in) -+ const unsigned char *in, int len) - { - int i, outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; - -- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) -+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) - out[i] ^= in[i]; - -- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_df, out, &outlen, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) -- || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) -+ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_df, out, &outlen, out, len) -+ || outlen != len) - return 0; - return 1; - } -@@ -82,12 +82,16 @@ __owur static int ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out, - */ - __owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in) - { -- if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in) -- || !ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, in)) -- return 0; -- if (ctr->keylen != 16 && !ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, in)) -- return 0; -- return 1; -+ unsigned char in_tmp[48]; -+ unsigned char num_of_blk = 2; -+ -+ memcpy(in_tmp, in, 16); -+ memcpy(in_tmp + 16, in, 16); -+ if (ctr->keylen != 16) { -+ memcpy(in_tmp + 32, in, 16); -+ num_of_blk = 3; -+ } -+ return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in_tmp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE * num_of_blk); - } - - /* -@@ -96,19 +100,14 @@ __owur static int ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in) - */ - __owur static int ctr_BCC_init(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr) - { -+ unsigned char bltmp[48] = {0}; -+ unsigned char num_of_blk; -+ - memset(ctr->KX, 0, 48); -- memset(ctr->bltmp, 0, 16); -- if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, ctr->bltmp)) -- return 0; -- ctr->bltmp[3] = 1; -- if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, ctr->bltmp)) -- return 0; -- if (ctr->keylen != 16) { -- ctr->bltmp[3] = 2; -- if (!ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, ctr->bltmp)) -- return 0; -- } -- return 1; -+ num_of_blk = ctr->keylen == 16 ? 2 : 3; -+ bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 1) + 3] = 1; -+ bltmp[(AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2) + 3] = 2; -+ return ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, bltmp, num_of_blk * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - } - - /* -@@ -197,20 +196,20 @@ __owur static int ctr_df(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, - || !ctr_BCC_final(ctr)) - return 0; - /* Set up key K */ -- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx, ctr->cipher, NULL, ctr->KX, NULL, 1)) -+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->KX, NULL, -1)) - return 0; - /* X follows key K */ -- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->KX, &outlen, ctr->KX + ctr->keylen, -+ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX, &outlen, ctr->KX + ctr->keylen, - AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - return 0; -- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->KX + 16, &outlen, ctr->KX, -+ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 16, &outlen, ctr->KX, - AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - return 0; - if (ctr->keylen != 16) -- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->KX + 32, &outlen, ctr->KX + 16, -- AES_BLOCK_SIZE) -+ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, ctr->KX + 32, &outlen, -+ ctr->KX + 16, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - return 0; - return 1; -@@ -229,31 +228,25 @@ __owur static int ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - { - RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; - int outlen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; -+ unsigned char V_tmp[48], out[48]; -+ unsigned char len; - - /* correct key is already set up. */ -+ memcpy(V_tmp, ctr->V, 16); - inc_128(ctr); -- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->K, &outlen, ctr->V, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) -- || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) -- return 0; -- -- /* If keylen longer than 128 bits need extra encrypt */ -- if (ctr->keylen != 16) { -+ memcpy(V_tmp + 16, ctr->V, 16); -+ if (ctr->keylen == 16) { -+ len = 32; -+ } else { - inc_128(ctr); -- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->K+16, &outlen, ctr->V, -- AES_BLOCK_SIZE) -- || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) -- return 0; -+ memcpy(V_tmp + 32, ctr->V, 16); -+ len = 48; - } -- inc_128(ctr); -- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->V, &outlen, ctr->V, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) -- || outlen != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) -+ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ecb, out, &outlen, V_tmp, len) -+ || outlen != len) - return 0; -- -- /* If 192 bit key part of V is on end of K */ -- if (ctr->keylen == 24) { -- memcpy(ctr->V + 8, ctr->V, 8); -- memcpy(ctr->V, ctr->K + 24, 8); -- } -+ memcpy(ctr->K, out, ctr->keylen); -+ memcpy(ctr->V, out + ctr->keylen, 16); - - if ((drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0) { - /* If no input reuse existing derived value */ -@@ -268,7 +261,8 @@ __owur static int ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - ctr_XOR(ctr, in2, in2len); - } - -- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx, ctr->cipher, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, 1)) -+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1) -+ || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1)) - return 0; - return 1; - } -@@ -285,8 +279,10 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - - memset(ctr->K, 0, sizeof(ctr->K)); - memset(ctr->V, 0, sizeof(ctr->V)); -- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx, ctr->cipher, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, 1)) -+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, NULL, NULL, ctr->K, NULL, -1)) - return 0; -+ -+ inc_128(ctr); - if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, pers, perslen, nonce, noncelen)) - return 0; - return 1; -@@ -296,20 +292,40 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - const unsigned char *entropy, size_t entropylen, - const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) - { -+ RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; -+ - if (entropy == NULL) - return 0; -+ -+ inc_128(ctr); - if (!ctr_update(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0)) - return 0; - return 1; - } - -+static void ctr96_inc(unsigned char *counter) -+{ -+ u32 n = 12, c = 1; -+ -+ do { -+ --n; -+ c += counter[n]; -+ counter[n] = (u8)c; -+ c >>= 8; -+ } while (n); -+} -+ - __owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, - const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) - { - RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr; -+ unsigned int ctr32, blocks; -+ int outl, buflen; - - if (adin != NULL && adinlen != 0) { -+ inc_128(ctr); -+ - if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) - return 0; - /* This means we reuse derived value */ -@@ -321,28 +337,51 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - adinlen = 0; - } - -- for ( ; ; ) { -- int outl = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; -+ inc_128(ctr); - -+ if (outlen == 0) { - inc_128(ctr); -- if (outlen < 16) { -- /* Use K as temp space as it will be updated */ -- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, ctr->K, &outl, ctr->V, -- AES_BLOCK_SIZE) -- || outl != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) -- return 0; -- memcpy(out, ctr->K, outlen); -- break; -- } -- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx, out, &outl, ctr->V, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) -- || outl != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) -+ -+ if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) - return 0; -- out += 16; -- outlen -= 16; -- if (outlen == 0) -- break; -+ return 1; - } - -+ memset(out, 0, outlen); -+ -+ do { -+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, -+ NULL, NULL, NULL, ctr->V, -1)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ /*- -+ * outlen has type size_t while EVP_CipherUpdate takes an -+ * int argument and thus cannot be guaranteed to process more -+ * than 2^31-1 bytes at a time. We process such huge generate -+ * requests in 2^30 byte chunks, which is the greatest multiple -+ * of AES block size lower than or equal to 2^31-1. -+ */ -+ buflen = outlen > (1U << 30) ? (1U << 30) : outlen; -+ blocks = (buflen + 15) / 16; -+ -+ ctr32 = GETU32(ctr->V + 12) + blocks; -+ if (ctr32 < blocks) { -+ /* 32-bit counter overflow into V. */ -+ blocks -= ctr32; -+ buflen = blocks * 16; -+ ctr32 = 0; -+ ctr96_inc(ctr->V); -+ } -+ PUTU32(ctr->V + 12, ctr32); -+ -+ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctr->ctx_ctr, out, &outl, out, buflen) -+ || outl != buflen) -+ return 0; -+ -+ out += buflen; -+ outlen -= buflen; -+ } while (outlen); -+ - if (!ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) - return 0; - return 1; -@@ -350,7 +389,8 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - - static int drbg_ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) - { -- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx); -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ecb); -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_ctr); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_df); - OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.ctr, sizeof(drbg->data.ctr)); - return 1; -@@ -374,25 +414,36 @@ int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg) - return 0; - case NID_aes_128_ctr: - keylen = 16; -- ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb(); -+ ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_128_ecb(); -+ ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_128_ctr(); - break; - case NID_aes_192_ctr: - keylen = 24; -- ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb(); -+ ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_192_ecb(); -+ ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_192_ctr(); - break; - case NID_aes_256_ctr: - keylen = 32; -- ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb(); -+ ctr->cipher_ecb = EVP_aes_256_ecb(); -+ ctr->cipher_ctr = EVP_aes_256_ctr(); - break; - } - - drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth; - - ctr->keylen = keylen; -- if (ctr->ctx == NULL) -- ctr->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); -- if (ctr->ctx == NULL) -+ if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL) -+ ctr->ctx_ecb = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); -+ if (ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL) -+ ctr->ctx_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); -+ if (ctr->ctx_ecb == NULL || ctr->ctx_ctr == NULL -+ || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ecb, -+ ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) -+ || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_ctr, -+ ctr->cipher_ctr, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1)) - return 0; -+ -+ drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth; - drbg->strength = keylen * 8; - drbg->seedlen = keylen + 16; - -@@ -410,7 +461,8 @@ int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg) - if (ctr->ctx_df == NULL) - return 0; - /* Set key schedule for df_key */ -- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df, ctr->cipher, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1)) -+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctr->ctx_df, -+ ctr->cipher_ecb, NULL, df_key, NULL, 1)) - return 0; - - drbg->min_entropylen = ctr->keylen; -diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_local.h b/crypto/rand/rand_local.h -index 1bc9bf7d266d..0cdfb3332e73 100644 ---- a/crypto/rand/rand_local.h -+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_local.h -@@ -138,9 +138,11 @@ typedef struct rand_drbg_method_st { - * The state of a DRBG AES-CTR. - */ - typedef struct rand_drbg_ctr_st { -- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_ecb; -+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_ctr; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_df; -- const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; -+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ecb; -+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_ctr; - size_t keylen; - unsigned char K[32]; - unsigned char V[16]; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/9cc834d966ea5afc38fb829bfe498aed4c5d498d.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/9cc834d966ea5afc38fb829bfe498aed4c5d498d.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/9cc834d966ea5afc38fb829bfe498aed4c5d498d.patch 2020-09-15 17:04:36.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/9cc834d966ea5afc38fb829bfe498aed4c5d498d.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ -From 9cc834d966ea5afc38fb829bfe498aed4c5d498d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Patrick Steuer -Date: Sat, 22 Feb 2020 01:20:09 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] AES CTR-DRGB: do not leak timing information - -Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer - -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz -Reviewed-by: Paul Dale -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11147) - -(cherry picked from commit 069165d10646a22000c596095cc04d43bbf1f807) ---- - crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c | 22 +++++++++------------- - 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c -index 93b82f34ceda..f41484e9d548 100644 ---- a/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c -+++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c -@@ -21,19 +21,15 @@ - - static void inc_128(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr) - { -- int i; -- unsigned char c; -- unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[15]; -- -- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++, p--) { -- c = *p; -- c++; -- *p = c; -- if (c != 0) { -- /* If we didn't wrap around, we're done. */ -- break; -- } -- } -+ unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[0]; -+ u32 n = 16, c = 1; -+ -+ do { -+ --n; -+ c += p[n]; -+ p[n] = (u8)c; -+ c >>= 8; -+ } while (n); - } - - static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-1.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-1.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-1.patch 2020-04-20 11:53:36.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-1.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,113 +0,0 @@ -From 540e4c35c534a5a12688beb707fee9e16a6a34fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Benjamin Kaduk -Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2020 12:27:28 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH] Add test for CVE-2020-1967 - -Add to test_sslsigalgs a TLSProxy test that injects a -"signature_algorithms_cert" extension that contains an unallocated -codepoint. - -The test currently fails, since s_server segfaults instead of -ignoring the unrecognized value. - -Since "signature_algorithms" and "signature_algorithms_cert" are very -similar, also add the analogous test for "signature_algorithms". ---- - test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- - 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t b/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t -index b3339ff59f..1a6390a3e9 100644 ---- a/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t -+++ b/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t -@@ -44,7 +44,9 @@ use constant { - COMPAT_SIGALGS => 6, - SIGALGS_CERT_ALL => 7, - SIGALGS_CERT_PKCS => 8, -- SIGALGS_CERT_INVALID => 9 -+ SIGALGS_CERT_INVALID => 9, -+ UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALGS_CERT => 4, -+ UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALG => 5 - }; - - #Note: Throughout this test we override the default ciphersuites where TLSv1.2 -@@ -53,7 +55,7 @@ use constant { - - #Test 1: Default sig algs should succeed - $proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests"; --plan tests => 24; -+plan tests => 26; - ok(TLSProxy::Message->success, "Default sigalgs"); - my $testtype; - -@@ -282,6 +284,39 @@ SKIP: { - ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail, "No matching certificate for sigalgs_cert"); - } - -+SKIP: { -+ skip "TLS 1.3 disabled", 2 if disabled("tls1_3"); -+ #Test 25: Send an unrecognized signature_algorithms_cert -+ # We should be able to skip over the unrecognized value and use a -+ # valid one that appears later in the list. -+ $proxy->clear(); -+ $proxy->filter(\&inject_unrecognized_sigalg); -+ $proxy->clientflags("-tls1_3"); -+ # Use -xcert to get SSL_check_chain() to run in the cert_cb. This is -+ # needed to trigger (e.g.) CVE-2020-1967 -+ $proxy->serverflags("" . -+ " -xcert " . srctop_file("test", "certs", "servercert.pem") . -+ " -xkey " . srctop_file("test", "certs", "serverkey.pem") . -+ " -xchain " . srctop_file("test", "certs", "rootcert.pem")); -+ $testtype = UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALGS_CERT; -+ $proxy->start(); -+ ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Unrecognized sigalg_cert in ClientHello"); -+ -+ #Test 26: Send an unrecognized signature_algorithms -+ # We should be able to skip over the unrecognized value and use a -+ # valid one that appears later in the list. -+ $proxy->clear(); -+ $proxy->filter(\&inject_unrecognized_sigalg); -+ $proxy->clientflags("-tls1_3"); -+ $proxy->serverflags("" . -+ " -xcert " . srctop_file("test", "certs", "servercert.pem") . -+ " -xkey " . srctop_file("test", "certs", "serverkey.pem") . -+ " -xchain " . srctop_file("test", "certs", "rootcert.pem")); -+ $testtype = UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALG; -+ $proxy->start(); -+ ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Unrecognized sigalg in ClientHello"); -+} -+ - - - sub sigalgs_filter -@@ -427,3 +462,30 @@ sub modify_cert_verify_sigalg - } - } - } -+ -+sub inject_unrecognized_sigalg -+{ -+ my $proxy = shift; -+ my $type; -+ -+ # We're only interested in the initial ClientHello -+ if ($proxy->flight != 0) { -+ return; -+ } -+ if ($testtype == UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALGS_CERT) { -+ $type = TLSProxy::Message::EXT_SIG_ALGS_CERT; -+ } elsif ($testtype == UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALG) { -+ $type = TLSProxy::Message::EXT_SIG_ALGS; -+ } else { -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ my $ext = pack "C8", -+ 0x00, 0x06, #Extension length -+ 0x18, 0x18, #unallocated -+ 0x04, 0x01, #rsa_pkcs1_sha256 -+ 0x08, 0x04; #rsa_pss_rsae_sha256; -+ my $message = ${$proxy->message_list}[0]; -+ $message->set_extension($type, $ext); -+ $message->repack; -+} diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-2.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-2.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-2.patch 2020-04-20 11:53:40.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-2.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -From fda4b40dacd47859c0760b62572af761e8e5ed74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Benjamin Kaduk -Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2020 12:27:28 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix NULL dereference in SSL_check_chain() for TLS 1.3 - -In the tls1_check_sig_alg() helper function, we loop through the list of -"signature_algorithms_cert" values received from the client and attempt -to look up each one in turn in our internal table that maps wire -codepoint to string-form name, digest and/or signature NID, etc., in -order to compare the signature scheme from the peer's list against what -is used to sign the certificates in the certificate chain we're -checking. Unfortunately, when the peer sends a value that we don't -support, the lookup returns NULL, but we unconditionally dereference the -lookup result for the comparison, leading to an application crash -triggerable by an unauthenticated client. - -Since we will not be able to say anything about algorithms we don't -recognize, treat NULL return from lookup as "does not match". - -We currently only apply the "signature_algorithm_cert" checks on TLS 1.3 -connections, so previous TLS versions are unaffected. SSL_check_chain() -is not called directly from libssl, but may be used by the application -inside a callback (e.g., client_hello or cert callback) to verify that a -candidate certificate chain will be acceptable to the client. - -CVE-2020-1967 ---- - ssl/t1_lib.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c -index a254fd5a05..76b4baa388 100644 ---- a/ssl/t1_lib.c -+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c -@@ -2130,7 +2130,7 @@ static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid) - sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs - ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]) - : s->shared_sigalgs[i]; -- if (sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash) -+ if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash) - return 1; - } - return 0; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-3.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-3.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-3.patch 2020-04-20 11:53:44.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-3.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -From f420c25bb7d0c198b4b080fce203f6d707e9c86c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Benjamin Kaduk -Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2020 08:58:20 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH] fixup! Add test for CVE-2020-1967 - ---- - test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t b/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t -index 1a6390a3e9..e3bc7b5534 100644 ---- a/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t -+++ b/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t -@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ use constant { - SIGALGS_CERT_ALL => 7, - SIGALGS_CERT_PKCS => 8, - SIGALGS_CERT_INVALID => 9, -- UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALGS_CERT => 4, -- UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALG => 5 -+ UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALGS_CERT => 10, -+ UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALG => 11 - }; - - #Note: Throughout this test we override the default ciphersuites where TLSv1.2 diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-4.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-4.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-4.patch 2020-04-20 11:53:47.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1967-4.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,22 +0,0 @@ -From c3a639fb591815604c512b34b83f0c285bdb6aa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Benjamin Kaduk -Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 14:44:42 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH] fixup! Add test for CVE-2020-1967 - ---- - test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t b/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t -index e3bc7b5534..9ea9d05219 100644 ---- a/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t -+++ b/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t -@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ sub inject_unrecognized_sigalg - - my $ext = pack "C8", - 0x00, 0x06, #Extension length -- 0x18, 0x18, #unallocated -+ 0xfe, 0x18, #private use - 0x04, 0x01, #rsa_pkcs1_sha256 - 0x08, 0x04; #rsa_pss_rsae_sha256; - my $message = ${$proxy->message_list}[0]; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-1.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-1.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-1.patch 2020-12-02 14:43:28.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-1.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,36 +0,0 @@ -From ae1e7c236db52fea0c84cb84ddbfe3d03c55ba4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matt Caswell -Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 15:19:34 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] DirectoryString is a CHOICE type and therefore uses explicit - tagging - -EDIPartyName has 2 fields that use a DirectoryString. However they were -marked as implicit tagging - which is not correct for a CHOICE type. - -Additionally the partyName field was marked as Optional when, according to -RFC5280 it is not. - -Many thanks to github user @filipnavara for reporting this issue. Also to -David Benjamin from Google who independently identified and reported it. - -Fixes #6859 ---- - crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c | 5 +++-- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c -index 23e3bc4565..b483f35a9e 100644 ---- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c -+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c -@@ -22,8 +22,9 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE(OTHERNAME) = { - IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OTHERNAME) - - ASN1_SEQUENCE(EDIPARTYNAME) = { -- ASN1_IMP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, nameAssigner, DIRECTORYSTRING, 0), -- ASN1_IMP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, partyName, DIRECTORYSTRING, 1) -+ /* DirectoryString is a CHOICE type so use explicit tagging */ -+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, nameAssigner, DIRECTORYSTRING, 0), -+ ASN1_EXP(EDIPARTYNAME, partyName, DIRECTORYSTRING, 1) - } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(EDIPARTYNAME) - - IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(EDIPARTYNAME) diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-2.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-2.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-2.patch 2020-12-02 14:43:32.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-2.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,96 +0,0 @@ -From 84743d3e7fae623c0a20bd727ec6e8c4031bf42f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matt Caswell -Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 16:12:58 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] Correctly compare EdiPartyName in GENERAL_NAME_cmp() - -If a GENERAL_NAME field contained EdiPartyName data then it was -incorrectly being handled as type "other". This could lead to a -segmentation fault. - -Many thanks to David Benjamin from Google for reporting this issue. - -CVE-2020-1971 ---- - crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- - 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c -index b483f35a9e..6f0a347cce 100644 ---- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c -+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c -@@ -58,6 +58,37 @@ GENERAL_NAME *GENERAL_NAME_dup(GENERAL_NAME *a) - (char *)a); - } - -+static int edipartyname_cmp(const EDIPARTYNAME *a, const EDIPARTYNAME *b) -+{ -+ int res; -+ -+ if (a == NULL || b == NULL) { -+ /* -+ * Shouldn't be possible in a valid GENERAL_NAME, but we handle it -+ * anyway. OTHERNAME_cmp treats NULL != NULL so we do the same here -+ */ -+ return -1; -+ } -+ if (a->nameAssigner == NULL && b->nameAssigner != NULL) -+ return -1; -+ if (a->nameAssigner != NULL && b->nameAssigner == NULL) -+ return 1; -+ /* If we get here then both have nameAssigner set, or both unset */ -+ if (a->nameAssigner != NULL) { -+ res = ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->nameAssigner, b->nameAssigner); -+ if (res != 0) -+ return res; -+ } -+ /* -+ * partyName is required, so these should never be NULL. We treat it in -+ * the same way as the a == NULL || b == NULL case above -+ */ -+ if (a->partyName == NULL || b->partyName == NULL) -+ return -1; -+ -+ return ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->partyName, b->partyName); -+} -+ - /* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */ - int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GENERAL_NAME *b) - { -@@ -67,8 +98,11 @@ int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GENERAL_NAME *b) - return -1; - switch (a->type) { - case GEN_X400: -+ result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->d.x400Address, b->d.x400Address); -+ break; -+ - case GEN_EDIPARTY: -- result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->d.other, b->d.other); -+ result = edipartyname_cmp(a->d.ediPartyName, b->d.ediPartyName); - break; - - case GEN_OTHERNAME: -@@ -115,8 +149,11 @@ void GENERAL_NAME_set0_value(GENERAL_NAME *a, int type, void *value) - { - switch (type) { - case GEN_X400: -+ a->d.x400Address = value; -+ break; -+ - case GEN_EDIPARTY: -- a->d.other = value; -+ a->d.ediPartyName = value; - break; - - case GEN_OTHERNAME: -@@ -150,8 +187,10 @@ void *GENERAL_NAME_get0_value(const GENERAL_NAME *a, int *ptype) - *ptype = a->type; - switch (a->type) { - case GEN_X400: -+ return a->d.x400Address; -+ - case GEN_EDIPARTY: -- return a->d.other; -+ return a->d.ediPartyName; - - case GEN_OTHERNAME: - return a->d.otherName; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-3.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-3.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-3.patch 2020-12-02 14:43:39.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-3.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,90 +0,0 @@ -From c521851116486d0cb351c46506d309dce0ae4c56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matt Caswell -Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 11:58:12 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] Check that multi-strings/CHOICE types don't use implicit - tagging - -It never makes sense for multi-string or CHOICE types to use implicit -tagging since the content would be ambiguous. It is an error in the -template if this ever happens. If we detect it we should stop parsing. - -Thanks to David Benjamin from Google for reporting this issue. ---- - crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c | 1 + - crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ - crypto/err/openssl.txt | 1 + - include/openssl/asn1err.h | 1 + - 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+) - ---- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c -+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c -@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_re - "asn1 sig parse error"}, - {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR), "aux error"}, - {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER), "bad object header"}, -+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE), "bad template"}, - {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH), - "bmpstring is wrong length"}, - {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_BN_LIB), "bn lib"}, ---- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c -+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c -@@ -182,6 +182,15 @@ static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALU - tag, aclass, opt, ctx); - - case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING: -+ /* -+ * It never makes sense for multi-strings to have implicit tagging, so -+ * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template. -+ */ -+ if (tag != -1) { -+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ - p = *in; - /* Just read in tag and class */ - ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL, -@@ -199,6 +208,7 @@ static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALU - ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL); - goto err; - } -+ - /* Check tag matches bit map */ - if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) { - /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */ -@@ -215,6 +225,15 @@ static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALU - return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); - - case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: -+ /* -+ * It never makes sense for CHOICE types to have implicit tagging, so -+ * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template. -+ */ -+ if (tag != -1) { -+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ - if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) - goto auxerr; - if (*pval) { ---- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt -+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt -@@ -1780,6 +1780,7 @@ ASN1_R_ASN1_PARSE_ERROR:203:asn1 parse e - ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR:204:asn1 sig parse error - ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR:100:aux error - ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER:102:bad object header -+ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE:230:bad template - ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH:214:bmpstring is wrong length - ASN1_R_BN_LIB:105:bn lib - ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH:106:boolean is wrong length ---- a/include/openssl/asn1err.h -+++ b/include/openssl/asn1err.h -@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ int ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void); - # define ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR 204 - # define ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR 100 - # define ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER 102 -+# define ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE 230 - # define ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 214 - # define ASN1_R_BN_LIB 105 - # define ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 106 diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-4.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-4.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-4.patch 2020-12-02 14:43:42.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-4.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,111 +0,0 @@ -From 69f3d3c405991b0d6eea78d554b6aab4daeb4514 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matt Caswell -Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 14:55:31 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] Complain if we are attempting to encode with an invalid ASN.1 - template - -It never makes sense for multi-string or CHOICE types to have implicit -tagging. If we have a template that uses the in this way then we -should immediately fail. - -Thanks to David Benjamin from Google for reporting this issue. ---- - crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c | 3 ++- - crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ - crypto/err/openssl.txt | 1 + - include/openssl/asn1err.h | 7 +++---- - 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c -index 99a087dcd2..cc0a59ca4c 100644 ---- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c -+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c -@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ - /* - * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT -- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * - * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use - * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy -@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_functs[] = { - "asn1_item_embed_d2i"}, - {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW, 0), - "asn1_item_embed_new"}, -+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D, 0), "ASN1_item_ex_i2d"}, - {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_FLAGS_I2D, 0), - "asn1_item_flags_i2d"}, - {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO, 0), "ASN1_item_i2d_bio"}, -diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c -index d600c7a538..52a051d5b1 100644 ---- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c -+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c -@@ -103,9 +103,25 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, - return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, tag, aclass); - - case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING: -+ /* -+ * It never makes sense for multi-strings to have implicit tagging, so -+ * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template. -+ */ -+ if (tag != -1) { -+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE); -+ return -1; -+ } - return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, -1, aclass); - - case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: -+ /* -+ * It never makes sense for CHOICE types to have implicit tagging, so -+ * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template. -+ */ -+ if (tag != -1) { -+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE); -+ return -1; -+ } - if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) - return 0; - i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it); -diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt -index 2f93221a86..815460b24f 100644 ---- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt -+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt -@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_D2I_FP:206:ASN1_item_d2i_fp - ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP:191:ASN1_item_dup - ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I:120:asn1_item_embed_d2i - ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW:121:asn1_item_embed_new -+ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D:144:ASN1_item_ex_i2d - ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_FLAGS_I2D:118:asn1_item_flags_i2d - ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO:192:ASN1_item_i2d_bio - ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP:193:ASN1_item_i2d_fp -diff --git a/include/openssl/asn1err.h b/include/openssl/asn1err.h -index 9070e26df4..e1ad1fefec 100644 ---- a/include/openssl/asn1err.h -+++ b/include/openssl/asn1err.h -@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ - /* - * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT -- * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. -+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * - * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use - * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy -@@ -11,9 +11,7 @@ - #ifndef HEADER_ASN1ERR_H - # define HEADER_ASN1ERR_H - --# ifndef HEADER_SYMHACKS_H --# include --# endif -+# include - - # ifdef __cplusplus - extern "C" -@@ -53,6 +51,7 @@ int ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void); - # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP 191 - # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I 120 - # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW 121 -+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D 144 - # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_FLAGS_I2D 118 - # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO 192 - # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP 193 diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-5.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-5.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-5.patch 2020-12-02 14:43:46.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-5.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,367 +0,0 @@ -From c3e7925c31675ad42d9e7d1974e98c10d4fef5df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matt Caswell -Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2020 13:50:52 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] Add a test for GENERAL_NAME_cmp - -Based on a boringssl test contributed by David Benjamin ---- - test/v3nametest.c | 344 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 344 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/test/v3nametest.c b/test/v3nametest.c -index 86f3829aed..4c8af92ce9 100644 ---- a/test/v3nametest.c -+++ b/test/v3nametest.c -@@ -359,8 +359,352 @@ static int call_run_cert(int i) - return failed == 0; - } - -+struct gennamedata { -+ const unsigned char der[22]; -+ size_t derlen; -+} gennames[] = { -+ { -+ /* -+ * [0] { -+ * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } -+ * [0] { -+ * SEQUENCE {} -+ * } -+ * } -+ */ -+ { -+ 0xa0, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, -+ 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00 -+ }, -+ 21 -+ }, { -+ /* -+ * [0] { -+ * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } -+ * [0] { -+ * [APPLICATION 0] {} -+ * } -+ * } -+ */ -+ { -+ 0xa0, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, -+ 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x60, 0x00 -+ }, -+ 21 -+ }, { -+ /* -+ * [0] { -+ * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } -+ * [0] { -+ * UTF8String { "a" } -+ * } -+ * } -+ */ -+ { -+ 0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, -+ 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61 -+ }, -+ 22 -+ }, { -+ /* -+ * [0] { -+ * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.2 } -+ * [0] { -+ * UTF8String { "a" } -+ * } -+ * } -+ */ -+ { -+ 0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, -+ 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x02, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61 -+ }, -+ 22 -+ }, { -+ /* -+ * [0] { -+ * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } -+ * [0] { -+ * UTF8String { "b" } -+ * } -+ * } -+ */ -+ { -+ 0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, -+ 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62 -+ }, -+ 22 -+ }, { -+ /* -+ * [0] { -+ * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } -+ * [0] { -+ * BOOLEAN { TRUE } -+ * } -+ * } -+ */ -+ { -+ 0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, -+ 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff -+ }, -+ 22 -+ }, { -+ /* -+ * [0] { -+ * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } -+ * [0] { -+ * BOOLEAN { FALSE } -+ * } -+ * } -+ */ -+ { -+ 0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, -+ 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00 -+ }, -+ 22 -+ }, { -+ /* [1 PRIMITIVE] { "a" } */ -+ { -+ 0x81, 0x01, 0x61 -+ }, -+ 3 -+ }, { -+ /* [1 PRIMITIVE] { "b" } */ -+ { -+ 0x81, 0x01, 0x62 -+ }, -+ 3 -+ }, { -+ /* [2 PRIMITIVE] { "a" } */ -+ { -+ 0x82, 0x01, 0x61 -+ }, -+ 3 -+ }, { -+ /* [2 PRIMITIVE] { "b" } */ -+ { -+ 0x82, 0x01, 0x62 -+ }, -+ 3 -+ }, { -+ /* -+ * [4] { -+ * SEQUENCE { -+ * SET { -+ * SEQUENCE { -+ * # commonName -+ * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 } -+ * UTF8String { "a" } -+ * } -+ * } -+ * } -+ * } -+ */ -+ { -+ 0xa4, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, -+ 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61 -+ }, -+ 16 -+ }, { -+ /* -+ * [4] { -+ * SEQUENCE { -+ * SET { -+ * SEQUENCE { -+ * # commonName -+ * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 } -+ * UTF8String { "b" } -+ * } -+ * } -+ * } -+ * } -+ */ -+ { -+ 0xa4, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, -+ 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62 -+ }, -+ 16 -+ }, { -+ /* -+ * [5] { -+ * [1] { -+ * UTF8String { "a" } -+ * } -+ * } -+ */ -+ { -+ 0xa5, 0x05, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61 -+ }, -+ 7 -+ }, { -+ /* -+ * [5] { -+ * [1] { -+ * UTF8String { "b" } -+ * } -+ * } -+ */ -+ { -+ 0xa5, 0x05, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62 -+ }, -+ 7 -+ }, { -+ /* -+ * [5] { -+ * [0] { -+ * UTF8String {} -+ * } -+ * [1] { -+ * UTF8String { "a" } -+ * } -+ * } -+ */ -+ { -+ 0xa5, 0x09, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x0c, 0x00, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61 -+ }, -+ 11 -+ }, { -+ /* -+ * [5] { -+ * [0] { -+ * UTF8String { "a" } -+ * } -+ * [1] { -+ * UTF8String { "a" } -+ * } -+ * } -+ */ -+ { -+ 0xa5, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, -+ 0x61 -+ }, -+ 12 -+ }, { -+ /* -+ * [5] { -+ * [0] { -+ * UTF8String { "b" } -+ * } -+ * [1] { -+ * UTF8String { "a" } -+ * } -+ * } -+ */ -+ { -+ 0xa5, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, -+ 0x61 -+ }, -+ 12 -+ }, { -+ /* [6 PRIMITIVE] { "a" } */ -+ { -+ 0x86, 0x01, 0x61 -+ }, -+ 3 -+ }, { -+ /* [6 PRIMITIVE] { "b" } */ -+ { -+ 0x86, 0x01, 0x62 -+ }, -+ 3 -+ }, { -+ /* [7 PRIMITIVE] { `11111111` } */ -+ { -+ 0x87, 0x04, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11 -+ }, -+ 6 -+ }, { -+ /* [7 PRIMITIVE] { `22222222`} */ -+ { -+ 0x87, 0x04, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 -+ }, -+ 6 -+ }, { -+ /* [7 PRIMITIVE] { `11111111111111111111111111111111` } */ -+ { -+ 0x87, 0x10, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, -+ 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11 -+ }, -+ 18 -+ }, { -+ /* [7 PRIMITIVE] { `22222222222222222222222222222222` } */ -+ { -+ 0x87, 0x10, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, -+ 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 -+ }, -+ 18 -+ }, { -+ /* [8 PRIMITIVE] { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } */ -+ { -+ 0x88, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, -+ 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01 -+ }, -+ 15 -+ }, { -+ /* [8 PRIMITIVE] { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.2 } */ -+ { -+ 0x88, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, -+ 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x02 -+ }, -+ 15 -+ } -+}; -+ -+static int test_GENERAL_NAME_cmp(void) -+{ -+ size_t i, j; -+ GENERAL_NAME **namesa = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*namesa) -+ * OSSL_NELEM(gennames)); -+ GENERAL_NAME **namesb = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*namesb) -+ * OSSL_NELEM(gennames)); -+ int testresult = 0; -+ -+ if (!TEST_ptr(namesa) || !TEST_ptr(namesb)) -+ goto end; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(gennames); i++) { -+ const unsigned char *derp = gennames[i].der; -+ -+ /* -+ * We create two versions of each GENERAL_NAME so that we ensure when -+ * we compare them they are always different pointers. -+ */ -+ namesa[i] = d2i_GENERAL_NAME(NULL, &derp, gennames[i].derlen); -+ derp = gennames[i].der; -+ namesb[i] = d2i_GENERAL_NAME(NULL, &derp, gennames[i].derlen); -+ if (!TEST_ptr(namesa[i]) || !TEST_ptr(namesb[i])) -+ goto end; -+ } -+ -+ /* Every name should be equal to itself and not equal to any others. */ -+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(gennames); i++) { -+ for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(gennames); j++) { -+ if (i == j) { -+ if (!TEST_int_eq(GENERAL_NAME_cmp(namesa[i], namesb[j]), 0)) -+ goto end; -+ } else { -+ if (!TEST_int_ne(GENERAL_NAME_cmp(namesa[i], namesb[j]), 0)) -+ goto end; -+ } -+ } -+ } -+ testresult = 1; -+ -+ end: -+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(gennames); i++) { -+ if (namesa != NULL) -+ GENERAL_NAME_free(namesa[i]); -+ if (namesb != NULL) -+ GENERAL_NAME_free(namesb[i]); -+ } -+ OPENSSL_free(namesa); -+ OPENSSL_free(namesb); -+ -+ return testresult; -+} -+ - int setup_tests(void) - { - ADD_ALL_TESTS(call_run_cert, OSSL_NELEM(name_fns)); -+ ADD_TEST(test_GENERAL_NAME_cmp); - return 1; - } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-6.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-6.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-6.patch 2020-12-02 14:43:50.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/CVE-2020-1971-6.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,116 +0,0 @@ -From 709c6b15ea437b2d3fa5241ab39ce7bb779caae4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matt Caswell -Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2020 14:46:47 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] Add a test for encoding/decoding using an invalid ASN.1 - Template - -If you have a CHOICE type that it must use explicit tagging - otherwise -the template is invalid. We add tests for this. ---- - test/asn1_decode_test.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - test/asn1_encode_test.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/test/asn1_decode_test.c b/test/asn1_decode_test.c -index 369023d5f1..94a22c6682 100644 ---- a/test/asn1_decode_test.c -+++ b/test/asn1_decode_test.c -@@ -160,6 +160,41 @@ static int test_uint64(void) - return 1; - } - -+typedef struct { -+ ASN1_STRING *invalidDirString; -+} INVALIDTEMPLATE; -+ -+ASN1_SEQUENCE(INVALIDTEMPLATE) = { -+ /* -+ * DirectoryString is a CHOICE type so it must use explicit tagging - -+ * but we deliberately use implicit here, which makes this template invalid. -+ */ -+ ASN1_IMP(INVALIDTEMPLATE, invalidDirString, DIRECTORYSTRING, 12) -+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(INVALIDTEMPLATE) -+ -+IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(INVALIDTEMPLATE) -+IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(INVALIDTEMPLATE) -+ -+/* Empty sequence for invalid template test */ -+static unsigned char t_invalid_template[] = { -+ 0x30, 0x03, /* SEQUENCE tag + length */ -+ 0x0c, 0x01, 0x41 /* UTF8String, length 1, "A" */ -+}; -+ -+static int test_invalid_template(void) -+{ -+ const unsigned char *p = t_invalid_template; -+ INVALIDTEMPLATE *tmp = d2i_INVALIDTEMPLATE(NULL, &p, -+ sizeof(t_invalid_template)); -+ -+ /* We expect a NULL pointer return */ -+ if (TEST_ptr_null(tmp)) -+ return 1; -+ -+ INVALIDTEMPLATE_free(tmp); -+ return 0; -+} -+ - int setup_tests(void) - { - #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10200000L -@@ -169,5 +204,6 @@ int setup_tests(void) - ADD_TEST(test_uint32); - ADD_TEST(test_int64); - ADD_TEST(test_uint64); -+ ADD_TEST(test_invalid_template); - return 1; - } -diff --git a/test/asn1_encode_test.c b/test/asn1_encode_test.c -index ed920a4d66..afbd18be6f 100644 ---- a/test/asn1_encode_test.c -+++ b/test/asn1_encode_test.c -@@ -856,6 +856,38 @@ static int test_uint64(void) - return test_intern(&uint64_test_package); - } - -+typedef struct { -+ ASN1_STRING *invalidDirString; -+} INVALIDTEMPLATE; -+ -+ASN1_SEQUENCE(INVALIDTEMPLATE) = { -+ /* -+ * DirectoryString is a CHOICE type so it must use explicit tagging - -+ * but we deliberately use implicit here, which makes this template invalid. -+ */ -+ ASN1_IMP(INVALIDTEMPLATE, invalidDirString, DIRECTORYSTRING, 12) -+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(INVALIDTEMPLATE) -+ -+IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(INVALIDTEMPLATE) -+IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(INVALIDTEMPLATE) -+ -+static int test_invalid_template(void) -+{ -+ INVALIDTEMPLATE *temp = INVALIDTEMPLATE_new(); -+ int ret; -+ -+ if (!TEST_ptr(temp)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ ret = i2d_INVALIDTEMPLATE(temp, NULL); -+ -+ INVALIDTEMPLATE_free(temp); -+ -+ /* We expect the i2d operation to fail */ -+ return ret < 0; -+} -+ -+ - int setup_tests(void) - { - #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10200000L -@@ -866,5 +898,6 @@ int setup_tests(void) - ADD_TEST(test_uint32); - ADD_TEST(test_int64); - ADD_TEST(test_uint64); -+ ADD_TEST(test_invalid_template); - return 1; - } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/e6a80cbad28ee748830815634917efe96948f2f3.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/e6a80cbad28ee748830815634917efe96948f2f3.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/e6a80cbad28ee748830815634917efe96948f2f3.patch 2020-09-15 17:04:36.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/e6a80cbad28ee748830815634917efe96948f2f3.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -From e6a80cbad28ee748830815634917efe96948f2f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Bernd Edlinger -Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 11:52:24 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix a buffer overflow in drbg_ctr_generate - -This can happen if the 32-bit counter overflows -and the last block is not a multiple of 16 bytes. - -Fixes #12012 - -[extended tests] - -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz -Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer -Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12016) - -(cherry picked from commit 42fa3e66697baa121220b4eacf03607280e4ff89) ---- - crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c | 8 +++++--- - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c -index 89c9ccc876a8..a757d0a258ab 100644 ---- a/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c -+++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c -@@ -367,9 +367,11 @@ __owur static int drbg_ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - ctr32 = GETU32(ctr->V + 12) + blocks; - if (ctr32 < blocks) { - /* 32-bit counter overflow into V. */ -- blocks -= ctr32; -- buflen = blocks * 16; -- ctr32 = 0; -+ if (ctr32 != 0) { -+ blocks -= ctr32; -+ buflen = blocks * 16; -+ ctr32 = 0; -+ } - ctr96_inc(ctr->V); - } - PUTU32(ctr->V + 12, ctr32); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/series openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/series --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/series 2020-12-02 14:43:50.