python-spake2 0.8-2 source package in Ubuntu

Changelog

python-spake2 (0.8-2) unstable; urgency=medium

  [ Ondřej Nový ]
  * d/copyright: Use https protocol in Format field
  * Use debhelper-compat instead of debian/compat.

  [ Antoine Beaupré ]
  * remove support for Python 2 (Closes: #938186)

 -- Antoine Beaupré <email address hidden>  Tue, 03 Sep 2019 11:18:26 -0400

Upload details

Uploaded by:
anarcat on 2019-09-03
Uploaded to:
Sid
Original maintainer:
anarcat
Architectures:
all
Section:
misc
Urgency:
Medium Urgency

See full publishing history Publishing

Series Pocket Published Component Section
Hirsute release on 2020-10-23 universe misc
Groovy release on 2020-04-24 universe misc
Focal release on 2019-10-26 universe misc

Builds

Focal: [FULLYBUILT] amd64

Downloads

File Size SHA-256 Checksum
python-spake2_0.8-2.dsc 1.8 KiB a86b8ad38c25e7a216db4961dffbd757e0be28c3795832e2529fca666d347c71
python-spake2_0.8.orig.tar.gz 56.7 KiB c17a614b29ee4126206e22181f70a406c618d3c6c62ca6d6779bce95e9c926f4
python-spake2_0.8.orig.tar.gz.asc 858 bytes 1e390ded9ebd552becbe3613adaa893033ca07f3499d304716b02e7dfbcfc565
python-spake2_0.8-2.debian.tar.xz 5.5 KiB 02445204d4c84079ed6987948451ee32f7d1523bb5c5c6eedc7fca56a5fc5bd4

Available diffs

No changes file available.

Binary packages built by this source

python3-spake2: SPAKE2 password-authenticated key exchange (pure python)

 This library implements the SPAKE2 password-authenticated key
 exchange ("PAKE") algorithm. This allows two parties, who share a
 weak password, to safely derive a strong shared secret (and therefore
 build an encrypted+authenticated channel).
 .
 A passive attacker who eavesdrops on the connection learns no
 information about the password or the generated secret. An active
 attacker (man-in-the-middle) gets exactly one guess at the password,
 and unless they get it right, they learn no information about the
 password or the generated secret. Each execution of the protocol
 enables one guess. The use of a weak password is made safer by the
 rate-limiting of guesses: no off-line dictionary attack is available
 to the network-level attacker, and the protocol does not depend upon
 having previously-established confidentiality of the network (unlike
 e.g. sending a plaintext password over TLS).
 .
 The protocol requires the exchange of one pair of messages, so only
 one round trip is necessary to establish the session key. If
 key-confirmation is necessary, that will require a second round
 trip.