camo 2.3.0+dfsg-1 source package in Ubuntu
Changelog
camo (2.3.0+dfsg-1) unstable; urgency=medium
[ Luke Faraone ]
* Imported Upstream version 2.3.0+dfsg
* Document DFSG removal in debian/copyright
* Bump standards version, no changes needed.
* Update copyright format to 1.0
* Fix test invocation in debian/rules
* Include {package,mime-types}.json in the built package
* Refresh patches
[ Tim Abbott ]
* Fix incorrect test in start-stop-daemon command.
-- Luke Faraone <email address hidden> Sun, 15 May 2016 18:05:03 +0000
Upload details
- Uploaded by:
- Zulip Debian Packaging Team
- Uploaded to:
- Sid
- Original maintainer:
- Zulip Debian Packaging Team
- Architectures:
- all
- Section:
- misc
- Urgency:
- Medium Urgency
See full publishing history Publishing
| Series | Published | Component | Section |
|---|
Downloads
| File | Size | SHA-256 Checksum |
|---|---|---|
| camo_2.3.0+dfsg-1.dsc | 1.9 KiB | 52db622379fb4063132076e20d53727dad64fe0e71c245088a20da60fd8a1dfa |
| camo_2.3.0+dfsg.orig.tar.gz | 12.5 KiB | 556a3486f36c2b9045ef265f6d0941fb93c895714c45eb81bb2b95c75ca141f3 |
| camo_2.3.0+dfsg-1.debian.tar.xz | 4.9 KiB | 3cc7c03648c6579a1ca9a7f8ae0ed30acbbeb84d2660ffeb07f54cde59f1084d |
Available diffs
- diff from 1.3.0+dfsg-1 to 2.3.0+dfsg-1 (11.4 KiB)
No changes file available.
Binary packages built by this source
- camo: SSL/TLS image proxy to prevent mixed-content warnings
Camo is an image proxy to prevent mixed content warnings on secure
pages.
.
It should not be installed by an end-user; instead people who operate
websites that allow user-specified image embeds by URL can run this as
a daemon to proxy such images through their own servers and serve the
resulting content over SSL/TLS.
.
This provides integrity protection and last-mile confidentiality to
images, thus preventing a local network attacker from seeing the images
you request (allowing for possible disclosure of the content you're
viewing) or changing their content (to misinform, confuse, or shock).
.
It of course does not prevent an attacker from modifying the content or
noticing its access if the attacker is in the path between your
datacentre and the image source.
.
However, even in this case, it provides some security insofar as it
may prevent the attacker from knowing who is accessing the image.
.
Using a shared key, proxy URLs are encrypted with hmac so we can bust
caches/ban/rate limit if needed.
.
Features include:
* Proxy Google charts
* Proxy images under 5 MB
* Follow redirects to a configurable depth
* Proxy remote images with a content-type of image/*
* Disallows proxying to private IP ranges