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/series 2021-02-23 21:46:53.000000000 +0000 @@ -33,24 +33,6 @@ pic.patch c_rehash-compat.patch # Remove Set-systemwide-default-settings-for-libssl-users.patch, this is done differently - # Ubuntu patches tests-use-seclevel-1.patch tls1.2-min-seclevel2.patch -CVE-2020-1967-1.patch -CVE-2020-1967-2.patch -CVE-2020-1967-3.patch -CVE-2020-1967-4.patch -# Upstream cherry-picks -11767.patch -# Fix RNG -9cc834d966ea5afc38fb829bfe498aed4c5d498d.patch -0d011f540400b425aba1c3e59624ad9dbabe83cb.patch -53eb05bdf00d7237e3b12976c2ac38d68206eb13.patch -e6a80cbad28ee748830815634917efe96948f2f3.patch -CVE-2020-1971-1.patch -CVE-2020-1971-2.patch -CVE-2020-1971-3.patch -CVE-2020-1971-4.patch -CVE-2020-1971-5.patch -CVE-2020-1971-6.patch diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/tls1.2-min-seclevel2.patch openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/tls1.2-min-seclevel2.patch --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/patches/tls1.2-min-seclevel2.patch 2020-01-08 17:17:41.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/patches/tls1.2-min-seclevel2.patch 2021-02-23 21:43:42.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ Description: TLS versions below 1.2 are not permitted as security level 2. -Index: openssl-1.1.1d/ssl/ssl_cert.c +Index: openssl-1.1.1i/ssl/ssl_cert.c =================================================================== ---- openssl-1.1.1d.orig/ssl/ssl_cert.c -+++ openssl-1.1.1d/ssl/ssl_cert.c -@@ -956,18 +956,12 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback +--- openssl-1.1.1i.orig/ssl/ssl_cert.c ++++ openssl-1.1.1i/ssl/ssl_cert.c +@@ -928,18 +928,12 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback } case SSL_SECOP_VERSION: if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { @@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ return 0; } break; -Index: openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod +Index: openssl-1.1.1i/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod =================================================================== ---- openssl-1.1.1d.orig/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod -+++ openssl-1.1.1d/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod +--- openssl-1.1.1i.orig/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod ++++ openssl-1.1.1i/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod @@ -84,22 +84,20 @@ using MD5 for the MAC is also prohibited Security level set to 112 bits of security. As a result RSA, DSA and DH keys shorter than 2048 bits and ECC keys shorter than 224 bits are prohibited. @@ -57,19 +57,11 @@ =item B -@@ -114,14 +112,8 @@ I +@@ -116,6 +114,7 @@ I - =head1 NOTES - --B at this time setting the security level higher than 1 for --general internet use is likely to cause B interoperability --issues and is not recommended. This is because the B algorithm --is very widely used in certificates and will be rejected at levels --higher than 1 because it only offers 80 bits of security. -- The default security level can be configured when OpenSSL is compiled by --setting B<-DOPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL=level>. If not set then 1 is used. -+setting B<-DOPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL=level>. On Ubuntu, 2 is used. + setting B<-DOPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL=level>. If not set then 1 is used. ++On Ubuntu, 2 is used. The security framework disables or reject parameters inconsistent with the set security level. In the past this was difficult as applications had to set diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/debian/rules openssl-1.1.1j/debian/rules --- openssl-1.1.1f/debian/rules 2020-04-01 15:57:10.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/debian/rules 2021-02-23 22:01:12.000000000 +0000 @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ include /usr/share/dpkg/architecture.mk include /usr/share/dpkg/pkg-info.mk -export DEB_BUILD_MAINT_OPTIONS = hardening=+all +export DEB_BUILD_MAINT_OPTIONS = hardening=+all future=+lfs export DEB_CFLAGS_MAINT_APPEND = -DOPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL=2 SHELL=/bin/bash @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ MAKEFLAGS += -j$(NUMJOBS) endif -CONFARGS = --prefix=/usr --openssldir=/usr/lib/ssl --libdir=lib/$(DEB_HOST_MULTIARCH) no-idea no-mdc2 no-rc5 no-zlib no-ssl3 enable-unit-test no-ssl3-method enable-rfc3779 enable-cms +CONFARGS = --prefix=/usr --openssldir=/usr/lib/ssl --libdir=lib/$(DEB_HOST_MULTIARCH) no-idea no-mdc2 no-rc5 no-zlib no-ssl3 enable-unit-test no-ssl3-method enable-rfc3779 enable-cms no-capieng OPT_alpha = ev4 ev5 ARCHOPTS = OPT_$(DEB_HOST_ARCH) OPTS = $($(ARCHOPTS)) @@ -119,9 +119,11 @@ mkdir -p debian/tmp/etc/ssl mv debian/tmp/usr/lib/ssl/{certs,openssl.cnf,private} debian/tmp/etc/ssl/ ln -s /etc/ssl/{certs,openssl.cnf,private} debian/tmp/usr/lib/ssl/ +ifeq (,$(filter noudeb,$(DEB_BUILD_PROFILES))) cp -pf debian/tmp/usr/lib/$(DEB_HOST_MULTIARCH)/libcrypto.so.* debian/libcrypto1.1-udeb/usr/lib/ cp -pf debian/tmp/etc/ssl/openssl.cnf debian/libcrypto1.1-udeb/usr/lib/ssl/openssl.cnf cp -pf debian/tmp/usr/lib/$(DEB_HOST_MULTIARCH)/libssl.so.* debian/libssl1.1-udeb/usr/lib/ +endif cp -auv build_shared/lib*.so* debian/tmp/usr/lib/$(DEB_HOST_MULTIARCH)/ for opt in $(OPTS); \ do set -xe; \ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/CA.pl.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/CA.pl.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/CA.pl.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/CA.pl.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ =item B<-signCA> -This option is the same as the B<-signreq> option except it uses the +This option is the same as the B<-sign> option except it uses the configuration file section B and so makes the signed request a valid CA certificate. This is useful when creating intermediate CA from a root CA. Extra params are passed on to B command. @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ CA.pl -newca CA.pl -newreq - CA.pl -signreq + CA.pl -sign CA.pl -pkcs12 "My Test Certificate" =head1 DSA CERTIFICATES @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ CA.pl -newca -enter cacert.pem when prompted for the CA file name. +enter cacert.pem when prompted for the CA filename. Create a DSA certificate request and private key (a different set of parameters can optionally be created first): @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ Sign the request: - CA.pl -signreq + CA.pl -sign =head1 NOTES @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/ca.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/ca.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/ca.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/ca.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ =item B<-passin arg> The key password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-notext> @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ =item B<-noemailDN> The DN of a certificate can contain the EMAIL field if present in the -request DN, however it is good policy just having the e-mail set into +request DN, however, it is good policy just having the e-mail set into the altName extension of the certificate. When this option is set the EMAIL field is removed from the certificate' subject and set only in the, eventually present, extensions. The B keyword can be @@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/cms.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/cms.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/cms.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/cms.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ =item B<-passin arg> The private key password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-rand file...> @@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2008-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2008-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/crl2pkcs7.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/crl2pkcs7.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/crl2pkcs7.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/crl2pkcs7.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Specifies a filename containing one or more certificates in B format. All certificates in the file will be added to the PKCS#7 structure. This -option can be used more than once to read certificates form multiple +option can be used more than once to read certificates from multiple files. =item B<-nocrl> @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/dgst.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/dgst.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/dgst.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/dgst.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -94,8 +94,7 @@ =item B<-sign filename> Digitally sign the digest using the private key in "filename". Note this option -does not support Ed25519 or Ed448 private keys. Use the B command -instead for this. +does not support Ed25519 or Ed448 private keys. =item B<-keyform arg> @@ -110,7 +109,7 @@ =item B<-passin arg> The private key password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-verify filename> @@ -242,7 +241,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/dsa.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/dsa.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/dsa.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/dsa.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ =item B<-passin arg> The input file password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-out filename> @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ =item B<-passout arg> The output file password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-aes128>, B<-aes192>, B<-aes256>, B<-aria128>, B<-aria192>, B<-aria256>, B<-camellia128>, B<-camellia192>, B<-camellia256>, B<-des>, B<-des3>, B<-idea> @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/ec.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/ec.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/ec.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/ec.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ =item B<-passin arg> The input file password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-out filename> @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ =item B<-passout arg> The output file password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-des|-des3|-idea> @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2003-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2003-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/enc.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/enc.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/enc.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/enc.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ =item B<-pass arg> The password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-e> @@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ All the block ciphers normally use PKCS#5 padding, also known as standard block padding. This allows a rudimentary integrity or password check to -be performed. However since the chance of random data passing the test +be performed. However, since the chance of random data passing the test is better than 1 in 256 it isn't a very good test. If padding is disabled then the input data must be a multiple of the cipher @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/genpkey.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/genpkey.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/genpkey.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/genpkey.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ =item B<-pass arg> The output file password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-I> @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/genrsa.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/genrsa.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/genrsa.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/genrsa.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ =item B<-passout arg> The output file password source. For more information about the format -of B see the B section in L. +of B see L. =item B<-aes128>, B<-aes192>, B<-aes256>, B<-aria128>, B<-aria192>, B<-aria256>, B<-camellia128>, B<-camellia192>, B<-camellia256>, B<-des>, B<-des3>, B<-idea> @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/ocsp.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/ocsp.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/ocsp.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/ocsp.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ =item B<-host hostname:port>, B<-path pathname> If the B option is present then the OCSP request is sent to the host -B on port B. B specifies the HTTP path name to use +B on port B. B specifies the HTTP pathname to use or "/" by default. This is equivalent to specifying B<-url> with scheme http:// and the given hostname, port, and pathname. @@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/pkcs12.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/pkcs12.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/pkcs12.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/pkcs12.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -78,14 +78,12 @@ =item B<-passin arg> The PKCS#12 file (i.e. input file) password source. For more information about -the format of B see the B section in -L. +the format of B see L. =item B<-passout arg> Pass phrase source to encrypt any outputted private keys with. For more -information about the format of B see the B section -in L. +information about the format of B see L. =item B<-password arg> @@ -206,14 +204,12 @@ =item B<-pass arg>, B<-passout arg> The PKCS#12 file (i.e. output file) password source. For more information about -the format of B see the B section in -L. +the format of B see L. =item B<-passin password> Pass phrase source to decrypt any input private keys with. For more information -about the format of B see the B section in -L. +about the format of B see L. =item B<-chain> @@ -245,7 +241,7 @@ encryption purposes but arbitrary length keys for signing. The B<-keysig> option marks the key for signing only. Signing only keys can be used for S/MIME signing, authenticode (ActiveX control signing) and SSL client -authentication, however due to a bug only MSIE 5.0 and later support +authentication, however, due to a bug only MSIE 5.0 and later support the use of signing only keys for SSL client authentication. =item B<-macalg digest> @@ -383,7 +379,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/pkcs8.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/pkcs8.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/pkcs8.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/pkcs8.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ =item B<-passin arg> The input file password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-out filename> @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ =item B<-passout arg> The output file password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-iter count> @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ Test vectors from this PKCS#5 v2.0 implementation were posted to the pkcs-tng mailing list using triple DES, DES and RC2 with high iteration counts, several people confirmed that they could decrypt the private -keys produced and Therefore it can be assumed that the PKCS#5 v2.0 +keys produced and therefore, it can be assumed that the PKCS#5 v2.0 implementation is reasonably accurate at least as far as these algorithms are concerned. @@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/pkey.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/pkey.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/pkey.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/pkey.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ =item B<-passin arg> The input file password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-out filename> @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ =item B<-passout password> The output file password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-traditional> @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2006-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -The B command can be used to perform low level public key operations +The B command can be used to perform low-level public key operations using any supported algorithm. =head1 OPTIONS @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ =item B<-passin arg> The input key password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-peerkey file> @@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/req.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/req.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/req.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/req.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ =item B<-passin arg> The input file password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-out filename> @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ =item B<-passout arg> The output file password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-text> @@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/rsa.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/rsa.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/rsa.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/rsa.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ =item B<-passin arg> The input file password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-out filename> @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ =item B<-passout password> The output file password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-aes128>, B<-aes192>, B<-aes256>, B<-aria128>, B<-aria192>, B<-aria256>, B<-camellia128>, B<-camellia192>, B<-camellia256>, B<-des>, B<-des3>, B<-idea> @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/s_client.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/s_client.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/s_client.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/s_client.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ =item B<-pass arg> the private key password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-verify depth> @@ -427,11 +427,11 @@ =item B<-nbio_test> -Tests non-blocking I/O +Tests nonblocking I/O =item B<-nbio> -Turns on non-blocking I/O +Turns on nonblocking I/O =item B<-crlf> @@ -781,14 +781,14 @@ list to choose from. This is normally because the server is not sending the clients certificate authority in its "acceptable CA list" when it requests a certificate. By using B the CA list can be viewed -and checked. However some servers only request client authentication +and checked. However, some servers only request client authentication after a specific URL is requested. To obtain the list in this case it is necessary to use the B<-prexit> option and send an HTTP request for an appropriate page. If a certificate is specified on the command line using the B<-cert> option it will not be used unless the server specifically requests -a client certificate. Therefor merely including a client certificate +a client certificate. Therefore, merely including a client certificate on the command line is no guarantee that the certificate works. If there are problems verifying a server certificate then the @@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/sess_id.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/sess_id.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/sess_id.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/sess_id.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ Since the SSL session output contains the master key it is possible to read the contents of an encrypted session using this -information. Therefore appropriate security precautions should be taken if +information. Therefore, appropriate security precautions should be taken if the information is being output by a "real" application. This is however strongly discouraged and should only be used for debugging purposes. diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/smime.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/smime.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/smime.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/smime.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ =item B<-passin arg> The private key password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-rand file...> @@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/spkac.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/spkac.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/spkac.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/spkac.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ =item B<-passin password> The input file password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-challenge string> @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/s_server.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/s_server.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/s_server.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/s_server.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ =item B<-pass val> The private key password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-dcert infile>, B<-dkey infile> @@ -432,9 +432,9 @@ =item B<-id_prefix val> Generate SSL/TLS session IDs prefixed by B. This is mostly useful -for testing any SSL/TLS code (eg. proxies) that wish to deal with multiple +for testing any SSL/TLS code (e.g. proxies) that wish to deal with multiple servers, when each of which might be generating a unique range of session -IDs (eg. with a certain prefix). +IDs (e.g. with a certain prefix). =item B<-rand file...> @@ -845,7 +845,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/s_time.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/s_time.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/s_time.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/s_time.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ [B<-cert filename>] [B<-key filename>] [B<-CApath directory>] -[B<-cafile filename>] +[B<-CAfile filename>] [B<-no-CAfile>] [B<-no-CApath>] [B<-reuse>] @@ -177,14 +177,14 @@ list to choose from. This is normally because the server is not sending the clients certificate authority in its "acceptable CA list" when it requests a certificate. By using L the CA list can be -viewed and checked. However some servers only request client authentication +viewed and checked. However, some servers only request client authentication after a specific URL is requested. To obtain the list in this case it is necessary to use the B<-prexit> option of L and send an HTTP request for an appropriate page. If a certificate is specified on the command line using the B<-cert> option it will not be used unless the server specifically requests -a client certificate. Therefor merely including a client certificate +a client certificate. Therefore, merely including a client certificate on the command line is no guarantee that the certificate works. =head1 BUGS @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2004-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2004-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/storeutl.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/storeutl.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/storeutl.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/storeutl.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ =item B<-passin arg> the key password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-text> @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/tsget.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/tsget.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/tsget.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/tsget.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -24,15 +24,15 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -The B command can be used for sending a time stamp request, as -specified in B, to a time stamp server over HTTP or HTTPS and storing -the time stamp response in a file. This tool cannot be used for creating the +The B command can be used for sending a timestamp request, as +specified in B, to a timestamp server over HTTP or HTTPS and storing +the timestamp response in a file. This tool cannot be used for creating the requests and verifying responses, you can use the OpenSSL B command to do that. B can send several requests to the server without closing the TCP connection if more than one requests are specified on the command line. -The tool sends the following HTTP request for each time stamp request: +The tool sends the following HTTP request for each timestamp request: POST url HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: OpenTSA tsget.pl/ @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ =item B<-h> server_url -The URL of the HTTP/HTTPS server listening for time stamp requests. +The URL of the HTTP/HTTPS server listening for timestamp requests. =item B<-e> extension @@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ =item B<-o> output This option can be specified only when just one request is sent to the -server. The time stamp response will be written to the given output file. '-' -means standard output. In case of multiple time stamp requests or the absence +server. The timestamp response will be written to the given output file. '-' +means standard output. In case of multiple timestamp requests or the absence of this argument the names of the output files will be derived from the names of the input files and the default or specified extension argument. (Optional) @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ =item [request]... -List of files containing B DER-encoded time stamp requests. If no +List of files containing B DER-encoded timestamp requests. If no requests are specified only one request will be sent to the server and it will be read from the standard input. (Optional) @@ -139,35 +139,35 @@ =head1 EXAMPLES The examples below presume that B and B contain valid -time stamp requests, tsa.opentsa.org listens at port 8080 for HTTP requests +timestamp requests, tsa.opentsa.org listens at port 8080 for HTTP requests and at port 8443 for HTTPS requests, the TSA service is available at the /tsa absolute path. -Get a time stamp response for file1.tsq over HTTP, output is written to +Get a timestamp response for file1.tsq over HTTP, output is written to file1.tsr: tsget -h http://tsa.opentsa.org:8080/tsa file1.tsq -Get a time stamp response for file1.tsq and file2.tsq over HTTP showing +Get a timestamp response for file1.tsq and file2.tsq over HTTP showing progress, output is written to file1.reply and file2.reply respectively: tsget -h http://tsa.opentsa.org:8080/tsa -v -e .reply \ file1.tsq file2.tsq -Create a time stamp request, write it to file3.tsq, send it to the server and +Create a timestamp request, write it to file3.tsq, send it to the server and write the response to file3.tsr: openssl ts -query -data file3.txt -cert | tee file3.tsq \ | tsget -h http://tsa.opentsa.org:8080/tsa \ -o file3.tsr -Get a time stamp response for file1.tsq over HTTPS without client +Get a timestamp response for file1.tsq over HTTPS without client authentication: tsget -h https://tsa.opentsa.org:8443/tsa \ -C cacerts.pem file1.tsq -Get a time stamp response for file1.tsq over HTTPS with certificate-based +Get a timestamp response for file1.tsq over HTTPS with certificate-based client authentication (it will ask for the passphrase if client_key.pem is protected): @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/ts.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/ts.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/ts.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/ts.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -101,23 +101,23 @@ =item 2. The TSA attaches the current date and time to the received hash value, -signs them and sends the time stamp token back to the client. By +signs them and sends the timestamp token back to the client. By creating this token the TSA certifies the existence of the original data file at the time of response generation. =item 3. -The TSA client receives the time stamp token and verifies the +The TSA client receives the timestamp token and verifies the signature on it. It also checks if the token contains the same hash value that it had sent to the TSA. =back -There is one DER encoded protocol data unit defined for transporting a time -stamp request to the TSA and one for sending the time stamp response +There is one DER encoded protocol data unit defined for transporting +a timestamp request to the TSA and one for sending the timestamp response back to the client. The B command has three main functions: -creating a time stamp request based on a data file, -creating a time stamp response based on a request, verifying if a +creating a timestamp request based on a data file, +creating a timestamp response based on a request, verifying if a response corresponds to a particular request or a data file. There is no support for sending the requests/responses automatically @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ =head2 Time Stamp Request generation -The B<-query> switch can be used for creating and printing a time stamp +The B<-query> switch can be used for creating and printing a timestamp request with the following options: =over 4 @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ =item B<-data> file_to_hash -The data file for which the time stamp request needs to be +The data file for which the timestamp request needs to be created. stdin is the default if neither the B<-data> nor the B<-digest> parameter is specified. (Optional) @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ =item B<-tspolicy> object_id The policy that the client expects the TSA to use for creating the -time stamp token. Either the dotted OID notation or OID names defined +timestamp token. Either the dotted OID notation or OID names defined in the config file can be used. If no policy is requested the TSA will use its own default policy. (Optional) @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ =item B<-in> request.tsq -This option specifies a previously created time stamp request in DER +This option specifies a previously created timestamp request in DER format that will be printed into the output file. Useful when you need to examine the content of a request in human-readable format. (Optional) @@ -212,13 +212,13 @@ =head2 Time Stamp Response generation -A time stamp response (TimeStampResp) consists of a response status -and the time stamp token itself (ContentInfo), if the token generation was -successful. The B<-reply> command is for creating a time stamp -response or time stamp token based on a request and printing the +A timestamp response (TimeStampResp) consists of a response status +and the timestamp token itself (ContentInfo), if the token generation was +successful. The B<-reply> command is for creating a timestamp +response or timestamp token based on a request and printing the response/token in human-readable format. If B<-token_out> is not -specified the output is always a time stamp response (TimeStampResp), -otherwise it is a time stamp token (ContentInfo). +specified the output is always a timestamp response (TimeStampResp), +otherwise it is a timestamp token (ContentInfo). =over 4 @@ -237,12 +237,12 @@ =item B<-queryfile> request.tsq -The name of the file containing a DER encoded time stamp request. (Optional) +The name of the file containing a DER encoded timestamp request. (Optional) =item B<-passin> password_src Specifies the password source for the private key of the TSA. See -B in L. (Optional) +L. (Optional) =item B<-signer> tsa_cert.pem @@ -282,19 +282,19 @@ =item B<-in> response.tsr -Specifies a previously created time stamp response or time stamp token +Specifies a previously created timestamp response or timestamp token (if B<-token_in> is also specified) in DER format that will be written to the output file. This option does not require a request, it is useful e.g. when you need to examine the content of a response or -token or you want to extract the time stamp token from a response. If -the input is a token and the output is a time stamp response a default +token or you want to extract the timestamp token from a response. If +the input is a token and the output is a timestamp response a default 'granted' status info is added to the token. (Optional) =item B<-token_in> This flag can be used together with the B<-in> option and indicates -that the input is a DER encoded time stamp token (ContentInfo) instead -of a time stamp response (TimeStampResp). (Optional) +that the input is a DER encoded timestamp token (ContentInfo) instead +of a timestamp response (TimeStampResp). (Optional) =item B<-out> response.tsr @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ =item B<-token_out> -The output is a time stamp token (ContentInfo) instead of time stamp +The output is a timestamp token (ContentInfo) instead of timestamp response (TimeStampResp). (Optional) =item B<-text> @@ -323,8 +323,8 @@ =head2 Time Stamp Response verification -The B<-verify> command is for verifying if a time stamp response or time -stamp token is valid and matches a particular time stamp request or +The B<-verify> command is for verifying if a timestamp response or +timestamp token is valid and matches a particular timestamp request or data file. The B<-verify> command does not use the configuration file. =over 4 @@ -345,18 +345,18 @@ =item B<-queryfile> request.tsq -The original time stamp request in DER format. The B<-data> and B<-digest> +The original timestamp request in DER format. The B<-data> and B<-digest> options must not be specified with this one. (Optional) =item B<-in> response.tsr -The time stamp response that needs to be verified in DER format. (Mandatory) +The timestamp response that needs to be verified in DER format. (Mandatory) =item B<-token_in> This flag can be used together with the B<-in> option and indicates -that the input is a DER encoded time stamp token (ContentInfo) instead -of a time stamp response (TimeStampResp). (Optional) +that the input is a DER encoded timestamp token (ContentInfo) instead +of a timestamp response (TimeStampResp). (Optional) =item B<-CApath> trusted_cert_path @@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ =item B The name of the file containing the hexadecimal serial number of the -last time stamp response created. This number is incremented by 1 for +last timestamp response created. This number is incremented by 1 for each response. If the file does not exist at the time of response generation a new file is created with serial number 1. (Mandatory) @@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ =item B Specifies the maximum number of digits, which represent the fraction of -seconds, that need to be included in the time field. The trailing zeroes +seconds, that need to be included in the time field. The trailing zeros must be removed from the time, so there might actually be fewer digits, or no fraction of seconds at all. Supported only on UNIX platforms. The maximum value is 6, default is 0. @@ -530,13 +530,13 @@ =head2 Time Stamp Request -To create a time stamp request for design1.txt with SHA-1 +To create a timestamp request for design1.txt with SHA-1 without nonce and policy and no certificate is required in the response: openssl ts -query -data design1.txt -no_nonce \ -out design1.tsq -To create a similar time stamp request with specifying the message imprint +To create a similar timestamp request with specifying the message imprint explicitly: openssl ts -query -digest b7e5d3f93198b38379852f2c04e78d73abdd0f4b \ @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ openssl ts -query -in design1.tsq -text -To create a time stamp request which includes the MD-5 digest +To create a timestamp request which includes the MD-5 digest of design2.txt, requests the signer certificate and nonce, specifies a policy id (assuming the tsa_policy1 name is defined in the OID section of the config file): @@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ tsacert.pem is the signing certificate issued by cacert.pem and tsakey.pem is the private key of the TSA. -To create a time stamp response for a request: +To create a timestamp response for a request: openssl ts -reply -queryfile design1.tsq -inkey tsakey.pem \ -signer tsacert.pem -out design1.tsr @@ -577,44 +577,44 @@ openssl ts -reply -queryfile design1.tsq -out design1.tsr -To print a time stamp reply to stdout in human readable format: +To print a timestamp reply to stdout in human readable format: openssl ts -reply -in design1.tsr -text -To create a time stamp token instead of time stamp response: +To create a timestamp token instead of timestamp response: openssl ts -reply -queryfile design1.tsq -out design1_token.der -token_out -To print a time stamp token to stdout in human readable format: +To print a timestamp token to stdout in human readable format: openssl ts -reply -in design1_token.der -token_in -text -token_out -To extract the time stamp token from a response: +To extract the timestamp token from a response: openssl ts -reply -in design1.tsr -out design1_token.der -token_out -To add 'granted' status info to a time stamp token thereby creating a +To add 'granted' status info to a timestamp token thereby creating a valid response: openssl ts -reply -in design1_token.der -token_in -out design1.tsr =head2 Time Stamp Verification -To verify a time stamp reply against a request: +To verify a timestamp reply against a request: openssl ts -verify -queryfile design1.tsq -in design1.tsr \ -CAfile cacert.pem -untrusted tsacert.pem -To verify a time stamp reply that includes the certificate chain: +To verify a timestamp reply that includes the certificate chain: openssl ts -verify -queryfile design2.tsq -in design2.tsr \ -CAfile cacert.pem -To verify a time stamp token against the original data file: +To verify a timestamp token against the original data file: openssl ts -verify -data design2.txt -in design2.tsr \ -CAfile cacert.pem -To verify a time stamp token against a message imprint: +To verify a timestamp token against a message imprint: openssl ts -verify -digest b7e5d3f93198b38379852f2c04e78d73abdd0f4b \ -in design2.tsr -CAfile cacert.pem @@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ =item * -No support for time stamps over SMTP, though it is quite easy +No support for timestamps over SMTP, though it is quite easy to implement an automatic e-mail based TSA with L and L. HTTP server support is provided in the form of a separate apache module. HTTP client support is provided by @@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ The file containing the last serial number of the TSA is not locked when being read or written. This is a problem if more than one -instance of L is trying to create a time stamp +instance of L is trying to create a timestamp response at the same time. This is not an issue when using the apache server module, it does proper locking. @@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/verify.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/verify.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/verify.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/verify.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -98,8 +98,11 @@ =item B<-check_ss_sig> -Verify the signature on the self-signed root CA. This is disabled by default -because it doesn't add any security. +Verify the signature of +the last certificate in a chain if the certificate is supposedly self-signed. +This is prohibited and will result in an error if it is a non-conforming CA +certificate with key usage restrictions not including the keyCertSign bit. +This verification is disabled by default because it doesn't add any security. =item B<-CRLfile file> @@ -333,7 +336,7 @@ =head1 VERIFY OPERATION The B program uses the same functions as the internal SSL and S/MIME -verification, therefore this description applies to these verify operations +verification, therefore, this description applies to these verify operations too. There is one crucial difference between the verify operations performed @@ -379,10 +382,14 @@ For compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL, a certificate with no trust settings is considered to be valid for all purposes. -The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain. The validity -period is checked against the current system time and the notBefore and notAfter -dates in the certificate. The certificate signatures are also checked at this -point. +The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain. +For each element in the chain, including the root CA certificate, +the validity period as specified by the C and C fields +is checked against the current system time. +The B<-attime> flag may be used to use a reference time other than "now." +The certificate signature is checked as well +(except for the signature of the typically self-signed root CA certificate, +which is verified only if the B<-check_ss_sig> option is given). If all operations complete successfully then certificate is considered valid. If any operation fails then the certificate is not valid. @@ -769,7 +776,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/x509.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/x509.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man1/x509.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man1/x509.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ =item B<-checkend arg> Checks if the certificate expires within the next B seconds and exits -non-zero if yes it will expire or zero if not. +nonzero if yes it will expire or zero if not. =item B<-fingerprint> @@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ =item B<-passin arg> The key password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see L. =item B<-clrext> @@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ In general an B or B type can contain an integer of almost arbitrary size and so cannot always be represented by a C -B type. However in many cases (for example version numbers) they +B type. However, in many cases (for example version numbers) they represent small integers which can be more easily manipulated if converted to an appropriate C integer type. @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ASN1_STRING_length.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ASN1_STRING_length.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ASN1_STRING_length.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ASN1_STRING_length.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ is null terminated or does not contain embedded nulls. The actual format of the data will depend on the actual string type itself: for example for an IA5String the data will be ASCII, for a BMPString two bytes per -character in big endian format, and for an UTF8String it will be in UTF8 format. +character in big endian format, and for a UTF8String it will be in UTF8 format. Similar care should be take to ensure the data is in the correct format when calling ASN1_STRING_set(). @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ASN1_TIME_set.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ASN1_TIME_set.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ASN1_TIME_set.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ASN1_TIME_set.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ will be positive. If B represents a time earlier than B then one or both of B<*pday> and B<*psec> will be negative. If B and B represent the same time then B<*pday> and B<*psec> will both be zero. -If both B<*pday> and B<*psec> are non-zero they will always have the same +If both B<*pday> and B<*psec> are nonzero they will always have the same sign. The value of B<*psec> will always be less than the number of seconds in a day. If B or B is NULL the current time is used. @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ =head1 BUGS ASN1_TIME_print(), ASN1_UTCTIME_print() and ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print() -do not print out the time zone: it either prints out "GMT" or nothing. But all +do not print out the timezone: it either prints out "GMT" or nothing. But all certificates complying with RFC5280 et al use GMT anyway. Use the ASN1_TIME_normalize() function to normalize the time value before @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2015-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ASN1_TYPE_get.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ASN1_TYPE_get.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ASN1_TYPE_get.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ASN1_TYPE_get.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ ASN1_TYPE_set1() sets the value of B to B a copy of B. ASN1_TYPE_cmp() compares ASN.1 types B and B and returns 0 if -they are identical and non-zero otherwise. +they are identical and nonzero otherwise. ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence() attempts to parse the SEQUENCE present in B using the ASN.1 structure B. If successful it returns a pointer @@ -62,12 +62,12 @@ ASN1_TYPE_cmp() may not return zero if two types are equivalent but have different encodings. For example the single content octet of the boolean TRUE -value under BER can have any non-zero encoding but ASN1_TYPE_cmp() will +value under BER can have any nonzero encoding but ASN1_TYPE_cmp() will only return zero if the values are the same. If either or both of the parameters passed to ASN1_TYPE_cmp() is NULL the -return value is non-zero. Technically if both parameters are NULL the two -types could be absent OPTIONAL fields and so should match, however passing +return value is nonzero. Technically if both parameters are NULL the two +types could be absent OPTIONAL fields and so should match, however, passing NULL values could also indicate a programming error (for example an unparsable type which returns NULL) for types which do B match. So applications should handle the case of two absent values separately. @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ ASN1_TYPE_set1() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. -ASN1_TYPE_cmp() returns 0 if the types are identical and non-zero otherwise. +ASN1_TYPE_cmp() returns 0 if the types are identical and nonzero otherwise. ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence() returns a pointer to an ASN.1 structure or NULL on failure. diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ASYNC_start_job.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ASYNC_start_job.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ASYNC_start_job.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ASYNC_start_job.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ On Windows platforms the openssl/async.h header is dependent on some of the types customarily made available by including windows.h. The application developer is likely to require control over when the latter -is included, commonly as one of the first included headers. Therefore +is included, commonly as one of the first included headers. Therefore, it is defined as an application developer's responsibility to include windows.h prior to async.h. @@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2015-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ B<*numfds>. It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that sufficient memory has been allocated in B<*fd> to receive all the file descriptors. Calling ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds() with a NULL B value will return no file -descriptors but will still populate B<*numfds>. Therefore application code is +descriptors but will still populate B<*numfds>. Therefore, application code is typically expected to call this function twice: once to get the number of fds, and then again when sufficient memory has been allocated. If only one asynchronous engine is being used then normally this call will only ever return @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ On Windows platforms the openssl/async.h header is dependent on some of the types customarily made available by including windows.h. The application developer is likely to require control over when the latter -is included, commonly as one of the first included headers. Therefore +is included, commonly as one of the first included headers. Therefore, it is defined as an application developer's responsibility to include windows.h prior to async.h. @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BF_encrypt.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BF_encrypt.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BF_encrypt.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BF_encrypt.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ to decrypt. Some programs and protocols simplify this, like SSH, where B is simply initialized to zero. BF_cbc_encrypt() operates on data that is a multiple of 8 bytes long, while -BF_cfb64_encrypt() and BF_ofb64_encrypt() are used to encrypt an variable +BF_cfb64_encrypt() and BF_ofb64_encrypt() are used to encrypt a variable number of bytes (the amount does not have to be an exact multiple of 8). The purpose of the latter two is to simulate stream ciphers, and therefore, they need the parameter B, which is a pointer to an integer where the current @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_ADDRINFO.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_ADDRINFO.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_ADDRINFO.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_ADDRINFO.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ The BIO_lookup_ex() implementation uses the platform provided getaddrinfo() function. On Linux it is known that specifying 0 for the protocol will not -return any SCTP based addresses when calling getaddrinfo(). Therefore if an SCTP +return any SCTP based addresses when calling getaddrinfo(). Therefore, if an SCTP address is required then the B parameter to BIO_lookup_ex() should be explicitly set to IPPROTO_SCTP. The same may be true on other platforms. @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_ADDR.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_ADDR.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_ADDR.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_ADDR.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ BIO_ADDR_clear() clears any data held within the provided B and sets it back to an uninitialised state. -BIO_ADDR_rawmake() takes a protocol B, an byte array of +BIO_ADDR_rawmake() takes a protocol B, a byte array of size B with an address in network byte order pointed at by B and a port number in network byte order in B (except for the B protocol family, where B is meaningless and @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_connect.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_connect.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_connect.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_connect.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ =item BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK -Sets the socket to non-blocking mode. +Sets the socket to nonblocking mode. =item BIO_SOCK_NODELAY @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_ctrl.