diff -Nru zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/changelog zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/changelog --- zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/changelog 2018-08-25 17:46:56.000000000 +0000 +++ zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/changelog 2019-01-15 14:45:20.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,3 +1,14 @@ +zeromq3 (4.2.5-2ubuntu0.1) cosmic-security; urgency=medium + + * SECURITY UPDATE: Integer overflow allows an authenticated attacker to + overwrite an arbitrary amount of bytes beyond the bounds of a buffer, + which can be leveraged to run arbitrary code on the target system. + - debian/patches/CVE-2019-6250.patch: Refactor bounds check arithmetic + such that no overflow shall occur. + - CVE-2019-6250 + + -- Eduardo Barretto Tue, 15 Jan 2019 12:45:20 -0200 + zeromq3 (4.2.5-2) unstable; urgency=medium * Update Standards-Version to 4.1.5 . diff -Nru zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/control zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/control --- zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/control 2018-08-25 17:46:56.000000000 +0000 +++ zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/control 2019-01-15 14:45:20.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,7 +1,8 @@ Source: zeromq3 Section: libs Priority: optional -Maintainer: Laszlo Boszormenyi (GCS) +Maintainer: Ubuntu Developers +XSBC-Original-Maintainer: Laszlo Boszormenyi (GCS) Build-Depends: debhelper (>= 11), libpgm-dev (>= 5.2.122~dfsg), libsodium-dev, diff -Nru zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/patches/CVE-2019-6250.patch zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/patches/CVE-2019-6250.patch --- zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/patches/CVE-2019-6250.patch 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000 +++ zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/patches/CVE-2019-6250.patch 2019-01-15 14:45:04.000000000 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +Author: Guido Vranken +Description: pointer overflow in zmq::v2_decoder_t::size_ready + leading to remote code execution (issue #3351). + Refactor bounds check arithmetic such that no overflow shall occur +Origin: https://github.com/zeromq/libzmq/pull/3353 +Applied-Upstream: 1a2ed12716693073032d57dac4e269df3d373751 +--- a/src/v2_decoder.cpp ++++ b/src/v2_decoder.cpp +@@ -114,9 +114,8 @@ int zmq::v2_decoder_t::size_ready (uint64_t msg_size, + // the current message can exceed the current buffer. We have to copy the buffer + // data into a new message and complete it in the next receive. + +- if (unlikely ( +- !zero_copy +- || ((unsigned char *) read_pos + msg_size > (data () + size ())))) { ++ if (unlikely (!zero_copy ++ || msg_size > (size_t) (data () + size () - read_pos))) { + // a new message has started, but the size would exceed the pre-allocated arena + // this happens every time when a message does not fit completely into the buffer + rc = in_progress.init_size (static_cast (msg_size)); diff -Nru zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/patches/series zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/patches/series --- zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/patches/series 2018-08-25 17:46:56.000000000 +0000 +++ zeromq3-4.2.5/debian/patches/series 2019-01-15 14:45:04.000000000 +0000 @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ disable-test_security_curve.patch #no-hardcoded-port-in-tests.patch fix-symbols-export.patch +CVE-2019-6250.patch