shim-signed 1.30 source package in Ubuntu

Changelog

shim-signed (1.30) artful; urgency=medium

  * update-secureboot-policy: track the installed DKMS modules so we can skip
    failing unattended upgrades if they hasn't changed (ie. if no new DKMS
    modules have been installed, just honour the user's previous decision to
    not disable shim validation). (LP: #1695578)
  * update-secureboot-policy: allow re-enabling shim validation when no DKMS
    packages are installed. (LP: #1673904)
  * debian/source_shim-signed.py: add the textual representation of SecureBoot
    and MokSBStateRT EFI variables rather than just adding the files directly;
    also, make sure we include the relevant EFI bits from kernel log.
    (LP: #1680279)

 -- Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <email address hidden>  Fri, 23 Jun 2017 14:37:21 -0400

Upload details

Uploaded by:
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre on 2017-06-23
Uploaded to:
Artful
Original maintainer:
Steve Langasek
Architectures:
amd64
Section:
utils
Urgency:
Medium Urgency

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Series Pocket Published Component Section

Builds

Artful: [FULLYBUILT] amd64

Downloads

File Size SHA-256 Checksum
shim-signed_1.30.tar.xz 304.6 KiB cb6fd26016f0dd8a077a4bcb149e3878dc14823138b06d631791fd46d3579ae0
shim-signed_1.30.dsc 1.4 KiB 732d4b7e957dc10e389f08bfc313bfaa7f9e252f79383edcdb8693f5c975bb39

Available diffs

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Binary packages built by this source

shim-signed: Secure Boot chain-loading bootloader (Microsoft-signed binary)

 This package provides a minimalist boot loader which allows verifying
 signatures of other UEFI binaries against either the Secure Boot DB/DBX or
 against a built-in signature database. Its purpose is to allow a small,
 infrequently-changing binary to be signed by the UEFI CA, while allowing
 an OS distributor to revision their main bootloader independently of the CA.
 .
 This package contains the version of the bootloader binary signed by the
 Microsoft UEFI CA.