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_ctrl.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_ctrl.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_ctrl.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ operation usually pass the operation to the next BIO in the chain. This often means there is no need to locate the required BIO for a particular operation, it can be called on a chain and it will -be automatically passed to the relevant BIO. However this can cause +be automatically passed to the relevant BIO. However, this can cause unexpected results: for example no current filter BIOs implement BIO_seek(), but this may still succeed if the chain ends in a FILE or file descriptor BIO. @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_get_data.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_get_data.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_get_data.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_get_data.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ This can be used by custom BIOs for storing implementation specific information. The BIO_set_init() function sets the value of the BIO's "init" flag to indicate -whether initialisation has been completed for this BIO or not. A non-zero value +whether initialisation has been completed for this BIO or not. A nonzero value indicates that initialisation is complete, whilst zero indicates that it is not. Often initialisation will complete during initial construction of the BIO. For some BIOs however, initialisation may not complete until after additional steps @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_parse_hostserv.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_parse_hostserv.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_parse_hostserv.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_parse_hostserv.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_parse_hostserv() will parse the information given in B, -create strings with the host name and service name and give those +create strings with the hostname and service name and give those back via B and B. Those will need to be freed after they are used. B helps determine if B shall -be interpreted primarily as a host name or a service name in ambiguous +be interpreted primarily as a hostname or a service name in ambiguous cases. The syntax the BIO_parse_hostserv() recognises is: @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_read.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_read.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_read.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_read.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ =head1 NOTES A 0 or -1 return is not necessarily an indication of an error. In -particular when the source/sink is non-blocking or of a certain type +particular when the source/sink is nonblocking or of a certain type it may merely be an indication that no data is currently available and that the application should retry the operation later. @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_s_accept.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_s_accept.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_s_accept.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_s_accept.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ connections. This can be resolved by using BIO_pop() (see above) and freeing up the accept BIO after the initial connection. -If the underlying accept socket is non-blocking and BIO_do_accept() is +If the underlying accept socket is nonblocking and BIO_do_accept() is called to await an incoming connection it is possible for BIO_should_io_special() with the reason BIO_RR_ACCEPT. If this happens then it is an indication that an accept attempt would block: the application @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_s_bio.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_s_bio.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_s_bio.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_s_bio.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ ... BIO_new_bio_pair(&internal_bio, 0, &network_bio, 0); SSL_set_bio(ssl, internal_bio, internal_bio); - SSL_operations(); /* e.g SSL_read and SSL_write */ + SSL_operations(); /* e.g. SSL_read and SSL_write */ ... application | TLS-engine @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ ... As the BIO pair will only buffer the data and never directly access the -connection, it behaves non-blocking and will return as soon as the write +connection, it behaves nonblocking and will return as soon as the write buffer is full or the read buffer is drained. Then the application has to flush the write buffer and/or fill the read buffer. @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_s_connect.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_s_connect.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_s_connect.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_s_connect.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ I/O call is caused by an error condition, although a zero return will normally mean that the connection was closed. -If the port name is supplied as part of the host name then this will +If the port name is supplied as part of the hostname then this will override any value set with BIO_set_conn_port(). This may be undesirable if the application does not wish to allow connection to arbitrary ports. This can be avoided by checking for the presence of the ':' @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_set_callback.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_set_callback.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_set_callback.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_set_callback.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_set_callback_ex() and BIO_get_callback_ex() set and retrieve the BIO -callback. The callback is called during most high level BIO operations. It can +callback. The callback is called during most high-level BIO operations. It can be used for debugging purposes to trace operations on a BIO or to modify its operation. @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_s_file.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_s_file.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BIO_s_file.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BIO_s_file.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ On Windows BIO_new_files reserves for the filename argument to be UTF-8 encoded. In other words if you have to make it work in multi- -lingual environment, encode file names in UTF-8. +lingual environment, encode filenames in UTF-8. =head1 RETURN VALUES @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BN_add.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BN_add.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BN_add.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BN_add.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -68,16 +68,16 @@ BN_mod() corresponds to BN_div() with I set to B. -BN_nnmod() reduces I modulo I and places the non-negative +BN_nnmod() reduces I modulo I and places the nonnegative remainder in I. -BN_mod_add() adds I to I modulo I and places the non-negative +BN_mod_add() adds I to I modulo I and places the nonnegative result in I. BN_mod_sub() subtracts I from I modulo I and places the -non-negative result in I. +nonnegative result in I. -BN_mod_mul() multiplies I by I and finds the non-negative +BN_mod_mul() multiplies I by I and finds the nonnegative remainder respective to modulus I (C). I may be the same B as I or I. For more efficient algorithms for repeated computations using the same modulus, see @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BN_bn2bin.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BN_bn2bin.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BN_bn2bin.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BN_bn2bin.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ BN_bn2binpad() also converts the absolute value of B into big-endian form and stores it at B. B indicates the length of the output buffer -B. The result is padded with zeroes if necessary. If B is less than +B. The result is padded with zeros if necessary. If B is less than BN_num_bytes(B) an error is returned. BN_bin2bn() converts the positive integer in big-endian form of length @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BN_generate_prime.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BN_generate_prime.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BN_generate_prime.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BN_generate_prime.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ If B is not B, B is called after the j-th iteration (j = 0, 1, ...). B is a -pre-allocated B (to save the overhead of allocating and +preallocated B (to save the overhead of allocating and freeing the structure in a loop), or B. BN_GENCB_call() calls the callback function held in the B structure diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BN_mod_mul_montgomery.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BN_mod_mul_montgomery.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BN_mod_mul_montgomery.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BN_mod_mul_montgomery.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ BN_from_montgomery() performs the Montgomery reduction I = I*R^-1. BN_to_montgomery() computes Mont(I,R^2), i.e. I*R. -Note that I must be non-negative and smaller than the modulus. +Note that I must be nonnegative and smaller than the modulus. For all functions, I is a previously allocated B used for temporary variables. @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BN_set_bit.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BN_set_bit.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/BN_set_bit.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/BN_set_bit.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -33,15 +33,15 @@ BN_is_bit_set() tests if bit B in B is set. BN_mask_bits() truncates B to an B bit number -(CEn)>). An error occurs if B already is +(CEn)>). An error occurs if B already is shorter than B bits. BN_lshift() shifts B left by B bits and places the result in -B (C). Note that B must be non-negative. BN_lshift1() shifts +B (C). Note that B must be nonnegative. BN_lshift1() shifts B left by one and places the result in B (C). BN_rshift() shifts B right by B bits and places the result in -B (C). Note that B must be non-negative. BN_rshift1() shifts +B (C). Note that B must be nonnegative. BN_rshift1() shifts B right by one and places the result in B (C). For the shift functions, B and B may be the same variable. @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/CMS_verify.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/CMS_verify.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/CMS_verify.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/CMS_verify.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ B is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the verify operation. -CMS_get0_signers() retrieves the signing certificate(s) from B, it must +CMS_get0_signers() retrieves the signing certificate(s) from B, it may only be called after a successful CMS_verify() operation. =head1 VERIFY PROCESS @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ is not considered important. Chain verification should arguably be performed using the signing time rather -than the current time. However since the signing time is supplied by the +than the current time. However, since the signing time is supplied by the signer it cannot be trusted without additional evidence (such as a trusted timestamp). @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2008-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2008-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/CRYPTO_memcmp.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/CRYPTO_memcmp.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/CRYPTO_memcmp.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/CRYPTO_memcmp.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -19,17 +19,17 @@ =head1 RETURN VALUES -CRYPTO_memcmp() returns 0 if the memory regions are equal and non-zero +CRYPTO_memcmp() returns 0 if the memory regions are equal and nonzero otherwise. =head1 NOTES Unlike memcmp(2), this function cannot be used to order the two memory regions -as the return value when they differ is undefined, other than being non-zero. +as the return value when they differ is undefined, other than being nonzero. =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ openssl/crypto.h header are dependent on some of the types customarily made available by including windows.h. The application developer is likely to require control over when the latter is included, commonly as -one of the first included headers. Therefore it is defined as an +one of the first included headers. Therefore, it is defined as an application developer's responsibility to include windows.h prior to crypto.h where use of CRYPTO_THREAD_* types and functions is required. @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/d2i_DHparams.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/d2i_DHparams.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/d2i_DHparams.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/d2i_DHparams.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ #include - DH *d2i_DHparams(DH **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); + DH *d2i_DHparams(DH **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); int i2d_DHparams(DH *a, unsigned char **pp); =head1 DESCRIPTION @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/d2i_X509.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/d2i_X509.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/d2i_X509.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/d2i_X509.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ =for comment generic - TYPE *d2i_TYPE(TYPE **a, unsigned char **ppin, long length); + TYPE *d2i_TYPE(TYPE **a, const unsigned char **ppin, long length); TYPE *d2i_TYPE_bio(BIO *bp, TYPE **a); TYPE *d2i_TYPE_fp(FILE *fp, TYPE **a); @@ -436,8 +436,8 @@ populated B structure -- it B simply be fed with an empty structure such as that returned by TYPE_new(). -The encoded data is in binary form and may contain embedded zeroes. -Therefore any FILE pointers or BIOs should be opened in binary mode. +The encoded data is in binary form and may contain embedded zeros. +Therefore, any FILE pointers or BIOs should be opened in binary mode. Functions such as strlen() will B return the correct length of the encoded structure. @@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ Attempt to decode a buffer: X509 *x; - unsigned char *buf, *p; + unsigned char *buf; + const unsigned char *p; int len; /* Set up buf and len to point to the input buffer. */ @@ -541,7 +542,8 @@ Alternative technique: X509 *x; - unsigned char *buf, *p; + unsigned char *buf; + const unsigned char *p; int len; /* Set up buf and len to point to the input buffer. */ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/DES_random_key.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DES_random_key.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/DES_random_key.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DES_random_key.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ error is returned, the key schedule is not generated. DES_set_key() works like -DES_set_key_checked() if the I flag is non-zero, +DES_set_key_checked() if the I flag is nonzero, otherwise like DES_set_key_unchecked(). These functions are available for compatibility; it is recommended to use a function that does not depend on a global variable. @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ decrypts a single 8-byte I in I (ECB) mode. It always transforms the input data, pointed to by I, into the output data, pointed to by the I argument. -If the I argument is non-zero (DES_ENCRYPT), the I +If the I argument is nonzero (DES_ENCRYPT), the I (cleartext) is encrypted in to the I (ciphertext) using the key_schedule specified by the I argument, previously set via I. If I is zero (DES_DECRYPT), the I (now @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ encryption by using I for the final encryption. DES_ncbc_encrypt() encrypts/decrypts using the I -(CBC) mode of DES. If the I argument is non-zero, the +(CBC) mode of DES. If the I argument is nonzero, the routine cipher-block-chain encrypts the cleartext data pointed to by the I argument into the ciphertext pointed to by the I argument, using the key schedule provided by the I argument, @@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/DH_generate_key.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DH_generate_key.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/DH_generate_key.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DH_generate_key.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ =head1 NAME -DH_generate_key, DH_compute_key - perform Diffie-Hellman key exchange +DH_generate_key, DH_compute_key, DH_compute_key_padded - perform +Diffie-Hellman key exchange =head1 SYNOPSIS @@ -10,14 +11,16 @@ int DH_generate_key(DH *dh); - int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); + int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); + + int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); =head1 DESCRIPTION DH_generate_key() performs the first step of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange by generating private and public DH values. By calling -DH_compute_key(), these are combined with the other party's public -value to compute the shared key. +DH_compute_key() or DH_compute_key_padded(), these are combined with +the other party's public value to compute the shared key. DH_generate_key() expects B to contain the shared parameters Bp> and Bg>. It generates a random private DH value @@ -28,6 +31,14 @@ DH_compute_key() computes the shared secret from the private DH value in B and the other party's public value in B and stores it in B. B must point to B bytes of memory. +The padding style is RFC 5246 (8.1.2) that strips leading zero bytes. +It is not constant time due to the leading zero bytes being stripped. +The return value should be considered public. + +DH_compute_key_padded() is similar but stores a fixed number of bytes. +The padding style is NIST SP 800-56A (C.1) that retains leading zero bytes. +It is constant time due to the leading zero bytes being retained. +The return value should be considered public. =head1 RETURN VALUES @@ -36,15 +47,21 @@ DH_compute_key() returns the size of the shared secret on success, -1 on error. +DH_compute_key_padded() returns B on success, -1 on error. + The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L +=head1 HISTORY + +DH_compute_key_padded() was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2. + =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/DH_get0_pqg.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DH_get0_pqg.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/DH_get0_pqg.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DH_get0_pqg.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ object, or NULL if no such ENGINE has been set. The DH_get_length() and DH_set_length() functions get and set the optional -length parameter associated with this DH object. If the length is non-zero then +length parameter associated with this DH object. If the length is nonzero then it is used, otherwise it is ignored. The B parameter indicates the length of the secret exponent (private key) in bits. @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/DH_set_method.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DH_set_method.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/DH_set_method.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DH_set_method.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ This will replace the DH_METHOD used by the DH key and if the previous method was supplied by an ENGINE, the handle to that ENGINE will be released during the change. It is possible to have DH keys that only work with certain DH_METHOD -implementations (eg. from an ENGINE module that supports embedded +implementations (e.g. from an ENGINE module that supports embedded hardware-protected keys), and in such cases attempting to change the DH_METHOD for the key can have unexpected results. @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ DH_set_default_method() returns no value. -DH_set_method() returns non-zero if the provided B was successfully set as +DH_set_method() returns nonzero if the provided B was successfully set as the method for B (including unloading the ENGINE handle if the previous method was supplied by an ENGINE). @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/DSA_set_method.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DSA_set_method.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/DSA_set_method.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DSA_set_method.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ B. This will replace the DSA_METHOD used by the DSA key and if the previous method was supplied by an ENGINE, the handle to that ENGINE will be released during the change. It is possible to have DSA keys that only -work with certain DSA_METHOD implementations (eg. from an ENGINE module +work with certain DSA_METHOD implementations (e.g. from an ENGINE module that supports embedded hardware-protected keys), and in such cases attempting to change the DSA_METHOD for the key can have unexpected results. See L for information on constructing custom DSA_METHOD @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ DSA_set_default_method() returns no value. -DSA_set_method() returns non-zero if the provided B was successfully set as +DSA_set_method() returns nonzero if the provided B was successfully set as the method for B (including unloading the ENGINE handle if the previous method was supplied by an ENGINE). @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/DTLSv1_listen.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DTLSv1_listen.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/DTLSv1_listen.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/DTLSv1_listen.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ If DTLS is used over UDP (or any datagram based protocol that does not validate the source IP) then it is susceptible to this type of attack. TLSv1.3 is designed to operate over a stream-based transport protocol (such as TCP). -If TCP is being used then there is no need to use SSL_stateless(). However some +If TCP is being used then there is no need to use SSL_stateless(). However, some stream-based transport protocols (e.g. QUIC) may not validate the source address. In this case a TLSv1.3 application would be susceptible to this attack. @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ filled in. A return value of 0 indicates a non-fatal error. This could (for -example) be because of non-blocking IO, or some invalid message having been +example) be because of nonblocking IO, or some invalid message having been received from a peer. Errors may be placed on the OpenSSL error queue with further information if appropriate. Typically user code is expected to retry the call to DTLSv1_listen() in the event of a non-fatal error. @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ECDSA_SIG_new.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ECDSA_SIG_new.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ECDSA_SIG_new.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ECDSA_SIG_new.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ ECDSA_SIG_get0, ECDSA_SIG_get0_r, ECDSA_SIG_get0_s, ECDSA_SIG_set0, ECDSA_SIG_new, ECDSA_SIG_free, ECDSA_size, ECDSA_sign, ECDSA_do_sign, ECDSA_verify, ECDSA_do_verify, ECDSA_sign_setup, ECDSA_sign_ex, -ECDSA_do_sign_ex - low level elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) +ECDSA_do_sign_ex - low-level elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) functions =head1 SYNOPSIS @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -Note: these functions provide a low level interface to ECDSA. Most +Note: these functions provide a low-level interface to ECDSA. Most applications should use the higher level B interface such as L or L instead. @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2004-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2004-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EC_GROUP_new.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EC_GROUP_new.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EC_GROUP_new.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EC_GROUP_new.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ EC_GROUP_set_curve() sets the curve parameters B

, B and B. For a curve over Fp B

is the prime for the field. For a curve over F2^m B

represents the irreducible polynomial - each bit represents a term in the polynomial. -Therefore there will either be three or five bits set dependent on whether the +Therefore, there will either be three or five bits set dependent on whether the polynomial is a trinomial or a pentanomial. In either case, B and B represents the coefficients a and b from the relevant equation introduced above. @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2013-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2013-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EC_KEY_new.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EC_KEY_new.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EC_KEY_new.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EC_KEY_new.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ EC_KEY_get0_group, EC_KEY_set_group, EC_KEY_get0_private_key, EC_KEY_set_private_key, EC_KEY_get0_public_key, EC_KEY_set_public_key, EC_KEY_get_conv_form, -EC_KEY_set_conv_form, EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag, EC_KEY_precompute_mult, +EC_KEY_set_conv_form, EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag, +EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params, EC_KEY_precompute_mult, EC_KEY_generate_key, EC_KEY_check_key, EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates, EC_KEY_oct2key, EC_KEY_key2buf, EC_KEY_oct2priv, EC_KEY_priv2oct, EC_KEY_priv2buf - Functions for creating, destroying and manipulating @@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key); void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *eckey, point_conversion_form_t cform); void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *eckey, int asn1_flag); + int EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(const EC_KEY *key); int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *key); int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *key); @@ -118,11 +120,15 @@ (if set). Refer to L for further information on the asn1_flag. +EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params() returns 1 if the group of the I was +decoded from data with explicitly encoded group parameters, -1 if the I +is NULL or the group parameters are missing, and 0 otherwise. + EC_KEY_precompute_mult() stores multiples of the underlying EC_GROUP generator for faster point multiplication. See also L. EC_KEY_oct2key() and EC_KEY_key2buf() are identical to the functions -EC_POINT_oct2point() and EC_KEY_point2buf() except they use the public key +EC_POINT_oct2point() and EC_POINT_point2buf() except they use the public key EC_POINT in B. EC_KEY_oct2priv() and EC_KEY_priv2oct() convert between the private key @@ -178,7 +184,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2013-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2013-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EC_POINT_new.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EC_POINT_new.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EC_POINT_new.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EC_POINT_new.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ Points can also be described in terms of their compressed co-ordinates. For a point (x, y), for any given value for x such that the point is on the curve -there will only ever be two possible values for y. Therefore a point can be set +there will only ever be two possible values for y. Therefore, a point can be set using the EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates() function where B is the x co-ordinate and B is a value 0 or 1 to identify which of the two possible values for y should be used. @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2013-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2013-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ENGINE_add.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ENGINE_add.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ENGINE_add.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ENGINE_add.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ =head2 Reference counting and handles Due to the modular nature of the ENGINE API, pointers to ENGINEs need to be -treated as handles - ie. not only as pointers, but also as references to +treated as handles - i.e. not only as pointers, but also as references to the underlying ENGINE object. Ie. one should obtain a new reference when making copies of an ENGINE pointer if the copies will be used (and released) independently. @@ -252,15 +252,15 @@ To obtain a functional reference from an existing structural reference, call the ENGINE_init() function. This returns zero if the ENGINE was not -already operational and couldn't be successfully initialised (eg. lack of +already operational and couldn't be successfully initialised (e.g. lack of system drivers, no special hardware attached, etc), otherwise it will -return non-zero to indicate that the ENGINE is now operational and will +return nonzero to indicate that the ENGINE is now operational and will have allocated a new B reference to the ENGINE. All functional references are released by calling ENGINE_finish() (which removes the implicit structural reference as well). The second way to get a functional reference is by asking OpenSSL for a -default implementation for a given task, eg. by ENGINE_get_default_RSA(), +default implementation for a given task, e.g. by ENGINE_get_default_RSA(), ENGINE_get_default_cipher_engine(), etc. These are discussed in the next section, though they are not usually required by application programmers as they are used automatically when creating and using the relevant @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ "algorithm" so all implementations implicitly register using the same 'nid' index. -When a default ENGINE is requested for a given abstraction/algorithm/mode, (eg. +When a default ENGINE is requested for a given abstraction/algorithm/mode, (e.g. when calling RSA_new_method(NULL)), a "get_default" call will be made to the ENGINE subsystem to process the corresponding state table and return a functional reference to an initialised ENGINE whose implementation should be @@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ will want to allow the user to specify exactly which ENGINE they want used if any is to be used at all. Others may prefer to load all support and have OpenSSL automatically use at run-time any ENGINE that is able to -successfully initialise - ie. to assume that this corresponds to +successfully initialise - i.e. to assume that this corresponds to acceleration hardware attached to the machine or some such thing. There are probably numerous other ways in which applications may prefer to handle things, so we will simply illustrate the consequences as they apply to a @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ driver or config files it needs to load, required network addresses, smart-card identifiers, passwords to initialise protected devices, logging information, etc etc. This class of commands typically needs to be -passed to an ENGINE B attempting to initialise it, ie. before +passed to an ENGINE B attempting to initialise it, i.e. before calling ENGINE_init(). The other class of commands consist of settings or operations that tweak certain behaviour or cause certain operations to take place, and these commands may work either before or after ENGINE_init(), or @@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ } Note that ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string() accepts a boolean argument that can -relax the semantics of the function - if set non-zero it will only return +relax the semantics of the function - if set nonzero it will only return failure if the ENGINE supported the given command name but failed while executing it, if the ENGINE doesn't support the command name it will simply return success without doing anything. In this case we assume the user is @@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ and input parameters of the control commands supported by an ENGINE using a structural reference. Note that some control commands are defined by OpenSSL itself and it will intercept and handle these control commands on behalf of the -ENGINE, ie. the ENGINE's ctrl() handler is not used for the control command. +ENGINE, i.e. the ENGINE's ctrl() handler is not used for the control command. openssl/engine.h defines an index, ENGINE_CMD_BASE, that all control commands implemented by ENGINEs should be numbered from. Any command value lower than this symbol is considered a "generic" command is handled directly by the @@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ operations via ENGINE_ctrl(), including passing to and/or from the control commands data of any arbitrary type. These commands are supported in the discovery mechanisms simply to allow applications to determine if an ENGINE -supports certain specific commands it might want to use (eg. application "foo" +supports certain specific commands it might want to use (e.g. application "foo" might query various ENGINEs to see if they implement "FOO_GET_VENDOR_LOGO_GIF" - and ENGINE could therefore decide whether or not to support this "foo"-specific extension). @@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ERR_get_error.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ERR_get_error.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ERR_get_error.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ERR_get_error.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ ERR_get_error_line(), ERR_peek_error_line() and ERR_peek_last_error_line() are the same as the above, but they -additionally store the file name and line number where +additionally store the filename and line number where the error occurred in *B and *B, unless these are B. ERR_get_error_line_data(), ERR_peek_error_line_data() and @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ERR_print_errors.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ERR_print_errors.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/ERR_print_errors.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/ERR_print_errors.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ The error strings will have the following format: - [pid]:error:[error code]:[library name]:[function name]:[reason string]:[file name]:[line]:[optional text message] + [pid]:error:[error code]:[library name]:[function name]:[reason string]:[filename]:[line]:[optional text message] I is an 8 digit hexadecimal number. I, I and I are ASCII text, as is I) takes input of a 512-bit key to achieve AES 256-bit security. +The XTS implementation in OpenSSL does not support streaming. That is there must +only be one L call per L call (and +similarly with the "Decrypt" functions). + +The I parameter to L or L is +the XTS "tweak" value. + =back =head1 RETURN VALUES @@ -176,7 +183,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2017-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_DigestInit.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_DigestInit.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_DigestInit.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_DigestInit.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -The EVP digest routines are a high level interface to message digests, +The EVP digest routines are a high-level interface to message digests, and should be used instead of the cipher-specific functions. =over 4 @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ =head1 NOTES The B interface to message digests should almost always be used in -preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes +preference to the low-level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the digest used and much more flexible. New applications should use the SHA-2 (such as L) or the SHA-3 @@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_DigestSignInit.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_DigestSignInit.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_DigestSignInit.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_DigestSignInit.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -The EVP signature routines are a high level interface to digital signatures. +The EVP signature routines are a high-level interface to digital signatures. EVP_DigestSignInit() sets up signing context B to use digest B from ENGINE B and private key B. B must be created with @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ =head1 NOTES The B interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in -preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes +preference to the low-level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible. EVP_DigestSign() is a one shot operation which signs a single block of data diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -The EVP signature routines are a high level interface to digital signatures. +The EVP signature routines are a high-level interface to digital signatures. EVP_DigestVerifyInit() sets up verification context B to use digest B from ENGINE B and public key B. B must be created @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ =head1 NOTES The B interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in -preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes +preference to the low-level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible. EVP_DigestVerify() is a one shot operation which verifies a single block of @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_EncodeInit.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_EncodeInit.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_EncodeInit.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_EncodeInit.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -The EVP encode routines provide a high level interface to base 64 encoding and +The EVP encode routines provide a high-level interface to base 64 encoding and decoding. Base 64 encoding converts binary data into a printable form that uses the characters A-Z, a-z, 0-9, "+" and "/" to represent the data. For every 3 bytes of binary data provided 4 bytes of base 64 encoded data will be produced @@ -83,8 +83,8 @@ be encoded or decoded that are pending in the B object. EVP_EncodeBlock() encodes a full block of input data in B and of length -B and stores it in B. For every 3 bytes of input provided 4 bytes of -output data will be produced. If B is not divisible by 3 then the block is +B and stores it in B. For every 3 bytes of input provided 4 bytes of +output data will be produced. If B is not divisible by 3 then the block is encoded as a final block of data and the output is padded such that it is always divisible by 4. Additionally a NUL terminator character will be added. For example if 16 bytes of input data is provided then 24 bytes of encoded data is @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_EncryptInit.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_EncryptInit.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_EncryptInit.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_EncryptInit.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -The EVP cipher routines are a high level interface to certain +The EVP cipher routines are a high-level interface to certain symmetric ciphers. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() creates a cipher context. @@ -146,10 +146,15 @@ EVP_EncryptUpdate() encrypts B bytes from the buffer B and writes the encrypted version to B. This function can be called multiple times to encrypt successive blocks of data. The amount -of data written depends on the block alignment of the encrypted data: -as a result the amount of data written may be anything from zero bytes -to (inl + cipher_block_size - 1) so B should contain sufficient -room. The actual number of bytes written is placed in B. It also +of data written depends on the block alignment of the encrypted data. +For most ciphers and modes, the amount of data written can be anything +from zero bytes to (inl + cipher_block_size - 1) bytes. +For wrap cipher modes, the amount of data written can be anything +from zero bytes to (inl + cipher_block_size) bytes. +For stream ciphers, the amount of data written can be anything from zero +bytes to inl bytes. +Thus, B should contain sufficient room for the operation being performed. +The actual number of bytes written is placed in B. It also checks if B and B are partially overlapping, and if they are 0 is returned to indicate failure. @@ -422,8 +427,8 @@ =item EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL) -Sets the CCM nonce (IV) length. This call can only be made before specifying an -nonce value. The nonce length is given by B<15 - L> so it is 7 by default for +Sets the CCM nonce (IV) length. This call can only be made before specifying +a nonce value. The nonce length is given by B<15 - L> so it is 7 by default for AES. =back @@ -463,10 +468,10 @@ =head1 NOTES Where possible the B interface to symmetric ciphers should be used in -preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes +preference to the low-level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the cipher used and much more flexible. Additionally, the B interface will ensure the use of platform specific cryptographic -acceleration such as AES-NI (the low level interfaces do not provide the +acceleration such as AES-NI (the low-level interfaces do not provide the guarantee). PKCS padding works by adding B padding bytes of value B to make the total @@ -591,7 +596,7 @@ /* Don't set key or IV right away; we want to check lengths */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, NULL, NULL, + EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, NULL, NULL, do_encrypt); OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) == 16); OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) == 16); @@ -654,7 +659,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_OpenInit.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_OpenInit.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_OpenInit.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_OpenInit.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -The EVP envelope routines are a high level interface to envelope +The EVP envelope routines are a high-level interface to envelope decryption. They decrypt a public key encrypted symmetric key and then decrypt data using it. @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ The default is 0. The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_pad() macro sets the DH padding mode. If B is -1 the shared secret is padded with zeroes up to the size of the DH prime B

. +1 the shared secret is padded with zeros up to the size of the DH prime B

. If B is zero (the default) then no padding is performed. EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_nid() sets the DH parameters to values corresponding to @@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_new.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ =head1 NOTES The B structure is an opaque public key algorithm context used -by the OpenSSL high level public key API. Contexts B be shared between +by the OpenSSL high-level public key API. Contexts B be shared between threads: that is it is not permissible to use the same context simultaneously in two threads. @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ The function EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info() returns parameters associated with the generation operation. If B is -1 the total number of parameters available is returned. Any non negative value returns the value of -that parameter. EVP_PKEY_CTX_gen_keygen_info() with a non-negative value for +that parameter. EVP_PKEY_CTX_gen_keygen_info() with a nonnegative value for B should only be called within the generation callback. If the callback returns 0 then the key generation operation is aborted and an @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_new.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_new.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_new.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_new.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -66,7 +66,8 @@ EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key() works in the same way as EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key() except it is only for the B algorithm type. In addition to the raw private key data, it also takes a cipher algorithm to be used during -creation of a CMAC in the B argument. +creation of a CMAC in the B argument. The cipher should be a standard +encryption only cipher. For example AEAD and XTS ciphers should not be used. EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key() works in the same way as EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(). New applications should use EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key() instead. diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_SealInit.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_SealInit.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_SealInit.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_SealInit.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -The EVP envelope routines are a high level interface to envelope +The EVP envelope routines are a high-level interface to envelope encryption. They generate a random key and IV (if required) then "envelope" it by using public key encryption. Data can then be encrypted using this key. @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_SignInit.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_SignInit.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_SignInit.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_SignInit.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -The EVP signature routines are a high level interface to digital +The EVP signature routines are a high-level interface to digital signatures. EVP_SignInit_ex() sets up signing context I to use digest @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ =head1 NOTES The B interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in -preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes +preference to the low-level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible. When signing with DSA private keys the random number generator must be seeded. diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_VerifyInit.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_VerifyInit.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/EVP_VerifyInit.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/EVP_VerifyInit.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -The EVP signature verification routines are a high level interface to digital +The EVP signature verification routines are a high-level interface to digital signatures. EVP_VerifyInit_ex() sets up verification context B to use digest @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ =head1 NOTES The B interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in -preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes +preference to the low-level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible. The call to EVP_VerifyFinal() internally finalizes a copy of the digest context. @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/HMAC.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/HMAC.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/HMAC.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/HMAC.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ #include unsigned char *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, - int key_len, const unsigned char *d, int n, + int key_len, const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *md_len); HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void); @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len, const EVP_MD *md, ENGINE *impl); - int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, int len); + int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len); int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx); @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ HMAC_CTX_new() creates a new HMAC_CTX in heap memory. -HMAC_CTX_reset() zeroes an existing B and associated +HMAC_CTX_reset() zeros an existing B and associated resources, making it suitable for new computations as if it was newly created with HMAC_CTX_new(). @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OCSP_cert_to_id.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OCSP_cert_to_id.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OCSP_cert_to_id.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OCSP_cert_to_id.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ OCSP_cert_to_id() and OCSP_cert_id_new() return either a pointer to a valid B structure or B if an error occurred. -OCSP_id_cmp() and OCSP_id_issuer_cmp() returns zero for a match and non-zero +OCSP_id_cmp() and OCSP_id_issuer_cmp() returns zero for a match and nonzero otherwise. OCSP_CERTID_free() does not return a value. @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2015-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OCSP_request_add1_nonce.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OCSP_request_add1_nonce.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OCSP_request_add1_nonce.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OCSP_request_add1_nonce.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ The return values of OCSP_check_nonce() can be checked to cover each case. A positive return value effectively indicates success: nonces are both present -and match, both absent or present in the response only. A non-zero return +and match, both absent or present in the response only. A nonzero return additionally covers the case where the nonce is present in the request only: this will happen if the responder doesn't support nonces. A zero return value indicates present and mismatched nonces: this should be treated as an error diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OCSP_resp_find_status.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OCSP_resp_find_status.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OCSP_resp_find_status.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OCSP_resp_find_status.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ OCSP_check_validity() checks the validity of B and B values which will be typically obtained from OCSP_resp_find_status() or -OCSP_single_get0_status(). If B is non-zero it indicates how many seconds +OCSP_single_get0_status(). If B is nonzero it indicates how many seconds leeway should be allowed in the check. If B is positive it indicates the maximum age of B in seconds. @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ An OCSP response for a certificate contains B and B fields. Normally the current time should be between these two values. To -account for clock skew the B field can be set to non-zero in +account for clock skew the B field can be set to nonzero in OCSP_check_validity(). Some responders do not set the B field, this would otherwise mean an ancient response would be considered valid: the B parameter to OCSP_check_validity() can be used to limit the permitted @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OCSP_sendreq_new.