[MIR] cloud-initramfs-tools
Affects | Status | Importance | Assigned to | Milestone | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
cloud-initramfs-tools (Ubuntu) |
Fix Released
|
Undecided
|
Scott Moser | ||
Natty |
Fix Released
|
Undecided
|
Scott Moser |
Bug Description
* Availability: package is in universe [1]
* Rationale: This package helps achieve blueprint [2]. It is useful to users of the Ubuntu HVM instances types on EC2, other EC2 and UEC instance types where the user cannot access the instance, and users of UEC images outside UEC/EC2.
* Security: There is very little security concern for this package. It builds function into the initramfs.
* Quality Assurance: Ubuntu bugs are filed at [3]. This is not a debian package.
* Dependencies: all build dependencies are in main
* Standards compliance: The package implements a very standard initramfs-tools plugin
* Maintenance: This is a Ubuntu only package, and will require maintenance by the Ubuntu server team. However, it is very small and is not expected to require much effort to maintain.
* Background information:
The cloud-initramfs
* cloud-initramfs
* cloud-initramfs
--
[1] https:/
[2] https:/
[3] https:/
This is a place holder bug for getting cloud-initramfs
It will be updated with thorough description later.
Changed in cloud-initramfs-tools (Ubuntu): | |
assignee: | nobody → Scott Moser (smoser) |
status: | New → Triaged |
summary: |
- MIR cloud-initramfs-tools + [MIR] cloud-initramfs-tools |
description: | updated |
description: | updated |
cloud-initramfs -growroot: seems fine.
cloud-initramfs -rescuevol:
I see no sane problems with this. If an attacker is in a position to be attaching volumes and rebooting, there are all kinds of other insane stuff they could do too.
The only thing I see as remotely "funny" would be what you outlined in email -- if they somehow have access to the label of an attached device and can trigger a reboot. But ... again, this falls into an existing vulnerability category.
I don't think it's a problem at all.
+1