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OCSP_sendreq_new.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OCSP_sendreq_new.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OCSP_sendreq_new.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -2,9 +2,15 @@ =head1 NAME -OCSP_sendreq_new, OCSP_sendreq_nbio, OCSP_REQ_CTX_free, -OCSP_set_max_response_length, OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header, -OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req, OCSP_sendreq_bio - OCSP responder query functions +OCSP_sendreq_new, +OCSP_sendreq_nbio, +OCSP_REQ_CTX_free, +OCSP_set_max_response_length, +OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header, +OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req, +OCSP_sendreq_bio, +OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d +- OCSP responder query functions =head1 SYNOPSIS @@ -26,6 +32,9 @@ OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_sendreq_bio(BIO *io, const char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req); + int OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, const char *content_type, + const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_VALUE *req); + =head1 DESCRIPTION The function OCSP_sendreq_new() returns an B structure using the @@ -34,7 +43,7 @@ default value of 4k is used. The OCSP request B may be set to B and provided later if required. -OCSP_sendreq_nbio() performs non-blocking I/O on the OCSP request context +OCSP_sendreq_nbio() performs nonblocking I/O on the OCSP request context B. When the operation is complete it returns the response in B<*presp>. OCSP_REQ_CTX_free() frees up the OCSP context B. @@ -51,6 +60,15 @@ OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req() sets the OCSP request in B to B. This function should be called after any calls to OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(). +OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(rctx, req) is equivalent to the following: + + OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d(rctx, "application/ocsp-request", + ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_REQUEST), (ASN1_VALUE *)req) + +OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d() sets the request context B to have the request +B, which has the ASN.1 type B. +The B, if not NULL, will be included in the HTTP request. +The function should be called after all other headers have already been added. OCSP_sendreq_bio() performs an OCSP request using the responder B, the URL path B, and the OCSP request B with a response header maximum line @@ -64,8 +82,8 @@ OCSP_sendreq_nbio() returns B<1> if the operation was completed successfully, B<-1> if the operation should be retried and B<0> if an error occurred. -OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header() and OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req() return B<1> for success -and B<0> for failure. +OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(), OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(), and OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d() +return B<1> for success and B<0> for failure. OCSP_sendreq_bio() returns the B structure sent by the responder or B if an error occurred. @@ -96,7 +114,7 @@ write) should be retried and appropriate action taken (for example a select() call on the underlying socket). -OCSP_sendreq_bio() does not support retries and so cannot handle non-blocking +OCSP_sendreq_bio() does not support retries and so cannot handle nonblocking I/O efficiently. It is retained for compatibility and its use in new applications is not recommended. diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OPENSSL_config.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OPENSSL_config.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OPENSSL_config.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OPENSSL_config.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ There are several reasons why calling the OpenSSL configuration routines is advisable. For example, to load dynamic ENGINEs from shared libraries (DSOs). -However very few applications currently support the control interface and so +However, very few applications currently support the control interface and so very few can load and use dynamic ENGINEs. Equally in future more sophisticated ENGINEs will require certain control operations to customize them. If an application calls OPENSSL_config() it doesn't need to know or care about @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2004-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2004-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ =item bit #64+19 denoting availability of ADCX and ADOX instructions; =item bit #64+21 denoting availability of VPMADD52[LH]UQ instructions, -a.k.a. AVX512IFMA extension; +aka AVX512IFMA extension; =item bit #64+29 denoting availability of SHA extension; @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2004-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2004-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OPENSSL_init_crypto.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OPENSSL_init_crypto.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OPENSSL_init_crypto.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OPENSSL_init_crypto.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -39,13 +39,13 @@ automatically deinitialise as required. However, there may be situations when explicit initialisation is desirable or -needed, for example when some non-default initialisation is required. The +needed, for example when some nondefault initialisation is required. The function OPENSSL_init_crypto() can be used for this purpose for libcrypto (see also L for the libssl equivalent). Numerous internal OpenSSL functions call OPENSSL_init_crypto(). -Therefore, in order to perform non-default initialisation, +Therefore, in order to perform nondefault initialisation, OPENSSL_init_crypto() MUST be called by application code prior to any other OpenSSL function calls. @@ -216,10 +216,10 @@ non-null B object. The object can be allocated via B. The B function can be used to specify a -non-default filename, which is copied and need not refer to persistent storage. +nondefault filename, which is copied and need not refer to persistent storage. Similarly, OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname() can be used to specify a -non-default application name. -Finally, OPENSSL_INIT_set_file_flags can be used to specify non-default flags. +nondefault application name. +Finally, OPENSSL_INIT_set_file_flags can be used to specify nondefault flags. If the B flag is not included, any errors in the configuration file will cause an error return from B or indirectly L. @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OPENSSL_init_ssl.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OPENSSL_init_ssl.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OPENSSL_init_ssl.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OPENSSL_init_ssl.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -23,14 +23,14 @@ automatically deinitialise as required. However, there may be situations when explicit initialisation is desirable or -needed, for example when some non-default initialisation is required. The +needed, for example when some nondefault initialisation is required. The function OPENSSL_init_ssl() can be used for this purpose. Calling this function will explicitly initialise BOTH libcrypto and libssl. To explicitly initialise ONLY libcrypto see the L function. Numerous internal OpenSSL functions call OPENSSL_init_ssl(). -Therefore, in order to perform non-default initialisation, +Therefore, in order to perform nondefault initialisation, OPENSSL_init_ssl() MUST be called by application code prior to any other OpenSSL function calls. @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ normally truncated to a power of 2, so make sure that your hash function returns well mixed low order bits. The B callback takes two arguments (pointers to two hash table entries), and returns -0 if their keys are equal, non-zero otherwise. +0 if their keys are equal, nonzero otherwise. If your hash table will contain items of some particular type and the B and @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ As an example, a hash table may be maintained by code that, for reasons of encapsulation, has only "const" access to the data being -indexed in the hash table (ie. it is returned as "const" from +indexed in the hash table (i.e. it is returned as "const" from elsewhere in their code) - in this case the LHASH prototypes are appropriate as-is. Conversely, if the caller is responsible for the life-time of the data in question, then they may well wish to make @@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OPENSSL_malloc.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OPENSSL_malloc.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OPENSSL_malloc.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OPENSSL_malloc.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ OPENSSL_cleanse() fills B of size B with a string of 0's. Use OPENSSL_cleanse() with care if the memory is a mapping of a file. -If the storage controller uses write compression, then its possible +If the storage controller uses write compression, then it's possible that sensitive tail bytes will survive zeroization because the block of zeros will be compressed. If the storage controller uses wear leveling, then the old sensitive data will not be overwritten; rather, a block of diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_open.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_open.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_open.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/OSSL_STORE_open.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -46,21 +46,22 @@ =head2 Functions -OSSL_STORE_open() takes a uri or path B, password UI method -B with associated data B, and post processing -callback B with associated data B, +OSSL_STORE_open() takes a uri or path I, password UI method +I with associated data I, and post processing +callback I with associated data I, opens a channel to the data located at that URI and returns a B with all necessary internal information. -The given B and B will be reused by all -functions that use B when interaction is needed. -The given B and B will be reused by +The given I and I will be reused by all +functions that use B when interaction is needed, +for instance to provide a password. +The given I and I will be reused by OSSL_STORE_load() to manipulate or drop the value to be returned. -The B function drops values by returning B, which +The I function drops values by returning NULL, which will cause OSSL_STORE_load() to start its process over with loading -the next object, until B returns something other than -B, or the end of data is reached as indicated by OSSL_STORE_eof(). +the next object, until I returns something other than +NULL, or the end of data is reached as indicated by OSSL_STORE_eof(). -OSSL_STORE_ctrl() takes a B, and command number B and +OSSL_STORE_ctrl() takes a B, and command number I and more arguments not specified here. The available loader specific command numbers and arguments they each take depends on the loader that's used and is documented together with @@ -94,6 +95,7 @@ OSSL_STORE_close() takes a B, closes the channel that was opened by OSSL_STORE_open() and frees all other information that was stored in the B, as well as the B itself. +If I is NULL it does nothing. =head1 SUPPORTED SCHEMES @@ -123,12 +125,12 @@ =head1 RETURN VALUES OSSL_STORE_open() returns a pointer to a B on success, or -B on failure. +NULL on failure. OSSL_STORE_load() returns a pointer to a B on success, or -B on error or when end of data is reached. +NULL on error or when end of data is reached. Use OSSL_STORE_error() and OSSL_STORE_eof() to determine the meaning of a -returned B. +returned NULL. OSSL_STORE_eof() returns 1 if the end of data has been reached, otherwise 0. @@ -149,9 +151,12 @@ OSSL_STORE_ctrl(), OSSL_STORE_load(), OSSL_STORE_eof() and OSSL_STORE_close() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1. +Handling of NULL I argument for OSSL_STORE_close() +was introduced in OpenSSL 1.1.1h. + =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ structure. The B functions also process an RSA public key using -an RSA structure. However the public key is encoded using a +an RSA structure. However, the public key is encoded using a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure and an error occurs if the public key is not RSA. @@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ =head1 BUGS The PEM read routines in some versions of OpenSSL will not correctly reuse -an existing structure. Therefore the following: +an existing structure. Therefore, the following: PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, &x, 0, NULL); @@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/PKCS7_verify.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/PKCS7_verify.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/PKCS7_verify.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/PKCS7_verify.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ is not considered important. Chain verification should arguably be performed using the signing time rather -than the current time. However since the signing time is supplied by the +than the current time. However, since the signing time is supplied by the signer it cannot be trusted without additional evidence (such as a trusted timestamp). @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RAND_add.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RAND_add.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RAND_add.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RAND_add.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ descriptors by default, which allows such sources to operate in a chroot(2) jail without the associated device nodes being available. When the B argument is zero, this call disables the retention of file -descriptors. Conversely, a non-zero argument enables the retention of +descriptors. Conversely, a nonzero argument enables the retention of file descriptors. This function is usually called during initialization and it takes effect immediately. @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RAND_DRBG_new.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RAND_DRBG_new.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RAND_DRBG_new.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RAND_DRBG_new.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ The optional B argument specifies a set of bit flags which can be joined using the | operator. Currently, the only flag is -RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF, which disables the use of a the derivation function +RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF, which disables the use of the derivation function ctr_df. For an explanation, see [NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1]. If a B instance is specified then this will be used instead of @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2017-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ it must also indicate an error by returning a buffer length of 0. See NOTES section for more details. -The B() callback is called from the B to to clear and +The B() callback is called from the B to clear and free the buffer allocated previously by get_entropy(). The values B and B are the random buffer's address and length, as returned by the get_entropy() callback. @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2017-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RAND_load_file.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RAND_load_file.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RAND_load_file.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RAND_load_file.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION RAND_load_file() reads a number of bytes from file B and -adds them to the PRNG. If B is non-negative, +adds them to the PRNG. If B is nonnegative, up to B are read; if B is -1, the complete file is read. Do not load the same file multiple times unless its contents have @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ filename. On all systems, if the environment variable B is set, its -value will be used as the seed file name. +value will be used as the seed filename. Otherwise, the file is called C<.rnd>, found in platform dependent locations: =over 4 @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ =back If C<$HOME> (on non-Windows and non-VMS system) is not set either, or -B is too small for the path name, an error occurs. +B is too small for the pathname, an error occurs. =head1 RETURN VALUES @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RAND_set_rand_method.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RAND_set_rand_method.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RAND_set_rand_method.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RAND_set_rand_method.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -33,10 +33,10 @@ =head1 THE RAND_METHOD STRUCTURE typedef struct rand_meth_st { - void (*seed)(const void *buf, int num); + int (*seed)(const void *buf, int num); int (*bytes)(unsigned char *buf, int num); void (*cleanup)(void); - void (*add)(const void *buf, int num, int randomness); + int (*add)(const void *buf, int num, double entropy); int (*pseudorand)(unsigned char *buf, int num); int (*status)(void); } RAND_METHOD; @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RSA_blinding_on.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RSA_blinding_on.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RSA_blinding_on.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RSA_blinding_on.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ must be used to protect the RSA operation from that attack. RSA_blinding_on() turns blinding on for key B and generates a -random blinding factor. B is B or a pre-allocated and +random blinding factor. B is B or a preallocated and initialized B. RSA_blinding_off() turns blinding off and frees the memory used for @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RSA_private_encrypt.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RSA_private_encrypt.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RSA_private_encrypt.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RSA_private_encrypt.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME -RSA_private_encrypt, RSA_public_decrypt - low level signature operations +RSA_private_encrypt, RSA_public_decrypt - low-level signature operations =head1 SYNOPSIS @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -These functions handle RSA signatures at a low level. +These functions handle RSA signatures at a low-level. RSA_private_encrypt() signs the B bytes at B (usually a message digest with an algorithm identifier) using the private key @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RSA_set_method.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RSA_set_method.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/RSA_set_method.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/RSA_set_method.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ B. This will replace the RSA_METHOD used by the RSA key and if the previous method was supplied by an ENGINE, the handle to that ENGINE will be released during the change. It is possible to have RSA keys that only -work with certain RSA_METHOD implementations (eg. from an ENGINE module +work with certain RSA_METHOD implementations (e.g. from an ENGINE module that supports embedded hardware-protected keys), and in such cases attempting to change the RSA_METHOD for the key can have unexpected results. @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SHA256_Init.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SHA256_Init.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SHA256_Init.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SHA256_Init.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -75,9 +75,6 @@ SHA224(), SHA256(), SHA384() and SHA512() functions are not thread safe if B is NULL. -The predecessor of SHA-1, SHA, is also implemented, but it should be -used only when backward compatibility is required. - =head1 RETURN VALUES SHA1(), SHA224(), SHA256(), SHA384() and SHA512() return a pointer to the hash @@ -98,7 +95,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_accept.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_accept.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_accept.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_accept.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -23,14 +23,14 @@ If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_accept() will only return once the handshake has been finished or an error occurred. -If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_accept() will also return +If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_accept() will also return when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_accept() to continue the handshake, indicating the problem by the return value -1. In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the return value of SSL_accept() will yield B or B. The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_accept(). -The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, +The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a nonblocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. The shutdown was not clean. It can also occur if action is needed to continue the operation -for non-blocking BIOs. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B +for nonblocking BIOs. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B to find out the reason. =back diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_alloc_buffers.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_alloc_buffers.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_alloc_buffers.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_alloc_buffers.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ After freeing the buffers, the buffers are automatically reallocated upon a new read or write. The SSL_alloc_buffers() does not need to be called, but -can be used to make sure the buffers are pre-allocated. This can be used to +can be used to make sure the buffers are preallocated. This can be used to avoid allocation during data processing or with CRYPTO_set_mem_functions() to control where and how buffers are allocated. @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2017-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ The B argument is a colon separated list of groups. The group can be either the B name (e.g. B), some other commonly used name where -applicable (e.g. B) or an OpenSSL OID name (e.g B). Group +applicable (e.g. B) or an OpenSSL OID name (e.g. B). Group names are case sensitive. The list should be in order of preference with the most preferred group first. @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ The B argument is a curve name or the special value B which picks an appropriate curve based on client and server preferences. The curve can be either the B name (e.g. B) or an OpenSSL OID name -(e.g B). Curve names are case sensitive. +(e.g. B). Curve names are case sensitive. =item B<-cipher> @@ -147,13 +147,16 @@ =item B<-min_protocol>, B<-max_protocol> Sets the minimum and maximum supported protocol. -Currently supported protocol values are B, B, -B, B, B for TLS and B, B for DTLS, -and B for no limit. -If either bound is not specified then only the other bound applies, -if specified. -To restrict the supported protocol versions use these commands rather -than the deprecated alternative commands below. +Currently supported protocol values are B, B, B, +B, B for TLS; B, B for DTLS, and B +for no limit. +If either the lower or upper bound is not specified then only the other bound +applies, if specified. +If your application supports both TLS and DTLS you can specify any of these +options twice, once with a bound for TLS and again with an appropriate bound +for DTLS. +To restrict the supported protocol versions use these commands rather than the +deprecated alternative commands below. =item B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2>, B<-no_tls1_3> @@ -356,7 +359,7 @@ The B argument is a colon separated list of groups. The group can be either the B name (e.g. B), some other commonly used name where -applicable (e.g. B) or an OpenSSL OID name (e.g B). Group +applicable (e.g. B) or an OpenSSL OID name (e.g. B). Group names are case sensitive. The list should be in order of preference with the most preferred group first. @@ -370,7 +373,11 @@ Currently supported protocol values are B, B, B, B, B, B and B. -The value B will disable the limit. +The SSL and TLS bounds apply only to TLS-based contexts, while the DTLS bounds +apply only to DTLS-based contexts. +The command can be repeated with one instance setting a TLS bound, and the +other setting a DTLS bound. +The value B applies to both types of contexts and disables the limits. =item B @@ -378,7 +385,11 @@ Currently supported protocol values are B, B, B, B, B, B and B. -The value B will disable the limit. +The SSL and TLS bounds apply only to TLS-based contexts, while the DTLS bounds +apply only to DTLS-based contexts. +The command can be repeated with one instance setting a TLS bound, and the +other setting a DTLS bound. +The value B applies to both types of contexts and disables the limits. =item B @@ -537,7 +548,7 @@ =item B -The value is a file name. +The value is a filename. =item B @@ -683,7 +694,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2012-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2012-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_connect.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_connect.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_connect.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_connect.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -23,14 +23,14 @@ If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_connect() will only return once the handshake has been finished or an error occurred. -If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_connect() will also return +If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_connect() will also return when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_connect() to continue the handshake, indicating the problem by the return value -1. In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the return value of SSL_connect() will yield B or B. The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_connect(). -The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, +The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a nonblocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred either at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. The shutdown was not clean. It can also occur if action is needed to continue the operation -for non-blocking BIOs. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B +for nonblocking BIOs. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B to find out the reason. =back diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ matched the peer certificate chain. The return value indicates the match depth or failure to match just as with SSL_get0_dane_authority(). -When the return value is non-negative, the storage pointed to by the B, +When the return value is nonnegative, the storage pointed to by the B, B, B and B parameters is updated to the corresponding TLSA record fields. The B field is in binary wire form, and is therefore not NUL-terminated, @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ optional DANE verification features. SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags() and SSL_dane_clear_flags() can be used to disable the same features. -The B argument is a bitmask of the features to enable or disable. +The B argument is a bit mask of the features to enable or disable. The B set for an B context are copied to each B handle associated with that context at the time the handle is created. Subsequent changes in the context's B have no effect on the B set @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ The functions SSL_get0_dane_authority() and SSL_get0_dane_tlsa() return a negative value when DANE authentication failed or was not enabled, a -non-negative value indicates the chain depth at which the TLSA record matched a +nonnegative value indicates the chain depth at which the TLSA record matched a chain certificate, or the depth of the top-most certificate, when the TLSA record is a full public key that is its signer. @@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ =head1 NOTES The protocol-lists must be in wire-format, which is defined as a vector of -non-empty, 8-bit length-prefixed, byte strings. The length-prefix byte is not +nonempty, 8-bit length-prefixed, byte strings. The length-prefix byte is not included in the length. Each string is limited to 255 bytes. A byte-string length of 0 is invalid. A truncated byte-string is invalid. The length of the vector is not in the vector itself, but in a separate variable. @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ /* * Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our * prefix is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects - * anyway, eg. the server could only possibly create 1 session - * ID (ie. the prefix!) so all future session negotiations will + * anyway, e.g. the server could only possibly create 1 session + * ID (i.e. the prefix!) so all future session negotiations will * fail due to conflicts. */ memcpy(id, session_id_prefix, strlen(session_id_prefix) < *id_len ? @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ If an alert is handled, SSL_CB_ALERT is set and B specifies the alert information. -B is a bitmask made up of the following bits: +B is a bit mask made up of the following bits: =over 4 @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ Callback has been called to indicate exit of a handshake function. This will happen after the end of a handshake, but may happen at other times too such as -on error or when IO might otherwise block and non-blocking is being used. +on error or when IO might otherwise block and nonblocking is being used. =item SSL_CB_READ @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ chain is set. The default value for the maximum certificate chain size is 100kB (30kB -on the 16bit DOS platform). This should be sufficient for usual certificate +on the 16-bit DOS platform). This should be sufficient for usual certificate chains (OpenSSL's default maximum chain length is 10, see L, and certificates without special extensions have a typical size of 1-2kB). @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -18,13 +18,13 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -SSL_CTX_set_mode() adds the mode set via bitmask in B to B. +SSL_CTX_set_mode() adds the mode set via bit mask in B to B. Options already set before are not cleared. -SSL_CTX_clear_mode() removes the mode set via bitmask in B from B. +SSL_CTX_clear_mode() removes the mode set via bit mask in B from B. -SSL_set_mode() adds the mode set via bitmask in B to B. +SSL_set_mode() adds the mode set via bit mask in B to B. Options already set before are not cleared. -SSL_clear_mode() removes the mode set via bitmask in B from B. +SSL_clear_mode() removes the mode set via bit mask in B from B. SSL_CTX_get_mode() returns the mode set for B. @@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ Make it possible to retry SSL_write_ex() or SSL_write() with changed buffer location (the buffer contents must stay the same). This is not the default to -avoid the misconception that non-blocking SSL_write() behaves like -non-blocking write(). +avoid the misconception that nonblocking SSL_write() behaves like +nonblocking write(). =item SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY @@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ B causes it to try to process the next record instead of returning. -In a non-blocking environment applications must be prepared to handle +In a nonblocking environment applications must be prepared to handle incomplete read/write operations. -Setting B for a non-blocking B will process +Setting B for a nonblocking B will process non-application data records until either no more data is available or an application data record has been processed. @@ -121,10 +121,10 @@ =head1 RETURN VALUES -SSL_CTX_set_mode() and SSL_set_mode() return the new mode bitmask +SSL_CTX_set_mode() and SSL_set_mode() return the new mode bit mask after adding B. -SSL_CTX_get_mode() and SSL_get_mode() return the current bitmask. +SSL_CTX_get_mode() and SSL_get_mode() return the current bit mask. =head1 SEE ALSO @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -23,16 +23,16 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -SSL_CTX_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B to B. +SSL_CTX_set_options() adds the options set via bit mask in B to B. Options already set before are not cleared! -SSL_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B to B. +SSL_set_options() adds the options set via bit mask in B to B. Options already set before are not cleared! -SSL_CTX_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in B +SSL_CTX_clear_options() clears the options set via bit mask in B to B. -SSL_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in B to B. +SSL_clear_options() clears the options set via bit mask in B to B. SSL_CTX_get_options() returns the options set for B. @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ =head1 NOTES The behaviour of the SSL library can be changed by setting several options. -The options are coded as bitmasks and can be combined by a bitwise B +The options are coded as bit masks and can be combined by a bitwise B operation (|). SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() affect the (external) @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ information needs to be cached locally. The TLSv1.3 protocol only supports tickets and does not directly support session -ids. However OpenSSL allows two modes of ticket operation in TLSv1.3: stateful +ids. However, OpenSSL allows two modes of ticket operation in TLSv1.3: stateful and stateless. Stateless tickets work the same way as in TLSv1.2 and below. Stateful tickets mimic the session id behaviour available in TLSv1.2 and below. The session information is cached on the server and the session id is wrapped up @@ -340,13 +340,13 @@ =head1 RETURN VALUES -SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() return the new options bitmask +SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() return the new options bit mask after adding B. -SSL_CTX_clear_options() and SSL_clear_options() return the new options bitmask +SSL_CTX_clear_options() and SSL_clear_options() return the new options bit mask after clearing B. -SSL_CTX_get_options() and SSL_get_options() return the current bitmask. +SSL_CTX_get_options() and SSL_get_options() return the current bit mask. SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() returns 1 is the peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 if it does not. @@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -123,7 +123,9 @@ check to see if a callback has been set via SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback() or SSL_set_psk_client_callback() and use that. In this case the B value will always be NULL and the handshake digest will default to SHA-256 for any returned -PSK. +PSK. TLSv1.3 early data exchanges are possible in PSK connections only with the +B callback, and are not possible with the +B callback. =head1 NOTES @@ -133,7 +135,7 @@ has occurred so that L will return true. There are no known security issues with sharing the same PSK between TLSv1.2 (or -below) and TLSv1.3. However the RFC has this note of caution: +below) and TLSv1.3. However, the RFC has this note of caution: "While there is no known way in which the same PSK might produce related output in both versions, only limited analysis has been done. Implementations can @@ -166,7 +168,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead() and SSL_set_read_ahead() set whether we should read as -many input bytes as possible (for non-blocking reads) or not. For example if +many input bytes as possible (for nonblocking reads) or not. For example if B bytes are currently required by OpenSSL, but B bytes are available from the underlying BIO (where B > B), then OpenSSL will read all B bytes into its buffer (providing that the buffer is large enough) if reading ahead is @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2015-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -114,12 +114,6 @@ =head1 NOTES -B at this time setting the security level higher than 1 for -general internet use is likely to cause B interoperability -issues and is not recommended. This is because the B algorithm -is very widely used in certificates and will be rejected at levels -higher than 1 because it only offers 80 bits of security. - The default security level can be configured when OpenSSL is compiled by setting B<-DOPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL=level>. If not set then 1 is used. @@ -180,7 +174,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2014-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2014-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ prevent sessions being stored in the internal cache (though the application can add them manually using L). Note: in any SSL/TLS servers where external caching is configured, any successful -session lookups in the external cache (ie. for session-resume requests) would +session lookups in the external cache (i.e. for session-resume requests) would normally be copied into the local cache before processing continues - this flag prevents these additions to the internal cache as well. @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Sessions are generated within a certain context. When exporting/importing sessions with B/B it would be possible, to re-import a session generated from another context (e.g. another -application), which might lead to malfunctions. Therefore each application +application), which might lead to malfunctions. Therefore, each application must set its own session id context B which is used to distinguish the contexts and is stored in exported sessions. The B can be any kind of binary data with a given length, it is therefore possible @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ The handshake should be aborted, either because of an error or because of some policy. Note that in TLSv1.3 a client may send more than one ticket in a single -handshake. Therefore just because one ticket is unacceptable it does not mean +handshake. Therefore, just because one ticket is unacceptable it does not mean that all of them are. For this reason this option should be used with caution. =item SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE @@ -177,12 +177,12 @@ =head1 HISTORY -The SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb(), SSSL_SESSION_set1_ticket_appdata() +The SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb(), SSL_SESSION_set1_ticket_appdata() and SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_appdata() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1. =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2017-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ In order to benefit from the pipelining capability. You need to have an engine that provides ciphers that support this. The OpenSSL "dasync" engine provides -AES128-SHA based ciphers that have this capability. However these are for +AES128-SHA based ciphers that have this capability. However, these are for development and test purposes only. SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment() and SSL_set_max_send_fragment() set the @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ =item SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING If this value is returned then the servername is not accepted by the server. -However the handshake will continue and send a warning alert instead. The value +However, the handshake will continue and send a warning alert instead. The value of the alert should be stored in the location pointed to by the B parameter as for SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL above. Note that TLSv1.3 does not support warning alerts, so if TLSv1.3 has been negotiated then this return value is @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ =item On the client, during or after the handshake and a TLSv1.2 (or below) resumption occurred -If the session from the orignal handshake had a servername accepted by the +If the session from the original handshake had a servername accepted by the server then it will return that servername. Otherwise it returns the servername set via SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() or NULL @@ -157,12 +157,12 @@ Prior to 1.1.1e, when the client requested a servername in an initial TLSv1.2 handshake, the server accepted it, and then the client successfully resumed but -set a different explict servername in the second handshake then when called by +set a different explicit servername in the second handshake then when called by the client it returned the servername from the second handshake. This has now been changed to return the servername requested in the original handshake. Also prior to 1.1.1e, if the client sent a servername in the first handshake but -the server did not accept it, and then a second handshake occured where TLSv1.2 +the server did not accept it, and then a second handshake occurred where TLSv1.2 resumption was successful then when called by the server it returned the servername requested in the original handshake. This has now been changed to NULL. diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -136,6 +136,8 @@ unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) { + your_type_t *key; /* something that you need to implement */ + if (enc) { /* create new session */ if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) <= 0) return -1; /* insufficient random */ @@ -154,21 +156,22 @@ } memcpy(key_name, key->name, 16); - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key->aes_key, iv); - HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, key->hmac_key, 16, EVP_sha256(), NULL); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, key->aes_key, iv); + HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, key->hmac_key, 32, EVP_sha256(), NULL); return 1; } else { /* retrieve session */ - key = findkey(name); + time_t t = time(NULL); + key = findkey(key_name); /* something that you need to implement */ - if (key == NULL || key->expire < now()) + if (key == NULL || key->expire < t) return 0; - HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, key->hmac_key, 16, EVP_sha256(), NULL); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key->aes_key, iv); + HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, key->hmac_key, 32, EVP_sha256(), NULL); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, key->aes_key, iv); - if (key->expire < now() - RENEW_TIME) { + if (key->expire < t - RENEW_TIME) { /* RENEW_TIME: implement */ /* * return 2 - This session will get a new ticket even though the * current one is still valid. @@ -190,7 +193,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2014-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2014-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -83,7 +83,9 @@ and it will use that in preference. If no such callback is present then it will check to see if a callback has been set via SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback() or SSL_set_psk_server_callback() and use that. In this case the handshake digest -will default to SHA-256 for any returned PSK. +will default to SHA-256 for any returned PSK. TLSv1.3 early data exchanges are +possible in PSK connections only with the B +callback, and are not possible with the B callback. =head1 NOTES @@ -126,7 +128,7 @@ =head1 NOTES There are no known security issues with sharing the same PSK between TLSv1.2 (or -below) and TLSv1.3. However the RFC has this note of caution: +below) and TLSv1.3. However, the RFC has this note of caution: "While there is no known way in which the same PSK might produce related output in both versions, only limited analysis has been done. Implementations can @@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_do_handshake.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_do_handshake.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_do_handshake.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_do_handshake.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_do_handshake() will only return once the handshake has been finished or an error occurred. -If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_do_handshake() will also return +If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_do_handshake() will also return when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_do_handshake() to continue the handshake. In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the return value of SSL_do_handshake() will yield B or B. The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_do_handshake(). -The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, +The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a nonblocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. The shutdown was not clean. It can also occur if action is needed to continue the operation -for non-blocking BIOs. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B +for nonblocking BIOs. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B to find out the reason. =back diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_get_all_async_fds.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_get_all_async_fds.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_get_all_async_fds.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_get_all_async_fds.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ from the file descriptor). This function should only be called if the SSL object is currently waiting for asynchronous work to complete (i.e. SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC has been received - see L). Typically the -list will only contain one file descriptor. However if multiple asynchronous +list will only contain one file descriptor. However, if multiple asynchronous capable engines are in use then more than one is possible. The number of file descriptors returned is stored in B<*numfds> and the file descriptors themselves are in B<*fds>. The B parameter may be NULL in which case no file @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ On Windows platforms the openssl/async.h header is dependent on some of the types customarily made available by including windows.h. The application developer is likely to require control over when the latter -is included, commonly as one of the first included headers. Therefore +is included, commonly as one of the first included headers. Therefore, it is defined as an application developer's responsibility to include windows.h prior to async.h. @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_get_error.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_get_error.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_get_error.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_get_error.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ The operation did not complete and can be retried later. B is returned when the last operation was a read -operation from a non-blocking B. +operation from a nonblocking B. It means that not enough data was available at this time to complete the operation. If at a later time the underlying B has data available for reading the same @@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ See L for more information. B is returned when the last operation was a write -to a non-blocking B and it was unable to sent all data to the B. -When the B is writeable again, the same function can be called again. +to a nonblocking B and it was unable to sent all data to the B. +When the B is writable again, the same function can be called again. Note that the retry may again lead to an B or B condition. @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ It is safe to call SSL_read() or SSL_read_ex() when more data is available even when the call that set this error was an SSL_write() or SSL_write_ex(). -However if the call was an SSL_write() or SSL_write_ex(), it should be called +However, if the call was an SSL_write() or SSL_write_ex(), it should be called again to continue sending the application data. For socket Bs (e.g. when SSL_set_fd() was used), select() or diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_new.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_new.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_new.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_new.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -26,10 +26,75 @@ SSL_up_ref() increments the reference count for an existing B structure. -SSL_dup() duplicates an existing B structure into a new allocated one. All -settings are inherited from the original B structure. Dynamic data (i.e. -existing connection details) are not copied, the new B is set into an -initial accept (server) or connect (client) state. +The function SSL_dup() creates and returns a new B structure from the same +B that was used to create I. It additionally duplicates a subset of +the settings in I into the new B object. + +For SSL_dup() to work, the connection MUST be in its initial state and +MUST NOT have yet started the SSL handshake. For connections that are not in +their initial state SSL_dup() just increments an internal +reference count and returns the I handle. It may be possible to +use L to recycle an SSL handle that is not in its initial +state for re-use, but this is best avoided. Instead, save and restore +the session, if desired, and construct a fresh handle for each connection. + +The subset of settings in I that are duplicated are: + +=over 4 + +=item any session data if configured (including the session_id_context) + +=item any tmp_dh settings set via L, +L, or L + +=item any configured certificates, private keys or certificate chains + +=item any configured signature algorithms, or client signature algorithms + +=item any DANE settings + +=item any Options set via L + +=item any Mode set via L + +=item any minimum or maximum protocol settings set via +L or L (Note: Only +from OpenSSL 1.1.1h and above) + +=item any Verify mode, callback or depth set via L or +L or any configured X509 verification parameters + +=item any msg callback or info callback set via L or +L + +=item any default password callback set via L + +=item any session id generation callback set via L + +=item any configured Cipher List + +=item initial accept (server) or connect (client) state + +=item the max cert list value set via L + +=item the read_ahead value set via L + +=item application specific data set via L + +=item any CA list or client CA list set via L, +SSL_set0_client_CA_list() or similar functions + +=item any security level settings or callbacks + +=item any configured serverinfo data + +=item any configured PSK identity hint + +=item any configured custom extensions + +=item any client certificate types configured via SSL_set1_client_certificate_types + +=back =head1 RETURN VALUES @@ -59,7 +124,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_pending.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_pending.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_pending.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_pending.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ DTLS and pipelining (see L). These additional bytes will be buffered by OpenSSL but will remain unprocessed until they are needed. As these bytes are still in an unprocessed state SSL_pending() -will ignore them. Therefore it is possible for no more bytes to be readable from +will ignore them. Therefore, it is possible for no more bytes to be readable from the underlying BIO (because OpenSSL has already read them) and for SSL_pending() to return 0, even though readable application data bytes are available (because the data is in unprocessed buffered records). @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_read_early_data.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_read_early_data.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_read_early_data.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_read_early_data.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -58,10 +58,11 @@ These functions are used to send and receive early data where TLSv1.3 has been negotiated. Early data can be sent by the client immediately after its initial ClientHello without having to wait for the server to complete the handshake. -Early data can only be sent if a session has previously been established with -the server, and the server is known to support it. Additionally these functions -can be used to send data from the server to the client when the client has not -yet completed the authentication stage of the handshake. +Early data can be sent if a session has previously been established with the +server or when establishing a new session using an out-of-band PSK, and only +when the server is known to support it. Additionally these functions can be used +to send data from the server to the client when the client has not yet completed +the authentication stage of the handshake. Early data has weaker security properties than other data sent over an SSL/TLS connection. In particular the data does not have forward secrecy. There are also @@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ server application will either use both of SSL_read_early_data() and SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data() (or SSL_set_max_early_data()), or neither of them, since there is no practical benefit from using only one of them. If the maximum -early data setting for a server is non-zero then replay protection is +early data setting for a server is nonzero then replay protection is automatically enabled (see L below). If the server rejects the early data sent by a client then it will skip over @@ -220,7 +221,7 @@ server. If a client sends more data than this then the connection will abort. The configured value for max_early_data on a server may change over time as -required. However clients may have tickets containing the previously configured +required. However, clients may have tickets containing the previously configured max_early_data value. The recv_max_early_data should always be equal to or higher than any recently configured max_early_data value in order to avoid aborted connections. The recv_max_early_data should never be set to less than @@ -285,7 +286,7 @@ When early data is in use the TLS protocol provides no security guarantees that the same early data was not replayed across multiple connections. As a mitigation for this issue OpenSSL automatically enables replay protection if the -server is configured with a non-zero max early data value. With replay +server is configured with a nonzero max early data value. With replay protection enabled sessions are forced to be single use only. If a client attempts to reuse a session ticket more than once, then the second and subsequent attempts will fall back to a full handshake (and any early data that @@ -316,7 +317,7 @@ the possibility of replay attacks. The OpenSSL replay protection does not apply to external Pre Shared Keys (PSKs) -(e.g. see SSL_CTX_set_psk_find_session_callback(3)). Therefore extreme caution +(e.g. see SSL_CTX_set_psk_find_session_callback(3)). Therefore, extreme caution should be applied when combining external PSKs with early data. Some applications may mitigate the replay risks in other ways. For those @@ -364,7 +365,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2017-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_read.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_read.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_read.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_read.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ The read functions work based on the SSL/TLS records. The data are received in records (with a maximum record size of 16kB). Only when a record has been completely received, can it be processed (decryption and check of integrity). -Therefore data that was not retrieved at the last read call can still be +Therefore, data that was not retrieved at the last read call can still be buffered inside the SSL layer and will be retrieved on the next read call. If B is higher than the number of bytes buffered then the read functions will return with the bytes buffered. If no more bytes are in the @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Note that if B is set and only non-application data is available the call will hang. -If the underlying BIO is B, a read function will also return when +If the underlying BIO is B, a read function will also return when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of the function to continue the operation. In this case a call to L with the @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of the read function. The action depends on the underlying BIO. -When using a non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be +When using a nonblocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_set1_host.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_set1_host.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_set1_host.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_set1_host.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ These functions configure server hostname checks in the SSL client. SSL_set1_host() sets the expected DNS hostname to B clearing -any previously specified host name or names. If B is NULL, +any previously specified hostname or names. If B is NULL, or the empty string the list of hostnames is cleared, and name -checks are not performed on the peer certificate. When a non-empty +checks are not performed on the peer certificate. When a nonempty B is specified, certificate verification automatically checks the peer hostname via L with B as specified via SSL_set_hostflags(). Clients that enable DANE TLSA authentication @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_set_bio.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_set_bio.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_set_bio.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_set_bio.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ SSL_set0_rbio() connects the BIO B for the read operations of the B object. The SSL engine inherits the behaviour of B. If the BIO is -non-blocking then the B object will also have non-blocking behaviour. This +nonblocking then the B object will also have nonblocking behaviour. This function transfers ownership of B to B. It will be automatically freed using L when the B is freed. On calling this function, any existing B that was previously set will also be freed via a @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ SSL_set0_wbio() works in the same as SSL_set0_rbio() except that it connects the BIO B for the write operations of the B object. Note that if the rbio and wbio are the same then SSL_set0_rbio() and SSL_set0_wbio() each take -ownership of one reference. Therefore it may be necessary to increment the +ownership of one reference. Therefore, it may be necessary to increment the number of references available using L before calling the set0 functions. @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_set_fd.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_set_fd.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_set_fd.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_set_fd.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ When performing the operation, a B is automatically created to interface between the B and B. The BIO and hence the SSL engine -inherit the behaviour of B. If B is non-blocking, the B will -also have non-blocking behaviour. +inherit the behaviour of B. If B is nonblocking, the B will +also have nonblocking behaviour. If there was already a BIO connected to B, BIO_free() will be called (for both the reading and writing side, if different). @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_set_shutdown.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_set_shutdown.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_set_shutdown.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_set_shutdown.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ =head1 NOTES -The shutdown state of an ssl connection is a bitmask of: +The shutdown state of an ssl connection is a bit mask of: =over 4 @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_shutdown.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_shutdown.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_shutdown.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_shutdown.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -95,13 +95,13 @@ If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_shutdown() will only return once the handshake step has been finished or an error occurred. -If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_shutdown() will also return +If the underlying BIO is B, SSL_shutdown() will also return when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_shutdown() to continue the handshake. In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the return value of SSL_shutdown() will yield B or B. The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_shutdown(). -The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, +The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a nonblocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. @@ -116,6 +116,16 @@ see L. When "quiet shutdown" is enabled, SSL_shutdown() will always succeed and return 1. +Note that this is not standard compliant behaviour. +It should only be done when the peer has a way to make sure all +data has been received and doesn't wait for the close_notify alert +message, otherwise an unexpected EOF will be reported. + +There are implementations that do not send the required close_notify alert. +If there is a need to communicate with such an implementation, and it's clear +that all data has been received, do not wait for the peer's close_notify alert. +Waiting for the close_notify alert when the peer just closes the connection will +result in an error being generated. =head1 RETURN VALUES @@ -128,8 +138,10 @@ The shutdown is not yet finished: the close_notify was sent but the peer did not send it back yet. Call SSL_read() to do a bidirectional shutdown. -The output of L may be misleading, as an -erroneous SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL may be flagged even though no error occurred. + +Unlike most other function, returning 0 does not indicate an error. +L should not get called, it may misleadingly +indicate an error even though no error occurred. =item Z<>1 @@ -140,7 +152,7 @@ The shutdown was not successful. Call L with the return value B to find out the reason. -It can occur if an action is needed to continue the operation for non-blocking +It can occur if an action is needed to continue the operation for nonblocking BIOs. It can also occur when not all data was read using SSL_read(). @@ -157,7 +169,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_state_string.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_state_string.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_state_string.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_state_string.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ or when a connection has been established. It however can be of significant interest during the handshake. -When using non-blocking sockets, the function call performing the handshake +When using nonblocking sockets, the function call performing the handshake may return with SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ or SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE condition, so that SSL_state_string[_long]() may be called. -For both blocking or non-blocking sockets, the details state information +For both blocking or nonblocking sockets, the details state information can be used within the info_callback function set with the SSL_set_info_callback() call. @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_want.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_want.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_want.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_want.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Unlike L, which also evaluates the error queue, the results are obtained by examining an internal state flag only. The information must therefore only be used for normal operation under -non-blocking I/O. Error conditions are not handled and must be treated +nonblocking I/O. Error conditions are not handled and must be treated using L. The result returned by SSL_want() should always be consistent with @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2001-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_write.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_write.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/SSL_write.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/SSL_write.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ If the underlying BIO is B, the write functions will only return, once the write operation has been finished or an error occurred. -If the underlying BIO is B the write functions will also return +If the underlying BIO is B the write functions will also return when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of the function to continue the operation. In this case a call to L with the return value of the write function will yield B @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ call to a write function can also cause read operations! The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of the write function. The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a -non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check +nonblocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/UI_create_method.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/UI_create_method.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/UI_create_method.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/UI_create_method.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -A method contains a few functions that implement the low level of the +A method contains a few functions that implement the low-level of the User Interface. These functions are: @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/UI_new.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/UI_new.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/UI_new.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/UI_new.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ a prompt from two pieces of information: an description and a name. The default constructor (if there is none provided by the method used) creates a string "Enter I for I:". With the -description "pass phrase" and the file name "foo.key", that becomes +description "pass phrase" and the filename "foo.key", that becomes "Enter pass phrase for foo.key:". Other methods may create whatever string and may include encodings that will be processed by the other method functions. @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/UI_UTIL_read_pw.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/UI_UTIL_read_pw.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/UI_UTIL_read_pw.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/UI_UTIL_read_pw.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ prompt, and stores it in B. The maximum allowed size is given with B, including the terminating NUL byte. -If B is non-zero, the password will be verified as well. +If B is nonzero, the password will be verified as well. UI_UTIL_read_pw() does the same as UI_UTIL_read_pw_string(), the difference is that you can give it an external buffer B for the @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_ALGOR_dup.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_ALGOR_dup.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_ALGOR_dup.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_ALGOR_dup.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME -X509_ALGOR_dup, X509_ALGOR_set0, X509_ALGOR_get0, X509_ALGOR_set_md, X509_ALGOR_cmp - AlgorithmIdentifier functions +X509_ALGOR_dup, X509_ALGOR_set0, X509_ALGOR_get0, X509_ALGOR_set_md, X509_ALGOR_cmp, X509_ALGOR_copy - AlgorithmIdentifier functions =head1 SYNOPSIS @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ const void **ppval, const X509_ALGOR *alg); void X509_ALGOR_set_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, const EVP_MD *md); int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b); + int X509_ALGOR_copy(X509_ALGOR *dest, const X509_ALGOR *src); =head1 DESCRIPTION @@ -34,23 +35,30 @@ values for the message digest B. X509_ALGOR_cmp() compares B and B and returns 0 if they have identical -encodings and non-zero otherwise. +encodings and nonzero otherwise. + +X509_ALGOR_copy() copies the source values into the dest structs; making +a duplicate of each (and free any thing pointed to from within *dest). =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_ALGOR_dup() returns a valid B structure or NULL if an error occurred. -X509_ALGOR_set0() returns 1 on success or 0 on error. +X509_ALGOR_set0() and X509_ALGOR_copy() return 1 on success or 0 on error. X509_ALGOR_get0() and X509_ALGOR_set_md() return no values. X509_ALGOR_cmp() returns 0 if the two parameters have identical encodings and -non-zero otherwise. +nonzero otherwise. + +=head1 HISTORY + +The X509_ALGOR_copy() was added in 1.1.1e. =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_check_ca.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_check_ca.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_check_ca.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_check_ca.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ B, and 5 if it has outdated Netscape Certificate Type extension telling that it is CA certificate. -Actually, any non-zero value means that this certificate could have been +Actually, any nonzero value means that this certificate could have been used to sign other certificates. =head1 SEE ALSO @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_check_host.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_check_host.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_check_host.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_check_host.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION The certificate matching functions are used to check whether a -certificate matches a given host name, email address, or IP address. +certificate matches a given hostname, email address, or IP address. The validity of the certificate and its trust level has to be checked by other means. X509_check_host() checks if the certificate Subject Alternative -Name (SAN) or Subject CommonName (CN) matches the specified host -name, which must be encoded in the preferred name syntax described +Name (SAN) or Subject CommonName (CN) matches the specified hostname, +which must be encoded in the preferred name syntax described in section 3.5 of RFC 1034. By default, wildcards are supported and they match only in the left-most label; but they may match part of that label with an explicit prefix or suffix. For example, @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ domain names must be given in A-label form. The B argument must be the number of characters in the name string or zero in which case the length is calculated with strlen(B). When B starts -with a dot (e.g ".example.com"), it will be matched by a certificate +with a dot (e.g. ".example.com"), it will be matched by a certificate valid for any sub-domain of B, (see also B below). @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2012-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2012-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_check_issued.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_check_issued.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_check_issued.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_check_issued.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME -X509_check_issued - checks if certificate is issued by another +X509_check_issued - checks if certificate is apparently issued by another certificate =head1 SYNOPSIS @@ -14,13 +14,14 @@ =head1 DESCRIPTION -This function checks if certificate I was issued using CA -certificate I. This function takes into account not only -matching of issuer field of I with subject field of I, -but also compares B extension of I with -B of I if B -present in the I certificate and checks B field of -I. +X509_check_issued() checks if certificate I was apparently issued +using (CA) certificate I. This function takes into account not only +matching of the issuer field of I with the subject field of I, +but also compares all sub-fields of the B extension of +I, as far as present, with the respective B, +serial number, and issuer fields of I, as far as present. It also checks +if the B field (if present) of I allows certificate signing. +It does not check the certificate signature. =head1 RETURN VALUES @@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_check_purpose.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_check_purpose.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_check_purpose.pod 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_check_purpose.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +X509_check_purpose - Check the purpose of a certificate + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include + + int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This function checks if certificate I was created with the purpose +represented by I. If I is nonzero, then certificate I is +checked to determine if it's a possible CA with various levels of certainty +possibly returned. + +Below are the potential ID's that can be checked: + + # define X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT 1 + # define X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER 2 + # define X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER 3 + # define X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN 4 + # define X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT 5 + # define X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN 6 + # define X509_PURPOSE_ANY 7 + # define X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER 8 + # define X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN 9 + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +For non-CA checks + +=over 4 + +=item -1 an error condition has occurred + +=item E<32>1 if the certificate was created to perform the purpose represented by I + +=item E<32>0 if the certificate was not created to perform the purpose represented by I + +=back + +For CA checks the below integers could be returned with the following meanings: + +=over 4 + +=item -1 an error condition has occurred + +=item E<32>0 not a CA or does not have the purpose represented by I + +=item E<32>1 is a CA. + +=item E<32>2 Only possible in old versions of openSSL when basicConstraints are absent. + New versions will not return this value. May be a CA + +=item E<32>3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1. + +=item E<32>4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted. + +=item E<32>5 legacy Netscape specific CA Flags present + +=back + +=head1 COPYRIGHT + +Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use this +file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file +LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. + +=cut diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_get0_signature.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_get0_signature.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_get0_signature.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_get0_signature.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -2,10 +2,10 @@ =head1 NAME -X509_get0_signature, X509_get_signature_nid, X509_get0_tbs_sigalg, -X509_REQ_get0_signature, X509_REQ_get_signature_nid, X509_CRL_get0_signature, -X509_CRL_get_signature_nid, X509_get_signature_info, X509_SIG_INFO_get, -X509_SIG_INFO_set - signature information +X509_get0_signature, X509_REQ_set0_signature, X509_REQ_set1_signature_algo, +X509_get_signature_nid, X509_get0_tbs_sigalg, X509_REQ_get0_signature, +X509_REQ_get_signature_nid, X509_CRL_get0_signature, X509_CRL_get_signature_nid, +X509_get_signature_info, X509_SIG_INFO_get, X509_SIG_INFO_set - signature information =head1 SYNOPSIS @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg, const X509 *x); + void X509_REQ_set0_signature(X509_REQ *req, ASN1_BIT_STRING *psig); + int X509_REQ_set1_signature_algo(X509_REQ *req, X509_ALGOR *palg); int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x); const X509_ALGOR *X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(const X509 *x); @@ -41,6 +43,9 @@ to the signature algorithm of B. The values returned are internal pointers which B be freed up after the call. +X509_set0_signature() and X509_REQ_set1_signature_algo() are the +equivalent setters for the two values of X509_get0_signature(). + X509_get0_tbs_sigalg() returns the signature algorithm in the signed portion of B. @@ -88,6 +93,10 @@ returned is valid or 0 if the information is not available (e.g. unknown algorithms or malformed parameters). +X509_REQ_set1_signature_algo() returns 0 on success; or 1 on an +error (e.g. null ALGO pointer). X509_REQ_set0_signature does +not return an error value. + =head1 SEE ALSO L, @@ -118,9 +127,12 @@ X509_CRL_get0_signature() and X509_CRL_get_signature_nid() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. +The X509_REQ_set0_signature() and X509_REQ_set1_signature_algo() +were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1e. + =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_get_extension_flags.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_get_extension_flags.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_get_extension_flags.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_get_extension_flags.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -78,12 +78,17 @@ =item B -Some certificate extension values are invalid or inconsistent. The -certificate should be rejected. +Some certificate extension values are invalid or inconsistent. +The certificate should be rejected. This bit may also be raised after an out-of-memory error while processing the X509 object, so it may not be related to the processed ASN1 object itself. +=item B + +Failed to compute the internal SHA1 hash value of the certificate. +This may be due to malloc failure or because no SHA1 implementation was found. + =item B The NID_certificate_policies certificate extension is invalid or @@ -194,7 +199,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2015-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ the directory. The directory should contain one certificate or CRL per file in PEM format, -with a file name of the form I.I for a certificate, or +with a filename of the form I.I for a certificate, or I.BI for a CRL. The I is the value returned by the L function applied to the subject name for certificates or issuer name for CRLs. @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_LOOKUP_meth_new.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_LOOKUP_meth_new.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_LOOKUP_meth_new.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_LOOKUP_meth_new.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ using X509_STORE_add_cert() or X509_STORE_add_crl(). This increments its reference count. However, the X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject() function also increases the reference count which leads to one too -many references being held. Therefore applications should +many references being held. Therefore, applications should additionally call X509_free() or X509_CRL_free() to decrement the reference count again. diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ checks. X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth() returns the B of the error. This is a -non-negative integer representing where in the certificate chain the error +nonnegative integer representing where in the certificate chain the error occurred. If it is zero it occurred in the end entity certificate, one if it is the certificate which signed the end entity certificate and so on. @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_get_error() returns B or an error code. -X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth() returns a non-negative error depth. +X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth() returns a nonnegative error depth. X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert() returns the certificate which caused the error or B if no certificate is relevant to the error. @@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2009-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2009-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_new() returns a newly initialised B structure. X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() internally cleans up an B structure. -The context can then be reused with an new call to X509_STORE_CTX_init(). +The context can then be reused with a new call to X509_STORE_CTX_init(). X509_STORE_CTX_free() completely frees up B. After this call B is no longer valid. @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ by B to be B. Ownership of the chain is transferred to B and should not be free'd by the caller. -X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain() returns a the internal pointer used by the +X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain() returns the internal pointer used by the B that contains the validated chain. X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() sets a set of CRLs to use to aid certificate @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ =head1 RETURN VALUES -X509_STORE_CTX_new() returns an newly allocates context or B is an +X509_STORE_CTX_new() returns a newly allocated context or B if an error occurred. X509_STORE_CTX_init() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred. @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2009-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2009-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ verification, either by overriding error conditions or logging errors for debugging purposes. -However a verification callback is B essential and the default operation +However, a verification callback is B essential and the default operation is often sufficient. The B parameter to the callback indicates the value the callback should @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2009-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2009-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ function will be used instead.> X509_STORE_set_check_issued() sets the function to check that a given -certificate B is issued with the issuer certificate B. +certificate B is issued by the issuer certificate B. This function must return 0 on failure (among others if B hasn't been issued with B) and 1 on success. I parameter is usually B. +occurrences is an error. Therefore, the B parameter is usually B. The B parameter may be one of the following values. @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509v3_get_ext_by_NID.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509v3_get_ext_by_NID.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509v3_get_ext_by_NID.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509v3_get_ext_by_NID.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ X509v3_get_ext_by_critical() is similar to X509v3_get_ext_by_NID() except it looks for an extension of criticality B. A zero value for B -looks for a non-critical extension a non-zero value looks for a critical +looks for a non-critical extension a nonzero value looks for a critical extension. X509v3_delete_ext() deletes the extension with index B from B. The @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ shorter than 1024 bits. X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() sets the expected DNS hostname to -B clearing any previously specified host name or names. If +B clearing any previously specified hostname or names. If B is NULL, or empty the list of hostnames is cleared, and name checks are not performed on the peer certificate. If B is NUL-terminated, B may be zero, otherwise B @@ -264,12 +264,15 @@ If B is set delta CRLs (if present) are used to determine certificate status. If not set deltas are ignored. -B enables checking of the root CA self signed -certificate signature. By default this check is disabled because it doesn't +B requests checking the signature of +the last certificate in a chain if the certificate is supposedly self-signed. +This is prohibited and will result in an error if it is a non-conforming CA +certificate with key usage restrictions not including the keyCertSign bit. +By default this check is disabled because it doesn't add any additional security but in some cases applications might want to -check the signature anyway. A side effect of not checking the root CA -signature is that disabled or unsupported message digests on the root CA -are not treated as fatal errors. +check the signature anyway. A side effect of not checking the self-signature +of such a certificate is that disabled or unsupported message digests used for +the signature are not treated as fatal errors. When B is set, construction of the certificate chain in L will search the trust store for issuer certificates @@ -376,7 +379,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2009-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2009-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man5/config.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man5/config.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man5/config.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man5/config.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -262,13 +262,11 @@ ssl_conf = ssl_sect [ssl_sect] - system_default = system_default_sect [system_default_sect] - MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 - + MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 =head1 NOTES @@ -355,8 +353,8 @@ Note: in the above example you will get an error in non FIPS capable versions of OpenSSL. -Simple OpenSSL library configuration to make TLS 1.3 the system-default -minimum TLS version: +Simple OpenSSL library configuration to make TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 the +system-default minimum TLS and DTLS versions, respectively: # Toplevel section for openssl (including libssl) openssl_conf = default_conf_section @@ -369,7 +367,12 @@ system_default = system_default_section [system_default_section] - MinProtocol = TLSv1.3 + MinProtocol = TLSv1.2 + MinProtocol = DTLSv1.2 + +The minimum TLS protocol is applied to B objects that are TLS-based, +and the minimum DTLS protocol to those are DTLS-based. +The same applies also to maximum versions set with B. More complex OpenSSL library configuration. Add OID and don't enter FIPS mode: @@ -432,7 +435,7 @@ The escaping isn't quite right: if you want to use sequences like B<\n> you can't use any quote escaping on the same line. -Files are loaded in a single pass. This means that an variable expansion +Files are loaded in a single pass. This means that a variable expansion will only work if the variables referenced are defined earlier in the file. diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man5/x509v3_config.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man5/x509v3_config.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man5/x509v3_config.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man5/x509v3_config.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ This is a multi valued extension which indicates whether a certificate is a CA certificate. The first (mandatory) name is B followed by B or -B. If B is B then an optional B name followed by an -non-negative value can be included. +B. If B is B then an optional B name followed by a +nonnegative value can be included. For example: @@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2004-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2004-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man7/evp.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/evp.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man7/evp.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/evp.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Symmetric encryption is available with the LI|EVP_EncryptInit(3)> functions. The LI|EVP_DigestInit(3)> functions provide message digests. -The BI functions provide a high level interface to +The BI functions provide a high-level interface to asymmetric algorithms. To create a new EVP_PKEY see L. EVP_PKEYs can be associated with a private key of a particular algorithm by using the functions @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ =item For signing and verifying see L, L and L. However, note that -these functions do not perform a digest of the data to be signed. Therefore +these functions do not perform a digest of the data to be signed. Therefore, normally you would use the L functions for this purpose. @@ -72,12 +72,12 @@ implementations automatically in preference to built in software implementations. For more information, consult the engine(3) man page. -Although low level algorithm specific functions exist for many algorithms +Although low-level algorithm specific functions exist for many algorithms their use is discouraged. They cannot be used with an ENGINE and ENGINE -versions of new algorithms cannot be accessed using the low level functions. +versions of new algorithms cannot be accessed using the low-level functions. Also makes code harder to adapt to new algorithms and some options are not -cleanly supported at the low level and some operations are more efficient -using the high level interface. +cleanly supported at the low-level and some operations are more efficient +using the high-level interface. =head1 SEE ALSO @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man7/ossl_store.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/ossl_store.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man7/ossl_store.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/ossl_store.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ =head2 General A STORE is a layer of functionality to retrieve a number of supported -objects from a repository of any kind, addressable as a file name or +objects from a repository of any kind, addressable as a filename or as a URI. The functionality supports the pattern "open a channel to the @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man7/SM2.pod openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/SM2.pod --- openssl-1.1.1f/doc/man7/SM2.pod 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/doc/man7/SM2.pod 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(pctx, id, id_len); When calling the EVP_DigestSignInit() or EVP_DigestVerifyInit() functions, a -pre-allocated B should be assigned to the B. This is +preallocated B should be assigned to the B. This is done by calling: EVP_MD_CTX_set_pkey_ctx(mctx, pctx); @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2018-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/e_os.h openssl-1.1.1j/e_os.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/e_os.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/e_os.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) # define strcasecmp _stricmp # define strncasecmp _strnicmp -# if (_MSC_VER >= 1310) +# if (_MSC_VER >= 1310) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) # define open _open # define fdopen _fdopen # define close _close diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/fuzz/asn1.c openssl-1.1.1j/fuzz/asn1.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/fuzz/asn1.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/fuzz/asn1.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/fuzz/x509.c openssl-1.1.1j/fuzz/x509.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/fuzz/x509.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/fuzz/x509.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ X509_print(bio, x509); BIO_free(bio); + X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(x509); + i2d_X509(x509, &der); OPENSSL_free(der); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/asn1err.h openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/asn1err.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/asn1err.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/asn1err.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -11,9 +11,7 @@ #ifndef HEADER_ASN1ERR_H # define HEADER_ASN1ERR_H -# ifndef HEADER_SYMHACKS_H -# include -# endif +# include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" @@ -53,6 +51,7 @@ # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP 191 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I 120 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_NEW 121 +# define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D 144 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_FLAGS_I2D 118 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO 192 # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP 193 @@ -145,6 +144,7 @@ # define ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR 204 # define ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR 100 # define ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER 102 +# define ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE 230 # define ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 214 # define ASN1_R_BN_LIB 105 # define ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 106 diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/bn.h openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/bn.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/bn.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/bn.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ * avoid leaking exponent information through timing, * BN_mod_exp_mont() will call BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime, * BN_div() will call BN_div_no_branch, - * BN_mod_inverse() will call BN_mod_inverse_no_branch. + * BN_mod_inverse() will call bn_mod_inverse_no_branch. */ # define BN_FLG_CONSTTIME 0x04 # define BN_FLG_SECURE 0x08 diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/ecerr.h openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/ecerr.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/ecerr.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/ecerr.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ # define EC_R_LADDER_POST_FAILURE 136 # define EC_R_LADDER_PRE_FAILURE 153 # define EC_R_LADDER_STEP_FAILURE 162 +# define EC_R_MISSING_OID 167 # define EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS 124 # define EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY 125 # define EC_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES 157 diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/ec.h openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/ec.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/ec.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/ec.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -829,6 +829,8 @@ void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags); +int EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(const EC_KEY *key); + /** Creates a new EC_KEY object using a named curve as underlying * EC_GROUP object. * \param nid NID of the named curve. diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/e_os2.h openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/e_os2.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/e_os2.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/e_os2.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ defined(__osf__) || defined(__sgi) || defined(__hpux) || \ defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined (__OpenBSD__) # include -# elif defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER<=1500 +# elif defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER<1600 /* * minimally required typdefs for systems not supporting inttypes.h or * stdint.h: currently just older VC++ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/evperr.h openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/evperr.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/evperr.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/evperr.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT - * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -11,9 +11,7 @@ #ifndef HEADER_EVPERR_H # define HEADER_EVPERR_H -# ifndef HEADER_SYMHACKS_H -# include -# endif +# include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" @@ -179,6 +177,7 @@ # define EVP_R_ONLY_ONESHOT_SUPPORTED 177 # define EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE 150 # define EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED 151 +# define EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW 184 # define EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING 162 # define EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR 181 # define EVP_R_PKEY_APPLICATION_ASN1_METHOD_ALREADY_REGISTERED 179 diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/obj_mac.h openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/obj_mac.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/obj_mac.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/obj_mac.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/objects/objects.pl * - * Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/opensslconf.h.in openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/opensslconf.h.in --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/opensslconf.h.in 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/opensslconf.h.in 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * {- join("\n * ", @autowarntext) -} * - * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -77,6 +77,11 @@ # undef DECLARE_DEPRECATED # define DECLARE_DEPRECATED(f) f __attribute__ ((deprecated)); # endif +# elif defined(__SUNPRO_C) +# if (__SUNPRO_C >= 0x5130) +# undef DECLARE_DEPRECATED +# define DECLARE_DEPRECATED(f) f __attribute__ ((deprecated)); +# endif # endif #endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/opensslv.h openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/opensslv.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/opensslv.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/opensslv.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for * major minor fix final patch/beta) */ -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1010106fL -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.1.1f 31 Mar 2020" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x101010afL +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.1.1j 16 Feb 2021" /*- * The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...) diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/pemerr.h openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/pemerr.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/pemerr.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/pemerr.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ # define PEM_F_PEM_SIGNFINAL 112 # define PEM_F_PEM_WRITE 113 # define PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO 114 +# define PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO_PRIVATEKEY_TRADITIONAL 147 # define PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_PRIVATEKEY 139 # define PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ 115 # define PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO 116 @@ -99,5 +100,6 @@ # define PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 113 # define PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION 114 # define PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS 126 +# define PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE 110 #endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/ssl3.h openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/ssl3.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/ssl3.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/ssl3.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -292,6 +292,9 @@ # define TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS 0x0800 +/* Set if extended master secret extension required on renegotiation */ +# define TLS1_FLAGS_REQUIRED_EXTMS 0x1000 + # define SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST 0 # define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO 1 # define SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO 2 diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/ssl.h openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/ssl.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/ssl.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/ssl.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * @@ -1393,7 +1393,7 @@ # define SSL_get1_groups(s, glist) \ SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_GET_GROUPS,0,(int*)(glist)) # define SSL_CTX_set1_groups(ctx, glist, glistlen) \ - SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_GROUPS,glistlen,(char *)(glist)) + SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_GROUPS,glistlen,(int *)(glist)) # define SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx, s) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_GROUPS_LIST,0,(char *)(s)) # define SSL_set1_groups(s, glist, glistlen) \ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/x509err.h openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/x509err.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/x509err.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/x509err.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -11,9 +11,7 @@ #ifndef HEADER_X509ERR_H # define HEADER_X509ERR_H -# ifndef HEADER_SYMHACKS_H -# include -# endif +# include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" @@ -65,6 +63,7 @@ # define X509_F_X509_OBJECT_NEW 150 # define X509_F_X509_PRINT_EX_FP 118 # define X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_DECODE 148 +# define X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET 161 # define X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET0 119 # define X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET 120 # define X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 144 diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/x509.h openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/x509.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/x509.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/x509.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -478,6 +478,7 @@ const void **ppval, const X509_ALGOR *algor); void X509_ALGOR_set_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, const EVP_MD *md); int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b); +int X509_ALGOR_copy(X509_ALGOR *dest, const X509_ALGOR *src); X509_NAME *X509_NAME_dup(X509_NAME *xn); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne); @@ -679,6 +680,8 @@ int X509_REQ_set_subject_name(X509_REQ *req, X509_NAME *name); void X509_REQ_get0_signature(const X509_REQ *req, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg); +void X509_REQ_set0_signature(X509_REQ *req, ASN1_BIT_STRING *psig); +int X509_REQ_set1_signature_algo(X509_REQ *req, X509_ALGOR *palg); int X509_REQ_get_signature_nid(const X509_REQ *req); int i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs(X509_REQ *req, unsigned char **pp); int X509_REQ_set_pubkey(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey); @@ -930,7 +933,7 @@ int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); -void *X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, +void *X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos, int type); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr, int nid, int atrtype, const void *data, diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/x509v3.h openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/x509v3.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/x509v3.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/x509v3.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -364,8 +364,9 @@ # define EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY 0x800 # define EXFLAG_FRESHEST 0x1000 -/* Self signed */ -# define EXFLAG_SS 0x2000 +# define EXFLAG_SS 0x2000 /* cert is apparently self-signed */ + +# define EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT 0x100000 # define KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE 0x0080 # define KU_NON_REPUDIATION 0x0040 diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -184,6 +184,10 @@ # define X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_NEEDED 73 /* Need OCSP verification */ # define X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_FAILED 74 /* Couldn't verify cert through OCSP */ # define X509_V_ERR_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN 75 /* Certificate wasn't recognized by the OCSP responder */ +# define X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH 76 +# define X509_V_ERR_NO_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 77 +# define X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM 78 +# define X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS 79 /* Certificate verify flags */ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/INSTALL openssl-1.1.1j/INSTALL --- openssl-1.1.1f/INSTALL 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/INSTALL 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -106,8 +106,7 @@ This will build and install OpenSSL in the default location, which is: Unix: normal installation directories under /usr/local - OpenVMS: SYS$COMMON:[OPENSSL-'version'...], where 'version' is the - OpenSSL version number with underscores instead of periods. + OpenVMS: SYS$COMMON:[OPENSSL] Windows: C:\Program Files\OpenSSL or C:\Program Files (x86)\OpenSSL The installation directory should be appropriately protected to ensure @@ -116,7 +115,9 @@ your Operating System it is recommended that you do not overwrite the system version and instead install to somewhere else. - If you want to install it anywhere else, run config like this: + If you want to install it anywhere else, run config like this (the options + --prefix and --openssldir are explained further down, and the values shown + here are mere examples): On Unix: @@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ Unix: /usr/local Windows: C:\Program Files\OpenSSL or C:\Program Files (x86)\OpenSSL - OpenVMS: SYS$COMMON:[OPENSSL-'version'] + OpenVMS: SYS$COMMON:[OPENSSL] --release Build OpenSSL without debugging symbols. This is the default. @@ -535,9 +536,9 @@ conjunction with the "-DPEDANTIC" option (or the --strict-warnings option). - no-ui - Don't build with the "UI" capability (i.e. the set of - features enabling text based prompts). + no-ui-console + Don't build with the "UI" console method (i.e. the "UI" + method that enables text based console prompts). enable-unit-test Enable additional unit test APIs. This should not typically @@ -961,9 +962,9 @@ share/doc/openssl/html/man7 Contains the HTML rendition of the man-pages. - OpenVMS ('arch' is replaced with the architecture name, "Alpha" - or "ia64", 'sover' is replaced with the shared library version - (0101 for 1.1), and 'pz' is replaced with the pointer size + OpenVMS ('arch' is replaced with the architecture name, "ALPHA" + or "IA64", 'sover' is replaced with the shared library version + (0101 for 1.1.x), and 'pz' is replaced with the pointer size OpenSSL was built with): [.EXE.'arch'] Contains the openssl binary. diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/NEWS openssl-1.1.1j/NEWS --- openssl-1.1.1f/NEWS 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/NEWS 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -5,6 +5,32 @@ This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL release. For more details please read the CHANGES file. + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1i and OpenSSL 1.1.1j [16 Feb 2021] + + o Fixed a NULL pointer deref in the X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() + function (CVE-2021-23841) + o Fixed the RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() function and the RSA_SSLV23_PADDING + padding mode to correctly check for rollback attacks + o Fixed an overflow in the EVP_CipherUpdate, EVP_EncryptUpdate and + EVP_DecryptUpdate functions (CVE-2021-23840) + o Fixed SRP_Calc_client_key so that it runs in constant time + + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1h and OpenSSL 1.1.1i [8 Dec 2020] + + o Fixed NULL pointer deref in GENERAL_NAME_cmp (CVE-2020-1971) + + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1g and OpenSSL 1.1.1h [22 Sep 2020] + + o Disallow explicit curve parameters in verifications chains when + X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is used + o Enable 'MinProtocol' and 'MaxProtocol' to configure both TLS and DTLS + contexts + o Oracle Developer Studio will start reporting deprecation warnings + + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1f and OpenSSL 1.1.1g [21 Apr 2020] + + o Fixed segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain() (CVE-2020-1967) + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1e and OpenSSL 1.1.1f [31 Mar 2020] o Revert the unexpected EOF reporting via SSL_ERROR_SSL diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/NOTES.ANDROID openssl-1.1.1j/NOTES.ANDROID --- openssl-1.1.1f/NOTES.ANDROID 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/NOTES.ANDROID 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ ------------------- Beside basic tools like perl and make you'll need to download the Android - NDK. It's available for Linux, Mac OS X and Windows, but only Linux - version was actually tested. There is no reason to believe that Mac OS X + NDK. It's available for Linux, macOS and Windows, but only Linux + version was actually tested. There is no reason to believe that macOS wouldn't work. And as for Windows, it's unclear which "shell" would be suitable, MSYS2 might have best chances. NDK version should play lesser role, the goal is to support a range of most recent versions. diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/NOTES.PERL openssl-1.1.1j/NOTES.PERL --- openssl-1.1.1f/NOTES.PERL 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/NOTES.PERL 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ $ cpan -f -i Text::Template - Note: on VMS, you must quote any argument that contains upper case + Note: on VMS, you must quote any argument that contains uppercase characters, so the lines above would be: $ cpan -i "Text::Template" diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/NOTES.VMS openssl-1.1.1j/NOTES.VMS --- openssl-1.1.1f/NOTES.VMS 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/NOTES.VMS 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ An ANSI C compiled is needed among other things. This means that VAX C is not and will not be supported. - We have only tested with DEC C (a.k.a HP VMS C / VSI C) and require + We have only tested with DEC C (aka HP VMS C / VSI C) and require version 7.1 or later. Compiling with a different ANSI C compiler may require some work. @@ -90,9 +90,9 @@ Unix mount point. The easiest way to check if everything got through as it should is to - check for one of the following files: + check that this file exists: - [.crypto]opensslconf^.h.in + [.include.openssl]opensslconf^.h.in The best way to get a correct distribution is to download the gzipped tar file from ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/, use GZIP -d to uncompress @@ -105,3 +105,11 @@ Should you need it, you can find UnZip for VMS here: http://www.info-zip.org/UnZip.html + + + How the value of 'arch' is determined + ------------------------------------- + + 'arch' is mentioned in INSTALL. It's value is determined like this: + + arch = f$edit( f$getsyi( "arch_name"), "upcase") diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/NOTES.WIN openssl-1.1.1j/NOTES.WIN --- openssl-1.1.1f/NOTES.WIN 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/NOTES.WIN 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ and require --cross-compile-prefix option. While on MSYS[2] it's solved rather by placing gcc that produces "MinGW binary" code 1st on $PATH. This is customarily source of confusion. "Hosted" applications "live" in - emulated file system name space with POSIX-y root, mount points, /dev + emulated filesystem name space with POSIX-y root, mount points, /dev and even /proc. Confusion is intensified by the fact that MSYS2 shell (or rather emulated execve(2) call) examines the binary it's about to start, and if it's found *not* to be linked with MSYS2 POSIX-y thing, - command line arguments that look like file names get translated from + command line arguments that look like filenames get translated from emulated name space to "native". For example '/c/some/where' becomes 'c:\some\where', '/dev/null' - 'nul'. This creates an illusion that there is no difference between MSYS2 shell and "MinGW binary", but @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ it's referred to in quotes here, as "MinGW binary", it's just as "native" as it can get.) - Visual C++ builds, a.k.a. VC-* + Visual C++ builds, aka VC-* ============================== Requirement details @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ the other hand oldest one is known not to work. Everything between falls into best-effort category. - - Netwide Assembler, a.k.a. NASM, available from https://www.nasm.us, + - Netwide Assembler, aka NASM, available from https://www.nasm.us, is required. Note that NASM is the only supported assembler. Even though Microsoft provided assembler is NOT supported, contemporary 64-bit version is exercised through continuous integration of @@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ For VC-WIN32, the following defaults are use: - PREFIX: %ProgramFiles(86)%\OpenSSL - OPENSSLDIR: %CommonProgramFiles(86)%\SSL + PREFIX: %ProgramFiles(x86)%\OpenSSL + OPENSSLDIR: %CommonProgramFiles(x86)%\SSL For VC-WIN64, the following defaults are use: @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ If you link with static OpenSSL libraries then you're expected to additionally link your application with WS2_32.LIB, GDI32.LIB, ADVAPI32.LIB, CRYPT32.LIB and USER32.LIB. Those developing - non-interactive service applications might feel concerned about + noninteractive service applications might feel concerned about linking with GDI32.LIB and USER32.LIB, as they are justly associated with interactive desktop, which is not available to service processes. The toolkit is designed to detect in which context it's diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/README openssl-1.1.1j/README --- openssl-1.1.1f/README 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/README 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ - OpenSSL 1.1.1f 31 Mar 2020 + OpenSSL 1.1.1j 16 Feb 2021 Copyright (c) 1998-2020 The OpenSSL Project Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/bio_ssl.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/bio_ssl.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/bio_ssl.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/bio_ssl.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ ssl_free(b); if (!ssl_new(b)) return 0; + bs = BIO_get_data(b); } BIO_set_shutdown(b, num); ssl = (SSL *)ptr; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/d1_lib.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/d1_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/d1_lib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/d1_lib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2005-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -142,10 +142,11 @@ ssl3_free(s); - dtls1_clear_queues(s); - - pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages); - pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages); + if (s->d1 != NULL) { + dtls1_clear_queues(s); + pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages); + pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages); + } OPENSSL_free(s->d1); s->d1 = NULL; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2005-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2005-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl) { + if (rl->d == NULL) + return; + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); pqueue_free(rl->d->unprocessed_rcds.q); pqueue_free(rl->d->processed_rcds.q); @@ -808,8 +811,8 @@ wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; /* - * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This - * will happen with non blocking IO + * DTLS writes whole datagrams, so there can't be anything left in + * the buffer. */ if (!ossl_assert(SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) == 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 - align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); + align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1; #endif len = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/s3_lib.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/s3_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/s3_lib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/s3_lib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -4072,9 +4072,10 @@ const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(const char *stdname) { - SSL_CIPHER *c = NULL, *tbl; - SSL_CIPHER *alltabs[] = {tls13_ciphers, ssl3_ciphers}; - size_t i, j, tblsize[] = {TLS13_NUM_CIPHERS, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS}; + SSL_CIPHER *tbl; + SSL_CIPHER *alltabs[] = {tls13_ciphers, ssl3_ciphers, ssl3_scsvs}; + size_t i, j, tblsize[] = {TLS13_NUM_CIPHERS, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS, + SSL3_NUM_SCSVS}; /* this is not efficient, necessary to optimize this? */ for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(alltabs); j++) { @@ -4082,21 +4083,11 @@ if (tbl->stdname == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(stdname, tbl->stdname) == 0) { - c = tbl; - break; + return tbl; } } } - if (c == NULL) { - tbl = ssl3_scsvs; - for (i = 0; i < SSL3_NUM_SCSVS; i++, tbl++) { - if (strcmp(stdname, tbl->stdname) == 0) { - c = tbl; - break; - } - } - } - return c; + return NULL; } /* diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/ssl_conf.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/ssl_conf.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/ssl_conf.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/ssl_conf.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2012-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2012-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -305,6 +305,13 @@ const char *name; int version; }; + /* + * Note: To avoid breaking previously valid configurations, we must retain + * legacy entries in this table even if the underlying protocol is no + * longer supported. This also means that the constants SSL3_VERSION, ... + * need to be retained indefinitely. This table can only grow, never + * shrink. + */ static const struct protocol_versions versions[] = { {"None", 0}, {"SSLv3", SSL3_VERSION}, diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/ssl_lib.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/ssl_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1200,6 +1200,8 @@ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp); OPENSSL_free(s->ext.alpn); OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie); + if (s->clienthello != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts); OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst); @@ -2676,7 +2678,7 @@ * - Otherwise it returns NULL * * During/after the handshake (TLSv1.2 or below resumption occurred): - * - If the session from the orignal handshake had a servername accepted + * - If the session from the original handshake had a servername accepted * by the server then it will return that servername. * - Otherwise it returns the servername set via * SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() (or NULL if it was not called). @@ -2895,7 +2897,8 @@ const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen, int use_context) { - if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) + if (s->session == NULL + || (s->version < TLS1_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)) return -1; return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label, @@ -3824,6 +3827,8 @@ goto err; ret->version = s->version; ret->options = s->options; + ret->min_proto_version = s->min_proto_version; + ret->max_proto_version = s->max_proto_version; ret->mode = s->mode; SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s)); SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s)); @@ -3839,21 +3844,6 @@ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data)) goto err; - /* setup rbio, and wbio */ - if (s->rbio != NULL) { - if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio, (char *)&ret->rbio)) - goto err; - } - if (s->wbio != NULL) { - if (s->wbio != s->rbio) { - if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio)) - goto err; - } else { - BIO_up_ref(ret->rbio); - ret->wbio = ret->rbio; - } - } - ret->server = s->server; if (s->handshake_func) { if (s->server) diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/ssl_local.h openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/ssl_local.h --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/ssl_local.h 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/ssl_local.h 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * @@ -537,7 +537,6 @@ int not_resumable; /* This is the cert and type for the other end. */ X509 *peer; - int peer_type; /* Certificate chain peer sent. */ STACK_OF(X509) *peer_chain; /* diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/ssl_rsa.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/ssl_rsa.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/ssl_rsa.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/ssl_rsa.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -148,15 +148,6 @@ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, pkey); ERR_clear_error(); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - /* - * Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly for smart - * cards. - */ - if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA - && RSA_flags(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey)) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK) ; - else -#endif if (!X509_check_private_key(c->pkeys[i].x509, pkey)) { X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509); c->pkeys[i].x509 = NULL; @@ -342,16 +333,6 @@ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, c->pkeys[i].privatekey); ERR_clear_error(); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - /* - * Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly for smart - * cards. - */ - if (EVP_PKEY_id(c->pkeys[i].privatekey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA - && RSA_flags(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(c->pkeys[i].privatekey)) & - RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK) ; - else -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ if (!X509_check_private_key(x, c->pkeys[i].privatekey)) { /* * don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free current private @@ -1082,13 +1063,6 @@ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pubkey, privatekey); } /* else both have parameters */ - /* Copied from ssl_set_cert/pkey */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if ((EVP_PKEY_id(privatekey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) && - ((RSA_flags(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(privatekey)) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK))) - /* no-op */ ; - else -#endif /* check that key <-> cert match */ if (EVP_PKEY_cmp(pubkey, privatekey) != 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT_AND_KEY, SSL_R_PRIVATE_KEY_MISMATCH); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/ssl_sess.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/ssl_sess.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/ssl_sess.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/ssl_sess.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ { SSL_SESSION *dest; - dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src)); + dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*dest)); if (dest == NULL) { goto err; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/statem/extensions.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/statem/extensions.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/statem/extensions.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/statem/extensions.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -966,7 +966,8 @@ * context, to avoid the confusing situation of having sess_accept_good * exceed sess_accept (zero) for the new context. */ - if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ctx != s->session_ctx) { + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ctx != s->session_ctx + && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) { tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept); tsan_decr(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); } @@ -1168,14 +1169,26 @@ static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context) { - if (!s->server) + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) { s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_REQUIRED_EXTMS; + } return 1; } static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) { + /* + * Check extended master secret extension is not dropped on + * renegotiation. + */ + if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) + && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_REQUIRED_EXTMS)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_EMS, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); + return 0; + } if (!s->server && s->hit) { /* * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@ if (sesstmp == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + goto err; } SSL_SESSION_free(sess); sess = sesstmp; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * @@ -1960,7 +1960,6 @@ goto err; } } - s->session->peer_type = certidx; X509_free(s->session->peer); X509_up_ref(x); @@ -2145,17 +2144,19 @@ } bnpub_key = NULL; - if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, - SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); - goto err; - } - if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } + dh = NULL; + + if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(peer_tmp), + 0, peer_tmp)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + goto err; + } s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1341,6 +1341,7 @@ static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, @@ -1503,8 +1504,8 @@ /* * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable - * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise - * returns 0. + * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has + * a servername callback configured. Otherwise returns 0. */ static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s) { @@ -1514,6 +1515,17 @@ EC_KEY *eckey; #endif + if (!ossl_assert(s->ctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL)) + return 0; + + /* + * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername + * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok + */ + if (s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL + || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL) + return 1; + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) return 1; @@ -1656,11 +1668,22 @@ */ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) { + int valid_tls; + int valid_dtls; + if (version == 0) { *bound = version; return 1; } + valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION; + valid_dtls = + DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) && + DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER); + + if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls) + return 0; + /*- * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. @@ -1671,31 +1694,24 @@ * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. + * + * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods, + * returning success. */ switch (method_version) { default: - /* - * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any - * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and - * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version - * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol - * versions. - */ - return 0; + break; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: - if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) - return 0; + if (valid_tls) + *bound = version; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: - if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || - DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) - return 0; + if (valid_dtls) + *bound = version; break; } - - *bound = version; return 1; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -2577,7 +2577,7 @@ s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { - /* SSLfatal() already called */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/t1_lib.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/t1_lib.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/t1_lib.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/t1_lib.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -2130,7 +2130,7 @@ sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]) : s->shared_sigalgs[i]; - if (sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash) + if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash) return 1; } return 0; @@ -2439,46 +2439,48 @@ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s) { + DH *dhp = NULL; + BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL; int dh_secbits = 80; - if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2) - return DH_get_1024_160(); - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) { - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256) - dh_secbits = 128; - else - dh_secbits = 80; - } else { - if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) - return NULL; - dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey); + if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) { + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) { + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256) + dh_secbits = 128; + else + dh_secbits = 80; + } else { + if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) + return NULL; + dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey); + } } - if (dh_secbits >= 128) { - DH *dhp = DH_new(); - BIGNUM *p, *g; - if (dhp == NULL) - return NULL; - g = BN_new(); - if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) { - DH_free(dhp); - BN_free(g); - return NULL; - } - if (dh_secbits >= 192) - p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL); - else - p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL); - if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) { - DH_free(dhp); - BN_free(p); - BN_free(g); - return NULL; - } - return dhp; + dhp = DH_new(); + if (dhp == NULL) + return NULL; + g = BN_new(); + if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) { + DH_free(dhp); + BN_free(g); + return NULL; + } + if (dh_secbits >= 192) + p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL); + else if (dh_secbits >= 152) + p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL); + else if (dh_secbits >= 128) + p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL); + else if (dh_secbits >= 112) + p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL); + else + p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL); + if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) { + DH_free(dhp); + BN_free(p); + BN_free(g); + return NULL; } - if (dh_secbits >= 112) - return DH_get_2048_224(); - return DH_get_1024_160(); + return dhp; } #endif diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/t1_trce.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/t1_trce.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/t1_trce.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/t1_trce.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2012-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2012-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -656,7 +656,10 @@ if (*pmsglen < 32) return 0; - tm = (p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; + tm = ((unsigned int)p[0] << 24) + | ((unsigned int)p[1] << 16) + | ((unsigned int)p[2] << 8) + | (unsigned int)p[3]; p += 4; BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80); BIO_puts(bio, "Random:\n"); @@ -864,8 +867,10 @@ break; if (extlen != 4) return 0; - max_early_data = (ext[0] << 24) | (ext[1] << 16) | (ext[2] << 8) - | ext[3]; + max_early_data = ((unsigned int)ext[0] << 24) + | ((unsigned int)ext[1] << 16) + | ((unsigned int)ext[2] << 8) + | (unsigned int)ext[3]; BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); BIO_printf(bio, "max_early_data=%u\n", max_early_data); break; @@ -1356,7 +1361,10 @@ } if (msglen < 4) return 0; - tick_life = (msg[0] << 24) | (msg[1] << 16) | (msg[2] << 8) | msg[3]; + tick_life = ((unsigned int)msg[0] << 24) + | ((unsigned int)msg[1] << 16) + | ((unsigned int)msg[2] << 8) + | (unsigned int)msg[3]; msglen -= 4; msg += 4; BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); @@ -1367,7 +1375,10 @@ if (msglen < 4) return 0; ticket_age_add = - (msg[0] << 24) | (msg[1] << 16) | (msg[2] << 8) | msg[3]; + ((unsigned int)msg[0] << 24) + | ((unsigned int)msg[1] << 16) + | ((unsigned int)msg[2] << 8) + | (unsigned int)msg[3]; msglen -= 4; msg += 4; BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/tls13_enc.c openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/tls13_enc.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/ssl/tls13_enc.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/ssl/tls13_enc.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -390,11 +390,18 @@ uint32_t algenc; ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN; - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL) { + algenc = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc; + } else if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { /* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */ algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc; + } else if (s->psksession != NULL && s->psksession->cipher != NULL) { + /* We must be doing early data with out-of-band PSK */ + algenc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc; } else { - algenc = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; } if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/asn1_decode_test.c openssl-1.1.1j/test/asn1_decode_test.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/asn1_decode_test.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/asn1_decode_test.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2017-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -160,6 +160,41 @@ return 1; } +typedef struct { + ASN1_STRING *invalidDirString; +} INVALIDTEMPLATE; + +ASN1_SEQUENCE(INVALIDTEMPLATE) = { + /* + * DirectoryString is a CHOICE type so it must use explicit tagging - + * but we deliberately use implicit here, which makes this template invalid. + */ + ASN1_IMP(INVALIDTEMPLATE, invalidDirString, DIRECTORYSTRING, 12) +} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(INVALIDTEMPLATE) + +IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(INVALIDTEMPLATE) +IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(INVALIDTEMPLATE) + +/* Empty sequence for invalid template test */ +static unsigned char t_invalid_template[] = { + 0x30, 0x03, /* SEQUENCE tag + length */ + 0x0c, 0x01, 0x41 /* UTF8String, length 1, "A" */ +}; + +static int test_invalid_template(void) +{ + const unsigned char *p = t_invalid_template; + INVALIDTEMPLATE *tmp = d2i_INVALIDTEMPLATE(NULL, &p, + sizeof(t_invalid_template)); + + /* We expect a NULL pointer return */ + if (TEST_ptr_null(tmp)) + return 1; + + INVALIDTEMPLATE_free(tmp); + return 0; +} + int setup_tests(void) { #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10200000L @@ -169,5 +204,6 @@ ADD_TEST(test_uint32); ADD_TEST(test_int64); ADD_TEST(test_uint64); + ADD_TEST(test_invalid_template); return 1; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/asn1_encode_test.c openssl-1.1.1j/test/asn1_encode_test.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/asn1_encode_test.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/asn1_encode_test.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2017-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -856,6 +856,38 @@ return test_intern(&uint64_test_package); } +typedef struct { + ASN1_STRING *invalidDirString; +} INVALIDTEMPLATE; + +ASN1_SEQUENCE(INVALIDTEMPLATE) = { + /* + * DirectoryString is a CHOICE type so it must use explicit tagging - + * but we deliberately use implicit here, which makes this template invalid. + */ + ASN1_IMP(INVALIDTEMPLATE, invalidDirString, DIRECTORYSTRING, 12) +} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(INVALIDTEMPLATE) + +IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(INVALIDTEMPLATE) +IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(INVALIDTEMPLATE) + +static int test_invalid_template(void) +{ + INVALIDTEMPLATE *temp = INVALIDTEMPLATE_new(); + int ret; + + if (!TEST_ptr(temp)) + return 0; + + ret = i2d_INVALIDTEMPLATE(temp, NULL); + + INVALIDTEMPLATE_free(temp); + + /* We expect the i2d operation to fail */ + return ret < 0; +} + + int setup_tests(void) { #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10200000L @@ -866,5 +898,6 @@ ADD_TEST(test_uint32); ADD_TEST(test_int64); ADD_TEST(test_uint64); + ADD_TEST(test_invalid_template); return 1; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/bioprinttest.c openssl-1.1.1j/test/bioprinttest.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/bioprinttest.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/bioprinttest.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ if (!TEST_int_eq(BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%f\n", 2 * (double)ULONG_MAX), -1)) return 0; + return 1; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/build.info openssl-1.1.1j/test/build.info --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/build.info 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/build.info 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -461,6 +461,9 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{ec} -}] PROGRAMS_NO_INST=ec_internal_test curve448_internal_test ENDIF + IF[{- !$disabled{cmac} -}] + PROGRAMS_NO_INST=cmactest + ENDIF SOURCE[poly1305_internal_test]=poly1305_internal_test.c INCLUDE[poly1305_internal_test]=.. ../include @@ -494,6 +497,12 @@ INCLUDE[ctype_internal_test]=.. ../include DEPEND[ctype_internal_test]=../libcrypto.a libtestutil.a + IF[{- !$disabled{cmac} -}] + SOURCE[cmactest]=cmactest.c + INCLUDE[cmactest]=../include + DEPEND[cmactest]=../libcrypto.a libtestutil.a + ENDIF + SOURCE[siphash_internal_test]=siphash_internal_test.c INCLUDE[siphash_internal_test]=.. ../include DEPEND[siphash_internal_test]=../libcrypto.a libtestutil.a @@ -558,7 +567,6 @@ SOURCE[gosttest]=gosttest.c ssltestlib.c INCLUDE[gosttest]=../include .. DEPEND[gosttest]=../libcrypto ../libssl libtestutil.a -ENDIF SOURCE[ssl_ctx_test]=ssl_ctx_test.c INCLUDE[ssl_ctx_test]=../include @@ -600,3 +608,4 @@ _____ } -} +ENDIF diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-explicit.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-explicit.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-explicit.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-explicit.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDGDCCAgCgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 +IENBMCAXDTIwMDkxNTEzMDY0MVoYDzIxMjAwOTE2MTMwNjQxWjANMQswCQYDVQQD +DAJDQTCCAUswggEDBgcqhkjOPQIBMIH3AgEBMCwGByqGSM49AQECIQD/////AAAA +AQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAP///////////////zBbBCD/////AAAAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AP///////////////AQgWsY12Ko6k+ez671VdpiGvGUdBrDMU7D2O848PifSYEsD +FQDEnTYIhucEk2pmeOETnSa3gZ9+kARBBGsX0fLhLEJH+Lzm5WOkQPJ3A32BLesz +oPShOUXYmMKWT+NC4v4af5uO5+tKfA+eFivOM1drMV7Oy7ZAaDe/UfUCIQD///// +AAAAAP//////////vOb6racXnoTzucrC/GMlUQIBAQNCAASlXna3kSD/Yol3RA5I +icjIxYb9UJoCTzb/LsxjlOvIS5OqCTzpqP0p3JrnvLPsbzq7Cf/g0bNlxAGs1iVM +5NDco1MwUTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUFk6ucH6gMXeadmuV7a1iWEnU/CIwHwYDVR0jBBgw +FoAUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3o1IwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG +9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAdyUgfT0eAsZzoHFXoWN5uqi0MHuhLI37TEzkH5h7iTpDQJTQ +F0SjbawfM/nxxUekRW3mjFu3lft+VA7yC0OTNBLffan/vTh+HGOvvYZSMJYgKrMG +PRWgDId+n9RTcQCf+91cISvOazHixRiJG7JfRLdNZsAE+miw4HgPLFboTwpxtTDJ +zJ4ssBC6P+5IHwBCtNMiilJMMMzuSaZa5iSo6M9AdXWfcQN3uhW1lgQOLOlKLcbo +3UhW1GMMhTTeytM5aylbKhRsnL7ozmS44zsKZ25YaQxgjdKitFjVN6j7eyQ7C9J2 +bLXgl3APweLQbGGs0zv08Ad0SCCKYLHK6mMJqg== +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-named.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-named.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-named.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ca-cert-ec-named.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIICJDCCAQygAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 +IENBMCAXDTIwMDkxNTEzMDY1MFoYDzIxMjAwOTE2MTMwNjUwWjANMQswCQYDVQQD +DAJDQTBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABPt+MXCi9+wztEvmdG2EVSk7 +bAiJMXJXW/u0NbcGCrrbhO1NJSHHV3Lks888sqeSPh/bif/ASJ0HX+VarMUoFIKj +UzBRMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRjigU5REz8Lwf1iD6mALVhsHIanjAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSO +9SWvHptrhD18gJrJU5xNcvejUjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB +CwUAA4IBAQCQs9wpblefb2C9a7usGL1DJjWJQIFHtUf+6p/KPgEV7LF138ECjL5s +0AWRd8Q8SbsBH49j2r3LLLMkvFglyRaN+FF+TCC/UQtclTb4+HgLsUT2xSU8U2cY +SOnzNB5AX/qAAsdOGqOjivPtGXcXFexDKPsw3n+3rJgymBP6hbLagb47IabNhot5 +bMM6S+bmfpMwfsm885zr5vG2Gg9FjjH94Vx4I7eRLkjCS88gkIR1J35ecHFteOdo +idOaCHQddYiKukBzgdjtTxSDXKffkaybylrwOZ8VBlQd3zC7s02d+riHCnroLnnE +cwYLlJ5z6jN7zoPZ55yX/EmA0RVny2le +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ca-key-ec-explicit.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ca-key-ec-explicit.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ca-key-ec-explicit.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ca-key-ec-explicit.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIBeQIBADCCAQMGByqGSM49AgEwgfcCAQEwLAYHKoZIzj0BAQIhAP////8AAAAB +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA////////////////MFsEIP////8AAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +///////////////8BCBaxjXYqjqT57PrvVV2mIa8ZR0GsMxTsPY7zjw+J9JgSwMV +AMSdNgiG5wSTamZ44ROdJreBn36QBEEEaxfR8uEsQkf4vOblY6RA8ncDfYEt6zOg +9KE5RdiYwpZP40Li/hp/m47n60p8D54WK84zV2sxXs7LtkBoN79R9QIhAP////8A +AAAA//////////+85vqtpxeehPO5ysL8YyVRAgEBBG0wawIBAQQgdEf20fpuqEZU +tZ4ORoq4vb5ETV4a6QOl/iGnDQt++/ihRANCAASlXna3kSD/Yol3RA5IicjIxYb9 +UJoCTzb/LsxjlOvIS5OqCTzpqP0p3JrnvLPsbzq7Cf/g0bNlxAGs1iVM5NDc +-----END PRIVATE KEY----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ca-key-ec-named.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ca-key-ec-named.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ca-key-ec-named.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ca-key-ec-named.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- +MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgCTrYrMKcyV49+w4B +TWr2WTZsMM4aFpaYulKAuhiuQ7mhRANCAAT7fjFwovfsM7RL5nRthFUpO2wIiTFy +V1v7tDW3Bgq624TtTSUhx1dy5LPPPLKnkj4f24n/wEidB1/lWqzFKBSC +-----END PRIVATE KEY----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ca-pss-cert.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ca-pss-cert.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ca-pss-cert.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ca-pss-cert.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDXjCCAhagAwIBAgIBAjA9BgkqhkiG9w0BAQowMKANMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaEa +MBgGCSqGSIb3DQEBCDALBglghkgBZQMEAgGiAwIBIDASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 +IENBMCAXDTIxMDEyNjEwMDUwOFoYDzIxMjEwMTI3MTAwNTA4WjARMQ8wDQYDVQQD +DAZDQS1QU1MwggEgMAsGCSqGSIb3DQEBCgOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAtclsFtJOQgAC +ZxTPn2T2ksmibRNVAnEfVCgfJxsPN3aEERgqqhWbC4LmGHRIIjQ9DpobarydJivw +epDaiu11rgwXgenIobIVvVr2+L3ngalYdkwmmPVImNN8Ef575ybE/kVgTu9X37DJ +t+8psfVGeFg4RKykOi7SfPCSKHKSeZUXPj9AYwZDw4HX2rhstRopXAmUzz2/uAaR +fmU7tYOG5qhfMUpP+Ce0ZBlLE9JjasY+d20/mDFuvFEc5qjfzNqv/7okyBjaWB4h +gwnjXASrqKlqHKVU1UyrJc76yAniimy+IoXKAELetIJGSN15GYaWJcAIs0Eybjyk +gyAu7Zlf/wIDAQABo2AwXjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MAsGA1UdDwQEAwIBBjAd +BgNVHQ4EFgQUGfmhA/VcxWkh7VUBHxUdHHQLgrAwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUjvUlrx6b +a4Q9fICayVOcTXL3o1IwPQYJKoZIhvcNAQEKMDCgDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgGhGjAY +BgkqhkiG9w0BAQgwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBogMCASADggEBAF6rSSBj+dkv0UGuE1El +lB9zVpqVlV72RY8gAkmSJmbzblHEO/PYV/UnNJ2C2IXEhAQaE0xKCg+WC2RO56oc +qZc6UXBCN8G9rJKVxgXVbciP4pQYN6POpmhJfQqzNPwzTADt3HY6X9gQtyG0fuQF +OPDc+mXjRvBrcYMkAgYiKe+oA45WDWYpIvipWVQ3xP/BSGJqrdKx5SOrJA72+BLM +bPbD3tBC2SVirDjv0N926Wcb/JQFkM+5YY2/yKNybstngr4Pb1T/tESsIZvGG2Tk +3IhBl1dJtC9gpGTRa8NzQvcmPK9VUjWtv5YNA+FxD9FTxGibh7Aw1fbFCV91Qjc3 +JQQ= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ca-pss-key.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ca-pss-key.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ca-pss-key.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ca-pss-key.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIEvQIBADALBgkqhkiG9w0BAQoEggSpMIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAtclsFtJOQgACZxTP +n2T2ksmibRNVAnEfVCgfJxsPN3aEERgqqhWbC4LmGHRIIjQ9DpobarydJivwepDa +iu11rgwXgenIobIVvVr2+L3ngalYdkwmmPVImNN8Ef575ybE/kVgTu9X37DJt+8p +sfVGeFg4RKykOi7SfPCSKHKSeZUXPj9AYwZDw4HX2rhstRopXAmUzz2/uAaRfmU7 +tYOG5qhfMUpP+Ce0ZBlLE9JjasY+d20/mDFuvFEc5qjfzNqv/7okyBjaWB4hgwnj +XASrqKlqHKVU1UyrJc76yAniimy+IoXKAELetIJGSN15GYaWJcAIs0EybjykgyAu +7Zlf/wIDAQABAoIBAErkiNt+GS+nwVWmhUMt3UfsOjal2EgBQt7xCKSbyVEYSqCg +TDN2Y0IC07kPbwhobR8u7kyzGCs5vwE/3EmQOwNRh/3FyxqSu9IfP9CKrG4GzqMu +DFjH9PjBaEQhi/pXRqFbA6qBgLpvoytcJNlkK3w5HDVuytoNoDpJAm4XhbEAwVG2 +u3De40lPKXBFaGjSrUQETnrm0Fhj+J7+VMheQZVjEHwMIOmbIDcckV0OSIWn00XG +/Md0y0i/U8S0TkP9sVC+cKkKMCNL+BJYf5YucUIna/9PgBD36RRRq2D0e8/iP8m+ +ftnmW7fxlL2neTZ2sAS+4sm7sOoudaeAta+JoEECgYEA5ZjbBJf+FhyFOBFRoYow +OHP+JfU7rdi8n5GpNswVmtNx3FK+eoUz+PlXTluUydS3L40ba7/mzYFzAZETF6YO +Z8STkmvLxRTDzvZoE0SCJQAcG9I1oVWMufDVnHvljflH+IBjvMQM527dfFgaebvD +TkRvnCup2oV3uT430++15K0CgYEAyrESfgP5f9+zZqz30N+QTWHZCzCUqSDcGhke +Irvjs5tSrCQibbSGkGNHZ/V019K8rKJQlvNbEEzlRRcohuqIuUPgPmXBbbruqCBP +a1+DD/HRg6BrTsNo67SbUJ6EsV5D80Ie76Yzye3By7E71xvFzFxbMwcwPFHBDViR +m4oRwNsCgYEAtdb/N78tVNPXytUkot0wXbW4RtXYI1Lx6StTKnwubEYk+otqIt1W +kUzhkcTEralUQEvwuMDvCjoJHOeKiINTC2pMOn43j+pnPoY3XXM35BgXKw2svg9k +emu8ssgJwgz5rF37ICjh03Yh4vZgWaOVBmr7PmPyjYiBjuwxCSDkHa0CgYEAkqwP +9aBqq131NBd2PG+KvHRR2wcMjFZ672e9puTPoOiEqox7XWeE+Hbe9RtpscONRF8w +cgsnmmQKhDR93yNYTLgRTRXVItJiYMcAsXIsJR2XvugWvqgpBGds/Km426CbCyyN +tl1OnJCv6/YUl1RBjeBHHmXVQdDnIgE1XJhMwIECgYEAt4zgPqswoicfDBqakP6X +ZND0s7fiki2YBmXyASIoUACnpJEWsOOEJrAcW7xtgXgjNxKdk1JqYV3ggU8wgCvv +9Ugsx0FiuPmIBhYNZMWIItNmpYqPm8KbEwIPqChs9OA+5FREFwFjJgGK2ublfmVj +dN2I3LilMIXTE4/MQ8Lhcjc= +-----END PRIVATE KEY----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-explicit.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-explicit.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-explicit.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-explicit.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIChzCCAi6gAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAgFw0y +MDA5MTUxMzE0MzlaGA8yMTIwMDkxNjEzMTQzOVowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2VydmVy +LmV4YW1wbGUwggFLMIIBAwYHKoZIzj0CATCB9wIBATAsBgcqhkjOPQEBAiEA//// +/wAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAD///////////////8wWwQg/////wAAAAEAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAD///////////////wEIFrGNdiqOpPns+u9VXaYhrxlHQawzFOw9jvOPD4n +0mBLAxUAxJ02CIbnBJNqZnjhE50mt4GffpAEQQRrF9Hy4SxCR/i85uVjpEDydwN9 +gS3rM6D0oTlF2JjClk/jQuL+Gn+bjufrSnwPnhYrzjNXazFezsu2QGg3v1H1AiEA +/////wAAAAD//////////7zm+q2nF56E87nKwvxjJVECAQEDQgAE+7TDP7C9VqQP +TnqoJc/Fvf/N45BX+lBfmfiGBeRKtSsvrERUlymzQ4/nxVtymozAgFxQ0my998HH +TSVCj7Sq56N9MHswHQYDVR0OBBYEFKKwEfKYhNv6fbQf0Xd0te7J3GZdMB8GA1Ud +IwQYMBaAFGOKBTlETPwvB/WIPqYAtWGwchqeMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAww +CgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwGQYDVR0RBBIwEIIOc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUwCgYIKoZIzj0E +AwIDRwAwRAIgb4UITAOFlATeaayWQX9r5gf61qcnzT7TjXCekf7ww9oCIBDltg/u +ZvS9gqviMFuPjTuk/FhsCTAUzTT7WmgcWeH7 +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-explicit.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-explicit.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-explicit.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-explicit.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIBlDCCATqgAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAgFw0y +MDA5MTUxMzE0NDVaGA8yMTIwMDkxNjEzMTQ0NVowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2VydmVy +LmV4YW1wbGUwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAQv5PnMStW/Wx9lpvjl +JTsFIjc2wBv14sNuMh1hfNX8ZJcoCfAAKYu6ujxXt328GWBMaubRbBjOd/eqpEst +tYKzo30wezAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUmb/qcE413hkpmtjEMyRZZFcN1TYwHwYDVR0jBBgw +FoAUFk6ucH6gMXeadmuV7a1iWEnU/CIwCQYDVR0TBAIwADATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggr +BgEFBQcDATAZBgNVHREEEjAQgg5zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNI +ADBFAiEA9y6J8rdAbO0mDZscIb8rIn6HgxBW4WAqTlFeZeHjjOYCIAmt2ldyObOL +tXaiaxYX3WAOR1vmfzsdrkCAOCfAkpbo +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-named.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-named.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-named.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-cert-ec-named-named.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIBkzCCATqgAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAgFw0y +MDA5MTUxNDEwNDhaGA8yMTIwMDkxNjE0MTA0OFowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2VydmVy +LmV4YW1wbGUwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAS0YU57+RFRWxr/frnL ++vOYkY3h9roKnvxCG07wK5tevEYtSdKz0KsHvDBDatw1r3JNv+m2p54/3AqFPAZ3 +5b0Po30wezAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUypypuZrUl0BEmbuhfJpo3QFNIvUwHwYDVR0jBBgw +FoAUY4oFOURM/C8H9Yg+pgC1YbByGp4wCQYDVR0TBAIwADATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggr +BgEFBQcDATAZBgNVHREEEjAQgg5zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNH +ADBEAiAEkKD7H5uxQ4YbQOiN4evbu5RCV5W7TVE80iBfcY5u4wIgGcwr++lVNX0Q +CTT+M3ukDjOA8OEvKUz1TiDuRAQ29qU= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-key-ec-explicit.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-key-ec-explicit.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-key-ec-explicit.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-key-ec-explicit.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIBeQIBADCCAQMGByqGSM49AgEwgfcCAQEwLAYHKoZIzj0BAQIhAP////8AAAAB +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA////////////////MFsEIP////8AAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +///////////////8BCBaxjXYqjqT57PrvVV2mIa8ZR0GsMxTsPY7zjw+J9JgSwMV +AMSdNgiG5wSTamZ44ROdJreBn36QBEEEaxfR8uEsQkf4vOblY6RA8ncDfYEt6zOg +9KE5RdiYwpZP40Li/hp/m47n60p8D54WK84zV2sxXs7LtkBoN79R9QIhAP////8A +AAAA//////////+85vqtpxeehPO5ysL8YyVRAgEBBG0wawIBAQQg0cmpcTcEYG5G +ZaVkGjtsBc3sLZn1EuV9qNK2qx6iNzmhRANCAAT7tMM/sL1WpA9Oeqglz8W9/83j +kFf6UF+Z+IYF5Eq1Ky+sRFSXKbNDj+fFW3KajMCAXFDSbL33wcdNJUKPtKrn +-----END PRIVATE KEY----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-explicit.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-explicit.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-explicit.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-explicit.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- +MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQg2ue+X5ZFJPJPQG2E +WQY4ALv2PkPp2Gy6KrMiokgmjkehRANCAAQv5PnMStW/Wx9lpvjlJTsFIjc2wBv1 +4sNuMh1hfNX8ZJcoCfAAKYu6ujxXt328GWBMaubRbBjOd/eqpEsttYKz +-----END PRIVATE KEY----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-named.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-named.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-named.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-key-ec-named-named.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- +MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgGSoneIKG3//ujXGu +/EoJdNhpKZj026EF/YQ5FblUBWahRANCAAS0YU57+RFRWxr/frnL+vOYkY3h9roK +nvxCG07wK5tevEYtSdKz0KsHvDBDatw1r3JNv+m2p54/3AqFPAZ35b0P +-----END PRIVATE KEY----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-pathlen.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-pathlen.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-pathlen.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-pathlen.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIICszCCAZugAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg +Fw0yMDA0MDMwODA0MTVaGA8yMTIwMDQwNDA4MDQxNVowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2Vy +dmVyLmV4YW1wbGUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCo/4lY +YYWu3tssD9Vz++K3qBt6dWAr1H08c3a1rt6TL38kkG3JHPSKOM2fooAWVsu0LLuT +5Rcf/w3GQ/4xNPgo2HXpo7uIgu+jcuJTYgVFTeAxl++qnRDSWA2eBp4yuxsIVl1l +Dz9mjsI2oBH/wFk1/Ukc3RxCMwZ4rgQ4I+XndWfTlK1aqUAfrFkQ9QzBZK1KxMY1 +U7OWaoIbFYvRmavknm+UqtKW5Vf7jJFkijwkFsbSGb6CYBM7YrDtPh2zyvlr3zG5 +ep5LR2inKcc/SuIiJ7TvkGPX79ByST5brbkb1Ctvhmjd1XMSuEPJ3EEPoqNGT4tn +iIQPYf55NB9KiR+3AgMBAAGjEDAOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMCAQAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL +BQADggEBAApOUnWWd09I0ts3xa1oK7eakc+fKTF4d7pbGznFNONaCR3KFRgnBVlG +Bm8/oehrrQ28Ad3XPSug34DQQ5kM6JIuaddx50/n4Xkgj8/fgXVA0HXizOJ3QpKC +IojLVajXlQHhpo72VUQuNOha0UxG9daYjS20iXRhanTm9rUz7qQZEugVQCiR0z/f +9NgM7FU9UaSidzH3gZu/Ufc4Ggn6nZV7LM9sf4IUV+KszS1VpcK+9phAmsB6BaAi +cFXvVXZjTNualQgPyPwOD8c+vVCIfIemfF5TZ6fyqpOjprWQAphwrTtfNDSmqRTz +FRhDf+vJERQclgUtg37EgWGKtnNQeRY= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-pss-cert.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-pss-cert.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-pss-cert.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-pss-cert.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDdDCCAiygAwIBAgIBAjA9BgkqhkiG9w0BAQowMKANMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaEa +MBgGCSqGSIb3DQEBCDALBglghkgBZQMEAgGiAwIBIDARMQ8wDQYDVQQDDAZDQS1Q +U1MwIBcNMjEwMTI2MTAwNjMzWhgPMjEyMTAxMjcxMDA2MzNaMBExDzANBgNVBAMM +BkVFLVBTUzCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKj/iVhhha7e +2ywP1XP74reoG3p1YCvUfTxzdrWu3pMvfySQbckc9Io4zZ+igBZWy7Qsu5PlFx// +DcZD/jE0+CjYdemju4iC76Ny4lNiBUVN4DGX76qdENJYDZ4GnjK7GwhWXWUPP2aO +wjagEf/AWTX9SRzdHEIzBniuBDgj5ed1Z9OUrVqpQB+sWRD1DMFkrUrExjVTs5Zq +ghsVi9GZq+Seb5Sq0pblV/uMkWSKPCQWxtIZvoJgEztisO0+HbPK+WvfMbl6nktH +aKcpxz9K4iIntO+QY9fv0HJJPlutuRvUK2+GaN3VcxK4Q8ncQQ+io0ZPi2eIhA9h +/nk0H0qJH7cCAwEAAaN1MHMwHQYDVR0OBBYEFOeb4iqtimw6y3ZR5Y4HmCKX4XOi +MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBn5oQP1XMVpIe1VAR8VHRx0C4KwMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYD +VR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwEQYDVR0RBAowCIIGRUUtUFNTMD0GCSqGSIb3DQEB +CjAwoA0wCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoRowGAYJKoZIhvcNAQEIMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaID +AgEgA4IBAQCzCXb5XpMvhuwWso9wj4B8AJjCugMlGdrLXIj3ueqyS1qSEcFp1meO +9jMDCjAkitTdZjf3gqEghC/joUd+XAw3JfOPOl36WlNrm9bwZTnfnCYFRrdprfMo +Q1Kqy9SNvDeHZZVcGeU3PZSt+EabmR9mQODg/qfpa9/3WktzFbvxlPOS7Tb0n2tn +vQnTmyrmGN2/o8X1qGQgETw5bH3csKgsPh668zN/gv3DxNN0EVACLaOSahNsNQa7 +KCcl1ez5KcFc0QIlQajhorTYOIeTb8UmR4wdy5C4Nd9P5OKv1sQvVO9PtswAv/s7 +Vs48cDO1+ASn0KjN41hXN5+fOIlNqOeU +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-self-signed.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-self-signed.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/ee-self-signed.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/ee-self-signed.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDIjCCAgqgAwIBAgIUT99h/YrAdcDg3fdLy5UajB8e994wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL +BQAwGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOZWUtc2VsZi1zaWduZWQwIBcNMjAwNzI4MTQxNjA4WhgP +MjEyMDA3MDQxNDE2MDhaMBkxFzAVBgNVBAMMDmVlLXNlbGYtc2lnbmVkMIIBIjAN +BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAqP+JWGGFrt7bLA/Vc/vit6gbenVg +K9R9PHN2ta7eky9/JJBtyRz0ijjNn6KAFlbLtCy7k+UXH/8NxkP+MTT4KNh16aO7 +iILvo3LiU2IFRU3gMZfvqp0Q0lgNngaeMrsbCFZdZQ8/Zo7CNqAR/8BZNf1JHN0c +QjMGeK4EOCPl53Vn05StWqlAH6xZEPUMwWStSsTGNVOzlmqCGxWL0Zmr5J5vlKrS +luVX+4yRZIo8JBbG0hm+gmATO2Kw7T4ds8r5a98xuXqeS0dopynHP0riIie075Bj +1+/Qckk+W625G9Qrb4Zo3dVzErhDydxBD6KjRk+LZ4iED2H+eTQfSokftwIDAQAB +o2AwXjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU55viKq2KbDrLdlHljgeYIpfhc6IwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU +55viKq2KbDrLdlHljgeYIpfhc6IwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zALBgNVHQ8EBAMC +B4AwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAGDEbS5kJArjjQNK02oxhQyz1dbDy23evRxm +WW/NtlJAQAgEMXoNo9fioj0L4cvDy40r87V6/RsV2eijwZEfwGloACif7v78w8QO +h4XiW9oGxcQkdMIYZLDVW9AZPDIkK5NHNfQaeAxCprAufYnRMv035UotLzCBRrkG +G2TIs45vRp/6mYFVtm0Nf9CFvu4dXH8W+GlBONG0FAiBW+JzgTr9OmrzfqJTEDrf +vv/hOiu8XvvlF5piPBqKE76rEvkXUSjgDZ2/Ju1fjqpV2I8Hz1Mj9w9tRE8g4E9o +ZcRXX3MNPaHxnNhgYSPdpywwkyILz2AHwmAzh07cdttRFFPw+fM= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/invalid-cert.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/invalid-cert.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/invalid-cert.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/invalid-cert.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDJTCCAg2gAwIBAgIUEUSW5o7qpgNCWyXic9Fc9tCLS0gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL +BQAwEzERMA8GA1UEAwwIUGVyc29TaW0wHhcNMjAxMjE2MDY1NjM5WhcNMzAxMjE2 +MDY1NjM5WjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhQZXJzb1NpbTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAD +ggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMsgRKnnZbQtG9bB9Hn+CoOOsanmnRELSlGq521qi/eBgs2w +SdHYM6rsJFwY89RvINLGeUZh/pu7c+ODtTafAWE3JkynG01d2Zrvp1V1r97+FGyD +f+b1hAggxBy70bTRyr1gAoKQTAm74U/1lj13EpWz7zshgXJ/Pn/hUyTmpNW+fTRE +xaifN0jkl5tZUURGA6w3+BRhVDQtt92vLihqUGaEFpL8yqqFnN44AoQ5+lgMafWi +UyYMHcK75ZB8WWklq8zjRP3xC1h56k01rT6KJO6i+BxMcADerYsn5qTlcUiKcpRU +b6RzLvCUwj91t1aX6npDI3BzSP+wBUUANBfuHEMCAwEAAaNxMG8wFwYDVR0OBBA8 +yBBnvz1Zt6pHm2GwBaRyMBcGA1UdIwQQPMgQZ789WbeqR5thsAWkcjAPBgNVHRMB +Af8EBTADAQH/MAsGA1UdDwQEAwIChDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAQYIKwYB +BQUHAwIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAIEzVbttOUc7kK4aY+74TANFZK/qtBQ7 +94a/P30TGWSRUq2HnDsR8Vo4z8xm5oKeC+SIi6NGzviWYquuzpJ7idcbr0MIuSyD ++Vg6n1sG64DxWNdGO9lR5c4mWFdIajShczS2+4QIRB/lFZCf7GhPMtIcbP1o9ckY +2vyv5ZAEU9Z5n0PY+abrKsj0XyvJwdycEsUTywa36fuv6hP3UboLtvK6naXLMrTj +WtSA6PXjHy7h8h0NC8XLk64mc0lcRC4WM+xJ/C+NHglpmBqBxnStpnZykMZYD1Vy +JJ1wNc+Y3e2uMBDxZviH3dIPIgqP1Vpi2TWfqr3DTBNCRf4dl/wwNU8= +-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/mkcert.sh openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/mkcert.sh --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/mkcert.sh 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/mkcert.sh 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ #! /bin/bash # -# Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +# Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # Copyright (c) 2016 Viktor Dukhovni . # All rights reserved. # @@ -114,6 +114,19 @@ } genca() { + local OPTIND=1 + local purpose= + + while getopts p: o + do + case $o in + p) purpose="$OPTARG";; + *) echo "Usage: $0 genca [-p EKU] cn keyname certname cakeyname cacertname" >&2 + return 1;; + esac + done + + shift $((OPTIND - 1)) local cn=$1; shift local key=$1; shift local cert=$1; shift @@ -123,17 +136,16 @@ local akid="authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid" exts=$(printf "%s\n%s\n%s\n" "$skid" "$akid" "basicConstraints = critical,CA:true") - for eku in "$@" - do - exts=$(printf "%s\nextendedKeyUsage = %s\n" "$exts" "$eku") - done + if [ -n "$purpose" ]; then + exts=$(printf "%s\nextendedKeyUsage = %s\n" "$exts" "$purpose") + fi if [ -n "$NC" ]; then exts=$(printf "%s\nnameConstraints = %s\n" "$exts" "$NC") fi csr=$(req "$key" "CN = $cn") || return 1 echo "$csr" | cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${cacert}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \ - -set_serial 2 -days "${DAYS}" + -set_serial 2 -days "${DAYS}" "$@" } gen_nonbc_ca() { diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/root-expired.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/root-expired.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/root-expired.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/root-expired.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIC8jCCAdqgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290 +IENBMB4XDTIwMTIwMjE0MTYwOVoXDTIwMTIwMTE0MTYwOVowEjEQMA4GA1UEAwwH +Um9vdCBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAOHmAPUGvKBG +OHkPPx5xGRNtAt8rm3Zr/KywIe3WkQhCO6VjNexSW6CiSsXWAJQDl1o9uWco0n3j +IVyk7cY8jY6E0Z1Uwz3ZdKKWdmdx+cYaUHez/XjuW+DjjIkjwpoi7D7UN54HzcAr +VREXOjRCHGkNOhiw7RWUXsb9nofGHOeUGpLAXwXBc0PlA94JkckkztiOi34u4DFI +0YYqalUmeugLNk6XseCkydpcaUsDgAhWg6Mfsiq4wUz+xbFN1MABqu2+ziW97mmt +9gfNbiuhiVT1aOuYCe3JYGbLM2JKA7Bo1g6rX8E1VX79Ru6669y2oqPthX9337Vo +IkN+ZiQjr8UCAwEAAaNTMFEwHQYDVR0OBBYEFI71Ja8em2uEPXyAmslTnE1y96NS +MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uEPXyAmslTnE1y96NSMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMB +Af8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAH1uqov7eXVT6GbhJ7foASTQpIaVi4GXIfbS +bYKCb0erWkLfW7EKalOTBp5TjWONSM4mX2OlZag7yq1P1YwMaBA51OkH0Ojic9fX +majK2S/ZyFI6NLoPqN0Uw/K1HHU0DXpK/mf3YdFOEZMf9LVlXR0O6og19HxBmNnN +LhTOQ29IGqNzayHGBi4U8LG+UAe5sxlC+gnnQEPGMrOS1XElybtHIxnqk2LJDvXj +2Dj12TCISD9bQ53oRkudTvTPyvxK6OsnFC/wTBmHk03yxnZdQEKyj9guahiRb+hj +sz4mDWWMmelcr6veEfzzlUZK7aoIrpJmgukhv/Qafwczo38J5U0= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/setup.sh openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/setup.sh --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/certs/setup.sh 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/certs/setup.sh 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,10 +1,11 @@ -#! /bin/sh +#! /bin/bash # Primary root: root-cert # root cert variants: CA:false, key2, DN2 # trust variants: +serverAuth -serverAuth +clientAuth -clientAuth +anyEKU -anyEKU # ./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key root-cert +DAYS=-1 ./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key root-expired ./mkcert.sh genss "Root CA" root-key root-nonca ./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key2 root-cert2 ./mkcert.sh genroot "Root Cert 2" root-key root-name2 @@ -116,11 +117,15 @@ # CA has 768-bit key OPENSSL_KEYBITS=768 \ ./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key-768 ca-cert-768 root-key root-cert +# EC cert with explicit curve +./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key-ec-explicit ca-cert-ec-explicit root-key root-cert +# EC cert with named curve +./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key-ec-named ca-cert-ec-named root-key root-cert # client intermediate ca: cca-cert # trust variants: +serverAuth, -serverAuth, +clientAuth, -clientAuth # -./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key cca-cert root-key root-cert clientAuth +./mkcert.sh genca -p clientAuth "CA" ca-key cca-cert root-key root-cert # openssl x509 -in cca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust serverAuth -out cca+serverAuth.pem @@ -138,7 +143,7 @@ # server intermediate ca: sca-cert # trust variants: +serverAuth, -serverAuth, +clientAuth, -clientAuth, -anyEKU, +anyEKU # -./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key sca-cert root-key root-cert serverAuth +./mkcert.sh genca -p serverAuth "CA" ca-key sca-cert root-key root-cert # openssl x509 -in sca-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust serverAuth -out sca+serverAuth.pem @@ -154,7 +159,7 @@ -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out sca+anyEKU.pem # Primary leaf cert: ee-cert -# ee variants: expired, issuer-key2, issuer-name2 +# ee variants: expired, issuer-key2, issuer-name2, bad-pathlen # trust variants: +serverAuth, -serverAuth, +clientAuth, -clientAuth # purpose variants: client # @@ -163,6 +168,8 @@ ./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-cert2 ca-key2 ca-cert2 ./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-name2 ca-key ca-name2 ./mkcert.sh genee -p clientAuth server.example ee-key ee-client ca-key ca-cert +./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-pathlen ca-key ca-cert \ + -extfile <(echo "basicConstraints=CA:FALSE,pathlen:0") # bash needed here # openssl x509 -in ee-cert.pem -trustout \ -addtrust serverAuth -out ee+serverAuth.pem @@ -182,6 +189,17 @@ # 768-bit leaf key OPENSSL_KEYBITS=768 \ ./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key-768 ee-cert-768 ca-key ca-cert +# EC cert with explicit curve signed by named curve ca +./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key-ec-explicit ee-cert-ec-explicit ca-key-ec-named ca-cert-ec-named +# EC cert with named curve signed by explicit curve ca +./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key-ec-named-explicit \ + ee-cert-ec-named-explicit ca-key-ec-explicit ca-cert-ec-explicit +# EC cert with named curve signed by named curve ca +./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key-ec-named-named \ + ee-cert-ec-named-named ca-key-ec-named ca-cert-ec-named + +# self-signed end-entity cert with explicit keyUsage not including KeyCertSign +openssl req -new -x509 -key ee-key.pem -subj /CN=ee-self-signed -out ee-self-signed.pem -addext keyUsage=digitalSignature -days 36500 # Proxy certificates, off of ee-client # Start with some good ones @@ -362,9 +380,14 @@ # SHA1 ./mkcert.sh genee PSS-SHA1 ee-key ee-pss-sha1-cert ca-key ca-cert \ -sha1 -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -sigopt rsa_pss_saltlen:digest -# SHA256 +# EE SHA256 ./mkcert.sh genee PSS-SHA256 ee-key ee-pss-sha256-cert ca-key ca-cert \ - -sha256 -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -sigopt rsa_pss_saltlen:digest + -sha256 -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -sigopt rsa_pss_saltlen:digest +# CA-PSS +./mkcert.sh genca "CA-PSS" ca-pss-key ca-pss-cert root-key root-cert \ + -sha256 -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -sigopt rsa_pss_saltlen:-1 +./mkcert.sh genee "EE-PSS" ee-key ee-pss-cert ca-pss-key ca-pss-cert \ + -sha256 -sigopt rsa_padding_mode:pss -sigopt rsa_pss_saltlen:-1 OPENSSL_KEYALG=ec OPENSSL_KEYBITS=brainpoolP256r1 ./mkcert.sh genee \ "Server ECDSA brainpoolP256r1 cert" server-ecdsa-brainpoolP256r1-key \ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/cmactest.c openssl-1.1.1j/test/cmactest.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/cmactest.c 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/cmactest.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "internal/nelem.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "testutil.h" + +static const char xtskey[32] = { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, + 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f +}; + +static struct test_st { + const char key[32]; + int key_len; + const unsigned char data[64]; + int data_len; + const char *mac; +} test[3] = { + { + { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, + 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f + }, + 16, + "My test data", + 12, + "29cec977c48f63c200bd5c4a6881b224" + }, + { + { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, + 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, + 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f + }, + 32, + "My test data", + 12, + "db6493aa04e4761f473b2b453c031c9a" + }, + { + { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, + 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, + 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f + }, + 32, + "My test data again", + 18, + "65c11c75ecf590badd0a5e56cbb8af60" + }, +}; + +static char *pt(unsigned char *md, unsigned int len); + +static int test_cmac_bad(void) +{ + CMAC_CTX *ctx = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + ctx = CMAC_CTX_new(); + if (!TEST_ptr(ctx) + || !TEST_false(CMAC_Init(ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) + || !TEST_false(CMAC_Update(ctx, test[0].data, test[0].data_len)) + /* Should be able to pass cipher first, and then key */ + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Init(ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL)) + /* Must have a key */ + || !TEST_false(CMAC_Update(ctx, test[0].data, test[0].data_len)) + /* Now supply the key */ + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Init(ctx, test[0].key, test[0].key_len, NULL, NULL)) + /* Update should now work */ + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Update(ctx, test[0].data, test[0].data_len)) + /* XTS is not a suitable cipher to use */ + || !TEST_false(CMAC_Init(ctx, xtskey, sizeof(xtskey), EVP_aes_128_xts(), + NULL)) + || !TEST_false(CMAC_Update(ctx, test[0].data, test[0].data_len))) + goto err; + + ret = 1; +err: + CMAC_CTX_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + +static int test_cmac_run(void) +{ + char *p; + CMAC_CTX *ctx = NULL; + unsigned char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t len; + int ret = 0; + + ctx = CMAC_CTX_new(); + + if (!TEST_true(CMAC_Init(ctx, test[0].key, test[0].key_len, + EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL)) + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Update(ctx, test[0].data, test[0].data_len)) + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Final(ctx, buf, &len))) + goto err; + + p = pt(buf, len); + if (!TEST_str_eq(p, test[0].mac)) + goto err; + + if (!TEST_true(CMAC_Init(ctx, test[1].key, test[1].key_len, + EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL)) + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Update(ctx, test[1].data, test[1].data_len)) + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Final(ctx, buf, &len))) + goto err; + + p = pt(buf, len); + if (!TEST_str_eq(p, test[1].mac)) + goto err; + + if (!TEST_true(CMAC_Init(ctx, test[2].key, test[2].key_len, NULL, NULL)) + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Update(ctx, test[2].data, test[2].data_len)) + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Final(ctx, buf, &len))) + goto err; + p = pt(buf, len); + if (!TEST_str_eq(p, test[2].mac)) + goto err; + /* Test reusing a key */ + if (!TEST_true(CMAC_Init(ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Update(ctx, test[2].data, test[2].data_len)) + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Final(ctx, buf, &len))) + goto err; + p = pt(buf, len); + if (!TEST_str_eq(p, test[2].mac)) + goto err; + + /* Test setting the cipher and key separately */ + if (!TEST_true(CMAC_Init(ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL)) + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Init(ctx, test[2].key, test[2].key_len, NULL, NULL)) + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Update(ctx, test[2].data, test[2].data_len)) + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Final(ctx, buf, &len))) + goto err; + p = pt(buf, len); + if (!TEST_str_eq(p, test[2].mac)) + goto err; + + ret = 1; +err: + CMAC_CTX_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + +static int test_cmac_copy(void) +{ + char *p; + CMAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx2 = NULL; + unsigned char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t len; + int ret = 0; + + ctx = CMAC_CTX_new(); + ctx2 = CMAC_CTX_new(); + if (!TEST_ptr(ctx) || !TEST_ptr(ctx2)) + goto err; + + if (!TEST_true(CMAC_Init(ctx, test[0].key, test[0].key_len, + EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL)) + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Update(ctx, test[0].data, test[0].data_len)) + || !TEST_true(CMAC_CTX_copy(ctx2, ctx)) + || !TEST_true(CMAC_Final(ctx2, buf, &len))) + goto err; + + p = pt(buf, len); + if (!TEST_str_eq(p, test[0].mac)) + goto err; + + ret = 1; +err: + CMAC_CTX_free(ctx2); + CMAC_CTX_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + +static char *pt(unsigned char *md, unsigned int len) +{ + unsigned int i; + static char buf[80]; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) + sprintf(&(buf[i * 2]), "%02x", md[i]); + return buf; +} + +int setup_tests(void) +{ + ADD_TEST(test_cmac_bad); + ADD_TEST(test_cmac_run); + ADD_TEST(test_cmac_copy); + return 1; +} + diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/drbgtest.c openssl-1.1.1j/test/drbgtest.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/drbgtest.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/drbgtest.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2011-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -286,7 +286,6 @@ */ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td) { - static char zero[sizeof(RAND_DRBG)]; RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL; TEST_CTX t; unsigned char buff[1024]; @@ -302,7 +301,7 @@ /* Test detection of too large personalisation string */ if (!init(drbg, td, &t) - || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, drbg->max_perslen + 1) > 0) + || !TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, drbg->max_perslen + 1))) goto err; /* @@ -311,7 +310,7 @@ /* Test entropy source failure detection: i.e. returns no data */ t.entropylen = 0; - if (TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen), 0)) + if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen))) goto err; /* Try to generate output from uninstantiated DRBG */ @@ -321,16 +320,18 @@ goto err; /* Test insufficient entropy */ + if (!init(drbg, td, &t)) + goto err; t.entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen - 1; - if (!init(drbg, td, &t) - || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0 + if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen)) || !uninstantiate(drbg)) goto err; /* Test too much entropy */ + if (!init(drbg, td, &t)) + goto err; t.entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen + 1; - if (!init(drbg, td, &t) - || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0 + if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen)) || !uninstantiate(drbg)) goto err; @@ -340,18 +341,20 @@ /* Test too small nonce */ if (drbg->min_noncelen) { + if (!init(drbg, td, &t)) + goto err; t.noncelen = drbg->min_noncelen - 1; - if (!init(drbg, td, &t) - || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0 + if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen)) || !uninstantiate(drbg)) goto err; } /* Test too large nonce */ if (drbg->max_noncelen) { + if (!init(drbg, td, &t)) + goto err; t.noncelen = drbg->max_noncelen + 1; - if (!init(drbg, td, &t) - || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0 + if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen)) || !uninstantiate(drbg)) goto err; } @@ -377,7 +380,7 @@ * failure. */ t.entropylen = 0; - if (TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 1, + if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 1, td->adin, td->adinlen)) || !uninstantiate(drbg)) goto err; @@ -385,15 +388,15 @@ /* Instantiate again with valid data */ if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t)) goto err; - reseed_counter_tmp = drbg->reseed_gen_counter; - drbg->reseed_gen_counter = drbg->reseed_interval; + reseed_counter_tmp = drbg->generate_counter; + drbg->generate_counter = drbg->reseed_interval; /* Generate output and check entropy has been requested for reseed */ t.entropycnt = 0; if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0, td->adin, td->adinlen)) || !TEST_int_eq(t.entropycnt, 1) - || !TEST_int_eq(drbg->reseed_gen_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1) + || !TEST_int_eq(drbg->generate_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1) || !uninstantiate(drbg)) goto err; @@ -410,15 +413,15 @@ /* Test reseed counter works */ if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t)) goto err; - reseed_counter_tmp = drbg->reseed_gen_counter; - drbg->reseed_gen_counter = drbg->reseed_interval; + reseed_counter_tmp = drbg->generate_counter; + drbg->generate_counter = drbg->reseed_interval; /* Generate output and check entropy has been requested for reseed */ t.entropycnt = 0; if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0, td->adin, td->adinlen)) || !TEST_int_eq(t.entropycnt, 1) - || !TEST_int_eq(drbg->reseed_gen_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1) + || !TEST_int_eq(drbg->generate_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1) || !uninstantiate(drbg)) goto err; @@ -428,12 +431,12 @@ /* Test explicit reseed with too large additional input */ if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t) - || RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, drbg->max_adinlen + 1, 0) > 0) + || !TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, drbg->max_adinlen + 1, 0))) goto err; /* Test explicit reseed with entropy source failure */ t.entropylen = 0; - if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0), 0) + if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0)) || !uninstantiate(drbg)) goto err; @@ -441,7 +444,7 @@ if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t)) goto err; t.entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen + 1; - if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0), 0) + if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0)) || !uninstantiate(drbg)) goto err; @@ -449,14 +452,10 @@ if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t)) goto err; t.entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen - 1; - if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0), 0) + if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0)) || !uninstantiate(drbg)) goto err; - /* Standard says we have to check uninstantiate really zeroes */ - if (!TEST_mem_eq(zero, sizeof(drbg->data), &drbg->data, sizeof(drbg->data))) - goto err; - ret = 1; err: @@ -483,7 +482,7 @@ DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td = &drbg_test[i]; int rv = 0; - if (error_check(td)) + if (!error_check(td)) goto err; rv = 1; @@ -601,14 +600,14 @@ */ /* Test whether seed propagation is enabled */ - if (!TEST_int_ne(master->reseed_prop_counter, 0) - || !TEST_int_ne(public->reseed_prop_counter, 0) - || !TEST_int_ne(private->reseed_prop_counter, 0)) + if (!TEST_int_ne(master->reseed_counter, 0) + || !TEST_int_ne(public->reseed_counter, 0) + || !TEST_int_ne(private->reseed_counter, 0)) return 0; /* Check whether the master DRBG's reseed counter is the largest one */ - if (!TEST_int_le(public->reseed_prop_counter, master->reseed_prop_counter) - || !TEST_int_le(private->reseed_prop_counter, master->reseed_prop_counter)) + if (!TEST_int_le(public->reseed_counter, master->reseed_counter) + || !TEST_int_le(private->reseed_counter, master->reseed_counter)) return 0; /* @@ -656,8 +655,8 @@ if (expect_success == 1) { /* Test whether all three reseed counters are synchronized */ - if (!TEST_int_eq(public->reseed_prop_counter, master->reseed_prop_counter) - || !TEST_int_eq(private->reseed_prop_counter, master->reseed_prop_counter)) + if (!TEST_int_eq(public->reseed_counter, master->reseed_counter) + || !TEST_int_eq(private->reseed_counter, master->reseed_counter)) return 0; /* Test whether reseed time of master DRBG is set correctly */ @@ -771,7 +770,7 @@ * Test whether the public and private DRBG are both reseeded when their * reseed counters differ from the master's reseed counter. */ - master->reseed_prop_counter++; + master->reseed_counter++; if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed(1, master, public, private, 0, 1, 1, 0))) goto error; reset_drbg_hook_ctx(); @@ -780,8 +779,8 @@ * Test whether the public DRBG is reseeded when its reseed counter differs * from the master's reseed counter. */ - master->reseed_prop_counter++; - private->reseed_prop_counter++; + master->reseed_counter++; + private->reseed_counter++; if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed(1, master, public, private, 0, 1, 0, 0))) goto error; reset_drbg_hook_ctx(); @@ -790,8 +789,8 @@ * Test whether the private DRBG is reseeded when its reseed counter differs * from the master's reseed counter. */ - master->reseed_prop_counter++; - public->reseed_prop_counter++; + master->reseed_counter++; + public->reseed_counter++; if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed(1, master, public, private, 0, 0, 1, 0))) goto error; reset_drbg_hook_ctx(); @@ -824,7 +823,7 @@ * Test whether none of the DRBGs is reseed if the master fails to reseed */ master_ctx.fail = 1; - master->reseed_prop_counter++; + master->reseed_counter++; RAND_add(rand_add_buf, sizeof(rand_add_buf), sizeof(rand_add_buf)); if (!TEST_true(test_drbg_reseed(0, master, public, private, 0, 0, 0, 0))) goto error; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/ec_internal_test.c openssl-1.1.1j/test/ec_internal_test.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/ec_internal_test.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/ec_internal_test.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -183,6 +183,106 @@ return ret; } +/* + * Tests behavior of the decoded_from_explicit_params flag and API + */ +static int decoded_flag_test(void) +{ + EC_GROUP *grp; + EC_GROUP *grp_copy = NULL; + ECPARAMETERS *ecparams = NULL; + ECPKPARAMETERS *ecpkparams = NULL; + EC_KEY *key = NULL; + unsigned char *encodedparams = NULL; + const unsigned char *encp; + int encodedlen; + int testresult = 0; + + /* Test EC_GROUP_new not setting the flag */ + grp = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GFp_simple_method()); + if (!TEST_ptr(grp) + || !TEST_int_eq(grp->decoded_from_explicit_params, 0)) + goto err; + EC_GROUP_free(grp); + + /* Test EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name not setting the flag */ + grp = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); + if (!TEST_ptr(grp) + || !TEST_int_eq(grp->decoded_from_explicit_params, 0)) + goto err; + + /* Test EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters not setting the flag */ + if (!TEST_ptr(ecparams = EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(grp, NULL)) + || !TEST_ptr(grp_copy = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(ecparams)) + || !TEST_int_eq(grp_copy->decoded_from_explicit_params, 0)) + goto err; + EC_GROUP_free(grp_copy); + grp_copy = NULL; + ECPARAMETERS_free(ecparams); + ecparams = NULL; + + /* Test EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters not setting the flag */ + if (!TEST_int_eq(EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(grp), OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE) + || !TEST_ptr(ecpkparams = EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(grp, NULL)) + || !TEST_ptr(grp_copy = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(ecpkparams)) + || !TEST_int_eq(grp_copy->decoded_from_explicit_params, 0) + || !TEST_ptr(key = EC_KEY_new()) + /* Test EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params on key without a group */ + || !TEST_int_eq(EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(key), -1) + || !TEST_int_eq(EC_KEY_set_group(key, grp_copy), 1) + /* Test EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params negative case */ + || !TEST_int_eq(EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(key), 0)) + goto err; + EC_GROUP_free(grp_copy); + grp_copy = NULL; + ECPKPARAMETERS_free(ecpkparams); + ecpkparams = NULL; + + /* Test d2i_ECPKParameters with named params not setting the flag */ + if (!TEST_int_gt(encodedlen = i2d_ECPKParameters(grp, &encodedparams), 0) + || !TEST_ptr(encp = encodedparams) + || !TEST_ptr(grp_copy = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &encp, encodedlen)) + || !TEST_int_eq(grp_copy->decoded_from_explicit_params, 0)) + goto err; + EC_GROUP_free(grp_copy); + grp_copy = NULL; + OPENSSL_free(encodedparams); + encodedparams = NULL; + + /* Asn1 flag stays set to explicit with EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters */ + EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(grp, OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE); + if (!TEST_ptr(ecpkparams = EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(grp, NULL)) + || !TEST_ptr(grp_copy = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(ecpkparams)) + || !TEST_int_eq(EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(grp_copy), OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE) + || !TEST_int_eq(grp_copy->decoded_from_explicit_params, 0)) + goto err; + EC_GROUP_free(grp_copy); + grp_copy = NULL; + + /* Test d2i_ECPKParameters with explicit params setting the flag */ + if (!TEST_int_gt(encodedlen = i2d_ECPKParameters(grp, &encodedparams), 0) + || !TEST_ptr(encp = encodedparams) + || !TEST_ptr(grp_copy = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &encp, encodedlen)) + || !TEST_int_eq(EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(grp_copy), OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE) + || !TEST_int_eq(grp_copy->decoded_from_explicit_params, 1) + || !TEST_int_eq(EC_KEY_set_group(key, grp_copy), 1) + /* Test EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params positive case */ + || !TEST_int_eq(EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(key), 1)) + goto err; + + testresult = 1; + + err: + EC_KEY_free(key); + EC_GROUP_free(grp); + EC_GROUP_free(grp_copy); + ECPARAMETERS_free(ecparams); + ECPKPARAMETERS_free(ecpkparams); + OPENSSL_free(encodedparams); + + return testresult; +} + int setup_tests(void) { crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0); @@ -196,6 +296,7 @@ ADD_TEST(field_tests_ec2_simple); #endif ADD_ALL_TESTS(field_tests_default, crv_len); + ADD_TEST(decoded_flag_test); return 1; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/ectest.c openssl-1.1.1j/test/ectest.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/ectest.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/ectest.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -2099,6 +2099,87 @@ return ret; } +/* + * check the EC_METHOD respects the supplied EC_GROUP_set_generator G + */ +static int custom_generator_test(int id) +{ + int ret = 0, nid, bsize; + EC_GROUP *group = NULL; + EC_POINT *G2 = NULL, *Q1 = NULL, *Q2 = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *k = NULL; + unsigned char *b1 = NULL, *b2 = NULL; + + /* Do some setup */ + nid = curves[id].nid; + TEST_note("Curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); + if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = BN_CTX_new())) + return 0; + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + + if (!TEST_ptr(group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid))) + goto err; + + /* expected byte length of encoded points */ + bsize = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8; + bsize = 2 * bsize + 1; + + if (!TEST_ptr(k = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) + /* fetch a testing scalar k != 0,1 */ + || !TEST_true(BN_rand(k, EC_GROUP_order_bits(group) - 1, + BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)) + /* make k even */ + || !TEST_true(BN_clear_bit(k, 0)) + || !TEST_ptr(G2 = EC_POINT_new(group)) + || !TEST_ptr(Q1 = EC_POINT_new(group)) + /* Q1 := kG */ + || !TEST_true(EC_POINT_mul(group, Q1, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) + /* pull out the bytes of that */ + || !TEST_int_eq(EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q1, + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, + 0, ctx), bsize) + || !TEST_ptr(b1 = OPENSSL_malloc(bsize)) + || !TEST_int_eq(EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q1, + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, b1, + bsize, ctx), bsize) + /* new generator is G2 := 2G */ + || !TEST_true(EC_POINT_dbl(group, G2, EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group), + ctx)) + || !TEST_true(EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, G2, + EC_GROUP_get0_order(group), + EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(group))) + || !TEST_ptr(Q2 = EC_POINT_new(group)) + || !TEST_true(BN_rshift1(k, k)) + /* Q2 := k/2 G2 */ + || !TEST_true(EC_POINT_mul(group, Q2, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) + || !TEST_int_eq(EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q2, + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, + 0, ctx), bsize) + || !TEST_ptr(b2 = OPENSSL_malloc(bsize)) + || !TEST_int_eq(EC_POINT_point2oct(group, Q2, + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, b2, + bsize, ctx), bsize) + /* Q1 = kG = k/2 G2 = Q2 should hold */ + || !TEST_int_eq(CRYPTO_memcmp(b1, b2, bsize), 0)) + goto err; + + ret = 1; + + err: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + EC_POINT_free(Q1); + EC_POINT_free(Q2); + EC_POINT_free(G2); + EC_GROUP_free(group); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + OPENSSL_free(b1); + OPENSSL_free(b2); + + return ret; +} + #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ int setup_tests(void) @@ -2126,6 +2207,7 @@ ADD_ALL_TESTS(check_named_curve_from_ecparameters, crv_len); ADD_ALL_TESTS(ec_point_hex2point_test, crv_len); + ADD_ALL_TESTS(custom_generator_test, crv_len); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ return 1; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/handshake_helper.c openssl-1.1.1j/test/handshake_helper.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/handshake_helper.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/handshake_helper.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -637,7 +637,8 @@ } if (extra->client.alpn_protocols != NULL) { unsigned char *alpn_protos = NULL; - size_t alpn_protos_len; + size_t alpn_protos_len = 0; + if (!TEST_true(parse_protos(extra->client.alpn_protocols, &alpn_protos, &alpn_protos_len)) /* Reversed return value convention... */ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-254-chars-at-the-end.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-254-chars-at-the-end.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-254-chars-at-the-end.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-254-chars-at-the-end.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 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 +mipKB41NPXrbp/T5eu+fndvZq72N/Tq0vZp2dRoz89NEFC3jYVBjp4pmVwCS9F/fGX1tnVfhb9k/4fqiI/y9lBVzxaHyMG/pt0D2nTS8iaMTM7uBeRvB5rUZlEbU8uvv4GXu3CeP/NnVceXruGbPb4IpjfoUbGLvn5oK35h8a+LNY5f7QRBlAXtUwYrdxVzT+CqQ4wIAuqoIVXgRIweveS1ArbS8hOtsVnu1bUAQVKqORHx8gtbOyiA4heTCEOkwh45YV6KW+uLI1wTeE4E9erlI4RwZ7umbBnQai/hYL//AUfQKQhpGbgfyJrS0UYY7WEP/mcFQh0U2EBTXtAy/e4XPiftViR3+pd+G2TJ/JFofDDzJRrceeo +9tUnMr0pKtU7oB77lSKgsruKKkhn6lLH8CAwEAAaNTMFEwHQYDVR0OBBYEFIkawSiFUdL6G3jw8qg1WQI8Xi4rMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIkawSiFUdL6G3jw8qg1WQI8Xi4rMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggE0AAHe/+71vykcq9BQ5h2X7MpnkE5n0Yn0Xi24uuCpv59JjABmOdaeT6XBQ5UJN8WfidawgzbJ6WiWgjflaMfRfjsdCJRgvdw0gfXXXrsseJMeMYnw1hQTGuB83BKjXBdL6zb45qGf2Fgjm3aNW2NUVM+Q2QfMjo +Kx13hTyDh9l5nOhMv/Rkygcx1Row2WbkvrhxvCLxY0VhL7RuPV8K0ogKicv8VJgQriOUVTTkqBP1xUimKSTaNaZ8KAnC7thxxZHxsNa45a6AouPSzyAOPZQgCJW83OIFxvWsdYU1KvP1wmoi1XC9giSQ/5sLPu/eAYTzmY+Xd6Sq8dF8uyodeI2gFu3AzC28PVKeUriIGfxaqEUn+aXx5W+r8JTE6fQ9mBo9YxJBXG+OTIFgHR27q2dJwqK9c= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-254-chars-in-the-middle.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-254-chars-in-the-middle.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-254-chars-in-the-middle.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-254-chars-in-the-middle.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIEcjCCAyegAwIBAgIUPLgYY73GEwkikNCKRJrcbCR+TbQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwgZUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkFVMWMwYQYDVQQIDFpUaGUgR3JlYXQgU3RhdGUgb2YgTG9uZy1XaW5kZWQgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgRmllbGQgTmFtZXMgV2hlcmVieSB0byBJbmNyZWFzZSB0aGUgT +3V0cHV0IFNpemUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdpdHMgUHR5IEx0ZDAeFw0yMDA0MDcwMDAwNDJaFw0zMDA0MDUwMDAwNDJaMIGVMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTFjMGEGA1UECAxaVGhlIEdyZWF0IFN0YXRlIG9mIExvbmctV2luZGVkIENlcnRpZmljYXRlIEZpZWxkIE5hbWVzIFdoZXJlYnkgdG8gSW5jcmVhc2UgdGhlIE91dHB1dCB +TaXplMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwggFUMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBQQAwggE8AoIBMwLfmipKB41NPXrbp/T5eu+fndvZq72N/Tq0vZp2dRoz89NEFC3jYVBjp4pmVwCS9F/fGX1tnVfhb9k/4fqiI/y9lBVzxaHyMG/pt0D2nTS8iaMTM7uBeRvB5rUZlEbU8uvv4GXu3CeP/NnVceXruGbPb4IpjfoUbGLvn5oK35h8a+LNY5f7QRBlAXtUwYrdxVzT+CqQ4wIAuqoIVXgRIweveS1ArbS8hOtsVnu1bUAQVKqORHx8gtbOyiA4heTCEOkwh45YV6KW+uLI1wTeE4E9erlI4RwZ7umbBnQai/hYL//AUfQKQhpGbgfyJrS0UYY7WEP/mcFQh0U2EBTXtAy/e4XPiftViR3+pd+G2TJ/JFofDDzJRrceeo9tUnMr0pKtU7oB77lSKgsruKKkhn6lLH8CAwEAAaNTMFEwHQYDVR0OBBYEFIkawSiFUdL6G3jw8qg1WQI8Xi4rMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIkawSiFUdL6G3jw8qg1WQI8Xi4rMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggE0AAHe/+71vykcq9BQ5h2X7MpnkE5n0Yn0Xi24uuCpv59JjABmOdaeT6XBQ5UJN8WfidawgzbJ6WiWgjflaMfRfjsdCJRgvdw0gfXXXrsseJMeMYnw1hQTGuB83BKjXBdL6zb45qGf2Fgjm3aNW2NUVM+Q2QfMjoKx13hTyDh9l5nOhMv/Rkygcx1Row2WbkvrhxvCLxY0VhL7RuPV8K0ogKicv8VJgQriOUVTTkqBP1xUimKSTaNaZ8KAnC7thxxZHxsNa45a6AouPSzyAOPZQgCJW83OIFxvWsdYU1KvP1wmoi1XC9giSQ/5sLPu/eAYTzmY+Xd6Sq8dF8uyodeI2gFu3AzC28PVKeUriIGfxaqEUn+aXx5W+r8JTE6fQ9mBo9YxJBXG+OTIFgHR27q2dJwqK9c= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-oneline-multiple-of-254.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-oneline-multiple-of-254.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-oneline-multiple-of-254.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/04-test_pem_data/cert-oneline-multiple-of-254.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIEcjCCAyegAwIBAgIUPLgYY73GEwkikNCKRJrcbCR+TbQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwgZUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkFVMWMwYQYDVQQIDFpUaGUgR3JlYXQgU3RhdGUgb2YgTG9uZy1XaW5kZWQgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUgRmllbGQgTmFtZXMgV2hlcmVieSB0byBJbmNyZWFzZSB0aGUgT3V0cHV0IFNpemUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdpdHMgUHR5IEx0ZDAeFw0yMDA0MDcwMDAwNDJaFw0zMDA0MDUwMDAwNDJaMIGVMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTFjMGEGA1UECAxaVGhlIEdyZWF0IFN0YXRlIG9mIExvbmctV2luZGVkIENlcnRpZmljYXRlIEZpZWxkIE5hbWVzIFdoZXJlYnkgdG8gSW5jcmVhc2UgdGhlIE91dHB1dCBTaXplMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwggFUMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBQQAwggE8AoIBMwLfmipKB41NPXrbp/T5eu+fndvZq72N/Tq0vZp2dRoz89NEFC3jYVBjp4pmVwCS9F/fGX1tnVfhb9k/4fqiI/y9lBVzxaHyMG/pt0D2nTS8iaMTM7uBeRvB5rUZlEbU8uvv4GXu3CeP/NnVceXruGbPb4IpjfoUbGLvn5oK35h8a+LNY5f7QRBlAXtUwYrdxVzT+CqQ4wIAuqoIVXgRIweveS1ArbS8hOtsVnu1bUAQVKqORHx8gtbOyiA4heTCEOkwh45YV6KW+uLI1wTeE4E9erlI4RwZ7umbBnQai/hYL//AUfQKQhpGbgfyJrS0UYY7WEP/mcFQh0U2EBTXtAy/e4XPiftViR3+pd+G2TJ/JFofDDzJRrceeo9tUnMr0pKtU7oB77lSKgsruKKkhn6lLH8CAwEAAaNTMFEwHQYDVR0OBBYEFIkawSiFUdL6G3jw8qg1WQI8Xi4rMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIkawSiFUdL6G3jw8qg1WQI8Xi4rMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggE0AAHe/+71vykcq9BQ5h2X7MpnkE5n0Yn0Xi24uuCpv59JjABmOdaeT6XBQ5UJN8WfidawgzbJ6WiWgjflaMfRfjsdCJRgvdw0gfXXXrsseJMeMYnw1hQTGuB83BKjXBdL6zb45qGf2Fgjm3aNW2NUVM+Q2QfMjoKx13hTyDh9l5nOhMv/Rkygcx1Row2WbkvrhxvCLxY0VhL7RuPV8K0ogKicv8VJgQriOUVTTkqBP1xUimKSTaNaZ8KAnC7thxxZHxsNa45a6AouPSzyAOPZQgCJW83OIFxvWsdYU1KvP1wmoi1XC9giSQ/5sLPu/eAYTzmY+Xd6Sq8dF8uyodeI2gFu3AzC28PVKeUriIGfxaqEUn+aXx5W+r8JTE6fQ9mBo9YxJBXG+OTIFgHR27q2dJwqK9c= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/04-test_pem.t openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/04-test_pem.t --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/04-test_pem.t 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/04-test_pem.t 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #! /usr/bin/env perl -# Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +# Copyright 2017-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ "cert-1023line.pem" => 1, "cert-1024line.pem" => 1, "cert-1025line.pem" => 1, + "cert-254-chars-at-the-end.pem" => 1, + "cert-254-chars-in-the-middle.pem" => 1, "cert-255line.pem" => 1, "cert-256line.pem" => 1, "cert-257line.pem" => 1, @@ -42,6 +44,7 @@ "cert-misalignedpad.pem" => 0, "cert-onecolumn.pem" => 1, "cert-oneline.pem" => 1, + "cert-oneline-multiple-of-254.pem" => 1, "cert-shortandlongline.pem" => 1, "cert-shortline.pem" => 1, "cert-threecolumn.pem" => 1, diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/05-test_cmac.t openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/05-test_cmac.t --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/05-test_cmac.t 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/05-test_cmac.t 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +#! /usr/bin/env perl +# Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +# +# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use +# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy +# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at +# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + + +use OpenSSL::Test::Simple; + +simple_test("test_cmac", "cmactest", "cmac"); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/15-test_ec.t openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/15-test_ec.t --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/15-test_ec.t 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/15-test_ec.t 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #! /usr/bin/env perl -# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +# Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -16,23 +16,51 @@ setup("test_ec"); -plan tests => 5; +plan tests => 11; require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl')); ok(run(test(["ectest"])), "running ectest"); - SKIP: { - skip "Skipping ec conversion test", 3 - if disabled("ec"); - - subtest 'ec conversions -- private key' => sub { - tconversion("ec", srctop_file("test","testec-p256.pem")); - }; - subtest 'ec conversions -- private key PKCS#8' => sub { - tconversion("ec", srctop_file("test","testec-p256.pem"), "pkey"); - }; - subtest 'ec conversions -- public key' => sub { - tconversion("ec", srctop_file("test","testecpub-p256.pem"), "ec", "-pubin", "-pubout"); - }; +SKIP: { + skip "Skipping EC conversion test", 3 + if disabled("ec"); + + subtest 'EC conversions -- private key' => sub { + tconversion("ec", srctop_file("test","testec-p256.pem")); + }; + subtest 'EC conversions -- private key PKCS#8' => sub { + tconversion("ec", srctop_file("test","testec-p256.pem"), "pkey"); + }; + subtest 'EC conversions -- public key' => sub { + tconversion("ec", srctop_file("test","testecpub-p256.pem"), + "ec", "-pubin", "-pubout"); + }; +} + +SKIP: { + skip "Skipping EdDSA conversion test", 6 + if disabled("ec"); + + subtest 'Ed25519 conversions -- private key' => sub { + tconversion("pkey", srctop_file("test","tested25519.pem")); + }; + subtest 'Ed25519 conversions -- private key PKCS#8' => sub { + tconversion("pkey", srctop_file("test","tested25519.pem"), "pkey"); + }; + subtest 'Ed25519 conversions -- public key' => sub { + tconversion("pkey", srctop_file("test","tested25519pub.pem"), + "pkey", "-pubin", "-pubout"); + }; + + subtest 'Ed448 conversions -- private key' => sub { + tconversion("pkey", srctop_file("test","tested448.pem")); + }; + subtest 'Ed448 conversions -- private key PKCS#8' => sub { + tconversion("pkey", srctop_file("test","tested448.pem"), "pkey"); + }; + subtest 'Ed448 conversions -- public key' => sub { + tconversion("pkey", srctop_file("test","tested448pub.pem"), + "pkey", "-pubin", "-pubout"); + }; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/15-test_genec.t 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,306 @@ +#! /usr/bin/env perl +# Copyright 2017-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +# +# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use +# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy +# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at +# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + + +use strict; +use warnings; + +use File::Spec; +use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/; +use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; + +setup("test_genec"); + +plan skip_all => "This test is unsupported in a no-ec build" + if disabled("ec"); + +my @prime_curves = qw( + secp112r1 + secp112r2 + secp128r1 + secp128r2 + secp160k1 + secp160r1 + secp160r2 + secp192k1 + secp224k1 + secp224r1 + secp256k1 + secp384r1 + secp521r1 + prime192v1 + prime192v2 + prime192v3 + prime239v1 + prime239v2 + prime239v3 + prime256v1 + wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6 + wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7 + wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8 + wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9 + wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12 + brainpoolP160r1 + brainpoolP160t1 + brainpoolP192r1 + brainpoolP192t1 + brainpoolP224r1 + brainpoolP224t1 + brainpoolP256r1 + brainpoolP256t1 + brainpoolP320r1 + brainpoolP320t1 + brainpoolP384r1 + brainpoolP384t1 + brainpoolP512r1 + brainpoolP512t1 +); + +my @binary_curves = qw( + sect113r1 + sect113r2 + sect131r1 + sect131r2 + sect163k1 + sect163r1 + sect163r2 + sect193r1 + sect193r2 + sect233k1 + sect233r1 + sect239k1 + sect283k1 + sect283r1 + sect409k1 + sect409r1 + sect571k1 + sect571r1 + c2pnb163v1 + c2pnb163v2 + c2pnb163v3 + c2pnb176v1 + c2tnb191v1 + c2tnb191v2 + c2tnb191v3 + c2pnb208w1 + c2tnb239v1 + c2tnb239v2 + c2tnb239v3 + c2pnb272w1 + c2pnb304w1 + c2tnb359v1 + c2pnb368w1 + c2tnb431r1 + wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1 + wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3 + wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4 + wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5 + wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10 + wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11 +); + +my @explicit_only_curves = (); +push(@explicit_only_curves, qw( + Oakley-EC2N-3 + Oakley-EC2N-4 + )) if !disabled("ec2m"); + +my @other_curves = (); +push(@other_curves, 'SM2') + if !disabled("sm2"); + +my @curve_aliases = qw( + P-192 + P-224 + P-256 + P-384 + P-521 +); +push(@curve_aliases, qw( + B-163 + B-233 + B-283 + B-409 + B-571 + K-163 + K-233 + K-283 + K-409 + K-571 +)) if !disabled("ec2m"); + +my @curve_list = (); +push(@curve_list, @prime_curves); +push(@curve_list, @binary_curves) + if !disabled("ec2m"); +push(@curve_list, @other_curves); +push(@curve_list, @curve_aliases); + +my @params_encodings = ('named_curve', 'explicit'); + +my @output_formats = ('PEM', 'DER'); + +plan tests => scalar(@curve_list) * scalar(@params_encodings) + * (1 + scalar(@output_formats)) # Try listed @output_formats and text output + * 2 # Test generating parameters and keys + + 1 # Checking that with no curve it fails + + 1 # Checking that with unknown curve it fails + + 1 # Subtest for explicit only curves + ; + +ok(!run(app([ 'openssl', 'genpkey', + '-algorithm', 'EC'])), + "genpkey EC with no params should fail"); + +ok(!run(app([ 'openssl', 'genpkey', + '-algorithm', 'EC', + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_paramgen_curve:bogus_foobar_curve'])), + "genpkey EC with unknown curve name should fail"); + +foreach my $curvename (@curve_list) { + foreach my $paramenc (@params_encodings) { + + # --- Test generating parameters --- + + ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genpkey', '-genparam', + '-algorithm', 'EC', + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_paramgen_curve:'.$curvename, + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_param_enc:'.$paramenc, + '-text'])), + "genpkey EC params ${curvename} with ec_param_enc:'${paramenc}' (text)"); + + foreach my $outform (@output_formats) { + my $outfile = "ecgen.${curvename}.${paramenc}." . lc $outform; + ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genpkey', '-genparam', + '-algorithm', 'EC', + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_paramgen_curve:'.$curvename, + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_param_enc:'.$paramenc, + '-outform', $outform, + '-out', $outfile])), + "genpkey EC params ${curvename} with ec_param_enc:'${paramenc}' (${outform})"); + } + + # --- Test generating actual keys --- + + ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genpkey', + '-algorithm', 'EC', + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_paramgen_curve:'.$curvename, + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_param_enc:'.$paramenc, + '-text'])), + "genpkey EC key on ${curvename} with ec_param_enc:'${paramenc}' (text)"); + + foreach my $outform (@output_formats) { + my $outfile = "ecgen.${curvename}.${paramenc}." . lc $outform; + ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genpkey', + '-algorithm', 'EC', + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_paramgen_curve:'.$curvename, + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_param_enc:'.$paramenc, + '-outform', $outform, + '-out', $outfile])), + "genpkey EC key on ${curvename} with ec_param_enc:'${paramenc}' (${outform})"); + } + } +} + +subtest "test curves that only support explicit parameters encoding" => sub { + @curve_list = @explicit_only_curves; + + plan skip_all => "This test is unsupported under current configuration" + if scalar(@curve_list) <= 0; + + plan tests => scalar(@curve_list) * scalar(@params_encodings) + * (1 + scalar(@output_formats)) # Try listed @output_formats and text output + * 2 # Test generating parameters and keys + ; + + foreach my $curvename (@curve_list) { + my $paramenc = "explicit"; + + # --- Test generating parameters --- + + ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genpkey', '-genparam', + '-algorithm', 'EC', + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_paramgen_curve:'.$curvename, + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_param_enc:'.$paramenc, + '-text'])), + "genpkey EC params ${curvename} with ec_param_enc:'${paramenc}' (text)"); + + foreach my $outform (@output_formats) { + my $outfile = "ecgen.${curvename}.${paramenc}." . lc $outform; + ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genpkey', '-genparam', + '-algorithm', 'EC', + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_paramgen_curve:'.$curvename, + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_param_enc:'.$paramenc, + '-outform', $outform, + '-out', $outfile])), + "genpkey EC params ${curvename} with ec_param_enc:'${paramenc}' (${outform})"); + } + + # --- Test generating actual keys --- + + ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genpkey', + '-algorithm', 'EC', + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_paramgen_curve:'.$curvename, + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_param_enc:'.$paramenc, + '-text'])), + "genpkey EC key on ${curvename} with ec_param_enc:'${paramenc}' (text)"); + + foreach my $outform (@output_formats) { + my $outfile = "ecgen.${curvename}.${paramenc}." . lc $outform; + ok(run(app([ 'openssl', 'genpkey', + '-algorithm', 'EC', + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_paramgen_curve:'.$curvename, + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_param_enc:'.$paramenc, + '-outform', $outform, + '-out', $outfile])), + "genpkey EC key on ${curvename} with ec_param_enc:'${paramenc}' (${outform})"); + } + + my $paramenc = "named_curve"; + + # --- Test generating parameters --- + + ok(!run(app([ 'openssl', 'genpkey', '-genparam', + '-algorithm', 'EC', + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_paramgen_curve:'.$curvename, + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_param_enc:'.$paramenc, + '-text'])), + "genpkey EC params ${curvename} with ec_param_enc:'${paramenc}' (text)"); + + foreach my $outform (@output_formats) { + my $outfile = "ecgen.${curvename}.${paramenc}." . lc $outform; + ok(!run(app([ 'openssl', 'genpkey', '-genparam', + '-algorithm', 'EC', + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_paramgen_curve:'.$curvename, + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_param_enc:'.$paramenc, + '-outform', $outform, + '-out', $outfile])), + "genpkey EC params ${curvename} with ec_param_enc:'${paramenc}' (${outform})"); + } + + # --- Test generating actual keys --- + + ok(!run(app([ 'openssl', 'genpkey', + '-algorithm', 'EC', + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_paramgen_curve:'.$curvename, + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_param_enc:'.$paramenc, + '-text'])), + "genpkey EC key on ${curvename} with ec_param_enc:'${paramenc}' (text)"); + + foreach my $outform (@output_formats) { + my $outfile = "ecgen.${curvename}.${paramenc}." . lc $outform; + ok(!run(app([ 'openssl', 'genpkey', + '-algorithm', 'EC', + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_paramgen_curve:'.$curvename, + '-pkeyopt', 'ec_param_enc:'.$paramenc, + '-outform', $outform, + '-out', $outfile])), + "genpkey EC key on ${curvename} with ec_param_enc:'${paramenc}' (${outform})"); + } + } +}; diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/20-test_dgst.t openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/20-test_dgst.t --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/20-test_dgst.t 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/20-test_dgst.t 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +#! /usr/bin/env perl +# Copyright 2017-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +# +# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use +# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy +# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at +# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + + +use strict; +use warnings; + +use File::Spec; +use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT with srctop_file/; +use OpenSSL::Test::Utils; + +setup("test_dgst"); + +plan tests => 5; + +sub tsignverify { + my $testtext = shift; + my $privkey = shift; + my $pubkey = shift; + + my $data_to_sign = srctop_file('test', 'README'); + my $other_data = srctop_file('test', 'README.external'); + + plan tests => 4; + + ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-sign', $privkey, + '-out', 'testdgst.sig', + $data_to_sign])), + $testtext.": Generating signature"); + + ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-prverify', $privkey, + '-signature', 'testdgst.sig', + $data_to_sign])), + $testtext.": Verify signature with private key"); + + ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-verify', $pubkey, + '-signature', 'testdgst.sig', + $data_to_sign])), + $testtext.": Verify signature with public key"); + + ok(!run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-verify', $pubkey, + '-signature', 'testdgst.sig', + $other_data])), + $testtext.": Expect failure verifying mismatching data"); + + unlink 'testdgst.sig'; +} + +SKIP: { + skip "RSA is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 1 + if disabled("rsa"); + + subtest "RSA signature generation and verification with `dgst` CLI" => sub { + tsignverify("RSA", + srctop_file("test","testrsa.pem"), + srctop_file("test","testrsapub.pem")); + }; +} + +SKIP: { + skip "DSA is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 1 + if disabled("dsa"); + + subtest "DSA signature generation and verification with `dgst` CLI" => sub { + tsignverify("DSA", + srctop_file("test","testdsa.pem"), + srctop_file("test","testdsapub.pem")); + }; +} + +SKIP: { + skip "ECDSA is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 1 + if disabled("ec"); + + subtest "ECDSA signature generation and verification with `dgst` CLI" => sub { + tsignverify("ECDSA", + srctop_file("test","testec-p256.pem"), + srctop_file("test","testecpub-p256.pem")); + }; +} + +SKIP: { + skip "EdDSA is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 2 + if disabled("ec"); + + skip "EdDSA is not supported with `dgst` CLI", 2; + + subtest "Ed25519 signature generation and verification with `dgst` CLI" => sub { + tsignverify("Ed25519", + srctop_file("test","tested25519.pem"), + srctop_file("test","tested25519pub.pem")); + }; + + subtest "Ed448 signature generation and verification with `dgst` CLI" => sub { + tsignverify("Ed448", + srctop_file("test","tested448.pem"), + srctop_file("test","tested448pub.pem")); + }; +} diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/25-test_req.t openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/25-test_req.t --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/25-test_req.t 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/25-test_req.t 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #! /usr/bin/env perl -# Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +# Copyright 2015-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ setup("test_req"); -plan tests => 12; +plan tests => 14; require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl')); @@ -100,6 +100,46 @@ "Generating request"); ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", + "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"), + "-verify", "-in", "testreq.pem", "-noout"])), + "Verifying signature on request"); + } +}; + +subtest "generating certificate requests with Ed25519" => sub { + plan tests => 2; + + SKIP: { + skip "Ed25519 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 2 + if disabled("ec"); + + ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", + "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"), + "-new", "-out", "testreq.pem", "-utf8", + "-key", srctop_file("test", "tested25519.pem")])), + "Generating request"); + + ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", + "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"), + "-verify", "-in", "testreq.pem", "-noout"])), + "Verifying signature on request"); + } +}; + +subtest "generating certificate requests with Ed448" => sub { + plan tests => 2; + + SKIP: { + skip "Ed448 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 2 + if disabled("ec"); + + ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", + "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"), + "-new", "-out", "testreq.pem", "-utf8", + "-key", srctop_file("test", "tested448.pem")])), + "Generating request"); + + ok(run(app(["openssl", "req", "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"), "-verify", "-in", "testreq.pem", "-noout"])), "Verifying signature on request"); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #! /usr/bin/env perl -# Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +# Copyright 2015-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ run(app([@args])); } -plan tests => 135; +plan tests => 146; # Canonical success ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]), @@ -132,6 +132,10 @@ "fail untrusted partial chain"); ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca-cert)], [], "-partial_chain"), "accept trusted partial chain"); +ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca-expired)], [], "-partial_chain"), + "reject expired trusted partial chain"); # this check is beyond RFC 5280 +ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-expired)], [qw(ca-cert)]), + "reject expired trusted root"); # this check is beyond RFC 5280 ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sca-cert)], [], "-partial_chain"), "accept partial chain with server purpose"); ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(cca-cert)], [], "-partial_chain"), @@ -222,6 +226,10 @@ "accept direct match with client trust"); ok(!verify("ee-client", "sslclient", [qw(ee-clientAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"), "reject direct match with client mistrust"); +ok(verify("ee-pathlen", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]), + "accept non-ca with pathlen:0 by default"); +ok(!verify("ee-pathlen", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)], "-x509_strict"), + "reject non-ca with pathlen:0 with strict flag"); # Proxy certificates ok(!verify("pc1-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ee-client ca-cert)]), @@ -276,6 +284,27 @@ ok(!verify("ee-cert-md5", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]), "reject md5 leaf at auth level 1"); +# Explicit vs named curve tests +SKIP: { + skip "EC is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 5 + if disabled("ec"); + ok(verify("ee-cert-ec-explicit", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], + ["ca-cert-ec-named"]), + "accept explicit curve leaf with named curve intermediate without strict"); + ok(verify("ee-cert-ec-named-explicit", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], + ["ca-cert-ec-explicit"]), + "accept named curve leaf with explicit curve intermediate without strict"); + ok(!verify("ee-cert-ec-explicit", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], + ["ca-cert-ec-named"], "-x509_strict"), + "reject explicit curve leaf with named curve intermediate with strict"); + ok(!verify("ee-cert-ec-named-explicit", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], + ["ca-cert-ec-explicit"], "-x509_strict"), + "reject named curve leaf with explicit curve intermediate with strict"); + ok(verify("ee-cert-ec-named-named", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], + ["ca-cert-ec-named"], "-x509_strict"), + "accept named curve leaf with named curve intermediate with strict"); +} + # Depth tests, note the depth limit bounds the number of CA certificates # between the trust-anchor and the leaf, so, for example, with a root->ca->leaf # chain, depth = 1 is sufficient, but depth == 0 is not. @@ -348,6 +377,9 @@ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"), "PSS signature using SHA256 and auth level 2"); +ok(verify("ee-pss-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-pss-cert"], ), + "CA PSS signature"); + ok(!verify("many-names1", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"], ["many-constraints"], ), "Too many names and constraints to check (1)"); ok(!verify("many-names2", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"], ["many-constraints"], ), @@ -364,6 +396,9 @@ ok(verify("root-cert-rsa2", "sslserver", ["root-cert-rsa2"], [], "-check_ss_sig"), "Public Key Algorithm rsa instead of rsaEncryption"); + ok(verify("ee-self-signed", "sslserver", ["ee-self-signed"], []), + "accept trusted self-signed EE cert excluding key usage keyCertSign"); + SKIP: { skip "Ed25519 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 1 if disabled("ec"); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/70-test_sslsigalgs.t 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -44,7 +44,9 @@ COMPAT_SIGALGS => 6, SIGALGS_CERT_ALL => 7, SIGALGS_CERT_PKCS => 8, - SIGALGS_CERT_INVALID => 9 + SIGALGS_CERT_INVALID => 9, + UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALGS_CERT => 10, + UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALG => 11 }; #Note: Throughout this test we override the default ciphersuites where TLSv1.2 @@ -53,7 +55,7 @@ #Test 1: Default sig algs should succeed $proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests"; -plan tests => 24; +plan tests => 26; ok(TLSProxy::Message->success, "Default sigalgs"); my $testtype; @@ -282,6 +284,39 @@ ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail, "No matching certificate for sigalgs_cert"); } +SKIP: { + skip "TLS 1.3 disabled", 2 if disabled("tls1_3"); + #Test 25: Send an unrecognized signature_algorithms_cert + # We should be able to skip over the unrecognized value and use a + # valid one that appears later in the list. + $proxy->clear(); + $proxy->filter(\&inject_unrecognized_sigalg); + $proxy->clientflags("-tls1_3"); + # Use -xcert to get SSL_check_chain() to run in the cert_cb. This is + # needed to trigger (e.g.) CVE-2020-1967 + $proxy->serverflags("" . + " -xcert " . srctop_file("test", "certs", "servercert.pem") . + " -xkey " . srctop_file("test", "certs", "serverkey.pem") . + " -xchain " . srctop_file("test", "certs", "rootcert.pem")); + $testtype = UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALGS_CERT; + $proxy->start(); + ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Unrecognized sigalg_cert in ClientHello"); + + #Test 26: Send an unrecognized signature_algorithms + # We should be able to skip over the unrecognized value and use a + # valid one that appears later in the list. + $proxy->clear(); + $proxy->filter(\&inject_unrecognized_sigalg); + $proxy->clientflags("-tls1_3"); + $proxy->serverflags("" . + " -xcert " . srctop_file("test", "certs", "servercert.pem") . + " -xkey " . srctop_file("test", "certs", "serverkey.pem") . + " -xchain " . srctop_file("test", "certs", "rootcert.pem")); + $testtype = UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALG; + $proxy->start(); + ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Unrecognized sigalg in ClientHello"); +} + sub sigalgs_filter @@ -427,3 +462,30 @@ } } } + +sub inject_unrecognized_sigalg +{ + my $proxy = shift; + my $type; + + # We're only interested in the initial ClientHello + if ($proxy->flight != 0) { + return; + } + if ($testtype == UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALGS_CERT) { + $type = TLSProxy::Message::EXT_SIG_ALGS_CERT; + } elsif ($testtype == UNRECOGNIZED_SIGALG) { + $type = TLSProxy::Message::EXT_SIG_ALGS; + } else { + return; + } + + my $ext = pack "C8", + 0x00, 0x06, #Extension length + 0xfe, 0x18, #private use + 0x04, 0x01, #rsa_pkcs1_sha256 + 0x08, 0x04; #rsa_pss_rsae_sha256; + my $message = ${$proxy->message_list}[0]; + $message->set_extension($type, $ext); + $message->repack; +} diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/70-test_verify_extra.t openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/70-test_verify_extra.t --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/70-test_verify_extra.t 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/70-test_verify_extra.t 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #! /usr/bin/env perl -# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +# Copyright 2015-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -16,4 +16,5 @@ ok(run(test(["verify_extra_test", srctop_file("test", "certs", "roots.pem"), srctop_file("test", "certs", "untrusted.pem"), - srctop_file("test", "certs", "bad.pem")]))); + srctop_file("test", "certs", "bad.pem"), + srctop_file("test", "certs", "rootCA.pem")]))); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/80-test_x509aux.t openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/80-test_x509aux.t --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/recipes/80-test_x509aux.t 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/recipes/80-test_x509aux.t 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #! /usr/bin/env perl -# Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +# Copyright 2015-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -14,14 +14,17 @@ setup("test_x509aux"); +my @path = qw(test certs); + plan skip_all => "test_dane uses ec which is not supported by this OpenSSL build" if disabled("ec"); plan tests => 1; # The number of tests being performed ok(run(test(["x509aux", - srctop_file("test", "certs", "roots.pem"), - srctop_file("test", "certs", "root+anyEKU.pem"), - srctop_file("test", "certs", "root-anyEKU.pem"), - srctop_file("test", "certs", "root-cert.pem")] - )), "x509aux tests"); + srctop_file(@path, "roots.pem"), + srctop_file(@path, "root+anyEKU.pem"), + srctop_file(@path, "root-anyEKU.pem"), + srctop_file(@path, "root-cert.pem"), + srctop_file(@path, "invalid-cert.pem"), + ])), "x509aux tests"); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/rsa_test.c openssl-1.1.1j/test/rsa_test.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/rsa_test.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/rsa_test.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1999-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -42,7 +42,8 @@ BN_bin2bn(dmp1, sizeof(dmp1)-1, NULL), \ BN_bin2bn(dmq1, sizeof(dmq1)-1, NULL), \ BN_bin2bn(iqmp, sizeof(iqmp)-1, NULL)); \ - memcpy(c, ctext_ex, sizeof(ctext_ex) - 1); \ + if (c != NULL) \ + memcpy(c, ctext_ex, sizeof(ctext_ex) - 1); \ return sizeof(ctext_ex) - 1; static int key1(RSA *key, unsigned char *c) @@ -211,90 +212,92 @@ SetKey; } -static int pad_unknown(void) -{ - unsigned long l; - while ((l = ERR_get_error()) != 0) - if (ERR_GET_REASON(l) == RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE) - return 1; - return 0; -} - -static int rsa_setkey(RSA** key, unsigned char* ctext, int idx) +static int rsa_setkey(RSA** key, unsigned char *ctext, int idx) { int clen = 0; + *key = RSA_new(); - switch (idx) { - case 0: - clen = key1(*key, ctext); - break; - case 1: - clen = key2(*key, ctext); - break; - case 2: - clen = key3(*key, ctext); - break; - } + if (*key != NULL) + switch (idx) { + case 0: + clen = key1(*key, ctext); + break; + case 1: + clen = key2(*key, ctext); + break; + case 2: + clen = key3(*key, ctext); + break; + } return clen; } -static int test_rsa_pkcs1(int idx) +static int test_rsa_simple(int idx, int en_pad_type, int de_pad_type, + int success, unsigned char *ctext_ex, int *clen, + RSA **retkey) { int ret = 0; RSA *key; unsigned char ptext[256]; unsigned char ctext[256]; static unsigned char ptext_ex[] = "\x54\x85\x9b\x34\x2c\x49\xea\x2a"; - unsigned char ctext_ex[256]; int plen; - int clen = 0; + int clentmp = 0; int num; plen = sizeof(ptext_ex) - 1; - clen = rsa_setkey(&key, ctext_ex, idx); + clentmp = rsa_setkey(&key, ctext_ex, idx); + if (clen != NULL) + *clen = clentmp; - num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key, - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); - if (!TEST_int_eq(num, clen)) + num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key, en_pad_type); + if (!TEST_int_eq(num, clentmp)) goto err; - num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); - if (!TEST_mem_eq(ptext, num, ptext_ex, plen)) - goto err; + num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key, de_pad_type); + if (success) { + if (!TEST_int_gt(num, 0) || !TEST_mem_eq(ptext, num, ptext_ex, plen)) + goto err; + } else { + if (!TEST_int_lt(num, 0)) + goto err; + } ret = 1; + if (retkey != NULL) { + *retkey = key; + key = NULL; + } err: RSA_free(key); return ret; } -static int test_rsa_sslv23(int idx) +static int test_rsa_pkcs1(int idx) { - int ret = 0; - RSA *key; - unsigned char ptext[256]; - unsigned char ctext[256]; - static unsigned char ptext_ex[] = "\x54\x85\x9b\x34\x2c\x49\xea\x2a"; - unsigned char ctext_ex[256]; - int plen; - int clen = 0; - int num; - - plen = sizeof(ptext_ex) - 1; - clen = rsa_setkey(&key, ctext_ex, idx); + return test_rsa_simple(idx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, 1, NULL, + NULL, NULL); +} - num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key, - RSA_SSLV23_PADDING); - if (!TEST_int_eq(num, clen)) - goto err; +static int test_rsa_sslv23(int idx) +{ + int ret; - num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING); - if (!TEST_mem_eq(ptext, num, ptext_ex, plen)) - goto err; + /* Simulate an SSLv2 only client talking to a TLS capable server */ + ret = test_rsa_simple(idx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, 1, NULL, + NULL, NULL); + + /* Simulate a TLS capable client talking to an SSLv2 only server */ + ret &= test_rsa_simple(idx, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, 1, NULL, + NULL, NULL); + + /* + * Simulate a TLS capable client talking to a TLS capable server. Should + * fail due to detecting a rollback attack. + */ + ret &= test_rsa_simple(idx, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, 0, NULL, + NULL, NULL); - ret = 1; -err: - RSA_free(key); return ret; } @@ -311,28 +314,16 @@ int num; int n; - plen = sizeof(ptext_ex) - 1; - clen = rsa_setkey(&key, ctext_ex, idx); - - num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key, - RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING); - if (num == -1 && pad_unknown()) { - TEST_info("Skipping: No OAEP support"); - ret = 1; - goto err; - } - if (!TEST_int_eq(num, clen)) + if (!test_rsa_simple(idx, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1, + ctext_ex, &clen, &key)) goto err; - num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key, - RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING); - if (!TEST_mem_eq(ptext, num, ptext_ex, plen)) - goto err; + plen = sizeof(ptext_ex) - 1; /* Different ciphertexts. Try decrypting ctext_ex */ num = RSA_private_decrypt(clen, ctext_ex, ptext, key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING); - if (!TEST_mem_eq(ptext, num, ptext_ex, plen)) + if (num <= 0 || !TEST_mem_eq(ptext, num, ptext_ex, plen)) goto err; /* Try decrypting corrupted ciphertexts. */ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/sm2_internal_test.c openssl-1.1.1j/test/sm2_internal_test.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/sm2_internal_test.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/sm2_internal_test.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2017-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -32,17 +32,18 @@ static int get_faked_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) { - int i; - if (fake_rand_bytes == NULL) return saved_rand->bytes(buf, num); - if (!TEST_size_t_le(fake_rand_bytes_offset + num, fake_rand_size)) + if (!TEST_size_t_gt(fake_rand_size, 0)) return 0; - for (i = 0; i != num; ++i) - buf[i] = fake_rand_bytes[fake_rand_bytes_offset + i]; - fake_rand_bytes_offset += num; + while (num-- > 0) { + if (fake_rand_bytes_offset >= fake_rand_size) + fake_rand_bytes_offset = 0; + *buf++ = fake_rand_bytes[fake_rand_bytes_offset++]; + } + return 1; } @@ -175,8 +176,7 @@ start_fake_rand(k_hex); if (!TEST_true(sm2_encrypt(key, digest, (const uint8_t *)message, msg_len, - ctext, &ctext_len)) - || !TEST_size_t_eq(fake_rand_bytes_offset, fake_rand_size)) { + ctext, &ctext_len))) { restore_rand(); goto done; } @@ -296,8 +296,7 @@ start_fake_rand(k_hex); sig = sm2_do_sign(key, EVP_sm3(), (const uint8_t *)userid, strlen(userid), (const uint8_t *)message, msg_len); - if (!TEST_ptr(sig) - || !TEST_size_t_eq(fake_rand_bytes_offset, fake_rand_size)) { + if (!TEST_ptr(sig)) { restore_rand(); goto done; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/sslapitest.c openssl-1.1.1j/test/sslapitest.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/sslapitest.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/sslapitest.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -590,7 +590,6 @@ return testresult; } -#endif /* * Very focused test to exercise a single case in the server-side state @@ -702,6 +701,7 @@ return testresult; } +#endif static int execute_test_large_message(const SSL_METHOD *smeth, const SSL_METHOD *cmeth, @@ -2129,8 +2129,11 @@ #define MSG6 "test" #define MSG7 "message." -#define TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384_BYTES ((const unsigned char *)"\x13\x02") #define TLS13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256_BYTES ((const unsigned char *)"\x13\x01") +#define TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384_BYTES ((const unsigned char *)"\x13\x02") +#define TLS13_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256_BYTES ((const unsigned char *)"\x13\x03") +#define TLS13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256_BYTES ((const unsigned char *)"\x13\x04") +#define TLS13_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256_BYTES ((const unsigned char *)"\x13\05") static SSL_SESSION *create_a_psk(SSL *ssl) @@ -3059,6 +3062,110 @@ } /* + * Test TLSv1.3 PSK can be used to send early_data with all 5 ciphersuites + * idx == 0: Test with TLS1_3_RFC_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * idx == 1: Test with TLS1_3_RFC_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * idx == 2: Test with TLS1_3_RFC_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + * idx == 3: Test with TLS1_3_RFC_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 + * idx == 4: Test with TLS1_3_RFC_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 + */ +static int test_early_data_psk_with_all_ciphers(int idx) +{ + SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL; + SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL; + int testresult = 0; + SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL; + unsigned char buf[20]; + size_t readbytes, written; + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; + const char *cipher_str[] = { + TLS1_3_RFC_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS1_3_RFC_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, +# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305) + TLS1_3_RFC_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, +# else + NULL, +# endif + TLS1_3_RFC_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, + TLS1_3_RFC_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 + }; + const unsigned char *cipher_bytes[] = { + TLS13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256_BYTES, + TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384_BYTES, +# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305) + TLS13_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256_BYTES, +# else + NULL, +# endif + TLS13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256_BYTES, + TLS13_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256_BYTES + }; + + if (cipher_str[idx] == NULL) + return 1; + + /* We always set this up with a final parameter of "2" for PSK */ + if (!TEST_true(setupearly_data_test(&cctx, &sctx, &clientssl, + &serverssl, &sess, 2))) + goto end; + + if (!TEST_true(SSL_set_ciphersuites(clientssl, cipher_str[idx])) + || !TEST_true(SSL_set_ciphersuites(serverssl, cipher_str[idx]))) + goto end; + + /* + * 'setupearly_data_test' creates only one instance of SSL_SESSION + * and assigns to both client and server with incremented reference + * and the same instance is updated in 'sess'. + * So updating ciphersuite in 'sess' which will get reflected in + * PSK handshake using psk use sess and find sess cb. + */ + cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(clientssl, cipher_bytes[idx]); + if (!TEST_ptr(cipher) || !TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher))) + goto end; + + SSL_set_connect_state(clientssl); + if (!TEST_true(SSL_write_early_data(clientssl, MSG1, strlen(MSG1), + &written))) + goto end; + + if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_read_early_data(serverssl, buf, sizeof(buf), + &readbytes), + SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS) + || !TEST_mem_eq(buf, readbytes, MSG1, strlen(MSG1)) + || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_early_data_status(serverssl), + SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) + || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_connect(clientssl), 1) + || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_accept(serverssl), 1)) + goto end; + + /* Send some normal data from client to server */ + if (!TEST_true(SSL_write_ex(clientssl, MSG2, strlen(MSG2), &written)) + || !TEST_size_t_eq(written, strlen(MSG2))) + goto end; + + if (!TEST_true(SSL_read_ex(serverssl, buf, sizeof(buf), &readbytes)) + || !TEST_mem_eq(buf, readbytes, MSG2, strlen(MSG2))) + goto end; + + testresult = 1; + end: + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + SSL_SESSION_free(clientpsk); + SSL_SESSION_free(serverpsk); + clientpsk = serverpsk = NULL; + if (clientssl != NULL) + SSL_shutdown(clientssl); + if (serverssl != NULL) + SSL_shutdown(serverssl); + SSL_free(serverssl); + SSL_free(clientssl); + SSL_CTX_free(sctx); + SSL_CTX_free(cctx); + return testresult; +} + +/* * Test that a server that doesn't try to read early data can handle a * client sending some. */ @@ -4325,9 +4432,20 @@ SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(cctx, protocols[tst]); if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, NULL, - NULL)) - || !TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, - SSL_ERROR_NONE))) + NULL))) + goto end; + + /* + * Premature call of SSL_export_keying_material should just fail. + */ + if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_export_keying_material(clientssl, ckeymat1, + sizeof(ckeymat1), label, + SMALL_LABEL_LEN + 1, context, + sizeof(context) - 1, 1), 0)) + goto end; + + if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, + SSL_ERROR_NONE))) goto end; if (tst == 5) { @@ -6471,6 +6589,131 @@ return testresult; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 +static int test_ssl_dup(void) +{ + SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL; + SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL, *client2ssl = NULL; + int testresult = 0; + BIO *rbio = NULL, *wbio = NULL; + + if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), + TLS_client_method(), + 0, + 0, + &sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey))) + goto end; + + if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl, + NULL, NULL))) + goto end; + + if (!TEST_true(SSL_set_min_proto_version(clientssl, TLS1_2_VERSION)) + || !TEST_true(SSL_set_max_proto_version(clientssl, TLS1_2_VERSION))) + goto end; + + client2ssl = SSL_dup(clientssl); + rbio = SSL_get_rbio(clientssl); + if (!TEST_ptr(rbio) + || !TEST_true(BIO_up_ref(rbio))) + goto end; + SSL_set0_rbio(client2ssl, rbio); + rbio = NULL; + + wbio = SSL_get_wbio(clientssl); + if (!TEST_ptr(wbio) || !TEST_true(BIO_up_ref(wbio))) + goto end; + SSL_set0_wbio(client2ssl, wbio); + rbio = NULL; + + if (!TEST_ptr(client2ssl) + /* Handshake not started so pointers should be different */ + || !TEST_ptr_ne(clientssl, client2ssl)) + goto end; + + if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_min_proto_version(client2ssl), TLS1_2_VERSION) + || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_max_proto_version(client2ssl), TLS1_2_VERSION)) + goto end; + + if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, client2ssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE))) + goto end; + + SSL_free(clientssl); + clientssl = SSL_dup(client2ssl); + if (!TEST_ptr(clientssl) + /* Handshake has finished so pointers should be the same */ + || !TEST_ptr_eq(clientssl, client2ssl)) + goto end; + + testresult = 1; + + end: + SSL_free(serverssl); + SSL_free(clientssl); + SSL_free(client2ssl); + SSL_CTX_free(sctx); + SSL_CTX_free(cctx); + + return testresult; +} +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 +/* + * Test that setting an SNI callback works with TLSv1.3. Specifically we check + * that it works even without a certificate configured for the original + * SSL_CTX + */ +static int test_sni_tls13(void) +{ + SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL, *sctx2 = NULL; + SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL; + int testresult = 0; + + /* Reset callback counter */ + snicb = 0; + + /* Create an initial SSL_CTX with no certificate configured */ + sctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); + if (!TEST_ptr(sctx)) + goto end; + /* Require TLSv1.3 as a minimum */ + if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(), + TLS1_3_VERSION, 0, &sctx2, &cctx, cert, + privkey))) + goto end; + + /* Set up SNI */ + if (!TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(sctx, sni_cb)) + || !TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(sctx, sctx2))) + goto end; + + /* + * Connection should still succeed because the final SSL_CTX has the right + * certificates configured. + */ + if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, + &clientssl, NULL, NULL)) + || !TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, + SSL_ERROR_NONE))) + goto end; + + /* We should have had the SNI callback called exactly once */ + if (!TEST_int_eq(snicb, 1)) + goto end; + + testresult = 1; + +end: + SSL_free(serverssl); + SSL_free(clientssl); + SSL_CTX_free(sctx2); + SSL_CTX_free(sctx); + SSL_CTX_free(cctx); + return testresult; +} +#endif + int setup_tests(void) { if (!TEST_ptr(certsdir = test_get_argument(0)) @@ -6549,6 +6792,7 @@ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_skip_abort, 3); ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_not_sent, 3); ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_psk, 8); + ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_psk_with_all_ciphers, 5); ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_not_expected, 3); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_early_data_tls1_2, 3); @@ -6590,6 +6834,12 @@ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_client_cert_cb, 2); ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ca_names, 3); ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_servername, 10); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 + ADD_TEST(test_ssl_dup); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + ADD_TEST(test_sni_tls13); +#endif return 1; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/tested25519.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/tested25519.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/tested25519.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/tested25519.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- +MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VwBCIEINTuctv5E1hK1bbY8fdp+K06/nwoy/HU++CXqI9EdVhC +-----END PRIVATE KEY----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/tested25519pub.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/tested25519pub.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/tested25519pub.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/tested25519pub.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- +MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAGb9ECWmEzf6FQbrBZ9w7lshQhqowtrbLDFw4rXAxZuE= +-----END PUBLIC KEY----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/tested448.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/tested448.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/tested448.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/tested448.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- +MEcCAQAwBQYDK2VxBDsEOWyCpWLLgI0Q1jK+ichRPr9skp803fqMn2PJlg7240ij +UoyKP8wvBE45o/xblEkvjwMudUmiAJj5Ww== +-----END PRIVATE KEY----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/tested448pub.pem openssl-1.1.1j/test/tested448pub.pem --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/tested448pub.pem 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/tested448pub.pem 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- +MEMwBQYDK2VxAzoAX9dEm1m0Yf0s54fsYWrUah2hNCSFpw4fig6nXYDpZ3jt8SR2 +m0bHBhvWeD3x5Q9s0foavq/oJWGA +-----END PUBLIC KEY----- diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/tls13encryptiontest.c openssl-1.1.1j/test/tls13encryptiontest.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/tls13encryptiontest.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/tls13encryptiontest.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ { int ret = 0; unsigned char *refd; - size_t refdatalen; + size_t refdatalen = 0; if (enc) refd = multihexstr2buf(recd->ciphertext, &refdatalen); diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/v3nametest.c openssl-1.1.1j/test/v3nametest.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/v3nametest.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/v3nametest.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2012-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2012-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -359,8 +359,352 @@ return failed == 0; } +static struct gennamedata { + const unsigned char der[22]; + size_t derlen; +} gennames[] = { + { + /* + * [0] { + * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } + * [0] { + * SEQUENCE {} + * } + * } + */ + { + 0xa0, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, + 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00 + }, + 21 + }, { + /* + * [0] { + * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } + * [0] { + * [APPLICATION 0] {} + * } + * } + */ + { + 0xa0, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, + 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x60, 0x00 + }, + 21 + }, { + /* + * [0] { + * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } + * [0] { + * UTF8String { "a" } + * } + * } + */ + { + 0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, + 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61 + }, + 22 + }, { + /* + * [0] { + * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.2 } + * [0] { + * UTF8String { "a" } + * } + * } + */ + { + 0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, + 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x02, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61 + }, + 22 + }, { + /* + * [0] { + * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } + * [0] { + * UTF8String { "b" } + * } + * } + */ + { + 0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, + 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62 + }, + 22 + }, { + /* + * [0] { + * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } + * [0] { + * BOOLEAN { TRUE } + * } + * } + */ + { + 0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, + 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff + }, + 22 + }, { + /* + * [0] { + * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } + * [0] { + * BOOLEAN { FALSE } + * } + * } + */ + { + 0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, + 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00 + }, + 22 + }, { + /* [1 PRIMITIVE] { "a" } */ + { + 0x81, 0x01, 0x61 + }, + 3 + }, { + /* [1 PRIMITIVE] { "b" } */ + { + 0x81, 0x01, 0x62 + }, + 3 + }, { + /* [2 PRIMITIVE] { "a" } */ + { + 0x82, 0x01, 0x61 + }, + 3 + }, { + /* [2 PRIMITIVE] { "b" } */ + { + 0x82, 0x01, 0x62 + }, + 3 + }, { + /* + * [4] { + * SEQUENCE { + * SET { + * SEQUENCE { + * # commonName + * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 } + * UTF8String { "a" } + * } + * } + * } + * } + */ + { + 0xa4, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, + 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61 + }, + 16 + }, { + /* + * [4] { + * SEQUENCE { + * SET { + * SEQUENCE { + * # commonName + * OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 } + * UTF8String { "b" } + * } + * } + * } + * } + */ + { + 0xa4, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, + 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62 + }, + 16 + }, { + /* + * [5] { + * [1] { + * UTF8String { "a" } + * } + * } + */ + { + 0xa5, 0x05, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61 + }, + 7 + }, { + /* + * [5] { + * [1] { + * UTF8String { "b" } + * } + * } + */ + { + 0xa5, 0x05, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62 + }, + 7 + }, { + /* + * [5] { + * [0] { + * UTF8String {} + * } + * [1] { + * UTF8String { "a" } + * } + * } + */ + { + 0xa5, 0x09, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x0c, 0x00, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61 + }, + 11 + }, { + /* + * [5] { + * [0] { + * UTF8String { "a" } + * } + * [1] { + * UTF8String { "a" } + * } + * } + */ + { + 0xa5, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, + 0x61 + }, + 12 + }, { + /* + * [5] { + * [0] { + * UTF8String { "b" } + * } + * [1] { + * UTF8String { "a" } + * } + * } + */ + { + 0xa5, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, + 0x61 + }, + 12 + }, { + /* [6 PRIMITIVE] { "a" } */ + { + 0x86, 0x01, 0x61 + }, + 3 + }, { + /* [6 PRIMITIVE] { "b" } */ + { + 0x86, 0x01, 0x62 + }, + 3 + }, { + /* [7 PRIMITIVE] { `11111111` } */ + { + 0x87, 0x04, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11 + }, + 6 + }, { + /* [7 PRIMITIVE] { `22222222`} */ + { + 0x87, 0x04, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 + }, + 6 + }, { + /* [7 PRIMITIVE] { `11111111111111111111111111111111` } */ + { + 0x87, 0x10, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11 + }, + 18 + }, { + /* [7 PRIMITIVE] { `22222222222222222222222222222222` } */ + { + 0x87, 0x10, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 + }, + 18 + }, { + /* [8 PRIMITIVE] { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } */ + { + 0x88, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, + 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01 + }, + 15 + }, { + /* [8 PRIMITIVE] { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.2 } */ + { + 0x88, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, + 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x02 + }, + 15 + } +}; + +static int test_GENERAL_NAME_cmp(void) +{ + size_t i, j; + GENERAL_NAME **namesa = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*namesa) + * OSSL_NELEM(gennames)); + GENERAL_NAME **namesb = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*namesb) + * OSSL_NELEM(gennames)); + int testresult = 0; + + if (!TEST_ptr(namesa) || !TEST_ptr(namesb)) + goto end; + + for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(gennames); i++) { + const unsigned char *derp = gennames[i].der; + + /* + * We create two versions of each GENERAL_NAME so that we ensure when + * we compare them they are always different pointers. + */ + namesa[i] = d2i_GENERAL_NAME(NULL, &derp, gennames[i].derlen); + derp = gennames[i].der; + namesb[i] = d2i_GENERAL_NAME(NULL, &derp, gennames[i].derlen); + if (!TEST_ptr(namesa[i]) || !TEST_ptr(namesb[i])) + goto end; + } + + /* Every name should be equal to itself and not equal to any others. */ + for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(gennames); i++) { + for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(gennames); j++) { + if (i == j) { + if (!TEST_int_eq(GENERAL_NAME_cmp(namesa[i], namesb[j]), 0)) + goto end; + } else { + if (!TEST_int_ne(GENERAL_NAME_cmp(namesa[i], namesb[j]), 0)) + goto end; + } + } + } + testresult = 1; + + end: + for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(gennames); i++) { + if (namesa != NULL) + GENERAL_NAME_free(namesa[i]); + if (namesb != NULL) + GENERAL_NAME_free(namesb[i]); + } + OPENSSL_free(namesa); + OPENSSL_free(namesb); + + return testresult; +} + int setup_tests(void) { ADD_ALL_TESTS(call_run_cert, OSSL_NELEM(name_fns)); + ADD_TEST(test_GENERAL_NAME_cmp); return 1; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/verify_extra_test.c openssl-1.1.1j/test/verify_extra_test.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/verify_extra_test.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/verify_extra_test.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2015-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -18,6 +18,21 @@ static const char *roots_f; static const char *untrusted_f; static const char *bad_f; +static const char *good_f; + +static X509 *load_cert_pem(const char *file) +{ + X509 *cert = NULL; + BIO *bio = NULL; + + if (!TEST_ptr(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()))) + return NULL; + if (TEST_int_gt(BIO_read_filename(bio, file), 0)) + (void)TEST_ptr(cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL)); + + BIO_free(bio); + return cert; +} static STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs_from_file(const char *filename) { @@ -58,7 +73,7 @@ return certs; } -/* +/*- * Test for CVE-2015-1793 (Alternate Chains Certificate Forgery) * * Chain is as follows: @@ -175,16 +190,48 @@ return testresult; } +static int test_self_signed(const char *filename, int expected) +{ + X509 *cert = load_cert_pem(filename); + STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = sk_X509_new_null(); + X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + int ret; + + ret = TEST_ptr(cert) + && TEST_true(sk_X509_push(trusted, cert)) + && TEST_true(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, NULL, cert, NULL)); + X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, trusted); + ret = ret && TEST_int_eq(X509_verify_cert(ctx), expected); + + X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); + sk_X509_free(trusted); + X509_free(cert); + return ret; +} + +static int test_self_signed_good(void) +{ + return test_self_signed(good_f, 1); +} + +static int test_self_signed_bad(void) +{ + return test_self_signed(bad_f, 0); +} + int setup_tests(void) { if (!TEST_ptr(roots_f = test_get_argument(0)) || !TEST_ptr(untrusted_f = test_get_argument(1)) - || !TEST_ptr(bad_f = test_get_argument(2))) { - TEST_error("usage: verify_extra_test roots.pem untrusted.pem bad.pem\n"); + || !TEST_ptr(bad_f = test_get_argument(2)) + || !TEST_ptr(good_f = test_get_argument(3))) { + TEST_error("usage: verify_extra_test roots.pem untrusted.pem bad.pem good.pem\n"); return 0; } ADD_TEST(test_alt_chains_cert_forgery); ADD_TEST(test_store_ctx); + ADD_TEST(test_self_signed_good); + ADD_TEST(test_self_signed_bad); return 1; } diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/test/x509aux.c openssl-1.1.1j/test/x509aux.c --- openssl-1.1.1f/test/x509aux.c 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/test/x509aux.c 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -30,17 +30,16 @@ typedef int (*i2d_X509_t)(X509 *, unsigned char **); int err = 0; BIO *fp = BIO_new_file(test_get_argument(num), "r"); - X509 *reuse = NULL; if (!TEST_ptr(fp)) return 0; for (c = 0; !err && PEM_read_bio(fp, &name, &header, &data, &len); ++c) { const int trusted = (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0); - d2i_X509_t d2i = trusted ? d2i_X509_AUX : d2i_X509; i2d_X509_t i2d = trusted ? i2d_X509_AUX : i2d_X509; X509 *cert = NULL; + X509 *reuse = NULL; const unsigned char *p = data; unsigned char *buf = NULL; unsigned char *bufp; @@ -93,9 +92,15 @@ goto next; } p = buf; - reuse = d2i(&reuse, &p, enclen); - if (reuse == NULL || X509_cmp (reuse, cert)) { - TEST_error("X509_cmp does not work with %s", name); + reuse = d2i(NULL, &p, enclen); + if (reuse == NULL) { + TEST_error("second d2i call failed for %s", name); + err = 1; + goto next; + } + err = X509_cmp(reuse, cert); + if (err != 0) { + TEST_error("X509_cmp for %s resulted in %d", name, err); err = 1; goto next; } @@ -141,13 +146,13 @@ */ next: X509_free(cert); + X509_free(reuse); OPENSSL_free(buf); OPENSSL_free(name); OPENSSL_free(header); OPENSSL_free(data); } BIO_free(fp); - X509_free(reuse); if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) { /* Reached end of PEM file */ diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/util/libcrypto.num openssl-1.1.1j/util/libcrypto.num --- openssl-1.1.1f/util/libcrypto.num 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/util/libcrypto.num 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -4587,3 +4587,7 @@ EVP_PKEY_meth_get_digestverify 4541 1_1_1e EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_meth_get_digestsign 4542 1_1_1e EXIST::FUNCTION: RSA_get0_pss_params 4543 1_1_1e EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA +X509_ALGOR_copy 4544 1_1_1h EXIST::FUNCTION: +X509_REQ_set0_signature 4545 1_1_1h EXIST::FUNCTION: +X509_REQ_set1_signature_algo 4546 1_1_1h EXIST::FUNCTION: +EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params 4547 1_1_1h EXIST::FUNCTION:EC diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/util/mkrc.pl openssl-1.1.1j/util/mkrc.pl --- openssl-1.1.1f/util/mkrc.pl 2020-03-31 12:17:45.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/util/mkrc.pl 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #! /usr/bin/env perl -# Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +# Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ $vft = "VFT_APP"; } -my $YEAR = [localtime()]->[5] + 1900; +my $YEAR = [gmtime($ENV{SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH} || time())]->[5] + 1900; print <<___; #include diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/VMS/msg_install.com openssl-1.1.1j/VMS/msg_install.com --- openssl-1.1.1f/VMS/msg_install.com 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/VMS/msg_install.com 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +$ ! Used by the main descrip.mms to print the installation complete +$ ! message. +$ ! Arguments: +$ ! P1 startup / setup / shutdown scripts directory +$ ! P2 distinguishing version number ("major version") +$ +$ systartup = p1 +$ osslver = p2 +$ +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Installation complete" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "The following commands need to be executed to enable you to use OpenSSL:" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "- to set up OpenSSL logical names:" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT " @''systartup'openssl_startup''osslver'" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "- to define the OpenSSL command" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT " @''systartup'openssl_utils''osslver'" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" diff -Nru openssl-1.1.1f/VMS/msg_staging.com openssl-1.1.1j/VMS/msg_staging.com --- openssl-1.1.1f/VMS/msg_staging.com 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ openssl-1.1.1j/VMS/msg_staging.com 2021-02-16 15:24:01.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +$ ! Used by the main descrip.mms to print the statging installation +$ ! complete +$ ! message. +$ ! Arguments: +$ ! P1 staging software installation directory +$ ! P2 staging data installation directory +$ ! P3 final software installation directory +$ ! P4 final data installation directory +$ ! P5 startup / setup / shutdown scripts directory +$ ! P6 distinguishing version number ("major version") +$ +$ staging_instdir = p1 +$ staging_datadir = p2 +$ final_instdir = p3 +$ final_datadir = p4 +$ systartup = p5 +$ osslver = p6 +$ +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Staging installation complete" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Finish or package in such a way that the contents of the following directory" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "trees end up being copied:" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "- from ", staging_instdir +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT " to ", final_instdir +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "- from ", staging_datadir +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT " to ", final_datadir +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "When in its final destination, the following commands need to be executed" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "to use OpenSSL:" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "- to set up OpenSSL logical names:" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT " @''systartup'openssl_startup''osslver'" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "- to define the OpenSSL command" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT " @''systartup'openssl_utils''osslver'" +$ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT ""